Transforming Patriarchal Kinship Relations:

Four Generations Of 'Modern Women' in Taiwan, 1900-1999

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the experiences of four generations of 'modern women,' analysing the interconnections between paid employment, domestic work, family structures and family relations. It adopts an oral history method, historical approach and discourse analysis to explore identities and practices in eighty-three women's life stories. By situating these in specific institutional and historical contexts, this research examines the transformation of the Han family institution under different modes of production and political regimes. It theorises the interplay of state ideology, class and patriarchal kinship structures in twentieth-century Taiwanese society.

The first part of the thesis investigates family practices under Japanese colonialism. The gentry-landlord household, into which most 'modern women' were born, acted as an economic unit in the market and distributed resources within the household according to patriarchal hierarchies of generation, age and gender. The state assigned patriarch as the delegate of the colonial power. This perpetuated the domestic mode of production, under which patriarchal kinship relations subsumed market exchange and state ideology. Married women's experiences differed according to their and their families' lifecycles as well as structures of their families.

The second part of the thesis considers changing Han family organisation after industrialisation and under KMT rule. After land reform, migration and industrialisation, the market economy penetrated patriarchal families in the 1960s. Dual-career new middle class families ceased to be units of production but remained units of reproduction and resource distribution. In the capitalist mode of production, the powers of patriarchal kinship seem to fluctuate with the market. Moreover, family practices were complicated by the spread of KMT ideology and contesting feminist thought.

Through grounded empirical investigation of the life stories of four generations of modern women, this research sharpens three analytical frameworks of class, patriarchy and state ideology, which in turn shed new light on women's lived experiences. It contributes to the study of gender, generation, kinship and the family in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and feminist studies.

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A Chronology of Selected Historical Events in Taiwan

1544	The island was sighted and named Ilha Formosa by the Portuguese.
1624-1662	Tainan (Southern Formosa) a Dutch colony. Between 1626 and 1642, the Spanish occupied Northern Formosa and was driven out by the Dutch in 1642.
1662	Cheng Cheng-kung, also known as Koxinga, defeated Dutch forces and declared loyalty to the Ming Dynasty.
1684	The Qing Dynasty replaced the Cheng family as the new rulers of Taiwan.
1885	Taiwan made a province of China.
1895	Taiwan was ceded to Japan after Shimonoseki Treaty was signed.
1898	Governor Kodama Gentaro and Civilian Affairs official Goto Simpei took office, adopting a 'gradual assimilation policy'.
1919	First civilian governor Hata Kenjiro arrived in Taiwan. The 'assimilation phase' began. Vocational schools for girls at Higher Subject level and above were established.
1921	Taiwan Cultural Association was formed.
1937	Onset of Sino-Japanese War. Japanisation campaign was launched.
1943	Compulsory primary school education for boys and girls.
1944	Daily bombardment by American Air Force began.
1945	Japan surrendered to end World War II. Governor Ando transferred administrative powers to the Executive Governor Chen Yi of Taiwan Province.
1947	February 28th Incident (228 Incident) erupted. Massacre of Taiwanese people began after reinforcements for the Nationalist Army landed on Taiwan. Mass arrests of Taiwanese elites thereafter.
1948	'Temporary Provisions during Mobilization to Suppress Rebellion' took effect. This was the beginning of the White Horror.
1949	Marshal Law came into force. Republic of China moved its capital from Nanking to Taipei. Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan with army of one million. Land Reform began.
1950	Onset of Korean War. USA President Truman proclaimed neutrality of Taiwan Strait.
1975	Chiang Kai-shek died. Yan Jia-gan became the president.
1978	Chiang Ching-kuo became the president.
1979	U.S. Congress signed "Taiwan Relations Acts" after USA normalized its relation with the PRC. US-Taiwan diplomatic relation ceased.
1987	Lifting of Marshal Law.
1988	Chiang Ching-kuo died. Lee Deng-hui became the first Taiwanese president.
1996	First Direct Presidential Election.
2000	Second Democratic President Election, end of KMT rule. Chen Shui-Bian of Democratic Progressive Party came into power.

Revised from 'Our Histories of Turmoil - A historical chronology' by Tsai Tehpen and Liim Keahioong, at http://www.edutech.org.tw/A1/turmoil-htm.htm, and 'Taiwan (Republic of China,' by unknown author, at http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Taiwan.html.

Map of Taiwan

Notes: Shi refers to City, while Hsien means County.
Source: http://www.world-gazetteer.com/s/s_tw.htm

Romanisation

I adopt Hanyu Pinyin for most of the names of people and places in this thesis. This was a painful decision because there is no officially consented romanisation system in Taiwan, and Hanyu Pinyin, used in the People's Republic of China, is currently the most prevalent system. There are two major problems in adopting Hanyu Pinyin. Firstly, a significant number of literary publications and names were based on the Wade-Giles system, which was used in the Republic of China (for China 1911-1949 and for Taiwan 1945-) until the 1990s. Secondly, Hanyu Pinyin is not applicable to local dialects, such as Hokkien and Hakka, which are languages used by elder informants. To overcome these problems, the following rules were applied.

Firstly, the names of native authors that have previously been romanised remain as they were presented in the available texts. For those authors, whose names have not (to my knowledge) been romanised, Hanyu Pinyin applies. For authors who have published work, no matter whether in English or Mandarin, their names are presented as Anglo-Saxon academic conventions require.

Secondly, names of the major cities are presented as Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung, instead of Taibei, Taizhong and Gaoxiong.

Thirdly, native terms pronounced in local dialect or addressed by anthropologists remain as they are presented in original texts. To aid comprehension, Chinese characters and English translations follow immediately after the terms.

Fourthly, informants who grew up in colonial Taiwan are given pseudonyms ending with 'hia', a common name in Hokkien but with no corresponding word in Hanyu Pinyin. This marks the limitations of applying Hanyu Pinyin to the local dialects of Taiwan.

Finally, to be systematic, hyphens between words are retained.

Ethnic Composition of Population

In contemporary Taiwan, four ethnic groups are commonly identified: Hokkien (71%), Hakka (14%), Mainlanders (13%) and Indigenous (1.7%). The first three are Han, while the indigenous category includes ten different ethnic groups. This thesis looks predominantly at Hokkien Taiwanese with a small number of Hakka. Although Hokkien and Hakka can be differentiated into two social groups, they shared a similar social position in twentieth-century Taiwan. Under Japanese colonialism, Hokkien and Hakka were Islanders (本島人), in contrast to the Japanese Inlanders (內地人). Under the KMT rule, they became Native Province People (本省人), in contrast to Ex-province People or Mainlanders (外省人), who came with the KMT between 1945 and 1949. Because their shared history in twentieth-century, I perceive them as one social group. The divisions between Hokkien and Hakka might be more meaningful in the early nineteenth century, when they competed for resources.

Notes on Interview Numbering System

Four generations of middle class women comprised the dataset of this research. The fact that each generation were born at a very similar time means that they faced similar political and economical contexts and thus can usefully be analysed as a 'cohort' although there remain important differences between them.

In this research, four generations are defined as follows. The first generation was born 1896-1920, the second 1921-1930, the third 1945-1950 and the fourth 1965-1970. This definition corresponds to the important periods of historical change in twentieth-century Taiwan. The first generation was born when Taiwan became a colony of Japan. They entered the labour market and married in the 1920s, when colonial policies were taking effect after twenty years of rule. The second generation also grew up under Japanese colonialism but they experienced a transition in the political regime in 1945 around the time that they started work or got married. Both of these generations were educated by the Japanese and understood as 'pre-war generations.'

The term 'post-war generations' refers to the third and fourth generations, who grew up under the KuoMingTang regime. When the third generation got married in the 1970s, Taiwan society had just experienced drastic industrialisation in the 1960s. They were the generation who benefited immediately from these economic developments. The fourth generation got married around 1995, as the Taiwanese economy became a post-industrial one. These generations were chosen in terms of these important political and economical transformations.

The names of my interviewees are pseudonyms but the names of women whose life stories have been published are quoted as they were in original texts. Both sets of names will be presented in the Chinese fashion, i.e. surname plus given names. To facilitate reading, I adopt two measures to distinguish between generations. Firstly, each case is given an index number such as 1-13 or 4-16. The first number specifies the generation and the second the sequent number within that generation. Secondly, Taiwanese names are usually composed of three characters: the first one is a kind of surname while the other two are given names. I use the last character to mark generational difference. 'Wang Dun-hia' can be used as an example. Wang is the surname, Dun-hia are given names. In this thesis, I use 'hia' to indicate that the woman belongs to the second generation; 'fen' for the third generation; and 'ping' for the fourth generation. Thus, Jiang Yu-fen indicates that the interviewee was in her fifties at the time of interview, while Peng Na-ping was a woman in her thirties and was thus categorised as the fourth generation.

Refer to the following table for details of generation, age in 1999, numbers of cases and pseudonyms.

Table A Generation, Age, Pseudonym and Sources

Generation	Years of birth	Age in 1999 (According to Han calculation)	Interviews	Secondary sources	Total number of cases collected	Pseudonym
First	1896-1920	81-105	1	17	18	As published.
Second	1921-1930	70-80	14	11	25	(surname), x-hia
Third	1945-1950	50-55	20	0	20	(surname), x-fen
Fourth	1965-1970	30-35	20	0	20	(surname), x-ping
Total			55	28	83	

Chapter 1 Introduction

Modern Women and Patriarchal Families

In 1921, Xie Xue-hong (謝雪紅), later a Taiwanese communist leader, gained employment as a 'career woman' (職業婦人) at the Singer sewing machine company. This was not an easy achievement. When she was ten, Xie was sold as an adopted daughter-in-law to cover the costs of burying her mother. She worked like a slave and received no formal education. At eighteen, she refused to marry her foster brother and escaped back to her biological brothers. However, lacking the means to support herself, she was married (more precisely, sold again) by her brothers to the son of a wealthy family, as a concubine. In despair, she attempted suicide. After this failed, she longed for a life in which she could take full control. She recalled in her autobiography,

> 'At that time, my ideal was to become a western style career women. It was said that those working women could rely on their own labour and have independent incomes. They would not be controlled by men. They could control their own life freely.' (X.H. Xie, 1997 [1971]:137)

With this in mind, she applied for training at Singer. Her hard-work and capacity to learn quickly earned her a job there. However, Xie never completely enjoyed the freedom of being a career woman because her independence was always impeded by her illiteracy. Were more well-educated 'career women' of her time able to enjoy the freedom and control that Xie had hoped for? Could the economic independence of such women grant them autonomy and emancipate them from the family, or from the control of patriarchy?

In 1999, an influx of migrant workers and an exodus of industrial capital made Taiwan into a post-industrial society. Mass media, cyber cultures and fast-moving consumerism all made Taipei feel newly post-modern. The customary practices of

having adopted daughters-in-law and concubines had long gone. Taiwanese daughters were not sold, but fell in love and married the man of their choice. It was hard to find extended families where five generations lived under one roof. Sociologists believed that Taiwanese families had shifted, not only towards nuclear forms but also single parent families, as in the West. Despite these changes, were 'modern women' really so remote from patriarchal kinship relations at the end of the twentieth century? In 1999, through friends, I met Na-ping in Starbucks in Taipei. Na-ping was an attractive young woman, aged 31, who had been married for two years without children after falling in love with her husband ten years ago. The couple had owned an architectural studio together for the previous four years. The three-hour life-history interview turned out to be a poignant account of the triangular relations between her, her husband and her mother-in-law. At the end of the interview, she concluded pessimistically that she would probably end up having a divorce due to relentless confrontations with her uncompromising mother-in-law. This happened in 2001.

Na-ping herself grew up in an urban nuclear family under the KuoMingTang (KMT) and shared the belief of many well-educated 'modern women,' who got married after years of romantic courtship, that they would have nothing to do with the kinship struggles that took place in the past. In other words, 'modern lives' and 'romantic love relationships' were seen as incompatible with the 'residue' of 'traditional' kinship relations. However, at the end of the twentieth century, there *were* significant numbers of young couples feeling supported by kin relations, who did not find them troublesome. Why did patriarchal kinship relations still matter to some women but not to others? Were these differences simply the result of personality clashes between family members?

These stories and questions illustrate the initial empirical concern of this research: the possible tensions between 'modern women' and patriarchal kinship relations. Can *modernity,* indicated by modern education and formal employment, contribute to emancipating women from the family or the exploitation of patriarchal kinship structures? How have patriarchal kinship relations been transformed in twentieth-century urban Taiwan? In what ways did they impinge on the lives of 'modern

women' in the past and in the present? Why did some women suffer under patriarchal kinship while others were 'lucky' enough to escape them? What strategies did women adopt to negotiate and contest patriarchy? Were modern women conscious of exploitation? Was it possible for them to draw on feminist consciousness in struggles with patriarchal kinship structures?

These empirical questions are not easy to answer. Problems emerged: How can patriarchal kinship relations be conceptualized in a way that allows me to adequately illustrate their transformation and persistence in urban Taiwanese families? How can the relationships between modernity, patriarchal kinship relations and women be presented from the perspective of feminism and qualitative sociology? As different disciplines have their own traditions, none offered a ready-made framework for my analysis. In the preliminary literature review, I address the limits of this existing literature, especially with regard to the concepts of patriarchy, social change and the family. To overcome these difficulties, I draw on the life history method, discourse analysis and historical approaches to develop my own frameworks. This process is addressed in the section on research method. After the painstaking process of putting the experiences of four generations of women in their proper institutional and historical contexts, it became clear that the interplay of patriarchal kinship relations, the state and class systematically shaped diverse experiences in the family. My initial inquiries about modern women and their relations with patriarchal families thus cannot be interpreted as "women's questions" alone. They were constituted by and constitutive of the social formation of twentieth-century Taiwan.

This thesis therefore can be read at a variety of levels. At the empirical level, it is about the lived experiences of four generations of 'modern women,' who received education and engaged in full-time employment in twentieth-century Taiwan. In particular, it looks at their family lives and explores the connections between paid employment, family structures, domestic arrangements and family relations in different historical periods. The evidence about women's lives is used to describe the changing organisation of production, reproduction and resource distribution in urban Han families

in agricultural, industrial and post-industrial settings. Therefore, this is also a study of the Han (ethnic Chinese) family institution in the urban context. At a theoretical level, the thesis builds on an understanding of patriarchy as patriarchal kinship structures and investigates its intersection with class and the state in a specific time and space. Moreover, it bridges disciplinary gaps between sociology, anthropology and feminism and argues for dialectic relationships between social structures and identity formation. To sum up, the three theoretical frameworks of patriarchy, class and the state are developed to account for empirical data about women's experiences in a transforming urban Han family institution under two political regimes and within different modes of production.

The rest of the chapter provides a preliminary review of the relevant literature and my reflections on the research methods: from collecting the data to writing up the thesis. After that the essential concepts for this research are introduced, followed by an outline of the structure of the thesis.

Preliminary Literature Review

Since the main concern of this research is the transformation of patriarchal kinship relations in twentieth-century Taiwanese families, I align my research with three areas of literature: sociology, anthropology and feminist theories of patriarchy. Drawing on studies of patriarchy, the family and social change at both general and specific levels in different disciplines, I suggest a way to approach my research.

Sociology

In early sociological writing, Max Weber used the term 'patriarchalism' to refer to a traditional form of domination in which,

> '[A] group (household) is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship basis: a particular individual governs who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance.' (1968 [1920]:231)

In the household, the patriarch exercised his authority over all household members,

including women, children, young men and slaves. For Weber, patriarchalism coexisted with gerontocracy, in which a patriarch ruled outside the household, and patrimonial bureaucracy, in which the ruler employed personnel tied him by benefices rather than kinship (c.f. Waters, 1989:196). Weber's historical analysis rightly pointed out the field of play of patriarchy, i.e. the household, and demonstrated that there were wider political organisations coexisting with it. However, Weber provided no further interpretation of how patriarchalism functioned and how it regulated gender relations or exploited women in their daily lives. Patriarchalism thus appears a static and descriptive concept and is not easily adapted for empirical analysis.

Many contemporary sociologists of Taiwan have studied 'the family' and 'intergenerational relations.' Nuclear families, women's employment and power relations between couples have been the centres of investigation.[1] Moreover, changes in family structures after industrialisation have been fervently debated.[2] Patriarchal kinship relations were studied quantitatively as dependent variables, such as ancestor worship, preference for sons over daughters, family resource distribution, patrilocal practices and

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[1] This literature focuses on women and the family. It discusses whether socio- economic status, education and urbanization were likely to have an impact on family structures, sex roles, employment patterns, arrangements of childcare, caring work, divisions of labour between husbands and wives and power relations between couples. Most research suggested similar conclusions: that working women experienced role conflicts between work and the family (Yi, 1982; Liao and Cheng, 1985; Yi and Kao, 1986), and that housework and childcare were still predominantly wives' responsibility (Lu, 1983; Yi, 1987). Women's work might not necessarily enhance women's status in the family (Lu, 1983, 1997) although in Taipei city, wives seem to have considerable influence over family decisions (Yi and Tsai, 1989; Yi et. al. 2000).

[2] The changing family structure and its effects on inter-generational relations were the main focuses of sociological investigations. Over time, changes in family structures appeared to be significant, but whether this meant a decline of patriarchal values was hotly debated. Earlier research suggested that urbanization, migration and education contributed to the trend towards nuclear families in Taiwan (Parish, 1978; Yi, 1985; Wen, et. al. 1989). However, if the researcher focused on the residence of the elderly, it appeared otherwise. Over 70% of the elderly still resided with their sons in the 1970s and 1980s (Lai and Chen, 1980; Luo, 1987). Thus, it has been argued that the changes in family structure reflected changes in demography rather than values (Wang and Chen, 1987). This view was strongly challenged by subsequent research. Firstly, Chi insisted that nuclearisation was taking place because the proportions of elderly people residing with their children declined from 79.96% in 1973 to 68.5% in 1985 (1990). Furthermore, using longitudinal data from 1943 to 1986, Chang and Chi (1991) advanced their argument by pointing out that the increasing number of nuclear families could be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the destruction of the extended family in itself produced significant numbers of nuclear families. Secondly, the nuclear family was itself increasing. From a psychological perspective, K.H. Yeh also showed that the willingness of parents and children to reside together was declining in urban areas (1997). Finally, even if patrilocality was still the norm, the length of this patrilocal residence decreased gradually (T.H. Sun, 1991; Thornton and Lin, 1994). These arguments seem to point to the conclusion that nuclearisation was the trend even if patrilocality was still the norm.

caring for the parents' old age, in order to measure their continued existence in contemporary Taiwanese society.[3] This literature repeatedly used quantitative methods to describe family practices, testing correlations between variables. As a result, there are plenty of fragmented research findings indicating the *degree* and *direction* of change in family relations, but no *structural* interpretations accounting for these changes. Why did Taiwanese families develop in these ways rather than others? What were the mechanisms behind the transformation? In addition, research looking at kinship beyond nuclear families often used the concept of patriarchal kinship relations in a very static way. How can the change or continuation of patriarchal kinship relations be interpreted qualitatively, without making essentialising assumptions? Furthermore, with a few exceptions, gender analysis and feminist perspectives were missing from this research. How were Taiwanese family practices gendered? Were women simply passive actors? Did women play a role in changing Taiwanese family practices? If so, how? Current sociological studies have not yet provided satisfactory answers to these questions.

Anthropology

Many anthropologists have studied kinship in the rural family and therefore have much to offer my conceptualization of patriarchal kinship relations. Nevertheless, as the feminist anthropologist, Holy (1996) has rightly assessed, women were largely invisible in early anthropological work. Although this trend has been changing and female anthropologists have produced distinctive ethnographical writing on rural Taiwanese

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[3] Please refer to Lai and Chen (1980); Luo (1987); Thornton and Lin (1994); K.H.Yeh (1997) mentioned above. Moreover, some researchers have drawn attention to the effects of gender in family resource distributions (D. Wolf, 1990; H.L. Lin, 1995). Others point out the correlations between class and residential decisions. There was a strong tendency for richer sons to bargain themselves out of co-residence with their parents. In other words, richer children used economic transfers and financial support to compensate their parents for their autonomy (Greenhalgh, 1985; Lee, et al. 1994; T.H. Sun, 1991).[3] Most of the research addressed parents and children without special mention of gender. However, research that focused on women (most conducted by women and combining qualitative and quantitative methods) made such presumptions problematic. They showed that urban women were more likely to provide money for their parents (Tsui, 1987; Lee et al. 1994) and had strong desires to reside near to their parents (Y. H. Hu, 1995) and to include their matrilineal family members as part of their family (Yi and Lu, 1996) despite the constraint of patrilocal and patrilineal principles. Among this work, only Y.H. Hu's (1995) had a strong political agenda critical of the gender blindness in previous academic and official research.

women (M. Wolf, 1972; R. Gallin, 1984),[4] I still experienced problems with the anthropological accounts. Firstly, early anthropologists tended to look at rural women and little space was given to show how women could be empowered by modernity and social change. Secondly, the work that did exist on social change and rural families tended to be descriptive rather than interpretative.[5] Thirdly, the concept of patrilineage was hardly mentioned. Sangren, an American anthropologist specialising in religion in Taiwan, critically reviewed this literature,

> 'Patriliny in all of its social and cultural complexity is clearly at the core of what, however vaguely, we might term Chinese culture. Yet despite the massive weight of both native and western commentary on the Chinese family and filial piety, the fact of patriliny — and particularly the expropriation Jay notes [that who produce children do not have social title to the product of their labour] -- is generally taken for granted, a fact whose consequences are reasonably well understood, but that in itself is treated, for the most part, as "not requiring explanation."' (2000:155)

Sangren was among the few anthropologists who have attempted to link patriliny with the exploitation of women in Han culture. However, his insightful cultural psychoanalysis on the subjects of religious tales (2000:153-223) did not directly address women's daily struggles within the family. Despite these constraints, ethnographic work on the Han family has contributed to my conceptualization of patriarchy. I will offer a more detailed evaluation of this literature in Chapter 2.

Feminism

In most early feminist literature, patriarchy was deployed to refer to male domination of women. Nevertheless, radical feminists (Firestone, 1970; Delphy, 1984), psychoanalytic

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[4] Although English literature on the Chinese family in Taiwan tended to follow the traditional form of anthropological writing, literature on Chinese women and the family in China was more inventive. Probably inspired by the communist revolution in China, feminist interpretations of Chinese women's lives have been rich (Croll, 1981, 1995; Andors, 1983; Johnson, 1983; and Stacey, 1983).

[5] Most of this literature was produced by native anthropologists, looking at changing family organisation in rural Taiwan after industrialisation (Y.C. Chuang, 1972, 1986; S.H. Wang, 1977; J.C. Hsieh, 1982; C.N. Chen, 1987; T.L. Hu, 1991). Their work usually depicted changes in families' residential arrangements, division of labour and intergenerational exchange. None addressed these issues from a feminist perspective and few attempted to tackle the underlying mechanisms shaping such developments.

feminists (Chodorow, 1978) and Marxist feminists (Hartmann, 1979; Eisenstein, 1979; Beechey, 1979; Barrett, 1988) provided very different interpretations as to how patriarchy shaped this domination. While these feminists were right to point out that gendered domination was formed by 'patriarchy,' their arguments failed to clarify what 'patriarchy' meant. This meant that 'the consequences of patriarchy,' borrowing from Sangren, were specified in their arguments, but there were no persuasive accounts of its logic or historical influence. Thus, feminist theories that attempted to articulate patriarchy with gendered domination have been criticised as essentialising, universalising, ahistorical and inappropriate for empirical analysis in time and space. Gender was regarded as offering a better analytical framework than a grand theory of patriarchy (Rowbotham, 1981; Scott, 1988; Riley, 1988; Acker, 1989; Pollert, 1996). However, within this literature, I find Kandiyoti (1988) provided the most persuasive account of the relationships between the two, an account which has the potential to answer these criticisms and provide a basic framework for my research.

In her article 'Bargaining with Patriarchy,' Kandiyoti conceptualised patriarchy as the kinship structures of each culture. She argued that patriarchy not only had its distinctive mode of production but also set up the rules between genders, shaping women's identities. Special attention was paid to women in 'classic patriarchy,' where kinship structures followed patrilineal-patrilocal-patriarchal principles as practiced in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and China. In these societies, women gained no direct access to production or patrimony and had to identify with patriarchal values in order to maximize their interests. Patriarchy thus shaped women's identities and continued to be effective when it broke down, usually due to colonialism or the emergence of new market forces. In discussing these challenges to patriarchy, Kandiyoti drew on instances of women's conservative resistance to feminism in the face of social change within industrialised, developing and third world countries at different historical moments. She thereby demonstrated how the theoretical implications of 'patriarchal bargains' might account for the contestations, negotiations and redefinitions of women's everyday struggles under patriarchy (1988).

Kandiyoti's 'Bargaining with Patriarchy' has provided the most plausible framework to investigate transforming patriarchal kinship structures from the viewpoint of women's lived experiences. She proposed a sophisticated and complex framework that shows the interconnections between changing patriarchal kinship relations, exploitation and women's consciousness. She revealed the internal logic of patriarchy, which could account for historical processes and consequences, i.e. gendered domination and female conservatism. Nevertheless, her theory of patriarchy has been dismissed by many British feminists on the grounds that the term 'patriarchy' should be reserved for a particular kind of male domination at a specific historical time, or within pre-capitalist societies (Waters, 1989; Acker, 1989:236; Pollert, 1996:654). These criticisms do not stand up since Kandiyoti argued that every culture has its kinship structures and her article only claims to offer a sketch of a possible conceptualisation.

A fallacy appearing in both Kandiyoti's writing and the criticisms of British feminists was responsible for this easy dismissal. Kandiyoti failed to put patriarchal kinship structures in a political and social context, as Weber had done so effectively. Therefore, she implied a split between a 'primitive' society dominated by kinship structures and an 'advanced' society where patriarchy had broken down. Postmodern anthropologists have named this dichotomy the 'primitive fiction' that assumes,

> '[T]raditional orders are natural and self-perpetuating and radically different from the unruly, unbounded, even unnatural worlds of "modernity" or "capitalism"' (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992:32).

This 'primitive fiction' led to two further weaknesses in the theory of 'patriarchal bargains.' Firstly, Kandiyoti assumed patriarchal kinship structures determined women's identities in a totalising way. Her theory was unable to answer postmodern challenges that perceived identities as fragmented and unstable. She also distanced herself from the structural theory of patriarchal bargains (Kandiyoti, 1998). Secondly, she used the term 'breakdown' to imply the collapse of patriarchy after the arrival of market economy or colonialism but did not explore how patriarchal kinship structures were actively maintained within different modes of production. This undermined her claim that

patriarchy was subjected to historical transformations.

A Synthesis

The preliminary literature review shows that the two elements of 'modern families' and 'patriarchal kinship relations' were often situated separately in the disciplines of sociology and anthropology. Sociologists studied modern Taiwanese families and social change quantitatively, while anthropologists studied rural families in Taiwan as representative of the traditional Chinese family. In feminist debates, Western academics were concerned about 'modern' gender relations in capitalist societies, while 'feudal' patriarchal kinship relations were often considered as relevant only for third world women (and their researchers), whose lives were assumed to be predominantly controlled by patriarchal kin in non-capitalist societies. However, a careful investigation of the existing literature on patriarchy, the family and social change suggests that patriarchal kinship structures might have existed in different historical time and space, but saw specific and significant transformations after industrialization. If we take Kandiyoti's interpretation of patriarchal bargains to account for certain social realities, we can then construe the documented changing gender and inter-generational relations as the *consequences* of changing patriarchal kinship structures. What has been missing in previous sociological and feminist literature is an overarching concept of patriarchy with its internal logic to account for such historical processes. Kandiyoti's theory of 'patriarchal bargains' (1988) provided the most plausible framework for this research. However, it inherited several theoretical problems and was not well received in a postmodern academic atmosphere. My research intends to overcome these problems by grounding arguments in women's lived experiences and utilising new theoretical paradigms, to which I now turn.

Research Methods

This section introduces my research methods and reflects on the difficulties of using life

stories for academic analysis. I also reflect upon the intellectual journey of analysing the empirical data and writing up the thesis.

Methods, Subjects and Sources

I adopted life history as the research method and collected life stories from four generations of modern women. This method was chosen because it bears the potential to reveal the workings of patriarchal kinship structures in women's lives on the one hand. On the other hand, it illustrates individual women's subjective interpretations of their experiences, possibly including strategies of resistance, within the family. That is to say, I utilise both analytical approaches that life history provides: first, to reconstruct social structures and trace social changes from the individual's perspective, and second, to analyse individual narratives on these events (Thompson, 2000:274-308).

The subjects of the research are 'modern women,' who are defined as having had 'modern' education and having engaged in formal employment at some time in their lives. For research purposes, this group can also be understood as 'the new middle class'. However, since my definition of the 'new middle class' changed with my analysis of the empirical data, 'modern women' in this research eventually refer to women who worked as the 'new middle class' and as 'the bourgeoisie,' with the majority of the informants belonging to the former. Both groups received average and above levels of modern education[6] and incomes and worked in white-collar non-manual jobs. The difference between them lay in their relations of production. The new middle class exchanged their skills for income. The bourgeoisie were self-employed and might even employ up to six workers themselves. For more detailed criteria used in selecting my informants please refer to Appendix B.

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[6] Since education expanded over the past one hundred years, educational levels are defined with reference to the educational system in each specific historical period. Women who worked under Japanese colonialism should have received at least primary school education to be included. In the post-war era, women who worked in the 1970s should have had high school education or above. For working women in the 1990s, it means that they gained college qualifications or above.

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The individual life story, rather than family stories, forms the basic unit of my research. The decision to use this material, rather than, for example, evidence about four generations in twenty families, stemmed from my desire to study new middle class women and to be able to make comparisons between generations. This would have been difficult to achieve if the family itself had been a research unit, due to the fluctuation of class status between generations. Moreover, looking at individual life stories allows a greater number of families to be included in the study. As historical knowledge of the period is still limited, thanks to the post-war dictatorship, it was important to collect as many cases as possible to analyse the same social group. Even so, the experiences and voices of other family members often entered my informants' narratives and these form the basis of much of my analysis.

The research covers the history of Taiwan in the twentieth century. During this period, Taiwanese society experienced tradition, colonialism, modernity and postmodernity. [7] It was transformed from an agricultural, to industrial and then post-industrial society within a period of one hundred years. A sociological study of transforming kinship relations in twentieth-century Taiwan offers precious chances to investigate these historical processes empirically. Four generations divided the one hundred year time span. The first generation is defined as those women who were born between 1900 and 1920, the second generation between 1920-1929 (aged 70-79 in 1999), the third generation between 1940-1945 (aged 50-55 in 1999) and the fourth generation between 1960-1965 (aged 30-35 in 1999). The definition of generation can be found in the notes at beginning of the thesis. To situate women's life stories in specific political and economical contexts, the life stories of the first two generations are used to illustrate family life under Japanese colonialism and the last two generations to explore families under KMT rule in the market economy.

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[7] Before Japanese rule in 1895, Taiwan was an agrarian Confucian society and a province of the Chinese Empire. Modernisation and light industrialisation was introduced under Japanese colonialism in the 1930s. A more far-reaching industrialisation was initiated in the 1950s and developed dramatically in the 1960s under the KMT regime. Since the late 1980s, industrial capital emigrated while the high wages of Taiwan attracted foreign workers. These historical backgrounds will be addressed in Chapters 2, 3 and 7.

Eighty-three life stories from four generations of modern women substantiate the arguments of the thesis. These life stories can be divided into two groups: those collected from secondary sources and interviews conducted in person. The exact source of individual life stories is displayed in appendix C. Twenty-eight life stories of first and second generation women came from secondary sources, including autobiography,[8] biography,[9] published oral history interview transcripts[10] and publications on women under Japanese colonialism.[11] Because these sources were so diverse, more detailed descriptions of them appear in appendix D.

In addition to secondary sources, I conducted fifty-five oral-history interviews in person during January and September 1999 with women from each of the four generations. Using snowball sampling, I met most of my informants for the first time at interview.[12] The life history interview focused on their families: the woman's natal family, marital family and 'uterine family' (see Chapter 2). These narratives usually followed the patterns of their lives in relation to education, work, marriage and

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[8] *Those Years of Alienated Love* (Qiu, 1994), *The Spring of Tiansongpi* (Fan, 1993) and *The Triangular Prism of the Life: the Autobiography of an Extraordinary Taiwan Female Writer* (Q.H. Yang, 1995).

[9] *Biography of Half of My Life* (Xie, 1997[1971]) and *Lu-gang Grandmother and Shi Zhen-rong* (D.W. Zhang, 1995). The former is the biography of a Taiwanese communist leader Xie Xue-hong, narrated by Xie but written by her life-long revolutionary partner Yang Ke-huan. The latter is written by Zhang Dien-wan, a journalist who interviewed the mother of Shi, a successful computer entrepreneur in contemporary Taiwan. These two biographies showed that the age and experiences of the biographer did make a significant difference to their language and content.

[10] *Taiwanese Career Women through Political Changes* (Yu, 1994), *Women's 228* (Shen, 1997), *Amah's Stories* (Jiang, 1995a), *The Disappearing Taiwan A-ma* (Jiang, 1995b), and *A-mu's Stories* (Jiang, 1998). These books were anthologies of women's life stories, recorded and written by different authors mostly in the form of oral-history transcripts.

[11] Occasionally, I also draw on cases quoted in research, such as *The Women's Map of Da-dau-cheng* (H.W. Chen, 1999), a M.A. dissertation that focused on a women's history of a treaty port, *Taiwanese Career Women Under Japanese Colony* (Yu, 1995), a PhD thesis on the working lives of Taiwanese career women and *Daughters of San-di-men —Chen Jin and her Female Students*, an experimental biography written up by Jiang (2001) on the basis of oral history interviews with several first and second generation career women.

[12] Most of the research took place in public spaces (mainly coffee shops) that offered enough privacy to conduct interviews. Some of the interviews were carried out in the informant's workplace with her colleagues around. To my surprise, the presence of others often helped open up discussions on family issues rather than disturb them. In contrast, in the few interviews conducted in private homes, the presence of other family members often disrupted the progress of the interview and sometimes seemed to prevent the informant revealing more personal feelings. This seems to suggest that when interviewing about family issues, the public can be turned into private space while the 'private' home can become a public sphere where emotions and words may be influenced by other family members.

childbirth. My informants' relationships with parents, husband, children and husband's family were the main topic. I also explored the organisation of domestic work, family finance and attitudes to old age, children, marriage and divorce. Apart from these themes, informants were encouraged to say what they wanted to say about their families. I only asked questions when they departed from issues of concern to me.

I transcribed all the interviews and treated both written oral histories and life-story interviews as texts for analysis. The amount of the information gathered went far beyond the scope of the thesis, but the thesis is structured around key issues such as paid employment, domestic labour and family relationships of women from all four generations when they were newly married or rearing children.

Life Stories as Collaborative Work in Historical Contexts

In this section, I consider the historical contexts that may have shaped the ways in which these life stories were told, recorded and written. The limits and constraints of using these life stories will then be discussed in more detail.

After marshal law was enforced in 1949 by the KMT government, post-war generations grew up learning histories of China over five thousand years without hearing the history of their birthplace, Taiwan. It was only after 1987, when marshal law was lifted, that forgotten histories could be told and the rights of free association and free speech were restored. This research and the secondary sources are products of the 1990s, when the desire to uncover Taiwanese history was growing and feminist movements became more vocal. This historical context had significant effects on the form, content, language and even the subjects of the interviews. The contents of life stories under Japanese colonialism were mainly about 'women's lives', i.e. their marriage, families of origin and procreation, paid and unpaid employment. They were mostly presented as transcriptions but were edited for public consumption.

Language was a significant problem. Before 1945, most Han people spoke a local dialect, Hokkien or Hakka. Only educated men and women wrote and spoke Japanese

for official business. After 1945, the official language was Mandarin. Japanese and local dialects were banned from public spaces. In the 1990s, most of the interviews were conducted in a combination of Hokkien and Mandarin and the texts were mainly written in Mandarin.[13] Language problems were also associated with the distance between generations. In the process of interviewing, I realised that many contemporary concepts and vocabularies which had developed in Mandarin were not directly translatable into Hokkien. Similarly, many popular idioms and concepts from the past may have got lost in translation of both language and time. The language problem inevitably put a constraint on what could be asked, expressed, communicated and written down in the interview process and transcriptions.

Generation gaps also shaped the content of the interviews. Women aged 70 and above often commented that 'Your generation think in this way but our generation think this and that,' or 'You will never understand how different and difficult it was in the past.' In this way they claimed the authenticity of their lived experiences, yet they also withheld some of their experience from the younger generation, probably out of fear of being criticised as outdated or old fashioned. These problems were not restricted to the oral history interviews. I also found that autobiographers constantly addressed and commented on generational differences, defending their values and behaviours.[14] The oral historian Paul Thompson has argued that autobiographies are also constrained by the gazes of an imagined public (2000:122). He did not explore how the imagined public is itself divided by generation and how the gaps between generations are embedded in the writing of autobiography or narrative.

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[13] Some of the texts (including my transcriptions) appropriated Mandarin characters to express Hokkien words and concepts or even used alternative signs to record Hokkien language (especially in several published life stories with prominent political stances).

[14] The generational gap came across quite strongly in autobiography. The writers addressed their own past in relation to the values of the present (such as Q.H. Yang, 1995; Fan, 1993; and Qiu, 1994). Most of them also consciously defended their values. For example, Q. H. Yang (1995) who had lived in the USA since the 1970s, described her relations with her husband, which appeared conservative according to contemporary values. In her writing, she often included dialogue with her children and friends' comments on her relationships and defended herself as having lived in a different society in different times.

In the 1990s, the legacy of political ideology and decades of white-horror continued to haunt this research. Firstly, it took me a long time to find modern women who had worked under Japanese colonialism. It only became clear to me later that most of them had left their jobs after marriage or otherwise left Taiwan after 1945 since the KMT intentionally eliminated the local elite for political reasons.[15] A majority of these early generations of women spoke Japanese or Hokkien, resisted KMT ideology, had lived abroad for most of their lives and only returned to Taiwan in the 1990s. All these factors shaped the contents of the interviews. Nostalgia for the period of Japanese colonialism was commonly expressed, even if it came hand in hand with hardships in the family. Secondly, my interviews with many third generation women, who spoke Mandarin, were sometimes very frustrating, not because of language or generational gaps but because of their reserved and distanced responses. These encounters usually lasted only one hour or ninety minutes[16] and often ended up as semi-structured interviews. I found it hard to access these women's feelings and opinions about their family lives. Why?[17] Three types of story were common. Some interviewees presented me with an image of a perfectly happy conjugal family. Some, I felt, consciously withheld information but I failed to push further. Only rarely, complex feelings about their husband's extra-marital affairs or disputes with their mother-in-law were revealed, often at the end of the interview. Such disclosure was usually followed with repeated exhortations not to reveal their identity in the thesis or to any common acquaintance, for the events had not been known or talked about for many years. This generation seemed to have a strongly held notion akin to public images of the happy 'modern Chinese family'[18] in contrast to private, complex,

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15 See Chapter 7.

16 Interviews with the second and fourth generations usually lasted two to three hours.

17 Certain questions proposed by the historian Michael Frisch have guided my analysis. When scrutinising the narratives of the Depression in America, Frisch asked 'What are they saying about it? ...At what distance, in what ways, for what reasons, and in what patterns do people generalize, explain, and interpret experiences?' (1998 [1978]:35)

18 During the 1960s and 1970s, KMT promoted an image of the 'Chinese' nuclear family that appeared to be simple, 'modern,' harmonious and peaceful, different from the 'traditional' Chinese extended family that was described as complex, quarrelsome and full of conflict. See also chapter 7 on state policy and research on school textbooks (Meyer, 1988).

hidden emotions. State ideology suppressed feelings and emotions. Thus various historical contexts shaped the life story interviews, although they were conducted in 1999.

I take the stance that life stories are contemporary interpretations of the past (Thompson, 2000) rather than stories revealing the historical truth. These stories are cultural products, the result of communicative processes between storytellers and their interlocutors in specific contexts.[19] Nevertheless, it seems important to ask how far can I take these life stories as providing valid accounts for academic work on the transformation of patriarchal kinship structures in Taiwanese families.

I understand life stories as comprising two sets of inextricably linked data, that describing practices and that of interpretation. Practices refer to things that had taken place in my informants' lives, such as employment, money management, and residential, childcare and housework arrangements. The coherence of this data was carefully assessed and incoherent accounts avoided. Secondly, I consider the women's interpretations of these arrangements. From their narratives, I find that different family members were very likely to produce different interpretations of the same practices. These life stories contain not only modern women's understandings of their family practices but also those of their husbands, parents, parents-in-law and children. These interpretations were often in dialogue with each other and gave different meanings to the same practices. My analysis of Han patriarchal families is based on these multiple views.

I do not regard these lived experiences as 'authentic voices' that stand for historical truth. Scott has argued that experiences are at once interpreted and in need of interpretation (1992). It is also contended that a feminist researcher needs to locate these experiences in social contexts and specify the informant's standpoint (Skeggs, 1997). Therefore, the researcher may produce interpretations that contradict those of the informants (Stacey, 1991). Moreover, the researcher is selective about social realities,

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[19] Here, I agree with Clifford and Marchus (1986:14), who have argued that culture is not a static object for analysis, but consists of realities negotiated within historically contextualised communicative processes.

for she uses the data to advance academic knowledge (Glucksmann, 2000). In my research design, I assumed that modern women's lived experiences were generated out of their specific positioning in the patriarchal kinship structures and thus have the potential to reveal the working of patriarchy, beyond accounts of oppression. My interpretation of women's experience aims to join threads that have not been connected and give sociological and feminist meanings to something seen as 'natural' in daily life. It expects to advance academic understanding of changing patriarchal kinship structures in a specific time and space. My interpretation might provide tools for women to rethink their experiences and generate new action.

Interpreting Differences

Post-structuralist perspectives usually criticise grand theories and look instead at the relationships between discourses, powers, and identity formations. In my view this approach complements modernist theorisation that often explains social formations at abstract levels, ignores social practices, and pays insufficient attention to the formation of identity. Particular post-structuralist concepts are used to assist analysis of women's life stories, creating a written account that can simultaneously explain objective structures and subjective identities in women's narratives.

Difference is the most important concept guiding my analysis. For many postmodernist theorists difference is a concept closely related to unstable, fragmented and free-floating identities. In this thesis, I do not intend to explore difference in this sense. Rather, I perceive difference at the levels of experience, social relations, subjectivity and identity (brah, 1996:115-27) in particular institutional, historical, and social contexts. From this perspective, difference is a productive sociological concept because it enables the researcher to challenge hegemonic power. Minh-ha T. Trinh has put it well:

> "Hegemony works at levelling out differences and at standardizing contexts and expectations in the smallest details of our daily lives. Uncovering this levelling of differences is, therefore, resisting that very notion of difference which defined in the master's terms often resorts to the simplicity of

essences" (1988, in Phelan, 1994:69).

This quotation suggests that difference is not always self-evident. It requires careful work by the researcher to put aside academic hegemony and pay close attention to the differences revealed in empirical data. At the beginning of my analysis, I compared and contrasted different domestic arrangements within and between generations, for earlier feminists have argued that domestic labour was the main site of women's oppression. My evidence suggests that in twentieth-century Taiwan, the division of domestic labour varied according to family structure, class and generation, as well as gender. This discovery contradicts feminist writing that has seen gender as the most important factor, followed by class and ethnicity. Since family structure appears to have had the most profound effects on the organisation of domestic work, my chapters are structured according to different family types.

I conceptualise each family type as an institution and explore the differences between each in some detail. This led to an investigation of the ways in which production and resource distribution varied. I suggest that the means of production, family cycles and women's life cycles all contributed to shape diverse outcomes. I also investigate the relationship between identity, social organisation and power. I ask how far modern women tolerated particular social relations and subordinated their interests to those of men or the elderly. What were the underlying mechanisms? How did different discourses help support or undermine particular social relationships?

At this point, I adopt discourse theory to 'investigate the way social practices systematically form the identities of subjects and objects by articulating together a series of contingent signifying elements available in a discursive field' (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000:7). By analyzing the relationships between the systematic differences observed between the words and things contained in life stories, I realised that the concept of patriarchal genealogy held the key to connect variables such as gender, generation, family structures and life cycles of women and of the family. I also found that structural forces such as state ideology and class 'lured' women to hold certain

beliefs, which might be seen as against their interests. To deal with these insights, I adopted the intersectional approach developed by black feminists and others (Rowbotham, 1981; Collins, 1990; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; brah, 1996; Glucksmann, 2000) to articulate the three elements of patriarchy, class and state ideology within the discursive field of the family in twentieth-century Taiwan.

The intersectional approach has been very useful in dealing with the complexity of social realities, for it describes different relationships as crisscrossing and intersecting without prioritising one social force over the other. I interpret the three structural forces of patriarchy, the state and class as the 'matrix of dominations' (Collins, 1990) because 'the oppression of each is inscribed within the other - is constituted by and is constitutive of the other' (brah, 1996:18). Such an interpretation allows me to situate patriarchal kinship structures in their political and economic contexts. It also enables me to see these modern women and their family members as 'simultaneously an oppressor and an oppressed' (Collins, 1990:225).

To conclude, I use concepts of differences, discourse analysis and intersectional approach to guide my analysis of the empirical data. At the end of my investigation, it was clear that patriarchy, class and state ideology were the three main structural forces systematically shaping differences among women. The thesis is written up with constant swings back and forth between these structural forces and the individual identities of four generations of modern women and their families.

Conceptualisations

Here, I define the key concepts of patriarchy, household, family and class as they are used in this thesis.

Patriarchy, Households and Families

Patriarchy is defined as the kinship structures of a culture. In Han families the kinship structures followed patrilineal-patrilocal-patriarchal principles. I use the terms

patriarchy, patrilineage (patriliny) and patriarchal kinship structures interchangeably to refer to these principles. These terms have been deployed in different disciplines to refer to the same system. My mixed usage is intended to help integrate understandings from different disciplines to develop a coherent feminist and sociological interpretation. I begin my analysis of patriarchy using anthropological research on patriliny. As the chapters progress, I explain how patriliny constitutes a specific form of familial exploitation based on hierarchies of gender and generation. At the end of the thesis, patriliny will be discussed as patriarchy, as objective social structures regulating family relations. Please note that I restrict my usage of patriarchy to refer to kinship structures, which *cannot* be reduced to *gender* alone. Relations between sexes, including gender hierarchy between husband and wife, inequalities in the work place or different subject positions described in state ideology are all referred to as 'gender' differences rather than 'patriarchy.'

I use the concept of the 'household' as it is commonly understood, to refer to a residential and economic unit that is involved in production, reproduction and consumption (Goode, 1970; Rapp, 1992:51; Moore, 1988:54). Within the household, people pool their resources and perform certain tasks. Households may vary in their membership composition and their relation to resource allocation (Rapp, 1992:51).

I define the family as a household where members are recruited through marriage or kinship relations (i.e. according to patriarchal principles).[20] The main focus of the thesis is to investigate the family institution, a point where patriarchy and household meet. Thus, 'household' and 'family' are often used interchangeably. Moreover, since Han kinship relations are patrilineal and follow patriarchal principles, 'families' are also called 'patriarchal families.'

This definition departs from an anthropological definition of the 'Chinese family' (*chia*), with three elements: the primary kinship group, common economy and common

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[20] I am aware that such a definition of the family reproduces heteronormativity and precludes families of choice. It must be pointed out that all the families I study in this thesis are heterosexual.

property (Fei, 1939; B. Gallin, 1966; Gates, 1987; Harrel, 1982; in Thornton and Lin 1994:32; Cohen, 1976). Anthropologists regard the three components as something that made them 'Chinese,' radically different from Western families. Nevertheless, this definition of the Chinese family is problematic. C.N. Chen has rightly pointed out that according to such materialist definitions, fathers living with sons would not qualify as a family if they did not own any property (1984). Moreover, after industrialization, the shapes of Chinese families changed. Migration meant that family members did not necessarily live together.[21] If family members still resided in the same house, they did not always hold a common coffer (T. L. Hu, 1991). Were these households still Chinese families? I reject the anthropological definition of the Chinese family because it lacks flexibility, obscures the patrilineal principles of the family and fails to account for social change. In contrast, to define the family as a conflation of patrilineage and household not only highlights the principles of patrilineage but also enables further investigation of how these principles could be realised or adjusted at the level of the household.

On the other hand, the family types developed by anthropologists to describe the Han family can be useful. These divide Han families into three forms: the conjugal family, the stem family and the joint family. These definitions are used in this thesis. The family has its simplest form as a **conjugal family**, consisting of husband, wife and unmarried children. The **stem family** is where the parents live with *one* married son and his conjugal family (with or without his unwed siblings). If the parents live with *more than one* married son and their conjugal families, it is regarded as a '**joint family**' or an '**extended family**'. I follow Cohen's usage (1976) to further categorise the stem family and the joint family as '**complex families**' because the two family types have the same structural principles. These are the most commonly discussed family forms in this thesis, although variations are discussed where necessary.

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[21] Complicated complementary concepts of primary households and secondary households have been developed (Cohen, 1976; Greenhalgh, 1985) to account for such change. However, they did not reflect on the problematic original definition of the Chinese family.

Feminists often argue that 'the family' is a concept loaded with ideology. Rapp defines the family as 'the normative, correct way in which people get recruited into households' (1992:52). However, I do not regard this is an adequate definition, for ideology alone cannot explain the diverse family structures that my informants lived in. Nevertheless, it is essential to point out the changing ideal in Han culture. In the past, 'complex families' were the normative form, where married sons resided with their parents following patrilineal and patrilocal principles. Nowadays, the stem family or conjugal families of close kin residing near-by are dominant. The normative family structure might not reflect social realities. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.

Class

How can class privilege be an inextricable part of family relations? What might changing economic relations mean for new middle class women and their family members? In previous research on Taiwan, class was often examined in isolation, without being articulated together with other social forces. Quantitative researchers adopted and revised Neo-Marxist and Neo-Weberian frameworks to allocate people of different occupations and status into different class positions (Sheu, 1987; Hsiao, 1990). The other possible approach was to research the subjective interpretation of class status and its potential to motivate political action (Kao, 1990, S.L. Tsai, 1990; Yi-Zhi Huang, 1999). For various reasons, I did not find either of these approaches sufficient to analyse the complex economic relations found in my empirical data.

Firstly, my research requires an historical perspective on changing class structures, but most sociological work was conducted in the late 1980s and 1990s. An historical perspective was often absent in the existing literature. Secondly, researchers often claimed that the basic unit of class analysis should be the family. However no meaningful conceptualization has been proposed explaining how family members with different class positions can be seen as a unit. Often, the head of the household has been regarded as representative of the class status of the family and the wife's employment

ignored, but this presents particular problems for research focusing on women and their life cycles. Thirdly, women may have very different relations to class than men. They often move in and out of the labour market and are more likely to do unpaid work for the family business or reproduction. How should I account for women's relation to class in the changing political and economic context of Taiwan over the twentieth century?

In this thesis, class is defined as *economic exchange relations* in the labour market, in the household *and* within the family. These three levels of economic exchange relations are conceptualized as follows.

In the labour market, I distinguish six class positions. **Capitalist** or **grand bourgeoisie** refers to those who own large amounts of industrial and financial capital in private and public sectors. The **new middle class** possess educational credentials, sell skills in employment as white-collar workers, without in general drawing on capital resources. The **bourgeoisie** have educational credentials and are self-employed in professional white-collar jobs. The **petty bourgeoisie** or **old middle class** own their means of production and use physical labour for production. The **proletariat** refers to blue-collar workers who sell skills without particular educational credentials. **Peasants** rely on the land as the means of production and do not deal with capital. A detailed classification is set out in Appendix A. These classifications may depart from conventional usage in Western European research. Their meanings become clear in the Taiwanese context. My historical investigation in Chapter 2, 3 and 7 explores how different families in Han society come to occupy these different class positions in colonial and industrial Taiwan. Using a historical perspective, these three chapters also demonstrate how class structures in contemporary post-industrial Taiwan have been transformed from traditional peasant-landlord class relations.

Secondly, I perceive the family as an economic unit in market exchange. It is assumed that family members may bring in different incomes from market exchanges. In my analysis, I adopt two methods to manage the diversity of the empirical data. On the one hand, I identify each family member's class position in the labour market in my case

studies. On the other, the overall wealth of each household will be compared and categorised as wealthy, averagely wealthy or poor. The first step avoids the risk of downplaying women's paid employment. The second deals with the fact that class positions do not necessarily reflect the levels of wealth of the family. For example, a petty bourgeois family might earn more than a new middle class or even a bourgeois family but could also have so little that the family lived on the margins of poverty. To sum up, in accounting for the family as an economic unit in market exchange, I not only specify the class status of different members in relation to the market but also categorise the different degrees of wealth of each household.

Thirdly, I explore economic exchange relations within the family, an area overlooked by much Marxist analysis, which many Marxist feminists strive to explain. I build on Glucksmann's proposal (2000:167) to perceive class as a relation of exchange, thus accounting for economic exchange within the household and between kin. I avoid collapsing different levels of analysis into one category, as in the approach of Delphy (1984), who reduced gender relations between men and women to class relations and argued that husbands and wives formed two distinct classes. Although Delphy may be right to expose the exchange nature of wives' reproductive labour within the family, this analysis was problematic for two reasons. As critics have correctly argued, it presumed that all women were housewives, precluding women who engaged in market exchanges (Walby, 1997). Also exchange relations may occur between genders as well as among women of different class or generation, as is clear from my evidence. The simplified and inflexible approach used by Delphy not only essentialised relations between genders but also missed other forms of unequal exchange relations within other kinship relations. In my analysis, class and kinship structures might overlap, but kinship, which has independent operational principles, cannot be reduced to class.

To sum up, in this thesis, 'class' accounts for economic exchange relations. It refers to economic exchanges in the market, the household and the family. It is in these senses that its intersection with patriarchy is investigated.

Outline of the Thesis

The thesis is structured to illustrate the experience of modern women in Han families in three different historical periods, the Qing dynasty, Japanese colonialism and KMT rule. In each chapter, the three analytical frameworks of patriarchy, class and state policy are used to account for the diversity of women's life stories.

Chapter 2 introduces the history of Taiwan before Japanese colonialism, investigating the social structure of Han society, the state ideology, Confucianism, in relation to women and the family, and the organisation of the 'traditional' Han family. In this chapter, I explore the concept of patriarchal genealogy in existing literature and distinguish it from Confucian ideology to facilitate further analysis in Parts One and Two.

Part One looks at the family lives of modern women in colonial Taiwan and investigates the organisation of Han families in terms of production, reproduction and resource distribution. The intersections of patriarchy, economic exchange and state policies during colonial times are drawn out in the conclusion to Part One.

Chapter 3 gives the history of Taiwan under Japanese colonialism. It introduces colonial policies on women and the family, changing class structures and the dynamic relationships between the colonial state and Han society. This chapter explains the Japanese ideological 'cult of productivity,' shows the historical background to the emergence of 'modern women' and describes their experience of work under colonialism. Chapter 4, 5, and 6 are structured according to women's lifecycles as daughters, daughters-in-law, wives and mothers, to explore the ways in which production, reproduction and resource distribution were organised in complex and conjugal families between 1900 and 1960. On the one hand, these chapters describe the ways in which patriarchal genealogy operated and how economic exchange relations were organised in complex and conjugal families. On the other, the relationships between the structures of patriarchy, class, state ideology and women's identities are considered for different family structures.

The conclusion to Part One draws together these findings on the intersection of state, class and patriarchy in colonial Taiwan, proposing a concept of 'patriarchal power structures' to allow explanations of further changes after industrialisation under KMT rule.

Part Two looks at changing family practices after industrialization, investigating the interconnections between changing employment patterns, ways of organising family economy or reproductive work and gender identities, using narratives of the third and fourth generation informants.

Chapter 7 describes the paradoxical history of Taiwan in terms of political, economical and educational transformations under KMT rule. It also investigates the increasing participation of women in the labour market and the conservative KMT state 'cult of domesticity.' In Chapter 8, I look in more detail at conjugal and complex families, asking how they were resourced after industrialisation by the changing employment and economic arrangements of the third and fourth generations. The experiences of women in conjugal and complex families are considered separately in Chapters 9 and 10, with particular focus on changes in gender ideologies and reproductive work. I also explore the relevance of patriarchal power structures in the development and maintenance of family practices. Chapter 11 investigates the identity formation of fourth generation daughters-in-law, once again exploring the linkages between state ideology, patriarchal kinship relations, gender identities and emerging feminist consciousness.

In the conclusion to Part Two, I pull these findings together to map the interplay of patriarchal power structures, state ideology and class relations in a market economy under the KMT.

In Chapter 12, I draw overall conclusions - summarising the analysis of the empirical evidence from the life histories to sharpen the three analytical frameworks of patriarchy, the state and class and overcome the divisions between anthropology, sociology and feminist studies.

Chapter 2 Imagining the 'Traditional Chinese Family' in Confucian Society

This chapter introduces the historical contexts of Han society and family in Taiwan before 1895 through the three frameworks of class, state ideology and patriarchal kinship structures. It starts with a brief history of Taiwan before Japanese colonialism, followed by a description of the class configurations of Han Confucian society and of Confucian ideologies on the subject of women and the family. Finally, it explores the organisation of the 'traditional' Han family. The central aim of this chapter is to reinterpret patriarchal genealogy as an independent analytical concept that should be distinguished from Confucian ideology and the household.

I explicate Han society and the family in Qing Taiwan by using historical, philosophical and anthropological literatures. However, these have some limitations. Historical research does not necessarily provide sociological analysis. Moreover, literature from philosophy presents contemporary interpretations of a timeless Confucian philosophy, while anthropology consists of ethnographies conducted mainly in post-war Taiwan. Altogether, they suggest that some of the ideas explored in this chapter are not necessarily representative of Qing Taiwan but form an imaginary view of traditional Han society.

History Before the Colonial Period (1662 –1895)

'Deviant' Han Migrant Society Before 1860

Before the 'discovery' of Taiwan by Chinese pirates, Japanese buccaneers, Portuguese sailors in the sixteenth century and Dutch merchants in the seventeenth century, a

significant number of ethnic groups belonging to the Malayo-Polynesian language family inhabited this island[22] (Zhou, 1998). Han migrants only increased significantly in 1662 when Zheng Cheng-gong retreated to Taiwan from Mainland China to occupy the land as his kingdom. In 1682, the Qing dynasty of China defeated Zheng and took over Taiwan as part of the Chinese Empire. After 1703, Han migration increased dramatically as earlier migrants started to recruit labour from Mainland China. Taiwan became an island of wealth and opportunities, where 'men were not to be servants and women were not to be maids' (*Taiwan Province Records*, n.d. quoted in Yin, 1990:37).

The Han community in eighteenth-century Taiwan was thus an immigrant society with an unbalanced sex ratio. Men and women were less confined by social norms than those in established Han society. Women moved freely in the streets, went to temples and attended street operas. Widows, who found it difficult to make a living in China, migrated to Taiwan for the wealth and autonomy it provided (Yi-rong Chen, n.d., quoted in Yin, 1990:38). It was not a paradise for women. As there were so few women, cases of women being kidnapped for marriage were not unheard of. However, women were not expected to be helpless victims either: they did not necessarily conform to Confucian virtues; they frequently cancelled improper marriage arrangements and their father or brothers did not stop them; moreover, the rate of remarriage was high. Confucian scholars and officers in China found such 'wicked' customs hard to tolerate and condemned them, but also found them difficult to change (Zhuo, 1991). Generally speaking, Han women in eighteenth century Taiwan enjoyed much more freedom than their counterparts in China (Yin, 1990).

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[22] It was recorded that there were 293 tribes within Dutch controlled areas in the 1620s, not including other tribes spread all over the island. However, the number of Chinese migrants increased dramatically and they outnumbered these indigenous tribes in a very short period. It has been estimated that in 1895 there were two to three million Chinese and two hundred thousand indigenous people (Davidson, 1973 [1903]: 392). At that time, relationships between Han and indigenous people were brutal, exploitative and antagonistic although the rate of inter-marriage between the Han and Pin-pu tribe (平埔族) was thought to be high.

Han-Confucianisation (儒漢化, 1860-1895)

Both historians and anthropologists have declared the 1860s to be an important period for demarcating changes in the Han community in Taiwan. In the 1860s, the economy of Taiwan became even more prosperous after the treaty ports opened up to Western Imperial powers. Taiwan started to export tea, sugar and camphor to the rest of the world, even though it had not yet become a capitalist economy (M.H. Lin, 1978). The historical irony is that the economic and symbolic act of 'opening up to the West' simultaneously brought Confucianism and familialism to Han migrant society on Taiwan. On both sides of the academic debate about indigenisation versus Mainlandisation between anthropologist Chi-nan Chen (1987) and historian Guo-qi Li (1996), they pointed out identical trends of 'Han-Confucianisation' taking place around the 1860s.[23] Han-Confucianisation – a process of establishing Confucian society – suggested the establishment of Confucian bureaucracy, values and patriarchal family structures (C. Yang, 1993:32-7). After the mid-nineteenth century, a gentry-official class replaced domineering landlords and merchants as the leading families in Taiwan (Zhou, 1998:99). Confucian education institutions were established by the central government and Taoist god, such as Guangong, was promoted to establish a well-governed, ethical Confucian society (G.Q. Li, 1996:65).

Han-Confucianisation affected women's status severely. *Provincial Records* showed that in the late Qing dynasty, Han women were disposed of, adopted, sold or divorced. Women's feet were bound again. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese in 1906, 56.9% of Taiwanese women had their feet bound. Adoption, uxorilocal marriage and selling daughters to become servants, concubines and prostitutes were not unusual (C. Yang, 1993; Yin, 1990; Wolf and Huang, 1980). Cui

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[23] Deriving from specific study of religious worship and the establishment of clan structures between 1860 and 1890, Chen argued that Han people 'indigenised' during this period (C.N. Chen, 1987). By 'indigenisation', Chen was suggesting that Han migrants in Taiwan transformed their social structure into one similar to Mainland China. Their society transformed itself from a migrant one into a settlement. In contrast, drawing on observations of the same period, historian Guo-qi Li contended that Han migrants became 'Mainlandised' (內地化) because after the 1860s, social and family structures were gradually transformed to resemble those of Mainland China (G.Q. Li, 1996).

Yang argued that this phenomenon revealed the continuous domination of patriarchy in a Han-Confucian society. The autonomy of Han women on Taiwan in the eighteenth century was just a temporary escape from patriarchal order, rather than a permanent change in values (C. Yang, 1993).

Confucian Social Organisation and Class Relations

Han society was mainly a peasant society. In Qing Taiwan, farmers composed the bulk of the population and three-quarters of these were tenant farmers. Among landowners, three levels of hierarchy could be discerned: local landlords, local elites on Taiwan and regional gentry in China. Each had different levels of wealth, distance from the land and power in central government. The regional gentry had accumulated wealth for generations in China and held powers in central government, but rarely visited Taiwan. Local elites were better-off and owned a wider range of lands than local landlords (C.N. Chen, 1987:89-90; 1990:73-4). There is no further information on the local power structures in Qing Taiwan but research on China suggests that both local landlords and local elites provided members for the boards of villages, local communities and towns, who were not appointed by the government, but selected by the local population (Lang, 1946:6). Local elites, as knowledgeable men, organised and mediated communal affairs as well as negotiating on the behalf of the community with government officials, who were appointed by central government (Fei, 1953). The relations between landlord/gentry and peasants were interdependent rather than confrontational because the hardship of tenant peasants was usually compensated by extra money earned from local industries and handicrafts, which were also controlled by landlords (Fei, 1953).

In traditional Han society, urban areas should be understood as regional town centres rather than cosmopolitan cities in a contemporary sense. City residents included wage earners, artisans and elites. In China, wage earners (such as coolies, transportation workers, casual workers, servants or journeymen working for the artisans (Lang, 1946:5)) were regarded as people of lower class. Urban elites were divided into three

groups on the basis of their wealth and power: the bureaucratic authorities of the garrison towns, the merchants of market towns and the compradors of treaty ports. Without exception, all of these leading elites were also landlords holding land in the countryside (Fei, 1953). Historian W.X. Wu (1992) found the same pattern of elite composition in late Qing Taiwan.

I have not found literature that addresses women's employment in traditional Confucian society. After examining several life stories from the late nineteenth century, it appears that women who lived in a Confucian society had virtually no *formal* employment opportunities, even if selling labour and sex was possible. Their main social status was most likely to be defined in terms of kinship. Daughters of poor peasants could be sold into wealthy households as handmaids, concubines or prostitutes. Daughters of the upper class could learn writing and poetry at 'inner chambers' and married into a family of an equivalent social status to their own. As wives, they could take charge in the family business or invest capital that belonged to their husband. Married women whose husbands were poor, did time-consuming and strenuous housework, caring and giving birth, probably along with productive labour of all kinds: in tea industries (as casual workers), handicrafts, knitting, cooking, wet-nursing, cleaning (Zhuo, 1991:144), midwifery or pediatrics.[24]

With this framework, we can now contextualise the Confucian 'classes' of 'scholar, peasant, artisan and merchant.' The Confucian 'class' distinction did not imply economic relations between groups. Rather, it suggested moral hierarchies of occupation. Scholars were praised and regarded as virtuous even if they were poor. Confucian ideology valued those who worked with their minds and degraded those who worked with their hands. However, peasants were the backbone of agricultural China and were therefore valued more highly than artisans. Merchants who earned money by the exchange of goods were regarded as disgraceful. Because scholars were so respected, all classes would send their sons for education if they could afford it. In

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[24] According to one of my informants, her grandmother was a pediatrician.

theory, these classes were not hereditary groups. Except for descendants of a few disreputable groups, every man was able to enter the state examination system that focused on Confucian texts, to seek officialdom. The central examination system claimed to grant equal opportunities to whoever passed the examination. However, thanks to the high requirements of examination boards, most of the officials were recruited from the gentry (Lang, 1946:6). In fact, Taiwan elite families, who only established themselves in the mid-nineteenth century and were latecomers to the gentry-official class, could not compete with the gentry in China. Most of the Taiwanese landlord families gained official positions through monetary donation rather than examination (G.Q. Li, 1996). Moreover, since Taiwan elite members who passed the lower levels of the examinations were so rare, they enjoyed great prestige locally. As a result, they preferred staying in their hometowns to taking up official office elsewhere. These 'hometown-gentlemen' (鄉 紳) were influential in spreading Confucian values to local communities (G.Q. Li, 1996:64).

The elite class is my particular focus in the next chapter because it bred the new middle class in colonial Taiwan. Here, I summarise its character before turning to examine the Han family. The elite class usually resided in towns, owned land in the rural areas and invested in local industry. They accumulated capital through market exchange and also studied Confucian texts in order to pass examinations, gain official posts, increase their standing and further expand their wealth. They were classified as the 'gentry-official' (宦紳) class in Confucian society (Fei, 1953).

Gendered Family Values in Confucian Philosophy

In Han culture, the family is central in terms of both cultural ideology and social practice. The rest of this chapter initially focuses on the role of women and the family in Confucian ideology from a philosophical perspective followed by an examination of Han family organisation from an anthropological viewpoint. I choose to focus on Confucianism, for it was the source of the most influential dictates on women and the

family. I consider Confucianism as the dominant philosophy in traditional Han culture and political ideology of the Qing dynasty (1645-1911).

Self, Society and the Family in Confucian Political Thought

In Confucianism, the social order was composed of a set of properly defined social roles (*li*,禮, or the grammar of social relations, translated by King and Bond, 1985). Like functionalists, Confucianists believed in structures more than individuals. They thought that the different elements of the system (i.e. diverse, properly-defined social roles) should function together harmoniously for the common good of society (Cheung 1989:162-166). Confucianists were thus devoted to dictating how these social roles should properly be performed in the nexus of social relations, which were hierarchically arranged. What were the most important social roles in Confucianism? They were the Five Cardinal Relations (*wulun*, 五倫), between sovereign and subject, father and son, elder and younger brothers, husband and wife and friends. Of these five relations, three referred to familial relations. The family was perceived as the foundation of society (Sun, 1990:15) and all social relations were extensions of familial relations. Since this ideology was widely practiced in the Han culture, the contemporary Chinese philosopher, Dong-sun Zhang, has concluded that

> '[T]he Five Cardinal Relations were the social organization of the traditional Chinese societies. There was nothing behind the Five Cardinal Relations in Han culture' (Dong-sun Zhang, in Cheung, 1989:165).

To Confucius, social order would be achieved when sovereign behaved as sovereign, subject behaved as subject, father as father, son as son, and so on. The Confucian self was always defined in relation to others. Isolated individuals were perceived as problematic in Han culture (Sun, 1990:15). Confucians believed that only by cultivating oneself in a nexus of social relations, especially familial relations, could one reach the ultimate development of the self (Z.S. Wu, 1968:35; Tu, 1985), the highest level of humanity, *jen* (仁) (Yu-sheng Lin, in King and Bond, 1985:31). In other words, self-cultivation was the main concern of Confucianism but there was no fixed

rule. Everything depended on particular social relations involved in specific social contexts, especially in the family.

In Confucian thought, all dyadic social relations were hierarchical, as were interpersonal relations. For example, higher value was given to the sovereign in relation to subject, father to son and husband to wife. Moreover, there was also a hierarchy of distance. Those who had closer social relations with the individual should be attended to prior to more distant relations. The Confucian self was at the centre of concentric circles and all social relations extended outwards from that point: from the self to the family, from the family to the nation, from the nation to the world. Thus, the cultivation of self laid the basis for governing wider social orders and the Five Cardinal Relations became the means of governing the nation. This structure of interpersonal relations was named by native anthropologist Xiao-tong Fei (1991[1947]:29-30) as *chaxu geju* (差序格局), 'differentiated mode of association,' a concept that illustrates the governing principles of traditional Han social relations. Even today, the differentiated mode of association can be found in the narratives of contemporary young women (Chapter 11).

Filial Piety

Xiao (孝，filial piety) was regarded as the root of all virtue in Confucianism, since the family was the basis of society. In early Confucian classics both parents and children should love one another. However, since the dyadic relation was hierarchically arranged, children, lower in the hierarchy, were expected to be filial: paying respect to their parents, obeying them and caring for parents in their old age. The practices of *xiao* also involved care of the body and maintaining patrilineal continuity. 'Body and hair are granted by parents, so you shall not hurt them. That is the beginning of filial piety' (*Xiaojing*, in Z.S. Wu, 1968:26). 'Producing male progeny is the most important duty of the filial son' (*Mencius* 1970: 4A:26, 4B:30, in Tu, 1985:238). 'Establish yourself, practice morals and become famous for later generations to honour your parents. This is the final goal of filial piety' (*Xiaojing*, in Z.S. Wu, 1968:26). Moreover, the Confucian ideas of filial piety were gendered. Gender dictates were developed gradually

throughout dynasties. The contents of filial piety and moral virtues differed according to gendered positions within patriarchal kinship relations, to which I now turn.

Un-gendered Persons, Gendered Virtues

In Confucianism, moral dictates were gender-neutral which resulted in muddled debates among Western comparative philosophers as to whether Confucius was sexist or not (Raphals, 1998; Goldin, 2000; Kupperman, 2000). It appears to me that these debates ignore the linguistic difference between English and Chinese. In the Han language, persons were not gendered.[25] Moreover, ideal personhood was androgynous in contrast to the dominance of the masculine in contemporary Western cultures (Hall and Ames, 2000). Confucianism was, however, gendered in terms of assigning gender-specific roles through the separation of the 'inner' (內) and the 'outer' (外) (Goldin, 2000). As we shall see in following chapters, the logic of 'inner' and 'outer' could be perceived as the underlying principles regulating gendered division of labour in the family.[26] Systematic articulations of women's virtues were developed by Xiang Liu (劉向, 77-6 BC Male) and Zhao Ban (班昭, AD 48-120 Female) in the Han Dynasty when Confucianism came to be established as the official ideology of the Chinese Empire. In *Instructions for Women*, Ban defined Four Female Virtues and Three Obediences that outlined gender-specific virtues for women for thousands of years to come. The Four Female Virtues were morality, speech, demeanour, and meritorious deeds. The Three Obediences dictated that women obey their fathers as daughters, husbands as wives and sons after becoming widows (Judge, 2000).

There were close connections between Confucian dictates and patriarchal kinship

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[25] In English, 'man' is used to refer to all people and 'men' and 'women' to refer to male and female, respectively, but in classical and contemporary Chinese, these terms are not used in such a way. Chinese language uses 'person' (*ren*, 人) to refer to all people without regard to their biological sex, while polarity was assigned to 'male' (*nan*, 男) and 'female'(*nu*, 女). Conceptually, being a person could mean being independent from the social role of being a male or a female.

[26] At face value, the division of 'inner-outer' resembles western feminist conceptualisation of 'public-private'. However the ideas are different at the level of metaphysics: the inner-outer division is a pair of relational terms, rather than a dichotomous concept.

structures. According to Kandiyoti's analysis (1988) of women in 'classic patriarchy,' because women did not own the means of production they relied on patriarchal kinship relations, the father, the husband and most importantly the son, for a living. Correspondingly, in Ban's dictates from the first century, women owed submission to all of them. Moreover, women in Confucian texts were defined by their roles in patriarchal kinship systems. A woman was a *nu* (女, daughter) at home, a *fu* (婦, wife) after marriage, a *mu* (母, mother) after bearing children. Specific tasks and expectations were described in detail in these 'protocols' (Barlow, 1991). Daughters were expected to serve and care for their parents. After marriage, daughters needed to transfer their filial piety to their parents-in-law, which required higher degrees of endurance. Neo-Confucian didactics developed in the Nan-Song Dynasty (1127-1279) provided detailed guidelines for married women on womanly behaviour, serving parents-in-law and being virtuous and obedient. The underlying logic was that to be virtuous a woman must defer to and obey the elderly and men. Throughout their lifecycles, women were supposed to be subordinate to men, whether in their roles as daughters, wives or mothers. (M.H. Chen, n.d. in Barlow, 1991).[27] These roles formed the principles of female virtues and set up the goals for moral cultivation of women in kinship relations. Confucianism came to be an inextricable part of patriarchal kinship structures.

Reproduction of Confucian Gender Ideology

Liu's *Biographies of Exemplary Women* was the subject of numerous reprints over the centuries and set up a paradigm for writing virtuous female biographies in dynasty histories till late Qing (see Judge, 2000). Throughout the dynasties there were incessant efforts by Confucian scholars, women and men, to produce books on female virtues, such as *Classics of Female Filial Piety* (女孝經), *Female Analects* (女論語), *Female Instructions* (女訓), to name just a few (Judge, 2000; Xiao, 2001). These texts were

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[27] Barlow's argument, that in Confucian texts women did not form a homogenous group, contributed immensely to my analysis of women in colonial Taiwan in Part One of the thesis.

originally read by upper-class intellectual women, but after the print industry developed in the fifteenth century they circulated extensively among ordinary people. The principles of female filial piety were written into songs for a wider audience (Xiao, 2001). In these songs, many themes stressed the roles of a daughter-in-law.[28] Gendered daily servitude was required but reverence to parents-in-law was essential.[29]

Confucianism was also the state ideology in the Qing dynasty. Confucian texts were the subjects of the imperial examination that was used to select officials. Confucian morality was very likely practiced by the elites and gentry, but was also utilised politically as a means to exercise control over the population. For example, the establishment of virtuous arch (for women) and tablets for virtuous and filial women were used to promote the morality of women in Taiwan. A woman earned the highest degree of respect if she could be honoured by virtuous arch or filial tablet for her filial or virtuous behaviours (Zhuo, 1991:105-24). They were also to be recorded as exemplified women in Confucian texts. Confucianism was also absorbed into Japanese culture and taught in the first three decades of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Later, Confucianism also became a cultural resource taken into state KMT ideology in 1930s Republican China and in post-war Taiwan. I address this issue in chapter 7.

Confucianism as a morality, as a state ideology, as texts of intensive scholarly interpretation and as folk story-telling incorporated diverse social agents into its making. These constant refashionings and reinventions, and state reinforcement, all contributed to the reproduction of gendered patriarchal values. In Confucian society,

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[28] I share the view of Xiao that to be a good daughter-in-law required higher levels of endurance and thus more moral teachings were required on this subject (2001:50-51).

[29] I quote one of these folk songs to show how the Confucian 'protocols' were adopted in colloquial language. The folk song entitled '*Advising women to be filial*' is as follows: 'After leaving your family, you should be filial to your parents-in-law. It is not very different from how you were to your parents. Your husband is the child of your parents-in-law, so that you are a daughter to them. Do not speak loudly, because parents-in-law are senior and you are junior. You should not be lazy when serving them because you are younger and they are older. It is not difficult to be filial. You just need to be devoted, docile and smart. Clean the dishes, serve the tea, wash clothes and sweep the floors. Cook all food thoroughly so that your parents-in-law do not find it difficult to chew. Every item should be stored carefully so that your parents-in-law would not find it difficult to find. If the parents-in-law want to blame you, you should immediate temper yourself to listen to them' (*sanzi nuer jin*, quoted in Xiao 2001:50).

these ideas were perhaps the dominant discourses on women in the family. I could not judge how far Han women on Taiwan before 1895 were subjected to such discourses in their daily lives. However, a secularised version of endurance and obedience was characteristic of many life stories in colonial and contemporary Taiwan. These discourses probably became embedded in people's thinking across classes and generations although they may also have been mingled with Buddhist or Taoist thinking and practised differently according to the social actors' interpretations. Apart from the gendered ideology of family values, how was the traditional Chinese family organised?

'Traditional Chinese Family' Organisation and its Lifecycle

In anthropological work, the Chinese family is understood in two senses. Firstly, it refers to kinship groups, such as the clan and lineage organisation that belonged to the public domain of village life and excluded women. Secondly, the Chinese family (家, *chia*) refers to the studies of the household as an economic and residential unit, organised by kinship relations. Women's status in the family, although mentioned often, has rarely been systematically analysed (except M. Wolf, 1972; A. Wolf and Huang, 1980). The latter sense of the family is the main concern of this research and my review of literature will concentrate on this area.

Genealogical Principles of the Chinese Family

How were Han families organised? Anthropological research on Chinese families on Taiwan provided detailed descriptions of family practices and attempted to generate principles from these observations. In the first place, the family was conceptualised as an economic and residential unit where production, reproduction and consumption were carried out. However, such an approach was problematic and often caused more confusion than clarification. Native anthropologist Chi-nan Chen (1984) performed the most sober analysis of the organising principles of the Chinese family. He pointed out that what Western anthropologists thought of as 'the family' was in fact the domestic

group 'whose membership is defined primarily by genealogical principles and secondarily by functional principles' (131). In other words, rather than seeing the family as one thing, where kinship relations, production and reproduction mingled, C.N. Chen clearly declared that genealogical principles were central to the Chinese family. He further differentiated these principles from the functional aspects of the family. This interpretation was a great leap forward. However, I disagree with C.N. Chen on his use of the term 'functional principles' because each family found their way to fulfil the material needs of the household, which might not follow any 'principles' at all. Therefore, I suggest that two elements of the family should be distinguished: genealogical principles and the household. The family should be conceptualised as the place where genealogy and the household overlap. The following section will interpret the ways in which genealogy operated in Han families by deploying the concepts of *fang* (房) and *chia-tsu* (家族).

Fang, as a native concept, is understood in relative terms. According to C.N. Chen (1984:66), a son composes a *fang* in relation to his father. A man stands as the head of a *chia-tsu* in relation to his sons. *Chia-tsu* is the encompassing genealogy that subordinates *fang.* Cohen (1976:57) also found that *fang* might be used in reference to 'agnatic subdivisions of varying size and genealogical depth within the lineage.' Very often, anthropologists used *fang* (or 'hu' in Mandarin, 'ho' in Hakka) to refer to the conjugal unit consisting of husband, wife and children in joint or stem families (see Hu, 1948:18; Fried, 1953:31; in Cohen, 1976:57). However, C.N. Chen criticised this usage and contended that even if *fang* and the conjugal unit might overlap they were not the same. *Fang* differed from the conjugal unit in three aspects: firstly, *fang* excluded unmarried daughters; secondly, following patrilineal principles, only the men in the lineage and their wives were recognised; thirdly, a son's *fang* was always subordinate to his father's *chia-tsu* (1984:82). In other words, *fang* as the basic unit of the genealogy signified the father-son relation and excluded the daughter. A married woman was regarded as a member of her husband's *fang* and her father-in-law's *chia-tsu*. An unwed daughter was a member of her father's conjugal unit, but she could never create a *fang*

in relation to her father's *chia-tsu*, even if she married uxorilocally. Neither could she inherit any property from her father's *chia-tsu*. Moreover, a daughter's ancestor tablet could not be placed in the main hall of her father's *chia-tsu*. She was not qualified to make sacrifices to her father, nor was she qualified to receive sacrifices from her father's line after her death (69). C.N. Chen further demonstrated how the concepts of *fang/chia-tsu* organised almost all aspects of family affairs, from lineage organisation to property division and household management. I shall not repeat this information here. While C.N. Chen did not use the term patriarchal genealogy but *chia-tsu*, it is clear that these genealogical principles followed patrilineal and patriarchal logics. Therefore, *chia-tsu* can be understood as patriarchal genealogy.

Family Structures, Lifecycles and Divisions

The second aspect of Chinese family organisation is the family structure. Sinologists seem to have a long-standing obsession with disputes over whether Chinese families, across all dynasties, including twentieth-century ones, lived as 'five generations under one roof.' These disputes resulted from scholars' belief that traditional families throughout China were extended ones (Fried, 1959). This belief was countered by statistical data generated from tax collection documents, suggesting that the average number of household members across all dynasties was between six and eight persons, and that this did not significantly change over time (Levy, 1963:51; L.K. Hsu, 1943, in Cohen, 1976:228). On the basis of such estimates, scholars then tended to argue that the majority of Chinese people in the past lived in stem or conjugal families (Lang, 1946:16; Freedman 1958:19; Levy, 1963:51; K.J. Chen and T.H. Lai, 1979). Nevertheless, on the basis of the household registration data in Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule, A. Wolf argued that even if statistics showed that average household had between five and seven members, detailed registration data revealed that a great number (between 40% and 50%) of the whole population in northern Taiwan experienced living in extended families at some stage in their lives (A. Wolf, 1982).

In disputing the 'real' size of the family, anthropologists went on to deploy the concepts of 'cultural ideal' and 'social reality' to construe the discrepancy between what they thought the family size was and what they read from statistics. It was argued that the sizes of Chinese families differed by class (Fei, 1946; Lang, 1946; Levy, 1963; Baker, 1979). Families presented in Chinese realistic novels showed a clear correlation between class and family size. Peasants usually lived in conjugal or stem families, while the gentry were very likely to have 'five generations under one roof'. The most common interpretation of such correlations was the interplay of poverty and demography (Lang, 1946:16; Levy, 1963; Baker, 1979) and Confucian ideology (Fei, 1946; Fried, 1959; L.K. Hsu, 1959:129). This group of scholars argued that the gentry and peasants were two dichotomous cultural groups possessing very different ideas of what an ideal family should be.

Cohen (1976) countered such arguments, pointing out that Chinese families across time, space and class shared the same family organisation (in that they all had a common coffer and common property) and thus it was wrong to conceptualise the gentry and the peasants as dichotomous. Nevertheless, Cohen's main contention was that those who believed Confucian ideology determined family composition failed to see that the common economic interests of the family were the essential element in sustaining complex households (1976:227-36). While accepting Cohen's view that both peasants and gentry shared the same family organisation, Stacey (1983) criticised his work for too much stress on the economic. She offered a synthesis, arguing that it was the patriarch in all social classes who was predisposed to take advantage of whatever economic conditions facilitated the large, extended family. They might have attempted to generate such conditions even if they lacked an economic basis, because they could realise Confucian patriarchal values (26).

From my viewpoint, this debate is missing a clear conceptualisation of 'patriarchy' as a kinship structure that predisposed all classes to patriarchal principles. I also believe that patriarchy *must* be differentiated from Confucianism, even if they

were often interwoven. With this in mind, let me revisit the debate. The problem with the 'class difference' interpretation is that gentry and peasants were perceived as two *dichotomous* groups, as if they did not possess similar patriarchal values. Cohen (1976) may have been right to point out that there was an ultimate similarity in family organisation across class, and that shared economic interests helped explain extended families. However, by failing to see patriarchy as the principle that organised households, he seemed to suggest an economically-determined perspective. Stacey (1983) extended Cohen's points to argue that both gentry and peasants possessed patriarchal values. At the same time, she also recognised the role of the economy in realising such values. However, by seeing 'Confucian patriarchal values' as one thing, rather than two intersected elements, Stacey failed to restore patriarchy to her analysis.

In addition, I refute these scholars' images of a homogenous Chinese society, underpinning their obsession with *the* dominant form of the Chinese family. Considering that family structures changed with family lifecycles (see below), the obsession with the 'traditional' family type is rather unproductive. These scholars failed to recognise the simultaneous presence of different family types in Han society and missed the chance to explore the meanings of these structures. I suggest there is a need to investigate the ways in which various family types interact with social and economic conditions in a specific time and space. Furthermore, the family structure debate was not able to contribute to my understanding of patriarchy. Patriarchal hierarchies of age, generation and gender were particularly strong in complex families. Important questions follow: How did different family structures affect women's lives in the family? Who benefited from extended families and who suffered? Which family member would would attempt to sustain a joint family and which would split it up into conjugal units? These questions will be explored in Parts One and Two.

Cohen (1976) went furthest to provide an insight into family structures from family lifecycle perspectives. The family had its simplest form in the conjugal family. Under different circumstances, the family structures changed. A conjugal family might

expand into a stem family, and the stem family might become a conjugal family or diffuse into a joint family. At times, there might also be conjugal families separated from a stem family or a joint family. However, rather than differentiating family structures and exploring the alternative ways that they functioned, most research on the 'traditional Chinese family' only focused on the large, extended family.

In extended families, the economy was organised to advance the interests of the whole family. The patriarch usually assigned different jobs to sons, to diversify sources of family income. In complex family organisations, the person in charge of the economy was not necessarily the *chia-chang* (家長, family head), 'an ascriptive status held by the oldest male in the senior generation, considered the *chia*'s representative to the outside world' (Cohen, 1976:60). This implies that there might be two different roles within the family economy: one had authority and one was in charge of finance. It was also found that women owned 'private money' that was accumulated through the wedding processes (Cohen, 1976), including cash and property from her dowries (R. Gallin, 1987). Moreover, daughters-in-law were allowed to cultivate a little land of their own or earn extra cash in leisure time, which was another source of private money (Cohen, 1976). The utility of such private money was disputed between Cohen (1976), M. Wolf (1975) and Watson (1991).[30] As a sociologist, I am concerned principally with the relationship between private money and women's autonomy, and that is what will be investigated in my empirical data.

Even if most scholars held the view that Han people chose to live in an unbroken

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[30] Cohen (1976) and Wolf (1975) disputed whether private money belonged to the *fang* but was entrusted to the wife or whether the wife had autonomy to make use of the money for her and her children. Cohen (1976) regarded private money as *fang* money. In a joint family, women could hold private money for the *fang*. After family division, a husband had the right to control the money. It was the role assigned to the men and women in the joint household that made women appear to have autonomy over their private money. As for Wolf (1975), she considered private money as funds for women's 'uterine family' (see the following section of this chapter). If the husband died and the woman remarried, she left her children but took the money with her. If the wife died, the husband took it as a trust for their children. To advance the debate, Watson suggested distinguishing between the jewellery, clothes and furniture given to a woman and the land, shops and businesses she received because Watson suspected that the form and/or source of a woman's property determined the control she could exercise over it (Watson, 1991:357).

large family, they faced the reality that the family did divide. The division of the family, as a household organised by patriarchal kinship relations, included two elements: one, patrilineal property, and the other, the co-residential and co-economic patriarchal household. Firstly, according to patrilineal genealogy, each brother had an equal share of the patrilineal property. The family property was divided according to the number of brothers. Secondly, the co-residential and co-economic households were also divided along *fang* lines. Before family division, all sisters-in-law shared the responsibility for reproductive work. After division, each *fang* was responsible for its own cooking and maintained its own independent finances. Very often, the extended family was divided but its members still lived in the compounds. To learn whether the extended family had divided or not, one should calculate the number of stoves in the compound. Before division, there was only one stove. After division, each *fang* had its own stove (C.N. Chen, 1984). In the past, family division usually took place after the death of the father. In some cases, however, it took place *before* the death of parents. The parents' status declined significantly after family division. Usually, the father would possess an 'old age farm' to provide support for the rest of his and his wife's life. They might cook in their own conjugal unit. In other cases, the parent(s) ate in turn at each son's conjugal family (C.N. Chen, 1990).

Anthropologists were also interested in the reasons why a family divided, which contrasted sharply with the Confucian ideology of filial piety and the patriarchal idea of maintaining an extended family. Repeatedly, Han people in different space and time attributed division to the 'quarrelsome' nature of the Chinese women. Yet, scholars maintained two (gender divided) views about such native interpretation.

Male anthropologists saw the 'quarrelsome' nature of the Han women as a representation of the fragile fraternal relations inherent in the patriarchal genealogy, which gives brothers equal shares over family property. Freedman (1966) perceived internal conflicts between brothers and rebellions of the sons against their father, as the underlying mechanisms that led to family division. Cohen (1976) found that in joint

families, the brothers tended to maintain the juridical equality (which appears to me to be the genealogical principle) between them and left the fights for resource distribution to their wives. This eventually led to family division. On the basis of such observation, Cohen argued

> [W]omen are accused of harbouring a mutual antipathy which threatens the relationship between the men when actually it is the men who by keeping the family together set the women against each other. (1976:201)

In contrast, M. Wolf (1972) insisted on the role played by women in these processes of family division. Women proposed family division for their own interests, especially for their 'uterine families' (see below). These differences in views probably relate to the different focus of the research. Freedman and Cohen tended to study the juridical parameters (i.e. the genealogical principles) of the Chinese family, while M. Wolf devoted her research to looking at women (Sangren, 2000:158). M. Wolf perceived women as active agents, who knew clearly how to defend their own interests. She also considered that women's behaviour had little to do with the interests of male family members. In my opinion, both perspectives are shaped by the logic of the Han patrilineage. When studying lineage, Freedman and Cohen granted little space for women. When studying women, M. Wolf had paid limited attention to the genealogy that shaped women's strategies, to which I now turn.

Patriarchy and the 'Uterine Family'

M. Wolf's (1972) research explored a woman's family. It opened up a female perspective on the Chinese family governed by patriarchal genealogy, even though she never used the term patriarchy in her analysis. My task here is to describe the reproduction process of the 'uterine family' and to articulate its links with patriarchy.

The term 'uterine family' is used to refer to a woman's family, composed of her and her children (especially sons). The importance of the 'uterine family' had to be understood from the lifecycle of a woman in the Chinese family. Unlike a man under

patriarchy, who never left his family, a woman followed a different trajectory. A woman left her natal family on her wedding day and found herself literally without a family. Then she entered a house of strangers in a very uneasy situation. Her husband and mother-in-law did not see her as a member of their family. But she was *essential* to it because she had to bear the next generation (35, my emphasis). M. Wolf argued that if a woman wanted to return to the certainty and sense of belonging she had in her childhood, she needed to create her own uterine family by bearing children, 'a goal that happily corresponds to the goals of the family into which she has married' (36). In most cases, by the time she added grandchildren, the uterine family and the household would almost completely overlap and there would be another daughter-in-law struggling with loneliness and beginning a new uterine family (36). A son growing up in the uterine family also learned to give loyalty to his mother and his distance from his wife would contribute to the creation of another uterine family in the future, that of his wife. Even though the uterine family was reproduced in such a way, generation after generation,

> [The] uterine family has no ideology, no formal structure, and no public existence. It is built out of sentiments and loyalties that die with its members, but it is no less real for all that. (1972:37)

M. Wolf's argument, although insightful, made only a weak link between the uterine family and patriarchy. By saying that the uterine family had no ideology and no formal structure, M. Wolf failed to take into consideration the patriarchal genealogy that shaped it. Considering the fact that the uterine family fitted so neatly with the conjugal unit of the complex households that overlapped with *fang,* the basic unit of patrilineal genealogy, I argue that the uterine family is the realised form of a woman's family, framed by patrilineal genealogy. Since the dominant framework was patrilineal genealogy, the spaces women created in the uterine family could maximise her interests to a certain level but not further. Patrilineage set up the rules and defined the boundaries within which a woman was allowed certain powers. Under patrilineage, men could see the unbroken ties between ancestors and descendants for thousands of years. However, for women who lived under the shadow of patrilineage, even if they established their

own uterine family, there was no continuous history except the lived experiences remembered by its members. In this sense, M. Wolf was right to say that the uterine family was built out of sentiments and loyalties that were extinguished with the death of its members.

The link between the uterine family and patriarchy could be further explored by comparing the 'uterine family' and 'patriarchal bargains.' The concept of the uterine family suggested the tendency of women under patriarchy to internalise and reproduce patriarchal values, a point that was also argued by Kandiyoti (1988),

> [T]he cyclical nature of women's power in the household and their anticipation of inheriting the authority of senior women encourages a thorough internalisation of this form of patriarchy by the women themselves. (1988: 279)

Living under patriarchy, elder women thus tended to suppress the conjugal ties between the son and the daughter-in-law in order to claim the son's loyalty for the security of their old age. Their arguments differ in emphasis. M. Wolf (1972) stressed the importance for women of belonging during the early stage of marital life as isolated daughters-in-law, and extended it to old age as a symbol of their power in the family. Kandiyoti (1988) emphasised the significance of potential old age insecurity in the later stage of women's lifecycles. Yet, they both pointed out that sons were invaluable assets for women under patriarchy. Moreover, they also perceived women as active agents who maximised their interests and adopted strategies, even if at the expense of other women, to secure their living and status within the constraint of patriarchy. Furthermore, they delineated the conflicts of interest between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, structured by patriarchy.

Marriage Practices

Marriage practices are an inextricable part of patriarchy although this thesis does not have space to address them fully. This section addresses three different forms of marriage that are essential to construe the empirical data in the following chapters:

'major marriage,' 'minor marriage,' and 'uxorilocal marriage'

In 'major marriage,' a woman grew up to adulthood in her own natal family and a marriage was arranged via the match-maker with a family of equal status. After marriage, she lived patrilocally and belonged to her husband's lineage.[31] This ideal form of marriage is called 'major marriage.' It was usually ostentatiously celebrated and extremely costly to both the bride's and groom's families (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980). 'Minor marriage' followed the same patrilineal principle, but the process of kinship exchange was spread over a long period of time. The bride entered the groom's family as a child in the name of adoption. Her husband's family raised her as an adopted daughter-in-law. She was treated simultaneously like a daughter and a daughter-in-law. When she grew up, she and her husband (adopted brother) were 'pushed together' in the same room to become husband and wife. Minor marriage was culturally despised. Nevertheless, it was extremely popular in northern Taiwan, where around 40% of the population practised minor marriage in early twentieth-century (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980). Apart from economic reasons, M. Wolf (1972) interpreted this as a strategy that women adopted to maximise their powers in their uterine family. Because the adult daughter-in-law usually posed a great threat to the stability of the mother-in-law's 'uterine family,' the mother-in-law turned to adopting a young girl, trained her to be her help from a young age and acted as her mother. By doing so, they developed quasi mother-daughter relations. When the girl grew up and married her foster brother, she

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[31] Anthropologists have produced a great deal of literature on wedding processes. Before marriage, the two families negotiated a bride price for the bride's family. The bride's family would then use this money to prepare the ceremony at the bride's house. They would also prepare dowries that consisted of jewellery, furniture, clothing and lands (in wealthy families) to be brought to the groom's family. On her wedding day, the groom and his relatives picked up the bride from her house (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980:75). As she left her natal family, her parents ritually spread water over the floor and slammed the door in front of her to show that she no longer belonged to her natal family (M. Wolf, 1972). The allocation of the new room in the husband's parents' home symbolised that a bride entered the family first as a daughter-in-law before she became a wife of her husband (Watson, 1991). When the groom and the bride with her dowries arrived at his family's threshold, she was led to his parents and grandparents. Then, the bride and groom exchanged clothes, worshipped his ancestors and bowed to each other to become husband and wife (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980:82). On the wedding day, the bride had to serve tea for her husband's kin and her performance was scrutinised by every member of her husband's family. In the process, she accumulated some money from family members and guests. Together with the dowries that she brought with her, this became her private money (Cohen, 1976).

was less likely to rebel against the authority of the mother-in-law than an adult daughter-in-law (1972). The negative side of minor marriage was the unhappy unions between husbands and wives. Using household registration data, A. Wolf and Huang (1980) found that the fertility rate of minor marriage was 25% lower than the major marriage and that 24.1% of minor marriages ended in divorce, while only 1.2% of major marriages did. Women in minor marriages were also more likely to be involved in extra-marital affairs. Sometimes it was the mother-in-law, desperate for grandsons, who made such arrangements for the daughter-in-law (M. Wolf, 1972:182).

According to A. Wolf and Huang (1980), 'uxorilocal marriage' operated in a way that countered most of the juridical arrangements found in major and minor marriages. In major and minor marriages, a woman left her natal family to live with her husband's family. In uxorilocal marriage, it was the young man who left his house to reside with her family. He might be adopted (change his surnames) to continue the genealogy of her father's family, thought this was rare. Most likely, he signed a contract with the bride's family as to the surnames of their children. This type of marriage was even more despised because the man who married into his wife's family was regarded as an unfilial son to his ancestors. This form of marriage accounted for 22% of registered marriage in 1906, but it declined to 16% in 1930 (Barclay, 1954, in Thornton and Lin, 1994:35). I think it should be stressed that however undesirable this type of marriage was, uxorilocal marriage still operated along patrilineal principles. A woman who 'called in' a husband for her father's family was still *not* regarded as a *fang* of her father's genealogy, but she was used to continue the family name of her father (C.N. Chen, 1984).

Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed literatures from the disciplines of history, philosophy and anthropology to introduce the historical background to colonial Taiwan. As a 'traditional' Confucian society, the peasant-landlord relation was the dominant

economic relation. Confucian philosophy was important as moral codes that regulated the social organisation of Han society and as the political ideology promoted by the Qing dynasty. By investigating the gendered virtues dictated in Confucian texts, I distinguished Confucianism from patriarchal kinship structures, arguing that Confucianism should be perceived as the ideology of patriarchy in traditional Han society. Moreover, I have explored the organisation and lifecyle of the Chinese family and unpacked the patriarchal principles from previous anthropological literature. I have argued that Chinese family organisation operated along genealogical principles of patriarchy. Due to the limited literature available it was suggested that these themes represent an imagined 'traditional' Confucian society. More substantive historical investigation is needed to determine how far they were representative of pre-colonial Taiwanese society.

This chapter restored the concept of patriarchy missing in previous studies. It differentiated Confucian ideology from patriarchal kinship structures. It also distinguished patriarchal genealogy from the household and redefined the family as the site where patriarchy and household are conflated. This suggests the possibility of using patriarchal genealogy as an analytical framework and lays the basis for further investigation of patriarchy in the coming chapters.

Part One

Becoming Women in Colonial Patriarchal Families

How did 'modern women' emerge under Japanese colonialism? What were their experiences in Han patriarchal families? How was the Han family organised during the colonial period? How did patriarchal genealogy intersect with class and state ideology in shaping the diverse experiences of women growing up under the Japanese regime? In this part, I draw on life stories of the first two generations of informants to answer these questions.[32] Although Part One focuses on families of colonial Taiwan, women's life stories clearly do not end with colonialism. The material extends into the first fifteen years of KMT rule and ends in 1960. However, my articulation of the patriarchal power structures in the conclusion to Part One is restricted to the colonial period. Part One begins with Chapter 3, which describes the historical contexts to Japanese colonialism. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are structured according to a lifecycle perspective of women as daughters, daughters-in-law, wives and mothers to explore the ways in which production, reproduction and resource distribution were organised in complex and conjugal families from 1900 to 1960.

In Chapter 3, I examine the changes that Japanese colonial government brought to Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. The specific themes are the emergence of new middle class women from a Confucian society and the colonial state policies that promoted modern womanhood. I use statistics and personal narratives to delineate the working lives of 'modern women' in early twentieth-century Taiwan. This chapter provides an historical

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[32] I treat the life histories of these two generations as one set of data because of the speed of social changes in the first half of the twentieth century was different from the second half. While certain social forces were more influential in one generation than the other, there was no significant break between generations. I only point out generation differences when there is sufficient data to support this.

background for the following three chapters, which investigate the institution of Han patriarchal families in more detail.

Chapter 4 focuses on the complex household of the gentry-merchant-landlord class between 1900 and 1950. My analysis looks at the experiences of daughters, adopted daughters and adopted daughters-in-law to explore the interplay of patriarchal genealogy and economic exchange relations in upper class families. I also develop the concept of patriarchal genealogy in relation to production, resource distribution and reproduction in these upper class families. This chapter aims to explore the organisation of wealthy complex families and to expose various women's relations to patriarchal genealogy. It serves as a background for the next chapter that focuses on daughters-in-law.

Chapter 5 investigates the experience of daughters-in-law between 1920 and 1960, in complex families of various economic standing, ranging from upper class to moderately wealthy landlord or merchant families. The relation between patriarchal genealogy and the reproductive work of complex families is the main focus of this chapter. I show how the diverse experiences, consciousness and resistant strategies of daughters-in-law might reveal the workings of class, patriarchy and state ideology.

Chapter 6 draws on the narratives of my informants describing their lives as wives and mothers to explore the production, reproduction and finance management of conjugal families from 1920 to 1960. I investigate the historical factors that might have contributed to shape the unusually high numbers of conjugal families in this period. I then consider the interplay of patriarchy and class in shaping different patterns of financial management and the interconnections between employment, motherhood and domesticity, scrutinising how the 'cult of productivity,' patriarchy and economics might affect the beliefs and identities of wives and mothers.

Through a lifecycle perspective, the three chapters uncover differences among women in diverse family structures of various economic standing and identify the workings of patriarchy, class and state ideology in shaping the heterogeneous experiences of

'modern women' growing up under Japanese colonialism. These findings contribute to a conclusion to Part One, where I pull together these arguments to develop the concept of 'patriarchal power structures' in colonial Taiwan. This concept is important for my approach to the empirical data in Part Two, where I address changes in patriarchal kinship relations after rapid industrialisation in the 1960s.

Table B shows the career trajectories and family structures of the informants of the first two generations. The data in this table underpins the main arguments of Part One.

Table B Work and Family Structures of First and Second Generation Informants Before and After Marriage

Name	Occupation/marriage*career break/work after break	Family Structure: Grown up in	Family Structures: Married into
1-01 Cai, A-xin	doctor/doctor/doctor	?/(step)implied joint-conjugal	(Implied) Conjugal
1-02 Lin, Cai-su	Teacher/ father's business/legislator (from local to national)	Conjugal	Conjugal
1-03 Lin, Yu-zhu	None/*/homeworking+husbandry	Extended-conjugal /(adopted) conjugal	Stem
1-04 Qiu, Yuan-yang	Teacher/*/legislator	Stem (uxorilocal)	Stem
1-05 Chen Wong, Shi-xia	Primary school teacher/ */teacher	Implied extended-conjugal	Extended-Conjugal
1-06 Ye, Tao	Primary school teacher/ vendor, social activist	?	Conjugal
1-07 Mother of Du Pan	None/none	Extended	Extended
1-08 Chen, Jin	Art teacher/art teacher/ art teacher	?	Conjugal
1-09 Guo, Yi-qin	Teacher/*/clogs factory owner	(Implied) extended	(Implied) Stem or extended
1-10 Yang, Mao-zhi	Teacher/*/ college chancellor	?	Conjugal
1-11 Chen, Shi-man	Doctor/doctor/legislator (local-national)	Joint	(Implied) Conjugal
1-12 Lin, Cai-wan	x/*/pharmacist	Extended	Conjugal
1-13 Yin, Xi-mei	Midwife/nurse	Implied complex.	Conjugal
1-14 Pan, Hen-Hong	Telephone operator/*/midwife	Conjugal	Extended-Stem-Conjugal
1-15 Chen, Ai-zhu	Teacher/*/leader of women's association	?	Stem (Uxorilocal)
1-16 Qing-hua	x/ x/ petty bourgeoisie (selling food)	(Adopted) Extended	Extended/Conjugal (second marriage)
1-17 Xu Jiang-chun	Working for father's company/ owned grocery shop	?	Conjugal
1-18 Xie, Xue-hong	Adopted daughter/employee of Singer/petty bourgeoisie + Taiwanese communist leader	Conjugal	Conjugal
2-01 Ruan, Mu-bi	x/x/provincial council woman	?	Extended
2-02 Lin zhuan, Ji-chun	Pharmacist	Implied complex.	Stem (Uxorilocal)

Name	Occupation/marriage*career break/work after break	Family Structure: Grown up in	Family Structures: Married into
2-03 Yang, Qien-he	Journalist／*／provincial council woman／civil servant/*	Stem- conjugal.	Stem-Conjugal
2-04 Jiang, Fen-hia	x/x/civil servant	Extended-conjugal	Conjugal-stem/ (widowed)
2-05 Shi Chen, Xiu-lian	Family worker/*/owned grocery shop	Three-generation stem with concubine.	Extended-conjugal (widowed)
2-06 You, Xiao-hia	Doctor/*/doctor	?	Stem-(divorced)
2-07 Lao, Jen-hia	Nurse/*/public midwife/pharmacist	Extended. Three generation.	Stem-extended-Conjugal
2-08 Wang, Dun-hia	Teacher/teacher/teacher	?	Stem-Conjugal
2-09 Zhong, Xue-hia.	Teacher/*homemaking/ owned business	?	Stem-Conjugal
2-10 Zeng, Hui-hia	Bank employee/*/owned a flowery shop.	?	?
2-11 Xie, Cui-hia	Civil servant/ owned grocery shop	Extended.	Conjugal
2-12 Zhang, Zhong-hia	Civil servant/civil servant/ civil servant	Four generation stem family with concubines.	Conjugal
2-13 Xin, Ben-hia.	Bank employee/*/?	?	Conjugal -Stem-Conjugal
2-14 Madam Wang	?	Extended	?
2-15 Lai, Qing-hia	Bank, bookshop employee/*	(Biological) stem, (adopted) conjugal	Conjugal
2-16 Du Pan, fan-ge	Teacher/* homeworking/*poet	Extended	Stem
2-17 Li, Yu-hia	Civil servant	Conjugal	x (unwed)
2-18 Qiu, Ruei-sui	Civil servant/*/casual worker, restaurant owner	Conjugal	Conjugal-Extended-Conjugal
2-19 Gue, Yen-hia	Civil servant/*/civil servant	Conjugal	Conjugal
2-20 Lim, Ting-hia	Civil servant (accountant)/*/textile broker	Conjugal, father had mistress outside home.	Conjugal
2-21 Fan, Li-qing	Accountant, bus waitress, civil servant/ petty bourgeoisie (managing husband's shoe shop)	Conjugal/alone with relatives/conjugal	Fraternal Joint
2-22 Zhang, Yu-zhan	Adopted daughter/*wife of doctor/farmer	Extended	Conjugal/stem (minor marriage)
2-23 Gue, yao-hia	Librarian/*	?	Extended-Conjugal.
2-24 Lun, zhun-hia	Domestic worker/petty bourgeoisie	Extended, grandparents had 5 sons. She used to live with grandma and separate from her parents.	Stem

Chapter 3 Modern Development in the Colonial Period, 1895-1945

In Chapter 2, I explained the contours of agricultural Han Confucian society. How did the configuration change under Japanese colonialism? What were the dynamics between the colonial state and Han society? How did new middle class women emerge during this period? What was state policy towards Taiwanese families and women? This chapter elaborates the political, economical and social changes during the colonial period, with a particular focus on colonial state policies on Han women. It begins with an overview of colonial history. Then, changing class structures and family practices during this period are examined. Thirdly, I look at state policy on Han women, exploring the gender ideology embedded within it. Finally, I explained working lives of 'modern women' in this historical context.

The Colonial History (1895-1945)

When the Japanese took over Taiwan in 1895, the ultimate aim was to exploit the island's fertility. Taiwan was perceived as an agricultural appendage of Japan to feed its growing industrial population (Ho, 1978:29). However, Taiwan was a difficult place to rule. It was hampered by large numbers of habitual opium smokers, with a variety of epidemics, such as plague, malaria, cholera and smallpox. Moreover, both the Chinese and indigenous population were fierce fighters, protesting against the Japanese coloniser (J.T. Yao, 2002: 1-3). To achieve effective rule, a colonial government was set up with its own legal, military, administrative, and financial systems. The Governor-General was given full rights to govern Taiwan without supervision by the national assembly of Japan (Kho, 1996:203).

Japanese state capitalism invested heavily in modernising agriculture. Exporting

rice and sugar to Japan became the most important economic activity (Ho, 1978). The three major areas of manufacturing: food processing, chemical and ceramic industries were all extensions of agricultural production. An island-wide transportation and communication network was built up, for the colonial aim of fully exploiting the land. Moreover, other industrial and agricultural infrastructures were established to advance productivity (Hermalin, et al. 1994:59). Systematic development of the police, public health and neighbourhood systems took place as means to strengthen colonial rule (J.T. Yao, 2002). These measures took place gradually in the phase of gradual assimilation (1895-1919) and developed drastically in the phases of integration (1920-1936).

After 1930, the Japanese began to see Taiwan as a foundation for the Asian empire it desired. The industrial base was broadened to include mining and metal production to help military preparation. However, this last minute modernisation did not bring about changes to the industrial structure that had been set up in the first three decades of colonial rule (Ho, 1978:74). After the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, a fierce 'Japanisation campaign' (皇民化) began, bringing Taiwan into the third phase of the colonial rule. Compulsory primary education was introduced for boys and girls and forceful processes of moral education, Japanese language education and a campaign promoting 'family of national language' were developed to make Taiwan islanders into loyal Japanese citizens. From 1942, Taiwanese men and women were conscripted or coerced to labour as military assistants or as comfort women for the Japanese armies in South Eastern Asia. Colonial rule ended in 1945 when Japan surrendered. Taiwan was given to Republic of China.

Despite of all these colonial exploitations and inequalities, the fifty years of Japanese colonial rule seemed to improve the infrastructure and health of Taiwan as a whole (Tsurumi, 1977; J.T. Yao, 2002). Modernity was introduced through developments in education, transportation, agriculture, public health and banking.

The Colonial State and Han Society

What impacts did colonial policies have on the class structures of Han society in general and the elite class in particular? What were state policies on Chinese families? What were the dynamics between the colonial state and the Han society?

With regard to class structures, historians and sociologists have suggested two significant changes took place. Firstly, the Japanese government transformed Taiwan's pre-modern economy to colonial state capitalism (Yanaihara, 1985 [1929]). This transformation further affected the class structures of Taiwan society. Colonial capitalism promoted banking and encouraged investment from local Han elites but maintained a strict racial hierarchy between the Japanese and Taiwan islanders (Yanaihara, 1985; J. M. Zhang, 1995). Moreover, there were already strikes by industrial and service workers[33] (Yanaihara, 1985; C. Yang, 1993:264-71), suggesting the exploitations of capitalism were felt. The second significant change was the emergence of 'modern professionals,' such as western-medicine doctors and teachers (J.M. Zhang, 1995). Beyond this, little research exists on the overall class structures of that time.[34] The following section focuses on the transformation of the gentry-official class and the emergence of 'modern professionals,' developments that were crucial to my analysis in following chapters.

In Chapter 2, I have shown that landlord-peasant relations were dominant in traditional Han society. This remained the case during the colonial period as the Japanese did not directly challenge local power structures and land relations. Nevertheless, the leading families of local merchants, compradors and landlords had

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[33] This information comes from the newspaper *Taiwan Minbao* (台灣民報), claiming to represent 'the most progressive voice of the Taiwan people.' These industrial and service workers included nurses, winery workers, textile workers, grass-bag and tobacco factory workers and workers in sugar plantations (C. Yang, 1993:264-71).

[34] Here, life stories might help constructing a more comprehensive picture than fragmented historical research. Auto/biographies (especially 1-18 and 2-21) suggested that perhaps the majority of the Han population still lived in class structures resembling those of traditional Han society, with emerging employment opportunities in handcrafts and sugar plantation in rural areas, and tea industries, factories and modern occupations in urban areas.

different lives from their counterparts in Qing dynasty.[35]

Firstly and most importantly, they were subordinated to the coloniser. The Japanese approached these elite families and incorporated them into the Hoko (neighbourhood self-governing) system. The patriarch of the local elite family was lured to take up the post of *Bao-zheng* (保正), local community leader, who was expected to cooperate with the colonial police in administration. These posts were voluntary and unpaid. In return, the Japanese bestowed local elites with 'a regular scheme of favours' (Barclay, 1954:51) that ranged from better education and business opportunities to appointment to government posts. Nevertheless, their status was always subordinate to the Japanese in terms of administration, education and business throughout the colonial period.

Secondly, the young members of elite families, who were the focus of my investigation, became 'modern professionals' rather than 'Confucian scholars' after the implement of westernised colonial education. Modern professionals relied on their educational credentials. However, they could be further differentiated into 'new middle class' and 'bourgeoisie'. New middle class sold their skills as educated employees of government (e.g. government officers, administrators, technicians, public health doctors, school teachers, lower-ranking office workers) or as employees of private companies and institutions (such as nurses, midwives, and white-collar service workers). The bourgeoisie owned their means of production, and included self-employed professionals, such as doctors and pharmacists, and educated small-business men who employed no more than six workers. This differentiation was

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[35] When Japanese came, the composition of leading elite families changed. The gentry-official class faced great anxiety about the security of their property and status. The Confucian examination system was abolished and their route to officialdom interrupted. As a result, high-ranking officials without lands in Taiwan fled to China between 1895 and 1897 (W.X. Wu, 1992:24-30). The remaining lower ranking Confucian scholars and some hometown-gentlemen who stayed in Taiwan retreated to world of literature, writing poems and teaching Chinese and Confucian literature without hopes of officialdom. Merchants, compradors and local landlords again replaced high-ranking Confucian gentries to become the leading elites under Japanese colonialism (W.X. Wu, 1992:31-42).

meaningful for the analytical purposes of this thesis.[36] In the historical context, these two groups had similar family backgrounds and were usually understood as 'new intellectuals' during colonial times.

Modern professionals inherited the social status of their original family, but were not simply remnants of the Confucian-elite class. The most significant distinction was the changes in the means of production and thus wages. As employees of other social institutions, or working independently as doctors or midwives, their incomes could not compete with those of the elder generations who generated family wealth from land rents, industrial investments and business. The prestige of being the 'leisured class' (Fei, 1946) could not be reproduced. Meanwhile, working independently from the family business also had the potential to give increasing autonomy from their parental landlord family.

However, the particular colonial situation limited the scope of the modern professionals. Except self-employed professionals, the majority of modern educated young men of elite families stayed home to maintain their landlord status. This might be attributed to the colonial discrimination in the labour market. The salaries of the Japanese were two to three times higher than those of Taiwan islanders plus 50% to 60% percent allowance. Taiwanese were excluded from higher-level jobs.[37] They could only work as the lowest-level administrators of the bureaucracy. For elite Taiwanese men, colonial segregation appeared to be very frustrating. Therefore, a young generation maintained their social status mainly through inheritance of family status rather than through social mobility outside the family.

To sum up, Han society gradually incorporated modern changes into the existing

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[36] Chapter 6 will argue that different relations of production affects the ways reproductive work was carried out and family economy managed.

[37] Cai Pei-huo (蔡培火), a leading nationalist reformer, criticised the Japanese because 'there were already 200,000 people knew Japanese. There was also a great amount of people who studied abroad in Japan. Every year, more than 100 students returned from Japan. ...How do the Bureaucracy deal with them?...We have only five high ranking officials (高等官), and thirty more upper middle level officials (判任官). The rest of us had no jobs....' (Cai, n.d. 'To Japanese citizens', p58-60, quoted in Yanaihara, 1985:98).

system. Even though Taiwan islanders were subordinated to the Japanese colonisers as a whole, the class structure did not change dramatically. Upper class families of merchants, landlords and compradors were very likely to maintain their landlord status while including young members who were or had been 'modern professionals.'

What was the family policy of the colonial state? Did the Japanese ever intend to challenge practices in the Han family? Most American scholars claimed that Japanese influences on the family system were negligible (Barclay, 1954:237; Fricke, et al. 1994:47) especially in rural communities (Cohen, 1976; M. Wolf, 1972; Gates, 1987). The family was thus perceived as a fortress of the Taiwanese people against Japanese colonialism. However, J. T. Yao challenged this interpretation and argued that by choosing the patriarch alone of the elite family as the Bao-zheng and assigning police officers accordingly to supervise them, the Hoko system was not a government *of* families but a government *through* the family (2002:247). That is to say, by recognising the power and authority of the patriarch in elite families, the colonial government legitimised its power on the basis of the Han patriarchal family system, well-known for hierarchies of generation and gender (J.T. Yao, 2002: 247-54).

In view of overall colonial state policies on women and the family, I support the argument of J.T. Yao. Considering the fact that colonial government did opt to intervene on some domestic issues (such as unbinding women's feet, outlawing handmaids and enhancing women's rights to divorce to discourage concubinage[38]) through legal changes but left out certain family practices (such as adoption and minor marriage), the influence of colonial government on Han family practices should be understood as follows: the colonial state recognised the authority of the patriarch over his family and assigned certain powers to him *as the delegate of colonial power* in the sphere of customary family practices; yet it also chose to intervene on other family practices

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[38] The issues of handmaids and concubines will be addressed in Chapter 4. The Japanese legal regulations that attempted to eliminate concubinage were addressed by Q.Y.Shi (1956). The rights to divorce through legal reform, accompanied by heated debates over how to transform the customary laws of the 'backward' colonized' and 'advanced colonizer', are well-explored by Z.R.Chen (1997) in her LLM dissertation *The History of Rights to Divorce*.

through legislative changes when it saw fit. Therefore, in contrast to common anthropological theories that Han family practices in colonial times were 'natural processes' for Chinese families, I argue that Japanese colonial power was present, even if it was sometimes delivered through hands-off policies rather than drastic changes.

The Colonial State and the 'Cult of Productivity'

One of the most significant changes during the colonial time was the rise of the new middle class working women. What happened? How did this group emerge from the traditional Confucian society? What were state policies on Han women? The following section looks at the impact of the Japanese colonial government on Han women, followed by analysis of the gender ideologies within state policies.

Women's Education

Japanese colonial state policy was characterised by a dual nature: being both conciliatory and repressive. This was also found in the introduction of modern education for women. To facilitate colonial rule in Taiwan after 1895, a modern education system was gradually set up,[39] but with an emphasis on providing 'differential education between the Japanese and the Taiwanese (日台差別教育)'.[40] The main goal was to teach the Japanese language in order to assimilate Taiwanese people as Japanese citizens, while the Taiwanese elites accepted these policies with the

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[39] Educational policies could be divided into three stages. From 1895 to 1919, the gradual assimilation phase, a few primary schools were set up, mainly for the benefit of Japanese children in Taiwan. Children of Taiwanese elites attended these schools as well. From 1919-1936, the assimilation phase, women's education expanded to middle and higher levels. The third, 'Japanisation campaign' phase (1937-1945) promoted Japanese language and culture for the majority of Taiwanese (Yu, 1987:40-53).

[40] Overall, the education provided for Japanese men and women was better than that for the Taiwanese. There were more schools for Han men in Taiwan, with richer content and longer hours for studying the main subjects (such as Japanese, writing, etc.) than for Han women (Yu, 1987). Interestingly, because the Japanese sponsored the education fees for indigenous communities, indigenous people had higher rates of education than Han people. In 1926, 74% indigenous men and 69.4% indigenous women attended primary school, while only 43% Han men and 12.3% Han women did (Yanaihara, 1985:145).

hope of progressing towards 'modernity' (W.X. Wu, 1992:294; C. Yang, 1993:62-3).[41]

The Japanese government perceived education as the foundation of a prosperous and powerful nation. It regarded women's education as the basis for the education of the next generation; its it's main aim was to produce 'wise wives and good mothers' to strengthen and develop the nation (Yu, 1987:53). The Xinzhu Girls' Primary School was set up with the aim of 'educating mothers for next generation' (Yu, 1987:58). At primary school levels, female pupils learned knitting and housework, while male pupils chose between agriculture and business (Zhou, 1997:27). At middle school, alongside physical education, science and social science, home economy and related subjects formed an important part of women's education. Moral education and female modesty were essential elements in women's education at all levels (Yu, 1987).

During the 'Japanisation campaign,' education became compulsory for Han people to speed the process of assimilation. From 1940 to 1943, 40% to 60% Han girls entered compulsory primary education (see figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Rate of Primary School Attendance, 1908-1943

Sources: Data computed from *School Year Books of Taiwan Governor-General,* quoted in Yu (1987:286).

Patriotic moral education, female modesty and female virtues were reinforced in

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[41] Modernisation was quite an acceptable idea for both Japanese and Han intellectuals in the early twentieth century, when Western Imperial power appeared to be more 'advanced' than the East. In Japan, modern education was implemented by Meiji in 1873 (Tsurumi, 1977).

schools. Primary school education for women aimed at inculcating moral discipline, cultivating female virtues and encouraging 'good customs' (i.e. Japanese customs). The contents of education emphasised the importance of managing households. Science and mathematics aimed at 'improving family life': i.e. teaching girls to do housework in scientific ways. Arts courses were to learn to practice Japanese housewives' tasks in the Japanese household. Practical skills of hygiene education and first aid were stressed. In music courses, children were taught how to sing on memorial days. Housework and knitting courses taught pupils how to worship ancestors, prepare food, and care for children, etc. (Yu, 1987:125). However, after 1935, textbooks encouraged women to work, which was not seen in 1922 textbooks (Yu, 1995:171).

The Japanese intentionally restricted education in Taiwan to low, mostly practical levels. Only after 1919, were vocational training courses established at post-primary school levels (Tsurumi, 1977), but purely with a pragmatic approach. The Japanese trained Taiwan islanders to work as teachers and health workers, probably in the hope of producing an obedient future generation of the colonised. Female teachers were trained to teach Singing and Home Economy for first and second grade students. Female health workers were trained to be midwives and nurses rather than doctors.[42] The study of law and politics, which was regarded as breeding rebellious intellectuals, was strongly discouraged (Kho, 1996).

Mobilising women for World War II

Women were perceived as the essential stabilizing and supporting forces of Japanese war. A 'Patriotic Women's Association' had been set up for Japanese and upper class Taiwanese women in 1905. They served as the supporting forces of the Japanese army fighting Taiwan indigenous people. In 1931, the association was reorganised to support the Sino-Japanese war in northeast China and expanded to support the 'Japanisation campaign'. Different groups were set up to mobilise women of diverse age groups (C.

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[42] Arguments generated from my data.

Yang, 1993:58).[43] Housewives who spoke no Japanese were also encouraged to attend meetings. All of these organisations were told to promote frugal family lives, change customs, enhance the spirit of citizenship and contribute to the nation in economic terms. They were also trained in first aid (Y.H. Yang: 1994: 29). The logic was that a wise and frugal housewife could save money for the nation. Spiritually, a woman should be able to endure material deficiency and accept the death of a husband or sons. Lower-class women were conscripted and coerced into the army, becoming nurses, maids or 'comfort women' (Y. H. Yang, 1994). Moreover, all women were mobilized as solid productive forces behind the war. Farmers and students were to engage in productive work on the land or to do manual work supporting military supply. Some women entered white-collar work in the post-office and newspaper agents, as well as employment in the civil service (Y.H. Yang, 1994:77).

Women in the Labour Market

Figure 3.2 Rate of Labour Force Participation, 1905-1930

Rate of Labour Force Participation here is defined as the proportion of the total number in the labor force to the total population aged *ten* years old and over. The figure is computed from Expedient Household Survey, 1905, 1915 and National Force Survey, 1920, 1930, summarised in Table 58-1 and 59-1, *Fifty Years of Official Statistics of Taiwan Province*, http://twstudy.iis.edu.tw/twstatistic50.

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[43] The 'Patriotic Girls' Group' was for girls at school, the 'Virgin Association' (or 'Young Women's Group' later named) for unmarried women, and the 'Women's Association' for married women (C. Yang, 1993:58).

Figure 3.2 shows the rate of labour force participation between 1905 and 1930. In 1905, 1915, and 1920 respectively, there were 28%, 38%, and 34% of women participated in the labour market. Nevertheless, it dropped back to 26% in 1930.[44] This overall employment rate includes three industries, however, in each year, around 70% of the employment opportunities for women were in agriculture, where the Japanese invested heavily in terms of technology, education and human resources.[45] From available data, we cannot know the percentage of female new middle class, but it is possible to learn the number of female service workers. In the year 1905 and 1920, female service workers only composed 1% of the working population. In 1930, this group grew to 37,670 people, about 2% of the employed population (see figure 3.3). This figure does not include those who worked in first and second sector industry as white-collar workers. Moreover, the category of service workers includes a large number of domestic workers. It might be disputed whether they should be included as new middle class. Thus, the percentage of female service workers is not representative of that of new middle class women. The figures are only used to illustrate the limited size of this group in the population as a whole.

Fig 3.3 Employment Structures of the 1930 Labour Market by Industry and Sex

☐ Agriculture ■ Industry ☐ Service (Female) ☐ Service (Male)

Sources: National Force Survey, 1930, quoted from table 2-4, Yu (1995:28).

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[44] Since this timing corresponded to the decline of handicraft industries (see Ho, 1978), where a significant number of women were employed, I suspect that the decrease in women's labour force participation might be related.

[45] The developing plan for Japan and Taiwan was 'Industrialising Japan, agriculturing Taiwan' (Kho, 1996).

Other sources showed that the number of educated women working was increasing. In 1920, 9.36% of school age girls attended primary school. In the same year, 85.68% of primary-educated Han women were unpaid household workers after they finished studying. However, in 1936, 26.89% school age Han women had received primary-level education. After graduation, more than half of them were employed. 27% of them engaged in agriculture, 7.29 % in business, 3.52% in manufactory and 30.99 % in service work (almost exclusively work as domestic servants). Unpaid household workers were not recorded in this year, but were already under 1% in 1931 (*School Year Books of Taiwan Governor-General*, in Yu, 1987:319). Among these occupations, it was not surprising to find agricultural workers since this was the area that the Japanese intended to develop. However, I do not think Japanese education intended to train domestic servants. I suspect the prevalence of domestic workers might result from Taiwanese women's practical needs to earn money after investing in primary education and that the exhaustive practical training aimed at producing 'scientific mothers for next generation' within schools might have contributed a great deal, becoming another kind of 'vocational training.'

Japanese State Ideology: the 'Cult of Productivity'

What was the gender ideology of the Japanese colonial state embedded in these changes brought to Han society in colonial Taiwan? They sent very paradoxical messages, which makes it difficult to assess whether Japanese policies were more 'progressive' or 'oppressive' than post-war KMT policies.

On the one hand, Japanese policies seemed to produce positive effects in breaking down the rigid Confucian divisions of 'inner' and 'outer' in Qing Taiwan. Women were educated and encouraged to work for the family and for the society. Women's engagement could go beyond the family. Upper class women did not appear to be enthusiastic about engaging in paid employment after marriage but they undertook philanthropic activities. Middle or lower middle class women received primary education and engaged in paid work of all kinds. For these Japanese educated women,

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Japanese policies had a profound impact because they learned how to manage a household in 'productive' (lucrative or unpaid) ways for the family and the society. However, the life stories of my informants also suggest that these practical skills did not necessarily lead to formal employment. Han women educated in colonial Taiwan usually engaged in informal work while taking care of their family.

On the other hand, the 'cult of productivity' strengthened and reinforced certain gendered protocols and gender hierarchy for women. Strict Japanese codes were introduced to Taiwanese families. The wife must greet and serve her husband in certain ways: dressing their husband, greeting him when he came back home, serving him with sandals or preparing bathing water for him. These well-known 'Japanese customs' were practiced by many of my second-generation interviewees at certain stages of their lives. [46] Nowadays in Taiwan, when evaluating women's status under Japanese colonialism, terms like 'Japanese customs' or 'Japanese culture' are almost equated with 'chauvinistic' 'conservative' and 'oppressive' gender relations. Even scholars have made such assertions too easily. After presenting grounded historical arguments on women's status in Qing Taiwan, the historian Yin uncritically claimed, without any evidence, that under Japanese colonisation Taiwanese women's status declined much more than in the years before it (1990:41). When the feminist Lu Hsiu-lien fostered 'New Feminism' in 1970s Taiwan, she argued that Taiwanese women were oppressed by both Chinese Confucianism and Japanese male chauvinism. She said,

> 'During half a century of colonial rule, the Japanese custom that men are well attended by women while women shall submit to men's domination was transplanted into Taiwanese families. Basically the husbands were masters of the family while wives were nothing but housemaids' (H.L. Lu, 1993:291).

This puzzle about Japanese policies haunted me for a long time until I came across an insightful article, 'The Meiji State's Policy Toward Women, 1890-1910' written by Nolte and Hastings (1991). They used the term 'cult of productivity' to describe the

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[46] These rituals were dropped after a certain time. One of my interviewees said, 'I used to help him dressing. But, I just did not do it any more.' 'Why not?' 'I was too busy and it was not necessary, really.'

ideal of womanhood in Meiji State policy. By analysing exemplified stories and policies, Nolte and Hastings argued that the Japanese government not only encouraged filial piety, frugality and feminine modesty, but also promoted a modern image of Japanese women of all classes as 'courageous, frugal, literate, hardworking and productive' (172). The virtues of being a 'good wife, wise mother' were stressed. However, the Japanese government valued a woman's productive power more than her ability as a mother. Nolte and Hastings argued that the government might recognise all characteristics of the 'cult of domesticity' found in the industrialising United States that stressed piety, purity, submission and domesticity as essential characters of ideal Japanese women. However, the most characteristic image of ideal Japanese women was their capability to endure and to be productive, under all circumstances, especially in wartime. Under this very Japanese logic, there was no distinction between private and public, corresponding to the division between family and nation, home and work.[47] Moreover, this image of modern women cut across class differences. Through the 'cult of productivity,' a pre-modern Japanese femininity that was defined specifically for each class was transformed into a general modern femininity that was expected from women of various classes. Upper class women had to be as productive as lower class women, while lower class women should receive education as upper class women did to become modern (Nolte and Hastings, 1991).

Although Nolte and Hastings' research focused on the last two decades of Meiji Policy in Japan, I find their analysis and concepts illustrative of the spirit of Japanese policies in Taiwan, even though the contents might differ. Taiwan was the colony. Education for women was kept at a low level and probably women's productivity was much more valued than that of Japanese women. Still, I find it appropriate to adopt the term 'cult of productivity' for its simultaneous emphasis on female virtues, modest and

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[47] This is how early Marxist Feminism conceptualised public/private, capitalism/patriarchy. In Japanese state policy, there was no such tension. A woman ought to carry out both since they were both defined as female virtues. In contrast, Nolte and Hastings pointed out Meiji leaders claimed the home as a public place. A woman could be conscripted to become a nurse in the army, but they could not claim these territories as their own (1991:173-4).

female productivity in describing Japanese policies on Taiwan. Moreover, the 'cult of productivity' in Taiwan could also imply modernity, due to its close association with modern education and industrial production as in Japan.[48]

Deploying the concept of the 'cult of productivity' enables me to avoid partial evaluations of gender ideology and accept the simultaneous presence of productivity and female virtues. In colonial Taiwan, female modesty and virtues were stressed, but defined in a 'modern' sense that linked educated women with the prosperity of the colony. Women were also trained to serve the wounded with first aid for Imperial Soldiers and to make savings for the household and for the Japanese Imperial War. Female virtues were not only defined in terms of the submissive wife,[49] but also productivity and endurance. While the state required women's contribution to its Imperial War, they equally assumed that they should also take up responsibilities as good mothers and wise wives. The ideal of womanhood was not defined in terms of a public and private division as in late nineteenth century Western industrial society, where women had to choose between home and work, but in an early twentieth-century Japanese sense, in which women's virtues were simultaneously feminine, modest and productive. Since there was no boundary between the home and the nation, a woman had to pursue productivity by whatever means to serve the nation and the family simultaneously.

Under the 'cult of productivity,' Taiwanese women's feet were unbound. Han women, few in comparison with with Japanese women, indigenous men and women and Han men, started to receive modern education. Nevertheless, the number of educated pupils increased over time. They were taught knitting, flower arranging, housework, house management and childcare in a scientific way, and practical

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[48] One could not deny that the agriculture in Taiwan was 'industrialised' under Japanese rule given the way infra-structure was built, technology was developed, workers were trained and more and more workers were formally employed in agricultural jobs, including women.

[49] In Confucian texts, filial daughters-in-law and wise mothers were the main focus of teaching. Little has been said about being a wife except vague ideas of being obedient (Please refer to Chapter 2). Japanese state policies happened to fit into this least regulated familial dyad in Han families. Probably due to this reason, for many Han people, Japanese gender code appeared to be even more oppressive than Han.

vocational skills to enhance productivity for the Japanese Empire. A positive image of modernisation appears to be behind these ideas. However, when the Japanese started to conscript the labour of men and women for their Imperial War, these policies were not carried out without resistance. The simultaneous emphasis of the nation and the family, and the conflation of public and private in Japanese thought fundamentally conflicted with Confucian ideology that perceived the family as the roots of all virtue.[50] However it was usually the wealthy families that had the power to resist. Impoverished lower-class women found it difficult to cope with the conscription and loss of their husbands and sons for the Japanese nation. In contrast, the powerful and the elites had more resources to escape conscription. Moreover, when the resource allocation policies reduced the lower class to starvation, the upper and middle upper class had access to the black market for proper food.[51] Thus, women of different classes experienced the Japanese state policies of the 'cult of productivity' differently. Impoverished and uneducated women were exploited to the extreme while educated and upper class women were supported by the power and wealth of their family (provided they had access to it) and practical skills learned at school to survive difficult times. Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan had very different meanings for women of different classes.

Becoming New Middle Class Working Women (1920-1945)

It was under such a moralistic and practically oriented 'cult of productivity' that my informants made their way to become new middle class working women. Table 3.1 shows the educational backgrounds of my informants of the first two generations. It is apparent that my informants were very privileged. Most of them came from elite families that had no problem supporting their education financially. Seven of them studied in Japan. Some of them studied medicine or pharmacy as their brothers or husband did, but at women's colleges. Some of them studied art, music or knitting as

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[50] In Han culture, the family was situated at the centre of concentric circles where all other social relations developed accordingly. Family was no doubt prioritised before the nation. See chapter 2.

[51] Argument generated from cases 1-03, 2-03 and various other stories in historical documents.

their Japanese teachers in Taiwan had advised them, for the sake of securing a job in teaching after returning home. Their great achievements in the early twentieth-century were unprecedented in Taiwanese history, and even Japanese educational history.[52]

Table 3.1 Educational Backgrounds of First and Second Generation Informants

Levels of Education	First Generation	Second Generation
Japan (above high school levels)	5	2
High school (plus vocational training)	7	15
Higher Levels (Business, Home Economy, etc.)	3	4
Primary School	2	4
None	1[53]	0
Total	18	25

Women who studied abroad in Japan were a minority in colonial Taiwan because wealth and a supportive family were the preconditions for such achievement. However, they were a strong presence in my sample, especially among the first generation. This could be largely attributed to their successes, which attracted the attention of feminists in the 1990s. As a result, their life stories became available to me. Secondly, according to the life stories of my second generation informants, the Pacific War that broke out in 1941 jeopardised their chances of studying in Japan. The decreasing number of women studying in Japan in the second generation might reflect this historical change. Table 3.2 lists the first jobs performed by my informants after graduation.

Table 3.2 First Job after Graduation for First and Second Generation Informants

First Job after Graduation	First Generation	Second Generation
Physicians	2	1
Teachers	8	3
Pharmacists	1	1
Nurses	1	1
Midwives	1	0
Bank employees	0	4

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[52] For example, Zhuang Wu-xian (莊無嫌) was once given out to be an adopted daughter. After high school, she was funded by the colonial government to study home economy in Japan. After four years, she returned home, teaching for three years to fulfill her obligations. She then returned to Japan, passing the examination for the department of education in the Hiroshima College of Literature and Science (廣島文理科). She was refused for entrance by the college on the ground of her gender. However, on her insistence, the college made an exception for her to study education. Her excellent performance paved the way for future Japanese women to study in the education department. In 1953, she was granted a doctor of philosophy degree and became the first female PhD of literature in post-war Japan (oral history in Yu, 1994:104).

[53] Xie Xue-hong was an adopted daughter, received no formal education and made her way to become a working woman after being married as a concubine.

First Job after Graduation	First Generation	Second Generation
Civil Servants (mostly as typists or accountants)	0	7
Journalists	0	1
Librarians	0	1
Domestic Servants	0	1
Family Business	1	1
Sales	1	0
Never worked[54]	3	3
Total	18	25

What were the urban and working environments in the 1920s when first generation career women entered the labour market? From 1895 to 1920, when my first generation informants were born and had their childhood, there was no Taipei city but two treaty ports and one garrison town. Han culture was still the dominant force in regulating daily lives (Ye, 1993:278-9). However, to benefit Japanese colonisers, personal comforts, such as running water, systems of sewage disposal, gas and electricity were built up in the city (Barclay, 1954:118, Ye, 1993:280-300). In the 1920s and 1930s, the first generation informants were entering the labour market, the second generation informants were children and the changes brought by the Japanese were gradually having an impact. The city attracted modest numbers of migrants from nearby rural areas but there appeared no sweeping dislocation of persons of different gender and age groups resulting from this urbanisation process (Barclay, 1954:125). Moreover, Japanese and westernised lifestyles started to add new flavours to urban lives. My first generation informants, who worked as new career women, were themselves one of these new flavours.

However exciting this development seemed, women who worked in Japanese institutions confronted gender and racial discrimination at work. The Japanese intentionally excluded Taiwan islanders from higher-level jobs (such as the high level bureaucratic, managerial, and technical jobs). The colonised Taiwanese could only become the lowest-level administrators of the bureaucracy. Even when Japanese

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[54] They were included in the data set because their education and family backgrounds resembled those of other working women. Their cases were compared and contrasted with working women and were used to illustrate the family structures in the next three chapters.

recruited lower level white-collar workers, they gave priority to Japanese women over Taiwanese men. As a general rule, the salaries of the Japanese were two to three times higher than those of Taiwan islanders. Moreover, Japanese workers usually enjoyed a 50% to 60% percent allowance that was not available for the Taiwanese (from various life stories). Although both Japanese and Taiwan islanders were allocated accommodation when employed by the colonial government, that for Taiwan islanders could be very primitive (Yu, 1995). Beyond these racial discriminations, there were gender discriminations. Taiwanese men were paid more than Taiwanese women. Taiwanese female teachers clustered in teaching first and second grade pupils on 'women's subjects' such as morals, Japanese language, singing, painting, sewing or handicraft, etc. (Yu, 1995:78-9). Similarly, women who worked in the hospitals as doctors, nurses and midwives also confronted institutional discrimination at work (Yu, 1995).

However, women who worked as independent professionals, such as doctors or pharmacists, did not seem to face any particular opposition to their status as a female doctor. Instead, their earnest performance at work seemed to earn them a good reputation (Yu, 1995; also reflected in my data). Moreover, many of these enthusiastic first generation working women were able to devote their energy to community services. For example, the first female doctor Cai, A-xin established her own midwifery schools. She wanted to train more qualified midwives to enhance the health and survival chances of women and infants (C. Yang, 1993:504; also Chapter 6).

After the late 1920s, entertainment and public spaces gradually emerged in Taipei city, such as conference halls, hospitals, schools, banks, libraries, bookshops, restaurants, hotels, coffee shops, tea shops, table tennis shops, pools and department stores (Ye, 1993, in Yu, 1995:24). All of these public spaces provided employment opportunities for service workers. According to the 1937 survey on the incomes of female workers in Taipei city, women's occupations showed amazing diversity. They worked as doctors, dancers, midwives, school teachers, prostitutes, geisha, nurses,

journalists, nannies, religious workers, secretaries, insurance workers, barbers, typists, broadcasters, bus drivers, teachers in tea-drinking, music and home economy, shopkeepers, waitresses, factory workers, writers, maids, carpenters and cleaners among others. (H.W.Chen, 1999:91). Moreover, there was already industrial action taken by women. In 1929, Taipei geishas and prostitutes organized themselves to protest against increasing taxes (C. Yang, 1993:271-2). In 1930, nurses in the Mackay Memorial Hospital initiated strikes and organized a nursing association to protect their working conditions (C. Yang, 1993:267). Diverse economic activities, cultural and social movements were characteristic of urban lives of this period.

In the 1930s, companies that wanted to recruit white-collar workers usually required applicants to have at least primary school education. These were competitive jobs. According to a newspaper report, one electric company that wanted to recruit four office workers attracted 126 applicants (Yu, 1995:30). Service jobs increased significantly after 1941, when most men were conscripted for the Pacific War. The Taipei post-office telephone department stands as an example. In 1936, there were only 112 Taiwan women employed. This increased to 746 in 1943 (Yu, 1995:32). Table 3.3 listed numbers of Han male and female in selected occupations (that required education credentials) in the 1930s. This shows a gendered occupational segregation that was closely related to the educational policies mentioned above, as well as employees' preferences for female workers in certain jobs.

Table 3.3 Numbers of Taiwan Workers in Burgeoning Occupations by Sex, 1930

Occupation	Male Taiwanese	Female Taiwanese
Teachers	3,645	437
Physicians	1,452	9
Midwives	0	794
Nurses	3	426
Pharmacists	1,422	51
Bus attendances	719	135
Finance and insurance workers	193	6
Accountants	2,052	19

Sources: National Force Survey (1930:120-7), Quoted from Yu (1995:32).

When the Chinese took over Taiwan, most (male) Mainlanders could not help but

be amazed by the prevalence of educated Taiwanese women working outside the home.

They were found in government institutions as secretary or accountants, in schools as

teachers, on the land as agricultural workers. Women also made handcrafts, or worked

as waitresses or saleswomen (P.N. Zhu, 1948:37). Live-in domestic service, seen as

shameful for Mainlanders, was regarded as an honourable occupation by Han

domestics.[55] Mainlander Liu Dong-yang observed in 1948,

> 'They made up, dressed smart and went to theatres. They would wear
> elegant watches and some of them even wore golden rings, better off than
> their employers. They were such good house managers that some male
> employers would give them all their salaries as if they [workers] were the
> housewives. Most importantly, they had courage. Employers could talk and
> joke with them. But, if they abused them, they would pack their clothes,
> leaving the house without any regrets' (D.Y. Liu, 1948:280).

The autonomy of women domestic workers seemed so high that they needed not to

tolerate employers' abuse. Interestingly, it also appeared that Japanese courses aimed at

training a 'good mother and wise wife' turned out to foster household management as a

set of professional skills that could be sold for a living. Judging from D.Y. Liu's

descriptions and many other similar observations repeating in these magazines during

1945-1949, the skills, working conditions and power of educated domestics had greatly

changed from those of traditional unpaid or low-paid domestic servants.[56]

The above sections delineating the formation of new middle class at macro and

micro levels have provided the background to the emergence of new middle class

women as a group. In the first two decades of colonial rule, only elite women received

education. With educational expansion in the 1920s, the numbers of women with

educational credentials increased. Moreover, job opportunities opened up during the

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[55] In school textbooks, Confucian morality in the Japanese style was taught. Confucianism despised manual workers and valued scholars. But, Taiwanese were also taught the Japanese work value which differed radically from Confucianism. Japanese believed that people who worked with their hands were equally important as people who worked with their minds (Tsurumi, 1977).

[56] I think when Yu (1995:30) said that these high numbers of maids and nannies in the 1930s were doing traditional women's work, not so different from 'traditional' maids and nannies, she underplayed the differences between these educated domestic workers and 'traditional' maids. I think that education had enhanced their skills and bargaining powers for their work contents and salaries. Their status might differ significantly from those low-paid or unpaid, uneducated servants in gentry-landlord or merchant households that I will address in next chapter.

wartime, particularly to women. This boosted the potential scope of the 'new middle class' to include women originally from different social strata. However, new middle class Han women worked in a gendered and racially stratified situation. Self-employed professionals were restricted to certain occupations, such as doctors or pharmacists. Those who worked for the colonial government (such as civil servants or teachers) or private companies remained in lower-level white-collar jobs with slim chances of promotion.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the changes that colonial rule brought about in Han society. It has also explored the dynamics between the colonial state, the elite family, class structure and women. The colonial state adopted conciliatory and yet repressive measures to deal with elite families, restricting their development under the colonialism. Its policies introduced capitalism to Han society, contributing to the rise in employment in both agricultural and service sectors. The state 'cult of productivity' had paradoxical effects on women. On the one hand, it contributed to the rise of new middle class women. On the other hand, it imposed strict gender codes on Taiwanese women. What impact did the growing numbers of the new middle class women have on patriarchal families? The following three chapters address the configurations of the Han family and the lived experiences of these modern women within the family institution.

Chapter 4 Patriarchy in Upper Class Complex Families, 1900-1950

In Chapter 2, I explored the concept of patriarchal genealogy as it emerges from previous anthropological work on rural families. In this chapter, I apply this concept to my data on the urban upper class family which draws on the childhood memories of first and second generation informants. What was the family configuration of upper class complex families? What role does patriarchal genealogy play in these families? Why and how were these family practices gendered?

This chapter looks at the production, reproduction, consumption and resource distribution of upper class complex families and interprets diverse women's relations to domestic labour through the frameworks of class and patriarchal genealogy. The main sources are the narratives of my informants on their lives as daughters, adopted daughters or adopted daughters-in-law within their family of origin or their foster family. Although the experiences that I draw on ranged from 1900 to 1950, the majority of the events took place between 1900 and 1930. These upper class families often faced dissolution within a generation or two, probably due to the natural lifecycle of the family as well as the high mortality of that time. This chapter describes the organization of urban complex families and thus also provides background for the following one, which looks at the experiences of my informants as adult daughters-in-law in complex families between 1920 and 1960.

The Patriarch

How was the upper class family organised? To answer this question, I begin by

introducing the patriarch, the central figure in this type of family. In early twentieth-century Taiwan, upper class elite families seemed to maintain a lifestyle resembling previous perceptions of traditional Han society. The eldest man of the family, identified as the patriarch, headed the household. He claimed his authority from his privileged position within generational, age and gendered hierarchies. The authority of the patriarch was far more significant in urban families than rural, in elite than ordinary families, because the urban elite patriarch usually combined several roles: a respectable man in the family, successful merchant in business and powerful leader of the local community. The patriarch was responsible for both the 'outer' (achievements in business and local community) and the 'inner' (the family) (Chapter 2). The powers of the patriarch could be so great that he laid down rules, redistributed family wealth and made decisions on all family affairs, including children's jobs and marriage. The famous merchant Li Chun-sheng (李春生, 1838-1924) at Da-dau-cheng (大稻程) had set up a 'family constitution' to regulate his descendents with regard to family principles, clan organisation, property, accountancy, reprimand and punishment (H.W. Chen, 1999:134).

According to Confucian ideas, the patriarch might be responsible for cultivating the morality of each family member. Chen Jin, the famous painter of the colonial period, remembered vividly that on one occasion, when she was 17, she was returning home from high school after the school opening ceremony, when her father (a Bao-zheng, local community leader) caught up with her and instructed her sternly that 'When others are taking a break, you shall continue to study hard' (1-08:97-98). Huang Wan-cheng (黃旺成), a social activist, who fearlessly criticised both Japanese colonialism and KMT rule in the 1920s and late 1940s, was an authoritarian figure in his family. Huang constantly seized opportunities to educate his family members. When he talked to his son, his son always stood still. His daughter-in-law, Ruan Mu-bi (2-18) said that her father-in-law always requested to see her in the evening and asked her what she had read in the newspapers that day. If she had not read them, he would

criticize her for not making even twenty minutes time to do so. Huang Wan-cheng's expectations of his offspring were high. Ruan Mu-bi recalled the following incident in 1997:

> My father-in-law was very strict with his daughters-in-law... Once my husband returned home, drunk, while it was pouring with rain outside. My father-in-law said, "No one shall open the door for someone who is not already at home by this time. How can he come home so late?" My husband was then knocking on the door continuously. He shouted, "I am back. Why don't you open the door?" I did not open the door because my father-in-law had spoken those words and was sitting there with me. It was pouring and my husband was excluded from his home. I felt so bad that evening and could hardly sleep. My father-in-law woke me up, saying "How do you explain what happened? Who are you? Are you a wife? Are you a wife to him? Shouldn't you beg me to let him in? Why did you keep quiet and keep him out of his home? ...You should consider your own behaviour and think more about it.' (2-18:183-184)[57]

As the family head had the authority to carry out his wishes, it was also possible that he made decisions that violated gender hierarchy or the gendered division of labour. Cai You-ting (蔡幼庭) was a political activist in the 1920s and believed strongly in promoting gender equality. In most families at that time, men ate before women. However, in his family, he commanded that all family members eat at the same time (1-02:150). Also at his insistence, neither of his daughters bound their feet and both received high school education. The father of Zhang Zhong-hia (2-29), a successful tea merchant in Da-dau-cheng area, arranged the food shopping every morning, rather than asking the women of the house to do it. He gave the reason that 'women tended to save money when shopping, which would lead to a bad quality of diet for the workers.'

If we consider the idea that generation, age and gender hierarchies were the main principles governing Chinese family organisation, it might be difficult to imagine that a patriarch was in charge of everyday family shopping or that men and women ate together in early twentieth-century Taiwan. However, these practices all became possible when the patriarch insisted. Nevertheless, the patriarch could not just act as he

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[57] When quoting life stories from secondary sources, I use their index numbers (see note on interview numbering system) to show that they were used as primary sources in this research.

pleased. The upper class household was still organised according to patriarchal genealogy. The following section looks at production work in upper class complex families.

The Family as an Economic Unit

The urban extended family could be perceived as an economic unit comprising productive and reproductive work. However, the production of the urban extended family differed significantly from the rural one, which has been the focus of most anthropological investigation. Two types of family can be identified. Firstly, some gentry had sons working as government officials and earning independent salaries to contribute to the family coffer. Thus, these families did not form a unit of production. Secondly, merchant families, the focus of the following discussion, utilized both family members and paid workers to carry out productive work for them. These families formed a unit of production. In this situation, family members with competence, both men and women, might be drawn into the family business as managers or bookkeepers. For example, Xu Jiang-chun worked as an accountant and secretary for a coalfield company, owned by her father (1-17:139). Zhang Zhong-hia (2-12) learned to manage a warehouse of 200 *ping*[58] after she finished primary school, aged 14. There were also various cases of capable women, who managed businesses competently, as wife to the merchant. The mother of Fan (2-21) ran three shops: offering clothing, jewellery and sewing services. The gender division of labour in the merchant family was not as clear-cut as it was in rural families. Nevertheless, I find H.W. Chen convincing when she argued that in the merchant families of Da-dau-cheng, there was still a gendered division in productive work: women were more likely to stay in the shop while the men went out to socialise and establish business networks (1999:128).

Female family members were incorporated into the productive work of the merchant family, but they were not 'employed' in the contemporary sense. In the

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[58] Equal to 660 square metres.

pre-modern Han merchant family, the profits generated from the businesses belonged to the family, rather than the 'company.'[59] The following example serves to illustrate this point. Xu Jiang-chun worked as secretary and a bookkeeper for her father's coalfield. She did not get monthly salary. She said,

> 'There was no salary. My father treated me very well. He often gave me money. It was up to me to ask for a certain amount. But we children were good. We did not waste money. My father often bought clothes and other things and gave them to us children. It was so good to be my father's child.' (1-17:148).

Xu appeared a typical case amongst those who worked for a family business. None of these family workers received steady monthly salaries for their labour although they did get payments as pocket money, for daily use or as a bonus on special occasions, i.e. whenever the father saw fit. Before marriage, a daughter obtained money directly from her father when she needed it. After marriage (or at a time of family division when the daughter was unwed) her rewards were presented in the form of 'property transmission.' In the case of Xu, this meant independent shares in the business and a house next-door to her father's after marriage. Moreover, her income was much greater than her husband's salary as a civil servant working in a railway station. Zhang gained several acres of land from her father. This property could sustain a good quality of life for her until old age. Since the patriarch still had complete control over the resources within the family business, it seems that even if a daughter or a daughter-in-law might receive small payments for her labour, this did not necessarily increase her power within the family. However, it suggests that there might be an increased possibility for negotiation. I will address this issue shortly.

Did sons receive payment for their labour? H.W. Chen (1999:124) found that most patriarchs held onto their property until their death, although they might arrange for a separate portion of their business to be run by sons after marriage and before family division. There is no direct information to confirm whether such sons returned all

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[59] Research shows that even contemporary Chinese family enterprises found it difficult to distinguish the two (C.N. Chen, 1987).

business profits directly to the patriarch. Research on traditional Chinese families suggested that sons in the most successful families were assigned to manage different part of the business and were allowed to accumulate tangible private property that was not part of the family estate (Greenhalgh, 1985:277). While not denying this possibility, my data also suggested two alternative situations. Firstly, some sons relied on 'pocket money' from the patriarch for personal spending. For example, Zhang Zhong-hia, as a beloved only daughter of her adopted father, asked money from the patriarch for her married brother and his wife whenever they needed money. I do not know the employment status of the son in the family business, but this suggested that the son could be placed in a dependent position in the joint family even if the pocket money from the patriarch could be generous. Secondly, a son who needed money urgently might use the excuse of business needs to gain capital (or cash) from the patriarch (the husband of 1-18). In this case, the son still needed the agreement of the patriarch to use the money but he seemed to have significant autonomy in spending it. Both cases suggest the dependent status of the son under the authority of the patriarch. This relates to the ways in which family resources were distributed in complex families, to which I now turn.

Resource Distribution

Despite different ways of utilising human labour, both gentry and merchant families formed a unit of consumption and family resources were centrally controlled and distributed. Before family division, food was cooked together in the central stove and clothes were either bought in or made by family members (Lang, 1946:17). The family held a common coffer. How was money distributed in complex families? Studies of the Chinese family suggest that in practices two roles were identified: one was the re-distributor of the common coffer and the other the financial manager. The latter was the treasurer while the former was the one with authority, usually but not necessarily, the patriarch. Lang drew on classic Chinese novels to refer to the treasurer as *tang-chia*

(當家), a role which could be filled by a man or a woman (1946:17). On the other hand, Cohen's study in rural Taiwan in the 1960s suggested that these roles tended to be allocated between the father and the son (1976:143).

In the urban extended family of my informants, the patriarch usually played the crucial role of re-distributor of the common coffer, as mentioned earlier. However, in contrast to Cohen's findings and in support of Lang, there were women acting as financial managers in complex households. When Jen-hia (2-07) married into her husband's family, the eldest married daughter of the family acted as the financial manager, controlling the family money. Jen-hia complained that she did not get enough money to buy food. The natal family of Su Fong-eng (3-15) had previously been a landlord family. Su also complained that her father's eldest married sister, who was in charge of the family finance in the Su family, had 'taken lots of advantages from it.'[60] Similarly, in the Zhang family, Zhong-hia's adopted father was the patriarch and the eldest daughter-in-law acted as the financial manager. It was expected that the patriarch could decide how to divide his property. Nevertheless, when he wished to give some land to his unwed adopted daughter, Zhong-hia, the eldest daughter-in-law strongly opposed it and created many obstacles. In the end, the patriarch had to trick her somehow to transfer the land to Zhong-hia. These cases suggest that a daughter-in-law or even a married daughter might act as the financial manager in complex families. They also imply that even if a woman rarely became the sole distributor of the family economy, by taking up the role of the family financial manager, she could exercise some influence.

There seem to be no rules determining which family member would become the financial manager. Rather, it seemed contingent on practical considerations for the senior family member. From my case studies, I find that when a daughter managed money it was because she was regarded as an 'insider' of the family in comparison with

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[60] Unfortunately Su refused to say more on this issue. However, a similar case of the *tang-chia* investing household money for her own profit was also found in the classic Chinese novel *Red Chamber Dreams* (see footnote 16, Lang, 1946:17).

a newly-wed daughter-in-law. She might continue to be in charge of money even if she eventually 'married out.' This suggests that patriarchal principles could be adapted and changed in practice. Although a married daughter was perceived as an outsider to her natal family in the genealogical sense, in practice, she might be regarded as more reliable than daughters-in-law. In contrast, a daughter-in-law who entered the marriage without knowing anyone could be rejected until she earned the trust of other family members. However, from the data available on the upper class extended family, a wife was unlikely to hold authority as the re-distributor of family resources unless she was a widow. This was in contrast to moderately wealthy families where the wife tended to control the money (next chapter). More work is needed to find a plausible interpretation of this situation[61] and to further explore the relationship between wealth and financial management.

It seems that other family members in addition to the financial manager might negotiate with the patriarch over access to family resources. The most obvious case is provided by daughters' education. In rural families, demands on limited resources left few funds to pay for the education of daughters. However, even in wealthy families, daughters did not necessarily receive financial support for their education. The resources available for daughters varied a great deal from case to case. The rare examples of daughters who did not face opposition about their education either had an egalitarian patriarch (a grandfather, adopted father or widowed grandmother or widowed mother[62]) who valued girls as much as boys, or a patriarch who had special affection for his daughters and wanted to give the girls the best that he could. For example, the father of Lin Cai-su (1-02) believed in gender equality and encouraged and supported both her and her sister in their high school education. Qing-hua (1-16)

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[61] I wonder whether this difference might be caused by the need for a specialised division in merchant families, where the patriarch was both the leader of the family and the business and thus would have more authority than the patriarch of an ordinary household. In addition the wife might find it too trivial to manage the family funds and thus assign a younger family member to do so. In ordinary families, the two roles were often blurred. The patriarch had little authority and the wife might thus control the money.

[62] Widows could take up the role of the patriarch on the basis of the generation hierarchy. This will be addressed in the following section on widows in joint families.

was a beloved adopted granddaughter of the Bao-Zheng family. Thanks to the patriarch's fondness for her, Qing-hua had the chance to attend primary school. When the patriarch, who had the final say, decided that education was necessary and important for a girl, her chances of education could be secured.

However, in most cases, daughters in wealthy families had to fight against gendered discrimination to get an education. Girls negotiated with the patriarch (or widowed mother) to achieve their aims. Of all possible strategies, their insistence was mostly essential. The father of Chen Ai-zhu (1-15) felt that education might hamper daughters' chances for marriage and discouraged girls from higher-level education. Chen was aware of her father's ideas and her two sisters only received primary school education. However, she still tried to convey her wishes indirectly to her father. Unexpectedly, he consented to her request and she completed high school education. In the process of negotiation, modern-educated relatives or schoolteachers played crucial roles in enhancing or limiting girls' opportunities for education. The famous painter Chen Jin (1-08) was sent on the boat to study in Japan, after her father talked to her high school teacher who was highly appreciative of her talents. In contrast, the wishes of Chen Ai-zhu to study abroad were not fulfilled because both her father and teacher discouraged girls from further education. She stayed in Taiwan and eventually became a schoolteacher. The female doctor Chen Shi-man (1-11) insisted on studying abroad and mobilized two of her uncles to persuade her widowed mother to give permission. Therefore a combination of daughters' insistence, the consent of the patriarch and very often, persuasion by educated young men, laid the foundations for these daughters from wealthy families became pioneering career women in twentieth-century Taiwan.

The above cases suggest that the patriarch had great power to redistribute family resources. Different family members might negotiate in their own interests, especially the financial manager. Does the evidence suggest then that the resources of the complex

family were distributed through negotiation? The answer is probably no.[63] There were

still rules determining the ways in which family resources were distributed. Perhaps the

taken for granted nature of these rules helps explain why they were rarely explicit in my

informants' narratives, except in the instance of family division.

What were the rules governing the distribution of family resources? I would like to

discuss a rural case first, which raises some interesting points of dialogue with the

existing literature. This rural extended family relied on mountain crops as well as

incomes from two members working as civil servants in the Japanese government. The

whole extended household formed a productive unit and the family shared a common

coffer. There was a gendered division of labour where men engaged in productive work

while women were in charge of the 'inner' sphere (in this context, cooking, cleaning,

feeding pigs, making clothes and bearing children).[64] Hen-hong told me the reasons for

family division in her husband's family:

> 'The family divided when my grandfather-in-law was still alive. Some
> brothers were better at making money. Some had more children than others.
> Those who earned more money said, 'We have ten children, and we want
> twenty more dollars.' But, for example, the *fang* of my father-in-law, he had
> fewer children than his brothers. He would also get thirty dollars [as his
> brother did.]...Every expense had to be shared [equality by each *fang*]
> including the bride price...in the end it [the family] separated.'

In Hen-Hong's narrative, the division of the family resulted from tensions caused

by unequal contributions to and distribution of family resources. This corresponds with

Cohen's argument that the division of rural extended families usually resulted from

conflicts between the brothers' 'juridical equality' in relation to family property and the

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[63] My interpretation here counters Lang (1946) who argued that there was not equal sharing in wealthy families, giving examples of the ways in which daily consumption was arranged and of private investments by daughters-in-law. As I argue in the following section, in terms of daily consumption, equality was less of an issue in affluent families, although disputes over equality of food consumption were not unheard of among my informants. Moreover, the existence of investments owned by daughters-in-law was also demonstrated among my informants. However, these should be interpreted as the 'private money' of the daughters-in-law rather than public resources. I investigate this issue in next chapter.

[64] There is no intention to generalise all forms of gender division of labour from this case study. In a farm family in late 1930s, a woman engaged in heavy labour such as cooking, washing, cleaning, obtaining water and preparing organic fertilisers (2-21:37-8).

'daily consumption equality' of each *fang* (1976). This argument suggests that one principle (the juridical equality) governed two aspects of family resource distributions. What exactly should we understand by this idea of 'juridical equality'? C.N. Chen (1984) might describe this with reference to genealogical principles. In my interpretation, the concept refers to 'patriarchal genealogy.' I thus contend that patriarchal genealogy governed resource distribution within rural extended families, including both daily consumption and property division. Patriarchal genealogy might do justice to the division of family property but not to daily consumption in the rural family.

Similarly, patriarchal genealogy also governed these two aspects of resource distribution in urban upper class families. Nevertheless, these faced different issues. Probably due to the affluence of these elite families, there were comparatively fewer disputes over daily consumption. The patriarch often gave generous pocket money to family members. Moreover, daughters-in-law might increase their private money by investment (1-02) or saving (H.W. Chen, 1999:123). Tensions over money did not seem to initiate family division. However, disputes over the division of family property were heard again and again in my respondents' life stories. The following case of the Shi family was illustrative of this. The contrasts between urban and rural families suggest that differing levels of wealth might have caused different patterns of family divisions and contributed to shape the correlation between class and family structures (Chapter 2). The poor divided early and easily creating small family units, possibly because poverty made equality of daily consumption a central source of tension. In contrast, the rich tended to maintain large, extended families for a long time, possibly because daily consumption was less likely to be the point of dispute but property division was. By taking into account the ways in which family resources were distributed in Han families, my interpretation here may contribute to the debate about class and family structures.

I have argued that patriarchal genealogy determined the ways in which family resource was distributed and drawn attention to contrasting patterns of family division

between the rich and the poor. These arguments have used patriarchal genealogy in gender-neutral terms. In the following section, by using a case study of a widow struggling to initiate family division, I will further investigate the working of patriarchal genealogy, its gendered effects and its relation to gender identity.

Shi-Man (1-11) was born in 1909 to the third son of the Shi family, E (see figure 4.1). The Shi family had been merchants for several generations and was fairly prosperous. All of the sons of the second generation (C-H) received a good education. E was a successful industrialist who set up a winery and a paper factory in the colonial period and his brothers were professionals and white-collar workers. After the death of the patriarch (A), they continued to live as a joint family, headed by E because the eldest son (C) and his wife were indulging in smoking opium, while the second son (D) had been adopted by his paternal uncle (B) and no longer belonged to the lineage of A. As the eldest present sister-in-law, e ran the extended household, even though she was illiterate. Her feet was bound but were later released during Japanese rule. In 1914, E was hard hit by his loss of the only son and passed away, to be succeeded by e (aged 32) and three daughters.

Figure 4.1 Patriarchal Genealogy of the Shi Family in 1914

Shi Man grew up in this extended family but she remembered little of how it was run. However, the death of her father hit her hard. After E's death, his brothers (i.e. F,G,H) all wanted e to remarry. When e returned to her natal family, the brothers F, G, H told the police that she had disappeared, hoping to prevent her making claims on the

family fortune. When *e* heard of this, she rushed back home but no one admitted to telling the police. After several other vindictive acts by her brothers-in-law, *e* eventually initiated family division to protect the interests of her husband's *fang*. In the process of division, because she was illiterate, she was cheated by her brothers-in-law, who gave her an unreasonable number of debt receipts among documents of stock and land holdings.

This event had a great impact on both *e* and Shi-Man. *e* was conservative and had opposed education for daughters but changed her attitude. She employed tutors to teach her daughters reading and writing, although they were already in their late teens. Shi-Man was studying at primary school at that time but she met no opposition to continuing on to higher education. Her education was funded by the land and stock holdings that her father had left on his death. In response to all kinds of unfair treatment she received at the hands of the extended family, Shi-Man was determined to bring honour to her mother. In 1933, Shi-Man became the first woman doctor in Luo Dong, specialising in ophthalmology and gynecology.

How does this case reveal the gendered exploitation of patriarchal genealogy? The hardships suffered by *e* may well be understood in the context of a woman's lifecycle in the extended patriarchal family. As a married woman, her status in the joint family relied a great deal on her husband and this declined on his death She then needed to fight for proper recognition and fair access to the resources of her husband's *fang*. In contrast, her husband's brothers seem to have intended to maximize their control over what they saw as *their* family property. Without a man in the family to defend her *fang* interests, a widow often found herself isolated and this experience could change her beliefs about the needs for women's education.

However, such emerging gender consciousness did not necessarily bring about challenges to the patriarchal order. On the contrary, a widow might even act to reinforce patriarchal values. Why? Firstly, to secure economic resources for her uterine family, widows in wealthy families would probably abide by the gendered code, behaving

normatively to safeguard her reputation.[65] Secondly, historically as well as in my research,[66] the exclusion and powerlessness of the widow might inspire children to outstanding achievement in response, proving that 'without a father, we can still do well.' Patriarchal exclusion usually pushed a widow to further invest in her 'uterine family,' a legitimate place for a woman to possess power. Thus, the suffering of the widow would often be compensated by the great achievements of her children. In turn, she would probably emphasise her sacrifice for the success of her children. After her children married, it was her turn to enjoy high status within the generational hierarchy. As a mother-in-law, she had culturally legitimised power over the young daughter-in-law (Kandiyoti, 1988).[67] Moreover, without a husband, she could take on the responsibilities of the patriarch, occupying the most powerful role within the family. In the end, it was very likely that patriarchal hierarchies of generation and gender remained unchallenged and the widow, who had once been excluded from her husband's family might even turn into the strongest guardian of patriarchal values.

In the above section, I addressed the ways in which family resources were distributed in the extended family and the role of patriarchal genealogy in this process. The following section looks at the relationship between patriarchal genealogy and reproduction.

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[65] It seems that widows of different class positions adopt different strategies, but all were mainly driven by economics. Widows in wealthy families tended to behave normatively as a virtuous widow to claim legitimate shares in the patriarchal extended family. Widows with no economic support might remarry. Widows who possessed means of production would probably start to work. Recourse to natal families was another important strategy adopted by several informants. However, they never asked without reservations because they felt that such help was illicit for the simple reason once married a woman was supposed to be an outsider to her natal family.

[66] In the textbooks of the KMT, instances of widowed mothers and children in many eras who had achieved highly were appropriated as cases of virtuous mothers educating their children for the nation (Meyer, 1988, see Chapter 7). In this discourse, the patriarchal context has been eliminated and replaced by the nation. Empirically, the experience of e was identical to many other widows who belonged to the first and second generations.

[67] See the next chapter.

Reproduction

In the following section, by drawing on the narratives of upper class daughters, I explore the experiences of upper-class daughters in relation to reproduction work. What was the relationship between patriarchal genealogy and reproduction work in the extended family of early twentieth century Taiwan? What were modern women's experiences as daughters? Who brought them up? What was their relationship with their mothers? Who was doing housework in the family and why? The following quotations form the basis of a discussion on childcare and domestic work in early twentieth-century upper class families.

Q: Who brought you up?

Zhang (1-12): No one. When there was food, everybody ate together. I came here at 3 [she was adopted without knowing it until nine]. I needed no one to bring me up. Not like other people, like a boy next door, he needed to carry water and cooked rice. If I stayed at my original family, I might need to take care of my younger brother. My [adopted] mother usually said that other people had to do this and that, but you need not. I really hated her saying so. [...] My [adopted] mother did not do anything at home. She could only be the wife. She did not care about children... She cared for nothing. She just enjoyed her life.

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Chen Shi Man (1-11): When studying in Taipei [at high school], I only went home on important holidays. I missed home very much. On the other hand, my mother also felt reluctant to let me go to Taipei. Every time I left home for school, she walked with me, crying, for as far as she could. Interestingly, I grew up at the house of my wet nurse. She treated me very well. When I was in Taipei, I missed her very much. I often saved the pocket money my mother sent me to buy gifts for her... the first time I returned home, I bought an umbrella for her. That might be the first umbrella she had in her whole life.

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Q: Why did you go out to work at the first place?

Lim (2-20): Why should I stay at home? I had nothing to do. The house was full of maids [...] children...three of my sisters were fed by wet nurses outside of the family, until the age of five, then returned home and went to

kindergarten. My younger brother... [Our family] employed the wet nurse in the house, to breast-feed him until the age of five. To employ a wet nurse you also needed to give her nutrition and so on, didn't you? I grew up in such a good family.

The quotes above seem to suggest that the meaning of being a biological mother in early twentieth century upper class complex families differed a great deal from its meaning in contemporary Taiwan. Nowadays, the dominant discourse suggests that the wife/mother takes full responsibility for childcare and domestic work. However, in early twentieth century upper-class families, a mother needed not breast-feed her children, a wife in an urban complex family might do no housework, the daughters of wealthy families might still be given away from a young age. What do these diverse arrangements tell us about patriarchal genealogy and its intersection with class?

Adoption as Patriarchal Exploitation

Adoption could be counted as the first confrontation between daughters and patriarchy. Even a daughter from a wealthy family could not avoid the fate of being given away and adopted although her parents might love her very much. In my research, 18% of informants[68] from the first two generations had adoption experiences, either as adopted daughters or as adopted daughters-in-law. It was believed that the peasant family was most likely to practice minor marriages, however, they were not restricted to lower-class families. The high rate of adoption among my informants corresponded to statistical data. According to the household registration in northern Taiwan, by 1915, 12.4% of the marriages of high status families[69] and 20.9% of moderately wealthy families[70] were between minors (A. Wolf and Huang 1980:262). Scholars used economic and kinship factors to interpret these practices. Economically, it saved bride price (A. Wolf and Huang). However, economic reasons could hardly explain adoption

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[68] This calculation does not include those who might have such experiences but did not mention it.

[69] This includes gentry and prominent royal citizen of Japan (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980), who are most often present as *Bao-zheng* or village head in this research.

[70] This refers to families headed by shopkeepers, businessmen, school teachers and physicians.

among wealthy families. Patriarchal genealogy might be a stronger explanation. M. Wolf (1972) argued that adopting a little daughter-in-law was a strategy of the mother-in-law to avoid confrontation with an adult daughter-in-law later. This interpretation offered some insights, but failed to point out the exploitation inherent in this practice and its linkage with class and patriarchy.

I argue that adoption is a form of patriarchal exploitation of young daughters, for it originated from the patriarchal assumption that a family needed a son to continue the patriliny and a daughter was useless in genealogical calculations. Therefore, sons were valued much more than daughters. A married woman typically wished to bear sons to secure her status in the Han family and imposed her authority on daughters-in-law to secure her uterine family. Her power and autonomy was based on exploiting the adopted daughter-in-law, who was abandoned by her biological parents from a young age and started to contribute her labour to her foster family.[71] Unless she was the only adopted daughter, who could expect to find a husband through uxorilocal marriage, her life as an adopted daughter-in-law was much tougher than being a daughter in the family of her biological parents. It is fair to say that the young mother-in-law benefited from adoption. She enhanced her hierarchy in the patriarchal kinship structure by exploiting the labour of the little daughter-in-law. The once powerless adult daughters-in-law in patriarchal hierarchy transferred their suffering to the even more powerless little daughters-in-law. Patriarchal values were exaggerated in the practices of adoption.

Considering how powerless these little girls were, it is surprising that so many of them successfully returned later to their natal family after fighting persistently against adoption (such as 1-01, 1-06, 2-03, plus stories of others in their narratives). Others accepted the arrangement while silently swallowing the pain of being abandoned as a daughter (2-12, 2-15, 2-21). The latter usually constructed their identity as adopted

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[71] The point that the adopted daughter-in-law was assigned domestic responsibility while daughters were not is developed in the next chapter.

daughters with a strong sense of pride to defend against feelings of alienation, generated from interactions with their natal or adopted parents (2-12, 2-21). However, living in a wealthy family, their lives as daughters or the only adopted daughters seem better than daughters of poor families. To show their privileges in class hierarchy, I now investigate the ways in which mothering and domestic labour was arranged in upper class families, exploring other women's relations to patriarchal genealogy and the interplay of patriarchy and class in shaping these domestic arrangements.

Mothering

In upper class families, biological mothers, foster mothers, wet nurses and sometimes concubines might act to take care of baby girls or female children. There were varying degrees of involvement of the biological or foster mother. On the one hand, there were caring mothers who developed very close relationships with daughters (1-11, 2-3). On the other hand, as a wife in an elite family, they might be involved in business (2-21) or enjoy leisure (1-12), spending little time on childcare. In most cases, wet nurses were employed to care for infants. As the above quotes from my informants indicated, wet nurses for boys lived in the family house, so that their physical health could be monitored to make sure the boy received adequate nutrition. In contrast, girls were taken out of the family to be nursed. Their welfare was apparently of less concern to the upper class. However, compared with children of lower classes, wealthy children were still much better off. While they were breast-fed by wet nurses, the biological children of wet nurses were usually given away for adoption or fed with rice water (H.W. Chen, 1999:116;M. Wolf, 1972).

One informant explained that she received little attention from either her biological or foster mothers, but was brought up by her father's concubine (2-14). During the colonial period it was common for men to have concubines in wealthy

families.[72] The majority of my second-generation interviewees had the average of two to three 'mothers' in their natal family.[73] Concubines were often daughters of from poor families, previous handmaids, wives of poor peasants, actresses or prostitutes married with no dowry (R. Watson, 1991). Very often a woman became a concubine of the upper class family because of economic necessity. Wealthy men, including educated young men of gentry families, were allowed to have a wife and as many concubines as they could afford. The patriarchal exploitation of the sexuality of poor women is worthy of more comprehensive research. There is neither sufficient data nor space to explore this issue here. For this research it is only important to acknowledge the wide presence of these women in upper class urban families, their possible role as 'surrogate mothers,' and their relations to patriarchy as daughters or wives of poor families.

Domestic Work

From the narratives of upper class daughters, there was limited information on how domestic work was done in upper class families. It seems that paid servants, handmaids, adopted daughters and adopted daughters-in-law all made a contribution. Probably these women were so neglected in the upper class family that little was said about them. I was told vaguely that 'there were servants specialising in washing clothes, cooking and cleaning. It was not like today.' (2-20) Research by H.W. Chen showed that in Da-dau-cheng merchant families, apart from handmaids, there were also paid servants carrying out heavy domestic work (1999:114). A similar employment structure was found in Jaschok's research on Hong Kong Chinese upper class families. According to

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[72] In Japan, monogamous marriage was granted after Meiji Restoration in 1868. When Japan started to colonize Taiwan, there was no intention to challenge polygamy in Taiwanese families, because of the fear that dramatic changes might cause rebellion. Nevertheless, through juridical intervention, the monogamous principle and limited tolerance of the existence of concubines became established. It became easier for concubines to seek divorce, although the practice itself was not banned (Zhao-ru Chen, 1997). After 1945, polygamous practices violated the civil law of R.O.C. Moreover, with the decline of Taiwanese gentry and powerful families in post-war Taiwan, selling daughters as concubines became less possible.

[73] Lan Min, a daughter of an upper class landlord family, recalled her childhood in complex households where each man had an average of six concubines, not including other women he had affairs with outside the family compound. 'When I was a child, I thought it was pretty normal for a man to have several wives,' she said (Lan, 1995:25).

Jaschok, paid servants did menial and heavy work, while the *mooi-jai* would be delegated to care for either the master's daughter or his wife (1988:96). This information suggested that adult servants were paid for specialised tasks, while young girls were bought or adopted to do lighter work.

It was clear that wealthy daughters grew up in the company of the handmaids. Lin Cai-su recalled that her mother had three handmaids. One served her mother and the other two served Lin and her sister (1-02:149). Little was revealed as to the working conditions of the handmaids. However, it seems likely that Jaschok's (1988) study on the '*mooi-jai*' (妹仔) in Hong Kong might again provide pointers to conditions for Taiwanese handmaids (*cha-bo-kan*, 查某嫺). Jaschok found that wealthy daughters were usually assigned a *mooi-jai* when they were six, while the *mooi-jai* was nine (1988:125). *Mooi-jai* were usually assigned light housework and were constantly at the mistresses''s beck and call.

> 'This means fanning the mistress when she felt hot, filling the water-pipe, pouring tea or just being present. Regardless of whether it was early in the morning or late at night, the girl's services were expected at a moment's notice.' (1988:97)

It was probably thanks to such wide-ranging services that Lim (2-20) told me that she did not know how to strike a match until she was eighteen. Zheng (3-13) revealed that her grandmother was carried on the back of the handmaid to the school until she finished primary school!

Handmaids were 'bought' into the upper class household. Probably because of this, 'handmaids' were usually understood as 'slave girls' in English. However this term failed to address the role of patriarchy in such 'trade.' Traditional Han society could be a classic example of patriarchalism (Weber, 1968) in that the patriarch had the rights to decide all aspects of arrangements of family members: marriage, adoption, concubinage and servitude (Sinn, 1994:141). This logic made unwed daughters and sons in the Han family 'belong' to their father. When the poor were in heavy debt, it was not surprising that selling children became one of the solutions (Q.Y. Wei et. al. 1982).

Destitute daughters could be sold as handmaids, adopted daughters-in-law, concubines or prostitutes by a mutual agreement sealed by a contract (Sinn, 1994; Zeng, 1998). Poor sons could be bought by the rich to strengthen their patrilineage. Although the economic transaction was most obvious in these cases, sons and daughters were actually exchanged through patriarchal kinship relations. In other words, patriarchy legitimized the selling of sons and daughters, especially those of poor families.

Comparing the lives of wealthy daughters and their handmaids, it appears that under the same patriarchal principles, the fate of daughters in poor families was more extreme than girls in wealthy families. Wealthy daughters who were not adopted or who were adopted as the only daughters by wealthy families were free from all domestic work, served by their handmaids. If handmaids were mentioned by wealthy daughters at all, it was usually in a benevolent discourse, for example as having been saved from poverty. They claimed that they taught handmaids to read and write and married them to a good husband when they grew up (1-11, 1-15). However, the life stories of handmaids in Jaschok (1988) and my data suggest that the exploitative sides of patriarchal 'benevolence' should not be neglected. A handmaid might accompany her mistress on her marriage (陪嫁) and serve her all her life. She very often became a concubine (Fong, 1989; and various narratives in life stories), satisfying the sexual and reproductive needs of the master.[74] She might be sold again to another family when her mistress did not need her any more (1-04). Mediated by the principle of patriarchy, a *cha-bo-kan* was sold from destitute families to be owned by the upper-class family. She had no rights to make her own decisions in work, marriage or sex. She was traded as a commodity and her low status could hardly be done away with the benevolent act of the patriarch.

The state did have laws with regard to selling children. The Qing Civil Code

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[74] One Taiwanese probe warned wealthy parents: 'Clever parents would not marry off a daughter with a beautiful *cho-mo-kan*.' to avoid the daughter's husband taking an interest in the handmaid (Fong, 1989). In Singapore, the life story of Janet Lim revealed the working conditions of the handmaid. It was also documented how the employer attempted to sexually harass her (Miers, 1994).

banned selling sons and daughters, but it was not illegal to own handmaids (Q.Y. Wei et. al. 1982). Although the Japanese colonial state often hesitated to intervene in Han family practices, they prohibited handmaids in a Japanese court verdict in 1917.

> '[E]ven though it gains mutual agreement to make a third person as *cha-bo-kan* and to restrain her to all her life, because it is against public social order and good custom, the agreement is regarded as invalid' (Fong, 1989: 171).

To abide by this legal precedent, the police did not accept the registration of handmaids in household records. To cope with this change, wealthy families started to register handmaids as adopted daughters or adopted daughters-in-law (Fong, 1989: 171). It seems that the end of legal recognition contributed to blurring the boundary between handmaids, adopted daughters and adopted daughters-in-law. Among the second generation informants, handmaids were less common. Nevertheless, patriarchal exploitation of destitute girls did not cease - it occurred in different forms.

Zhang Yu-zhan (2-22) came from a poor family and was adopted by the Zhang family when she was seven. The Zhangs was gentry, always having five or six adopted daughters/-in-law to run errands. If any of them married someone outside the family, they would adopt one more daughter. The Zhang family was particularly fond of Yu-zhan. She was sent to elementary school and finished high school. Nevertheless, Yu-zhan had to sweep the floor and care for the children from a young age. When she was 18, it was arranged that she would marry the third son of the family, who had just returned home after finishing his training in medical school in Japan.

Here, we meet a case of benevolent patriarchal practices. As an adopted daughter, she was first treated as a domestic and a daughter even though she was also supported to study. While her counterparts at high school might grow up without knowing how to strike a match, Yu-zhan was responsible for childcare and light domestic work.[75] As she grew older, owing to the decision of the patriarch, her status turned into that of an adopted daughter-in-law, as she married her foster-brother. Yu-zhan was grateful to the

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[75] The difference between daughters and adopted daughters-in-law is explored in the next chapter.

Zhang family for treating her so well. However, it appears to me that the Zhang family had benefited as much as they could from her as a woman in a patriarchal context. She was used as a household helper at a young age and then an obedient young daughter-in-law who would not oppose her mother-in-law. She was guided into marriage with her foster brother and bore sons for the Zhang lineage. The latter point had become even more obvious after her husband died in 1947. Her adopted mother-in-law asked her to enter uxorilocal marriage to continue the Zhang lineage. However, her second husband could not bear the pressures of living in an uxorilocal marriage and escaped. Yu-zhan was asked to choose between her second husband and her child whose surname was Zhang. Yu-zhan stayed for her child. All her life, Yu-zhan was subjected to the exploitation intrinsic to patriarchal genealogy although at some points it appeared benevolent.

My analysis has highlighted the political economy of kinship exchanges, as Gayle Rubin (1996[1975]) has also attempted. However, in contrast to her work, which focuses on sex and sexuality with a theoretical perspective, I looked at the relationships between patriarchy, adoption and reproductive work through the narratives of my informants. I argue that adoption was a form of patriarchal exploitation against girls, whatever the wealth of her family of origin. However, the class privileges of upper class daughters guaranteed a better childhood than that of daughters of destitute families, who were often sold into service. Nevertheless, the boundary between patriarchal kinship exchange and economic exchange was sometimes blurred, especially in the practices of adopted daughters-in-law. My analysis was limited by the very scant accounts of domestic labour in upper class families.[76] More detailed empirical investigation on these issues is called for.

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[76] Perhaps this is due to their position as daughters in upper class families. The meaning of such omission only becomes clear after I put their experiences into a life-cycle perspective. See the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated that patriarchal genealogy was the implicit logic behind the regulation of production, reproduction and resource distribution in upper class complex families. The upper class family could be perceived as both a unit of production and reproduction, headed by the patriarch, to whom both sons and daughters were subordinated. The family held a common coffer and patriarchal genealogy regulated the ways in which daily consumption and property was distributed in the family, although different family members might create space for negotiation. I have interpreted adoption as a form of patriarchal exploitation. Diverse groups of women performed reproductive work for the upper class household through either patriarchal exchange relations (e.g. adoption) or economic exchange relations. The urban upper class family could afford to adopt, buy or employ destitute women to carry out different kinds of reproductive work. Patriarchy affected women and men of all different roles and classes, but it was experienced differently according to their class, gender and positions in a stratified patriarchal kinship structures.

This chapter has focused on daughters' account of urban upper class complex families. The organisation of complex families that I have delineated here will provide the context to understand the experiences of daughters-in-law in complex families, which are the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 5 Lives as Daughters-in-law in Complex Families, 1920-1960

In Chapter 4, I explored the shape of urban complex families by drawing on narratives of daughters in upper-class families. This chapter investigates the experiences of daughters-in-law and the organisation of domestic work in moderately wealthy and wealthy complex families. This adds to the limited data on domestic work in the previous chapter. What were women's experiences as daughters-in-law in the colonial period? What was the relationship between patriarchal genealogy and daughters-in-law? Did daughters-in-law ever resist? The time span of this chapter ranges from 1920 to 1960, however most of the events quoted at length took place between 1940 and 1945.

This chapter first examines the role of patriarchy in organising domestic work in complex families. It demonstrates why patriarchal genealogy might be a better interpretative framework than gendered socialisation in explaining women's relations to domestic labour. Secondly, by contrasting the different experiences of daughters-in-law, it unearths the workings of patriarchy and examines the ways in which it was played out in distinct class, family structures, and life stages of women. Thirdly, by drawing on two examples of resistance by daughters-in-law against patriarchy, I investigate the strategies available to daughters-in-law and the conditions for their success.

Patriarchy and Divisions of Domestic Labour

What was the governing principle of domestic responsibilities in complex households?

Who was assigned what work and why? Let me again return to the rural family mentioned in Chapter 4. When conducting my interviews, I had a strong image of the exploited daughter-in-law, who was used and abused by her mother-in-law and had to carry out all housework. Thus, I was stunned when I encountered Pan Hen-hong and heard her experience as the grand-daughter-in-law in a rural family with forty-two members. At first, I thought that Hen-hong, as *the* grand-daughter-in-law, situated at the bottom of gender and generational hierarchy, would be the most exploited woman in the household. However, she married into an averagely wealthy extended family with two civil servants, and seemed to have a great deal of freedom in the extended family although there were no domestic servants. By analysing the contradictions between my expectations and her experience, the following excerpt illustrates some principles in the division of domestic labour in the extended family.

> Hen-Hong: [....] The sisters-in-law [of her mother-in-law's generation] in the family never fought. We cooked in turn, one for each week. Those who did not cook had to clean the living room, the kitchen, or feed the pigs. We took turns.

> Q: How was the work for you?

> Hen-Hong: When it was the turn of my mother-in-law, I helped her. She did most of the work and I only helped. It was OK. Only when there was important festival, when our family held a feast, I remember that we washed dishes until 2 o'clock in the morning. [... But, mostly,] I had plenty of time...if there was not much work to do at home I would go out to play (Laugh).

> Q: Play?

> Hen-Hong: Yes. Yes. I did not mind people gossiping. (Laugh). But, you know, it was not easy to be a bride in the past. You needed to be able to make clothes. Sometimes neighbours or relatives asked the bride to make clothes to test her....You were expected to learn everything about domestic affairs before you got married. But I never did. My mother told me that I needed to know the principles so that I could make clothes when I needed to....

I later learned that Hen-hong went back to her natal family once a week to stay overnight at the beginning of the marriage. Later on, she attended midwifery school in Taipei and lived in the dorm during that period. Was Hen-hong's case simply very unusual?

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Answering this question involves two levels of analysis. At the micro level, both Hen-hong and her mother-in-law followed the gendered division of labour and performed their roles 'properly.' Hen-Hong seemed to have a mother-in-law who treated her very well and allowed her considerable freedom. This shows that the role of the mother-in-law could be performed differently by different individuals. Some mothers-in-law could be kind and permissive. On the other hand, Hen-Hong did perform all the basic work that she needed to do. She took up the role of daughter-in-law 'properly'. She did what she was expected to do but did not strive for excellence or worry unduly about fulfilling other people's expectations of the 'good daughter-in-law.' Her decision about how to perform the role contrasted with many other women who grew up under KMT rule (see Part Two).

However, it seems to me that the structural position Hen-Hong occupied in the extended family was in fact more important than personal characteristics. From Pan's words, we do not know the exact family composition, but figure 5.1 depicts a partial reconstruction of the patriarchal genealogy of her family according to the limited information available and helps illustrate the principles behind the division of housework in extended families.

Figure 5.1 Reconstructed Patriarchal Genealogy of the Ye Family

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                         A ▲━━┯━━O a
        ┌─────────────┬────────┴─────────────┬──────┐
    B▲┯O b        C▲┯O c            D▲┯O d       E▲┯O e  F▲┯O f
    ┌──┼─┐┐   ┌─┐┌─┐┐┐   ┌─┐─┐┐┐      ┌┐┼┐      ┌┐┐
    ▲=O O  O▲O▲ ▲OO▲ ▲O ▲OO  ▲ ▲O  ▲ ▲ O▲   O▲▲ O     OO▲
    ↑
    Hen-Hong
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
According to research done by C.N. Chen (1984) and Cohen (1976) on Chinese extended families, domestic labour was divided along *fang* lines. Since there were five *fang*, the whole burden of housework for the extended family was divided into five

portions, performed by *b, c, d, e, f* in turn. As the mother-in-law of five daughters-in-law, *a* might be retired from housework but continue to act in a supervisory role. This means that the *division of domestic labour in extended families was determined by patriarchal genealogy and that the daughters-in-law of the second generation were assigned primary domestic responsibility.* Hen-hong only helped her mother-in-law with her one-in-fifth share. Therefore, even though Pan was the grand-daughter-in-law in the youngest generation, she did not have to shoulder all the responsibility as I assumed at first. Thus, she had relatively more free time to go out and to visit her natal family as long as she was the grand-daughter-in-law. While it was relevant that Hen-hong's mother-in-law was kind to her,[77] I also think that the autonomy Hen-Hong enjoyed at beginning of her marriage owed a great deal to the specific stage of the family lifecycle.[78] After family division, Pan became the only daughter-in-law. Then she had to serve her mother-in-law and did take on most of the domestic chores.

Daughters, Daughters-in-law and Patriarchy

The idea that domestic labour was organised according to patriarchal genealogy has several further implications. Let's turn to the daughters' relations to domestic labour first. In genealogical terms, a daughter was not recognized as *fang*, but a temporary member of her father's *fang*. A daughter had neither status nor accountability to her natal parents' *fang* (C.N. Chen, 1984).[79] By the same logic, a daughter did not have any serious domestic responsibility. However, in practice, class and the practical needs of the household often altered the effects of patriarchal genealogy. Daughters of poor

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[77] Her mother-in-law later agreed to take care of her children when Hen-hong went out to work as a midwife. However, Hen-hong still dutifully performed all her tasks after she returned home.

[78] When Hen-Hong first married, the wife of B was not in a position to retire. She was still defined as a daughter-in-law to the Ye family, which took precedence over her role as a mother-in-law to Hen-Hong. Probably, in this specific case, Pan's position as a granddaughter-in-law made her relations to domestic labour similar to that of a daughter. She was only a helper to the wife of B.

[79] This could well be one of the fundamental reasons that girls were perceived as '*pei-qian-huo*' (賠錢貨), a goods that make her parents suffer a loss. Since she was regarded as useless to her natal family's genealogy, she was looked down in patriarchal kinship relations.

families were drawn into housework or childcare when their mothers needed helpers, just as sons of poor families would be drawn into work early when the family needed their labour (Chapter 6). In other words, the practical needs of the family (which were often shaped by gender and class) might shift the effects of patriarchal genealogy in determining daughters' (especially destitute daughters') domestic duties. In the following section I develop the argument that patriarchal genealogy assigned different roles to daughters and (adopted) daughters-in-law by drawing on another case study.

The father of Yang (2-03) was a self-made well-to-do merchant. Yang enjoyed the benefit of paid servants in her childhood. In her house there were maids to wash clothes and do the cooking. Outside the home, she received a college education and had a job as journalist as a 'modern woman.' However, things changed dramatically after her marriage. She married into an averagely wealthy landlord stem family living in a two-floor western style house without maids. Before Yang married, the mother-in-law used to do the housework together with her adopted daughter-in-law, who had been expected to marry Yang's husband. However, he had refused to marry his adopted sister and married Yang after a short period of romantic courtship.[80] Yang replaced this

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[80] This specific case not only illustrates the powers of patriarchal genealogy in governing domestic labour arrangements, but also highlights a historical moment when the young son rebelled against patriarchal authority in marriage arrangements after the 1920s. Yang Kui, an active social reformer and a writer born in 1902, wrote an article 'Notes of a Digamist' in *Folk Taiwan* (1995 [1925]:88-90) describing his experiences of struggling for the dissolution of an arranged marriage with his adopted sister. The girl was brought to his family when she was twelve to be a daughter (soon after his mother lost her daughter), to help with domestic chores and save the bride price his family would have to pay in the future. When he was 19, his parents pushed her to stay in his room. Yang Kui, who had received Japanese education, saw this custom as 'backward' and longed for a free-choice marriage. He escaped to Tokyo, where he wrote letters to his and her parents, threatening that he would not go home unless the marriage arrangement was abandoned. Because of the dissolution of the marriage, the adopted daughter became insane. It seems that the powerless adopted daughter was the first victim of the young son's rebellion. Lin Jia-xiong, the husband of Yang Qien-he, also utilised strategies to resist marrying his adopted sister and married Yang instead. It appears to me that these experiences were quite prevalent among Japanese educated young men who rebelled against his parents' wish for them to marry an adopted daughter-in-law.

By drawing on registration and fieldwork data in the 1950s, M. Wolf claimed that the decline in adoption was particularly steep in northern Taiwan in the 1930s when factory work became available to young men (1972:180-1). However, my data on upper class young people in the 1920s suggests limited relations between young men having independent incomes and their rebellion. Instead, I see a strong link between modern education, modernisation and romantic courtship and suggest that rebellion had more to do with the discourses of freedom and romantic love than economical independence. Free-choice marriage was also fostered by Taiwanese cultural activists in relation to the May Fourth Movements that took place in 1920s China (see C. Yang, 1993).

adopted daughter-in-law to become *the* daughter-in-law in the household. At this point, the status of the adopted daughter-in-law changed, as she became an unwed adopted daughter, who would never become part of her adopted father's genealogy. In this position she was free from most of the housework. Instead, Yang, who had 'won' a position in her father-in-law's genealogy, was expected to carry out most of the housework, under the supervision of her mother-in-law. Although this marriage changed these two women's positions in patriarchy, the mother-in-law had always enjoyed a daughter-in-law under her command either through minor marriage (adoption) or major marriage. In her autobiography, Yang recorded every detail of the heavy domestic labour that she had to carry out in this period. The comfortable life that she had enjoyed as a daughter felt like a dream.

In this section, I have argued that patriarchal genealogy determined the ways in which reproduction work was organised in complex families. I have also demonstrated that patriarchal genealogy assigned different levels of responsibility to women according to their position in the kinship structure. Daughters had no formal responsibility for domestic labour – only as unofficial helpers for their mothers. Daughters-in-law, whether adopted as young girls or adult women, had primary responsibility for domestic work. Mothers-in-law could command the labour of daughters-in-law. However women's responsibilities might be changed due to other practical needs of the household, varying in line with class or different stages in the lifecycle of the family unit. Thus, Yang's case should be understood in the context of a complex household with average income, where adopted daughters-in-law appeared as the main domestic workers, rather than the paid servants, handmaids or, after 1917, adopted daughters who had these duties in upper class complex households.

My argument here is a challenge to popular assumptions that daughters were involved in housework because of their gender and that most daughters were free from housework because of their class privileges. M. Wolf faced some uncertainty in interpreting her ethnographic findings in 1958 rural Taiwan.

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'Considering that little girls are introduced to chores and household routines much earlier than their brothers, it is surprising how ill-equipped many brides are with the basic skills necessary to run a house. In urban and wealthy families this ignorance might be explained by the presence of servants. In the country there are few servants, but several other explanations are possible. Some families have adopted daughters[81] who do the work; other families have married sons whose wives do all the cooking and housework. And the chores assigned to little girls do not give them a particularly broad experience' (M. Wolf, 1972:132).

With a gendered socialisation process in mind, M. Wolf attempted to explain why even in rural peasant family, where a daughter was not privileged by her gender or class, she was able to keep some distance from housework before marriage. Wolf gave several possible reasons. Nevertheless, it appears to me that Wolf failed to ask why adopted daughters-in-law performed housework but daughters did not, even when both were living as young girls in the same household. She did not clarify the crucial difference between daughters and adopted daughters-in-law, who were positioned differently in patriarchal genealogy. By restoring this aspect, my analysis explains what was unexplainable. However, I am not suggesting that all daughters-in-law had the same experience because they shared a position in the patriarchal genealogy. Patriarchy might intersect with class or family lifecycles and daughters-in-law might have very different experiences In the next section I explore these differences further, using more detailed life story evidence.

Experiences of Daughters-in-law

What were daughters-in-law's experiences in complex families? How did they differ from each other? The following section looks at daughters-in-law in moderately wealthy and upper class families, and daughters-in-law who worked, in order to identify some of the structural forces shaping their diverse experiences.

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[81] According to her case studies in the chapter where I quote this paragraph, M. Wolf (1972) used the term 'adopted daughter' interchangeably with 'adopted daughters-in-law' (sim-pu-a). It appears quite clear that when she used adopted daughters, she was referring to adopted daughters-in-law.

Daughters-in-law in Averagely Wealthy Families

In averagely wealthy families, women's status also changed dramatically after marriage. The life stories of my informants repeatedly offered contrasting images of girls as the "pearl on the parents' palm" and enslaved adult daughters-in-law. Daughters-in-law found themselves suddenly shouldering huge domestic responsibility and subjugated to other members of their husband's family, in sharp contrast to their lives as daughters.

Let's consider the case of Yang Qien-he in more detail. The marriage brought Yang into a landlord-cum-new-middle-class stem family, [82] living with her parents-in-law, her husband, her husband's adopted sister, and three young brothers. Yang became responsible for cooking three meals for eight people, making clothes for her husband's brothers, washing clothes for her conjugal unit, obtaining water from the well to cook and to clean the two-floor western-style mansion and preparing bathing water for all family members. All this was tremendously labour consuming at a time when gas hob, running water, washing machine and plastic water pipe were not available. Yang mainly conducted these tasks on her own, under the supervision of her mother-in-law. This supervision and nagging from the mother-in-law made the work appeared even more arduous for her (2-03: 117-222).

The domestic work performed by Yang seemed heavy enough, but the workload of Xiu-lian (2-05) who became the eldest daughter-in-law in a moderately wealthy merchant family without maids was even greater. In contrast to Yang's family, which did not require any productive activity from her, Xiu-lian was not only responsible for reproductive but also the productive work of the merchant family.

> 'I was a golden lady,[83] facing the whole Shi family. I cooked three meals per day, did the housework, and ran errands. After eating, I also needed to clean the kitchen. Then, I had to wash bamboos to make incense. Besides, we also had to run back and forth to hide from air raids. Sometimes my waist was so

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82 In this landlord family, the father-in-law was a well-educated schoolteacher, while the mother-in-law received no formal education. The husband was employed as factory manager at his uncle's factory.

83 *Qianjin Xiaojia* (千金小姐) is a courteous expression referring to someone's daughter. It also means a daughter who is well protected, incapable of doing any kinds of heavy work (or housework).

sore that I could not stand up. In the winter, the wind howled, the door squeaked, my hands sank in the water, my tears fell.' (2-05:97)

'Every morning, I had to hold a basin of warm water for my mother-in-law, serving her to wash her face. If the water were too cold or too warm, she would complain. I also needed to bring dishes [of food] to the room of my parents-in-law. I had to wait until they finished. Then, it was my turn to eat.' (2-05:103)

On the top of all kinds of domestic labour, including cooking three meals for sixteen persons (including the employees of the merchant family), washing, cleaning and ancestor worship, Xiu-lian also had to engage in productive work of manufacturing incenses for the family business. Like Yang, she also suffered from her mother-in-law's constant nagging. The imposed load of both productive and reproductive labour, and the services and obedience that she had to perform, as dictated in Confucian texts (see Chapter 2) made her life as a daughter-in-law unbearable.

It seems that marriage made previously leisured daughters enter a new servitude. They appeared unprepared and shocked by their treatment and questioned the meaning of marriage or the role of a daughter-in-law.

'Was this what the daughter-in-law was all about? I came to the Shi family to work as if I were a cow or a horse.' (2-05:97)

'Marriage turns a woman's life and career upside down. It is upsetting not to read books. Everyday, I am exhausted by housework. There is no space to think about the meaning of life. ...I really wonder what is the point of marriage. Am I the slave bought by his family for the purpose of work?' (The 1943 diary of 2-03: 221-2)

These feelings often led to some forms of resistance as I shall explore in later part of this chapter. Here, instead of inferring that daughters-in-law were universally exploited in Han patriarchy, I would like to stress the importance of contextualising their experiences in terms of different family structures and stages of the family lifecycle. As stated earlier, domestic labour was shared according to patriarchal genealogy in complex households. When a stem family turned into an extended family, i.e. when more sons got married and the number of daughters-in-law increased, the domestic labour would be shared equally among all of them. This meant that a

daughter-in-law could expect the heaviest workload if she was the *only* daughter-in-law in complex households, which could happen in two sets of circumstances: first, if she married into a stem family with only one son; second, when she married a potentially extended family with more than one son but was the eldest or *the only* daughter-in-law for a period of time.

In other words, from all possible family structures, a daughter-in-law suffered the most in a stem family. She had no sisters-in-law to share the domestic labour and had to work under the direct supervision of her mother-in-law. Sisters-in-law could compete for resources, become enemies and turn out to be the most competitive relations in the extended family.[84] However in a stem family, without sisters in law, a daughter-in-law became extremely isolated. One might wonder whether class or the presence of maids would alleviate the workload of the daughter-in-law and enhance her status in the family. The following section addresses experiences of daughters-in-law in upper class families with maids.

Upper Class Daughters-in-law

Yu Xiu-hia (2-06) was trained at medical school in Japan. She was a qualified doctor when she got married, as was her husband. However, after marriage, she was not able to

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[84] Kandiyoti (1988) argued that patriarchy created a conflict of interest between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law but my empirical data suggests me that when the family turned from stem family to the extended family, the tension between mother-in-law and daughters-in-law was more likely to be replaced by disputes between sisters-in-law. My argument here links household composition to structural conflicts between women. For example, Xiu-lian's tensions with her mother-in-law were gradually diffused when three more daughters-in-law married into the family.In extended families, sisters-in-law were more likely compete with each other as discussed by Cohen (1976) over family resources. The same pattern was found in my data but it was not confined to economical questions. In a group discussion, Hen-Hong asked me, '*In the past, do you know what was the most difficult relation in the family? Dan-sai [sisters-in-law]. I think that's the most difficult relation. I was all right in my family for I easily ignored people's criticism. But, after I saw many other families [as a midwife], I felt that Dan-sai-a was the most difficult relation to deal with.*' Her words stimulated all participants' memories of their experiences in the extended family, mainly as daughters. '*I remembered... my mother was hanging clothes to dry. Then, my uncle's wife came in. She just pushed it away to dry theirs no matter whether ours had dried or not.*' Even the most commonly heard problems of 'thousand year old in-law conflicts' could be diverted to become conflicts between sisters-in-law. '*Some da-ge loved this sim-pu more than that one. In my family, the eldest brother's wife was really a nice person, but her da-ge did not like her. On the contrary, the third brother's wife was really spoilt and very often shouted at her husband. But her da-ge liked her very much.*' The unequal affection and attention between sisters-in-law easily led to conflicts between them.

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continue working even though the family had maids. The life of a daughter-in-law in an

upper class family was just as humiliating and painful as those in the averagely wealthy

family with no maids. Yu expressed her strong resentment towards the stem family[85] in

the interview,

> 'They were rich. He [her husband] lent out money for profit but he wouldn't give me money. They all looked down on me. He laughed at me, "We are both doctors. If you don't have money, why don't you go out and work?" But I couldn't. He never gave it a thought that I was doing all the housework, giving birth, bringing up children as well as serving the patients at his clinic... To live with *da-ge* [and] *da-guan* was even worse... They were old fashioned. Once I was asked, "What aspect of Taiwan life should be improved, judging from your experiences of studying in Japan?" I said, "The cooking. We should not require so many dishes for each meal. Women could use the time to read books." My *da-ge* [and] *da-guan* both jeered at me as a "lazy woman"... When I was fetching logs for cooking, my *da-ge* also laughed at me, "You don't find your husband too heavy to raise but find it difficult to lift logs?" (舉尪就不重, 舉柴就會重)'

Thus, no matter how high a status she had achieved through education or work,

Yu's husband's family perceived her primarily as the daughter-in-law, an idea generated

within the structures of patriarchal genealogy. She had to contribute to the patrilineage

of her husband's family (bear children), shoulder domestic responsibility in her

husband's household, and assist in her husband's productive work. Her skills and

education were not appreciated at all. All of her work was unpaid, determined by a

marriage contract. Her wish to reduce the unnecessary workload earned her the label of

a 'lazy' woman who only thought of escaping from *her* responsibilities as a

daughter-in-law.[86]

Similar paradoxical status is also found in other wealthy families. Du (1-07) very

often went out to do charitable work, as expected of an upper class woman under the

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[85] Yu divorced in the 1950s and went to the States for higher education in biology. I feel that she could denounce her treatment so powerfully because she no longer lived in the brutal family system. Women who suffered a lot as a daughter-in-law had often internalised patriarchal ideas and thought this suffering was 'natural' or 'necessary.'

[86] The association of laziness and domestic responsibility was constantly found in my informants' words across generations. When a woman did not perform the housework expected of her (as a daughter-in-law in complex households or as a wife in conjugal families), the term 'lazy' usually followed. Either she self-claimed it without challenge or other family member labelled her as such.

Japanese 'cult of productivity' (Chapter 3). At home, she ran the extended household and supervised servants. However, she herself was subjected both to the commands of her mother-in-law and violence of her husband. There is no doubt that the status of daughter-in-law was higher than that of the handmaids and paid servants, but it did not change the fact that daughters-in-law were situated at the bottom of the gender and generation hierarchy of patriarchal kinship and often subjected to abuse. Some might be fortunate enough to have kind mothers-in-law, as Pan did in a moderately wealthy family, and have comparably better lives. However, this did not involve any challenge to the patriarchal kinship structure that granted both the mother-in-law and the husband power over the daughter-in-law.

Private Money and the Power of the Daughter-in-law

Perhaps a more effective way to assess the power (or powerlessness) of daughters-in-law in complex households is to look at access to private money. As mentioned in previous chapter, in wealthy urban complex households, the family shared a common coffer and the patriarch had direct control over money. However, according to my data, it also seems that in averagely wealthy or non-merchant families, the wife of the patriarch (i.e. the mother-in-law) was very likely to have full control over the common coffer (see Chapter 6). This arrangement often (but not always) caused conflict between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law about money. Daughters-in-law were allowed to have private money, accumulated from their wedding. The private money of a daughter-in-law might not directly alleviate the stress of living in her husband's family, but it could grant her certain autonomy.

We can return to Yu, the qualified doctor, to discuss this further. Despite her education, Yu was penniless after marriage and this was a partial cause of her powerlessness. Her husband even scornfully jeered at her penniless situation. According to the way family economy was arranged in Chinese complex households (Chapter 4), the daughter-in-law had no direct access to money, unless she was the

financial manager. Her only resources were the private money from her dowry (Cohen, 1976, see Chapter 2). However, Yu did not have any such private money because her mother, as an elite educated woman, optimistically believed that her qualification as a doctor was her invaluable dowry. When such idealism met patriarchal reality, it rendered Yu powerless in her husband's family.

In folk discourses, connections were often made between the size of the dowry and the treatment daughters-in-law received from their mother-in-law. Xiu-lian attributed her tough life to the limited dowry that she brought with her. 'It must be because my dowry was so little' (2-03:91). Given my discussion of domestic labour, I doubt whether the amount of dowry could really alleviate the woman's workload as *the* only daughter-in-law in the stem family. However, in other cases, my data supported the argument of M. Wolf (1975:135) that private money could affect daughters-in-law's ability to negotiate within the complex household.

Women who owned private money were able to make their own decisions, even if they were subjected to mothers-in-law's supervision and opinions. For example, the mother-in-law of Yu-zhu (1-03:125) valued boys much more than girls. She treated her grandchildren partially, giving all the good food and clothes to her grandsons, while the granddaughters had leftovers. Lin Yu-zhu saw the suffering of her daughters. She earned money by weaving straw hats, which was the most prominent handcraft at that time, to accumulate private money to improve her daughters' living conditions. Moreover, she ignored her mother-in-law's objections and paid for her daughters' education. Private money also provided the economic source for resistance on a larger scale: the young bride could use her money to return to her natal family without her mother-in-law's consent (2-03, 2-05).

Working daughters-in-law

This analysis demonstrates that the lives of daughters-in-law were often dominated by heavy domestic workloads, domineering supervision from mothers-in-law, a lack of

economic independence and secondary status which enforced obedience and subordination. Constraint by all these 'family' factors – a term often used by contemporary researchers to generalise these different issues - meant that it was rare for women in complex households to take up paid employment after marriage. During colonial times, economic factors could lead women in conjugal families to engage in work outside the home, but this did not seem to be the case in complex households. Perhaps given the way complex families were organised, it was usually the men, rather than women, who would be sent out to seek work. None of the daughters-in-law mentioned above were formally employed after marriage. The rest of the informants said little about the reasons that they did not work after marriage. Some women quit their jobs at the request of their mother-in-law (mother of 3-13, 3-14) or the patriarch (2-09). Others did not seem to provide satisfactory answers to this question. Maybe the domestic responsibilities fell so heavily on daughters-in-law upon marriage that they never had a chance to think of alternatives. Perhaps it would be more productive to ask, 'What made it possible for some daughters-in-law in complex households to take up full time paid employment?'

Permission or instruction from male authorities (the patriarch or husband) might allow women to work, but more often they mentioned 'kind' others, such as mothers-in-law or sisters-in-law who made it possible. Pan (1-14), who I used as the example at the beginning of this chapter, was a self-employed midwife. In a stem family without sisters-in-law,[87] her 'kind' mother-in-law was willing to help her when she went out to deliver babies. Nevertheless, she was still required to take over all housework immediately after she returned home. To supplement the limited data from my informants, I quote another case in research done by Yu (1995:73) on career women in the colonial period. In a rare case of a teacher who married into a complex household and continued to work, it was her sisters-in-law who generously took over her domestic

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[87] At this time, Pan had experienced the second family division and she lived with her parents-in-law, her husband and their children in a stem family.

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responsibility. In return, she 'donated' part of her salary to them to show her gratitude. This was probably an early case of 'buying' domestic services from kin, which was a common pattern after industrialization (Chapter 8).

Qiu (1-04) was the only woman in my sample who lived in a complex household and carried on working full time as a teacher after marriage. She had a kind mother-in-law (widowed) and a supportive husband (the only son). Even though it was a complex household, the family composition was rather simple. Moreover, the household was wealthy enough to have handmaids responsible for domestic labour prior to her marriage. She also had fairly substantial private money, which would have empowered her. However, Qiu eventually gave up her job after four years of marriage because she felt it was her duty to take care of her aging mother-in-law. Even a daughter-in-law in a better position than most to negotiate autonomy found it difficult to put aside the domestic expectations assigned under patriarchy.

The state 'cult of productivity' might have encouraged upper class women in complex households to perform voluntary work (such as Du and Qiu after she quit teaching), but certainly not to enter full-time employment. It seems that a patriarchy, which positioned daughters-in-law at the bottom of generational and gender hierarchy was the most influential discourse in preventing women in complex households from working full time. In conjugal families where women were only subjugated to gender hierarchy, both lower middle class working women and averagely wealthy housewives did take decisions to employ maids to enable them to go out to work.[88] However, women in moderately wealthy and wealthy complex households were not allowed to do so. These women could not make their own decisions. If they wanted to work, it was the mother or sisters-in-law who would carry out 'their' housework. The former situation violated generational hierarchy. The latter violated the principle of fairness in division of labour among sisters-in-law.[89] These women needed consensus from several other

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[88] See Chapter 6.

[89] This was probably the underlying reason that the working woman mentioned previously rewarded her sisters-in-law with money.

family members to realise their wish to work. Moreover, employing maids would have involved the family budget, which was not in their control. Given the low-status of daughters-in-law, it is hard to imagine them successfully resisting other family members expectations. It might be hard for a wife in a conjugal family to work if her husband opposed it, but would be a hundred times harder for a daughter-in-law in complex household to work after marriage.

Without 'kind' support from other family members, a young wife could only hope to climb up the generation hierarchy and became powerful at the later stage of her life. When she started to take charge, she would be able to make her own decision to work and employ maids. This was how Lao Jin-hia (2-07) eventually went out to work as a public-health midwife and then opened her own pharmacy after eleven years of marriage.

Before marriage, Lao worked as a nurse for five years and as a secretary for a year in the Governor-General Hall. She married in 1948 and became the eldest daughter-in-law in a stem family, living with her parents-in-law, her husband (a civil servant) and his five unwed siblings. She also experienced very tough times as the eldest daughter-in-law.[90] However, over time, her husband's five siblings grew up and got married. The family became an extended one. Her workload gradually lifted because her sisters-in-law started to share it. By the time she was asked to work as a public health midwife in the local council in 1959, Lao had become the respectable eldest daughter-in-law and a complete family insider. With her mother-in-law's approval, she took up the job offer. Three years later, her father-in-law died. The family divided and the mother-in-law was to live with her eldest son, i.e. Lao's husband. Thus, Lao, her mother-in-law, her husband, and their three children formed a stem family. Lao started to take charge. She rented a house from her mother and opened her own

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[90] She had to do domestic labour was for nine people in total under her mother-in-law's supervision. She not only suffered from her brother-in-law's ridicule but also found herself given insufficient funds to buy goods for the whole family.

pharmacy there. Then, she *moved* the whole household there, including her mother-in-law and asked her husband to transfer his post to her mother's town. At first she attempted to combine her pharmacy business with housework but found it impossible. Later, she started to employ maids to help her with cooking and cleaning.

This story illustrates very well a woman's life cycle in a patriarchal family. As a daughter, she had no domestic responsibility and enjoyed relative freedom to work outside the home. As a daughter-in-law, she had to carry out domestic work. As she grew older, she gained bargaining power. Years of performing as a filial daughter-in-law increased her abilities to negotiate with her mother-in-law about the new job opportunity. After family division, the mother-in-law became old and relied on Lao for support. Then, Lao exercised culturally legitimised power to make decisions that benefited her and her uterine family. She started her business, moved the whole family to her mother's hometown and employed maids.

To conclude this section, although they occupied the same position in the patriarchal kinship structure, daughters-in-law were subject to different degrees of domination. The personality of the mother-in-law and husband might have some influence, but to a great extent, the experiences of daughters-in-law were structurally determined. The amount of domestic work they had to carry out depended a great deal on the size, structure and lifecycles of the household. Situated at the bottom of generation and gender hierarchy of the complex family, it was the private money, rather than the economic standing of the family or the presence of maids, that empowered daughters-in-law. Daughters-in-law hardly had the opportunity to work outside the home, without gaining the support of other family members or before moving up to the next stage of her lifecycle. However, it must be acknowledged that most of my informants did not wait for this change over time. They engaged in active strategies to improve their lives and it is to these that I now turn.

Resistance of daughters-in-law

Bearing Kandiyoti (1988)'s theory of patriarchal bargaining in mind, I was surprised to find that daughters-in-law resisted patriarchy! This was less obvious among the first generation informants (for which information was limited) but six out of nine second generation informants mentioned their resistance in one form or another. In the following section, I contrast two examples of resistance. Drawing conclusions from these two cases, I investigate what might contribute to the success of resistance and explore the relationship between resistance and the working of patriarchy.

Shi Chen Xiu-lian

Xiu-lian grew up in a complex family with grandparents who had a vegetarian hall in rural Nan-to and a father who owned a photo studio on the high street of Nan-to town. She received primary school education, never worked outside the home and had an arranged marriage. After marriage, she suffered.

> 'My mother-in-law had just become a mother-in-law. She liked nagging. She complained that I worked slowly, that I was unfocused and that the rice I cooked was difficult to swallow... She went on and on and my heart sank. When I felt that I could not bear any more, I escaped to see my mother. [...On the bus,] I wondered how come I was so ill-fated. I resented my mother for arranging a marriage so far away from home and I had to do all the hard labour.' (2-05:97)

Upon seeing her mother, Xiu-lian cried. Her mother embraced her and said,

> 'How come you come back? It's not because your husband abused you. It's only because your mother-in-law nagged you. Be a daughter-in-law. You should learn to endure.' (2-05:98)

The next day, Xiu-lian's husband travelled from his family to pick Xiu-lian up. He said to her, 'I treat you well. It's only the elderly people nagging you. Please endure these years.' (2-05:98) Xiu-lian went home with him. Xiu-liang ran home like this on several occasions, until she found herself pregnant. Yet she vowed to leave her husband's family when the child grew older. During this time, Xiu-lian adjusted herself to life in her husband's family and became friends with her unwed sister-in-law.

Moreover, her son also legitimised her status in her husband's family. Eventually, when there were more sisters-in-law married in, she became the eldest daughter-in-law and did not run back to her natal family anymore (2-05:115-6).

Yang Qien-he

Yang met her husband, Jia-xiong, through 'romantic courtship' and expected a happy marriage in the modern sense. Before marriage, she had worked as a journalist but quit to protest against racial discrimination at work. After that she did not work. After marriage, she entered servitude as the daughter-in-law. Her first thought was to escape home before her husband had sex with her. However, this plan was not realised and Yang forced herself to adjust. Isolated in his family, her husband became the only person who could provide her with mental support and keep her living up to the difficult role of a daughter-in-law in the stem family. Nevertheless, this support was fragile and tentative. One day after three months of the marriage, Yang was severely scolded by her mother-in-law. Without knowing exactly what the argument was about, Jia-xiong slapped Yang's face. Never having been beaten by anyone, Yang felt humiliated, shocked, deeply hurt and disappointed. She left home the next day morning with clogs on. She attempted to commit suicide but lacked the courage. Then, she returned to her natal family (2-03:214-29).

Qien-he did not say a word until the next day, when questioned by her brother. Then she burst into tears and told them what happened. Her conservative father was concerned about a married daughter staying in the natal family, which was regarded as shameful. Nevertheless, her brother, who had received modern education objected, 'She should stay. If she goes home like this, she might commit suicide.' Qien-he stayed (2-03:231).

Yang stayed with her natal family for a month. She hated her husband's indecisive way of handling this difficult situation between his wife and his mother. She could not forgive him humiliating her and giving her a hard time. After three days, pushed by

Yang's brother, her husband eventually showed up and visited her occasionally during that month. Later, they made up with sex and wanted to have a baby. Even then, he hesitated to mention their reconciliation to his mother. If he could have done so, he would probably have continued living like this without making any effort to improve the icy relationship between his mother and his wife. It was Yang's father, who could not bear the anxiety of married daughter staying at home, who finally pushed Jia-xiong to find a solution (2-03: 232-4).

Jia-xiong eventually plucked up the courage to talk to his father, an educated schoolteacher. He said that for the sake of his career, he wanted to move out of the family. His father agreed. Then, Yang returned home with him. On the day they were moving out, Yang's mother-in-law became insane. She hit and abused her son, grabbing Yang's dowries to stop them from moving out. The young couple only moved out successfully after his father stopped her protests. After this event, Yang lived happily as a conjugal family with her husband. She avoided returning to his family as much as possible and only did so when it was inevitable. But serious conflicts never happened again (2-03:235-48).

What do these two stories tell us about the resistance of daughters-in-law? By looking into the timing, strategies and outcomes of resistance, the following section will evaluate what made resistance successful and what made it fail.

These two cases suggest that resistance usually took place at the beginning of the marriage. Why? I consider a woman's lifecycle in the Han family was the key factor that determined the timing of resistance. Since a woman experienced the toughest time as a newly-wed daughter-in-law (M. Wolf, 1972; Kandiyoti, 1988; Croll, 1995), she had the strongest incentive to resist when she was first married with no children and was often desperate enough to resist without thinking about the consequences.

One of the possible strategies was suicide, as Yang attempted. M. Wolf suggested

that the high incidence of suicide by women aged between 19-29 in early twentieth-century Taiwan was a type of revenge by young daughters-in-law against their husband's family because 'suicide was a socially acceptable solution to a variety of problems that offer no other solution' (1975:112). In other words, suicides should be considered as a form of resistance, when young women felt they had no alternatives. If they succeeded, they could turn into ghosts and empower themselves through the supernatural (M. Wolf, 1975). That is to say, suicide was a strategy for resistance, but one most likely adopted by daughters-in-law with no resources or supports in the secular world, which was less likely to be the case for my informants.

Neither Xiu-lian nor Qien-he committed suicide, but rather sought help from their natal family. Recourse to the natal family appeared to be the most common strategy for daughters-in-law in major marriages.[91] Nevertheless, this resistance could meet very different results. Xiu-lian's natal family responded with 'traditional' discourses and allowed no alternative advice other than the request to accept the patriarchal order: to obey, to comply and to endure as a daughter-in-law. Her husband's secret support, under patriarchal norms, was a bonus in an arranged marriage. In contrast, neither Qien-he's brother, who had received a modern education, nor later her father, despite his conservative instincts, did expected her simply to conform to patriarchal norms. They backed her and negotiated on her behalf to find a better solution. Moreover, Qien-he herself did not think that she should subordinate herself to the existing patriarchal order in her husband's family, a position which I believe was closely related to the romantic courtship and modern education that she had experienced, which may both have given her very different expectations of marriage. These 'modern' values, expressed separately by Qien-he's brother, her father and father-in-law, contributed to support Qien-he's resistance, to push her indecisive husband to find a final solution and

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[91] Recourse to natal family needed material resources to realise it: enough private money for transportation home. My informants seemed to have no problem with this. However, in a rural context, maybe a woman's community was the solution: women in the community exercised their power through gossip (M.Wolf, 1972).

provide an alternative resolution of the problems faced by almost all newly-wed daughters-in-law.

Where would resistance lead? It seems that possible positive outcomes were very limited. Negative outcomes included death, but, most likely, as for Xiu-lian, required submission to the patriarchal order, returning to their husband's family, having children and waiting to become mothers-in-law, which Kandiyoti called 'passive resistance' (1988). My analysis so far leads me to believe that 'passive resistance' resulted from a lack of resources. Positive outcomes were to leave their husband's family, alone or with their husband. The high frequency of 'successful' resistance among my informants, i.e. divorce or living as a conjugal family with her husband, might reflect their class privilege and the effects of 'romantic courtship.'

A lot of first generation educated women and some second generation tended to seek divorce by recourse to their natal family.[92] Three aunts of Fan-ge (2-16), who were daughters of upper class families, were divorced. Among the second generation informants, Madam Wang only lived in her husband's family for four months and then returned her natal family for good (2-14:137).[93] Yu divorced late in 1952, seven years after her marriage, when her husband took a prostitute as a concubine. Divorce released these women from the tough life of a daughter-in-law.[94] Nevertheless, I experienced surprise when I heard about these divorces, thanks to the contemporary myth of women's life-long suffering in the past. Yu told me that she got divorced through her parents' intervention. Divorce! How was this possible? Statistics from historical

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[92] The life stories of first generation women who married into complex households were usually brief and distanced and revealed little about resistance. However, narratives from second generation informants about their mothers or relatives had a similar theme, with two different outcomes. The common theme was that educated first generation daughters-in-law found it difficult to adjust to complex households. 'They themselves needed other people's service, how were they feeling to serve their parents-in-law or husband?' (Quoted from 2-16: 29; 2-11, 2-20 shared similar views)

[93] There is no information as to whether she got divorced or not.

[94] Although I do not intend to romanticise divorce, assuming that it represented a fully self-conscious act of resistance (because divorce might not be her decision but her husband's), I suggest that divorce at least provided a chance for daughters-in-law to escape the specific form of patriarchal exploitation in complex households.

records show that divorce was in fact very common in early twentieth-century Taiwan. It was estimated that the divorce rate was somewhere between 14.4% and 22.3% in 1906 and between 7.7 % and 9.4 % in 1925 (Barclay, 1954:221). These estimates only included marriages that dissolved within five years, which were only about 60% to 70% of all the marriages that eventually ended in divorce (Barclay, 1954:221).

Ethnographers attributed the high divorce rate to the prevalence of minor marriages (A. Wolf, 1975; A. Wolf and Huang, 1980). This interpretation could not account for the divorce cases in my data, all of them major marriages. What was the explanation? Most probably it related to the historical contexts in which marriage was mostly arranged between families of equal social status by the patriarch or the wife of the patriarch. Given the powerful family background, the husband's family was under pressure to treat the daughter-in-law well. If they abused her to an unreasonable extent it might cause a long-standing feud. Even though cases of abuse did occur and some educated daughters suffered and died young (the mother of 2-11, 2-20),[95] in many other cases divorce seemed to provide a solution to these wealthy daughters' unhappiness in her husband's family.

Over time an increasing number of second generation women left their husband's family together with their husband. This was perhaps the most successful form of resistance for the daughter-in-law but the greatest nightmare of the mother-in-law and so remained difficult. To illustrate the point, I return to the structural conflict between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law in classic patriarchy that is best illustrated by Kandiyoti:

> 'In classic patriarchy, subordination to men is offset by the control that elder women attain over younger women. However, women have access to the only type of labour power they can control, and to old-age security, through their married sons. Since sons are a woman's most critical resource, ensuring their life-long loyalty is an enduring preoccupation. Older women have a vested interest in the suppression of romantic love between youngsters to

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[95] I do not have information as to whether their natal family intervened in their marriage.

keep the conjugal bond secondary and to claim sons' primary allegiance. Younger women have an interest in circumventing and possibly evading their mother-in-law's control.' (Kandiyoti, 1988:279).

Situating in the extended patrilocal family, it could be understood that the mother-in-law would strive to ensure security for her old age through bonds with her son. This mechanism led to the formation of the 'uterine family' (M. Wolf, 1972). For the continuance of the 'uterine family,' attraction between genders must be subordinated to the generation hierarchy of the complex household. The mother-in-law would often attempt to supervise any sign of intimacy between the young couple, a form of control experienced by most informants who lived in complex households.[96] When sexual attraction seemed more powerful than mother-son ties, the mother-in-law's 'uterine family' was threatened.

With this framework in mind, we can reinterpret the two examples of resistance as follows: Xiu-lian was satisfied with her husband's secret support and was never able to disrupt the generational hierarchy of the complex household. In contrast, Yang capitalised on her husband's affection and support from her natal family to subvert the generational hierarchy. She eventually moved out and formed her own 'uterine family.' The insane behaviour of her mother-in-law on their departure can be understood as her final bid to protect her 'uterine family' that guaranteed her future security. The contestations between generational hierarchy and sex attractions crisscrossed the son. The son, caught in between loyalty to his mother and attraction to his wife was often left in a limbo in such contests. In other words, to successfully resist generational hierarchy, the conjugal ties between the young couple must overwhelm the patrilineal ties. Shi-xia

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[96] Many informants have mentioned this in the life story. The husband of Yu-Zhu (1-02) was separated from his wife and forced to sleep next to her mother. Xiu-lian's husband could only comfort her privately in their room, but could not even talk to her in public. Yang's mother-in-law also kept an eye on their sexual life. Since the first night of their marriage, the mother-in-law, pretending to cover the quilt of her other sons next door, watched them. Although the couple dated before marriage, after marriage, Yang's husband behaved differently. He did not show any sign of intimacy. After coming home from work, he talked with his parents downstairs and only came back to their room upstairs for sleep. They hardly had any sex - perhaps because the watchful eyes of his mother intimidated him.

(1-05), one of the few first generation women who married after 'romantic courtship,'[97] was abused by her step mother-in-law. Her husband eventually decided to take her away from the extended family by giving up his chance of inheritance from the wealthy landlord family. Several of my second-generation informants, including Qien-he, resisted successfully in this way. Although the strong conjugal tie between the husband and the wife was essential, most crucially, resistance needed the son's final decision to rebel against his family.

In this section, using life stories, I argued that daughters-in-law were very likely to try to resist, especially at the beginning of the marriage. Committing suicide and haunting their oppressors from beyond the grave was one form of resistance. Nevertheless, upper class and educated women in colonial Taiwan mostly attempted to rebel with the help of their powerful natal family or support from the husband. If their resistance failed, they were left to live in complex households, to bear children and become mothers-in-law in due course (or die young).

This argument counters the suggestions put forward by Kandiyoti (1988). Although Kandiyoti rightly pointed out the divided interests between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law, she failed to incorporate this into her overall argument. She suggested that *women* resisted social change and colluded with patriarchy because they expected to benefit from patriarchy in the old age. The most likely way for daughters-in-law to resist was to wait to become mothers-in-law in their turn. In contrast I stress the visible resistance of daughters-in-law, especially in the early stages

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[97] Although it would be right to say that romantic courtship only become prevalent among my fourth generation informants, it must be realised that it was known among upper class young people in early twentieth century Taiwan. Shi-xia might have been one of these 'pioneers.' However, the term 'romantic courtship' should be understood in its historical context. Through schooling, these upper class young men met their spouses via the introductions of their same-sex classmates to their cousins or through chances encounters on the way to school. In the former case, they usually went out in groups. Later, the young man would develop personal preferences and ask his parents to arrange the marriage for him. Since this was still an upper-class network, such marriage usually took place thanks to a combination of [male] free-choice and [parental] arrangement even if the choices were usually made on very simplistic grounds. This is what it meant to be married through 'romantic courtship' in early twentieth-century Taiwan.

of their marriage and their attempts to find support and to leave their husband's family, against the wishes of mothers-in-law. I argue it was *the failed* attempts of daughters-in-law to resist rather than a lack of resistance in the first place that led to what Kandiyoti called 'patriarchal bargains.'

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have used the diverse experiences of women in complex families to reject any simple identification of daughters-in-law as a powerless or homogenous group. I have argued that daughters, daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law were assigned different responsibilities for domestic work. This puts patriarchal genealogy in the centre of the picture and counters the popular interpretation of the gendered socialisation process. Moreover, I have demonstrated that while daughters-in-law were often situated at the bottom of the generation and gender hierarchy, they were subject to different degrees of domination, according to the lifecycle of patriarchal families, the private funds they had access too and their own lifecycle. I also disagree with Kandiyoti (1988) that women did not typically resist their subjection. I argue that daughters-in-law were very likely to resist their mothers-in-law, especially at the beginning of the marriage, through attempts to divorce, recourse to their natal family or forming their own conjugal family. I contend that patriarchal genealogy had different effects in terms of the positions, duties and responsibilities assigned to particular women. Women did not simply share beliefs or interests under patriarchy. In the next chapter, I investigate the roles played by women in a different type of patriarchal family, i.e. the conjugal family in colonial Taiwan, where women were both mothers and wives.

Chapter 6 Wives and Mothers in Conjugal Families, 1920-1960

In Chapter 4 and 5, I drew on the narratives of daughters and daughters-in-law to explore the structure of complex families from 1900 to 1960, and investigated the role of patriarchal genealogy in organising production, resource distribution and reproduction. This chapter explores a different life stage, when the women became mothers and wives, in a different family type, the conjugal family. This provides an opportunity to explore the relationships between couples and to compare and contrast the experiences of women in different family structures. The evidence covers the period between 1920 and 1960.

I start by analysing why there were so many conjugal families, as this was not expected in 'traditional Han society.' I then explore the conjugal family form by investigating production, resource distribution and reproduction in families in different class positions. How far did these patterns depart from those seen in complex households? How did women's experiences vary between conjugal and complex families? The difference between these family forms is further explicated in the conclusion to Part One where I conceptualise 'patriarchal power structures' in colonial Taiwan.

Emerging Conjugal Families

Anthropologists have pointed out correlations between class and family size in traditional Han society. Conjugal families were more common among the poor than among the upper classes. This pattern was confirmed by data about the natal family of my informants. However, looking at their family of procreation suggests otherwise.

Excluding those conjugal families formed because of family division or family lifecycle, an unexpectedly large number of averagely wealthy and above families lived in conjugal units immediately after marriage. What were the reasons for this? What made these families depart from tradition? Table 6.1 shows the occupation, class status and given reasons for forming conjugal families among my informants of the first two generations.

Table 6.1 Occupation, Class Status and Reasons for Forming Conjugal Families, First and Second Generations

Name	Premarital occupation/marriage*career break/occupation after break	Husband's job (- job transition /second husband)	Class status of the household	Reasons for becoming a conjugal family
1-05 Chen Wong, Shi-xia	Primary school teacher/ */teacher	Merchant (mining and transportation)	NMC +grand bourgeoisie	Husband's rebellion
1-13 Yin, Xi-mei	Midwife/nurse	Construction Manager-Business	NMC + bourgeoisie (e)	Late marriage, 48
1-12 Lin, Cai-wan	x/*/pharmacist	Teacher-doctor	NMC + bourgeoisie (e)	Husband's work
2-12 Zhang, Zhong-hia	Civil servant/civil servant /civil servant	Civil servant - unemployed-factory manager	NMC (wife, e) +bourgeoisie	Late marriage, 37 Mainlander
1-10 Yang, Mao-zhi	Teacher/*/ college chancellor	Lawyer (died 1947)	New middle class (e)	Late marriage, 33
1-03Lin, Yu-zhu	x/*/homeworking+husbandry	Civil servant-employee at sugar plantation	New middle class (wife, e)	x(stem)-lifecycle
2-04 Jiang, Fen-hia	x/x/civil servant	Businessman (died 1943)	New middle class	Marriage arrangements
1-08 Chen, Jin	Art teacher/art teacher /art teacher	Civil servant-government manager	New middle class	Late marriage, 40
1-15 Chen, Ai-zhu	Teacher/*/leader of women's association	Teacher	New middle class, (wife, e)	Uxorilocal
2-07 Lao, Jen-hia	Nurse/*/public midwife/pharmacist	Civil servant-president of local health council	New middle class + Bourgeoisie	Lifecycle
2-03 Yang, Qien-he	Journalist/*/province council woman/civil servant/*	Civil servant-prison-county magistrate	New middle class	Resisting patrilocality
2-15 Lai, Qing-hia	Bank, bookshop employee/*	Lawyer-Judge.	New middle class	Marry H.M.
2-17 Li, Yu-hia	Civil servant	x (unwed)	New middle class	x
2-20 Lim, Ting-hia	Civil servant (accountant)/*/textile broker	Soldier-National Security Bureau.	New middle class	Mainlander
2-19 Gue, Yen-hia	Civil servant/*/civil servant	Civil servant, died 1958. M.	New middle class	Mainlander
2-25 Zhong, Zheng-hua	Bank employee /bank employee	Bank employee (Dv.)	New middle class	x
1-14 Pan, Hen-Hong	Telephone operator/*/midwife	Civil servant (-1945)-business-self-employed researcher	New middle class	Lifecycle
2-08 Wang, Dun-hia	Teacher/teacher/teacher	Teacher-High school chancellor	New middle class	Work, Living quarters
2-11 Xie, Cui-hia	Civil servant/Owned grocery shop	Leader of cleaning bureau-porter-unemployed	NMC -petty bourgeoisie	Mainlander

Name	Premarital occupation/marriage*career break/occupation after break	Husband's job (- job transition /second husband)	Class status of the household	Reasons for becoming a conjugal family
1-09 Guo, Yi-qin	Teacher/*/clogs factory owner	Judge-legislator (local) (died 1947)	Bourgeoisie	X
2-10 Zeng, hui-hia	Bank employee/*/owned a flower shop.	?	Bourgeoisie (? implied)	?
2-22 Zhang, Yu-zhan	Adopted daughter/*wife of doctor/farmer	Doctor (died 1948)/?	Bourgeoisie /peasant (e)	Work/ stem, U.
1-01Cai, A-xin	Doctor/doctor/doctor	Social activist (Dv) /clergyman	Bourgeoisie /?	?
1-04 Qiu, Yuan-yang	Teacher/*/legislator	Teacher-merchant-legislator (H.M)	Bourgeoisie (e)	Half-mountain
1-07 Mother of Du Pan	None/None	Government employee-village head	Bourgeoisie (e)	x (extended family)
1-02 Lin,Cai-su	Teacher/ father's business/legislator (from local to national)	Doctor	Bourgeoisie (e)	Husband's work, living quarters
1-11 Chen, Shi-man	Doctor/doctor/legislator (local-national)	Doctor	Bourgeoisie (e)	?
1-18 Xie, Xue-hong	Adopted DIL/*concubine/employee of Singer/bookshop owner/Taiwanese communist leader	Merchant (Dv)/Social activist	Bourgeoisie (e)	Concubine
2-06 Yu, Xiao-hia	Doctor/*/doctor	Doctor (Dv. 1952)	Bourgeoisie (e)	x (stem)
2-02 Lin zhuan, Ji-chun	Pharmacist	Doctor	Bourgeoisie	X (stem, U.)
2-16 Du Pan, fan-ge	Teacher/* homeworking/*poet	Doctor	Bourgeoisie	X (stem)
2-23 Gue, yao-hia	Librarian/*	Business	Bourgeoisie	X (stem)-work+ lifecycle
2-09 Zhong, Xue-hia.	Teacher/*homemaking/ owned business	Teacher-business	Bourgeoisie	Husband's work
1-16 Qing-hua	x/x/ petty bourgeoisie (selling food)	?(run away)/artisan (died 1955)	Petty bourgeoisie	X (stem)/without parents
1-06 Ye, Tao	Primary school teacher/ vendor, social activist	Writer - social activist (in prison)-writer	Petty bourgeoisie	? (Possibly rebellion, cohabitation)
1-17 Xu Jiang-chun	Working for father's company/ owned grocery shop	Civil servant (died 1947) U.	Petty bourgeoisie	Quasi-U.M.
2-18 Qiu, Ruei-sui	Civil servant/*/casual worker, restaurant owner	Government employee-politician.	Petty bourgeoisie	H.M.
2-21 Fan, Li-qing	Accountant, bus conductoress, civil servant/petty bourgeoisie (managing husband's shoe shop)	Owner of the shoe shop	Petty bourgeoisie	X (fraternal joint family)-lifecycle
2-24 Lun, zhun-hia	Domestic worker/petty bourgeoisie	Soldier-unemployed	Petty bourgeoisie	X (stem)- lifecycle + Mainlander
2-05 Shi Chen, Xiu-lian	Family worker/*/owned grocery shop	Family business (died 1948)	Petty bourgeoisie	X (family division)
2-01 Ruan, Mu-bi	X/x/province council woman	?	? (e)	X (extended)
2-13 Xin, Ben-hia.	Bank employee/*/?	?	?	?
2-14 Madam Wang	?	?	?	X(resided with natal family)

?: no information; *: break from formal employment ; x: none given or inapplicable.(e): elite family connections. NMC: New Middle Class. H.M.: Half-mountains, *Ban-shan* (see footnote 99). M.: Mainlander. Dv.: divorced from the informant. U.M Uxorilocal Marriage.

Why were there so many conjugal families? The empirical data suggests two factors, both related to social change. One reason was the emerging employment opportunities outside the extended family. Among families where this was important, two different groups can be identified according to the ways their family was resourced.

The first group was the 'bourgeois family,' formed by children from upper class families who had strong connections with their family of origin. The husband usually worked as a doctor or teacher at first, but later took over the family business. The wife was usually educated to at least high school level and often worked full-time as a teacher, doctor or pharmacist, or worked unpaid at her husband's clinic. Wives in these upper class conjugal families were very likely to be actively engaged in work of all kinds (1-01, 1-11). However, there was only limited information on the key grounds for forming a conjugal family among upper class families. In one case, the husband worked as a doctor in town and lived away from his parents who were part of the local elite of a mountain area (2-22). In the other two cases, both wives actively engaged in work, but there was no information on the decision to live away from their husband's family.

Secondly, 'new middle class families' were mostly the consequence of the jobs provided by the Japanese bureaucracy for Han men and women as public health doctors, midwives, teachers, police officers and in sugar plantations or power plants. These familiesincluded dual-career couples and male-breadwinner families. All these jobs were allocated with living quarters and this provided a chance for the young couple to live independently. Compared with 'bourgeois' employment, new middle class jobs were ill-paid, low-ranking and subject to the racial discrimination of the Japanese. Therefore, the sons of elite families did not usually stay long in these jobs, which were taken up by daughters of elite families to defy patriarchy (see below) and by sons and daughters from poorer backgrounds.

The second important set of reasons for forming conjugal families were the result of alternative marriage arrangements. For example, some parents thoughtfully choose marriage candidates with no living parents for their beloved daughters (2-04). This

avoided any risk of the young woman being abused by her parents-in-law. In other cases, the father arranged a quasi-uxorilocal marriage for his daughter, asking the husband to live next door (1-17).

There were also a significant number of the younger generation who resisted conventional marriages. Some well-educated first generation daughters of upper class families worked as teachers or nurses to delay marriage and remained single until their 30s or 40s (1-08, 1-10,1-13). However, the pressure to marry was so strong that they eventually got married to please their mothers. When they married late they often had no living parents-in-law and lived in a conjugal unit while continuing to work (1-08, 1-13, 2-12). In addition, many second generation young women married Mainlanders or Ban-shan[98] after romantic courtships. These young women usually had primary school or higher subject qualifications, worked at new middle class jobs in the government and fell in love with their colleagues from Mainland China in the late 1940s or early 1950s.[99] Due to the tensions between Mainlanders and Taiwanese, they usually married against their parents' wishes (2-11, 2-15, 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 2-24). After marriage, since Mainlanders were unlikely to have parents in Taiwan due to the war and migration, these couples lived in conjugal families.[100] Most of these women worked in new middle class jobs out of economic necessity and quit their jobs at some stage of their lives. I interpret these conjugal families formed through alternative marriage arrangements as a type of resistance against patriarchal families, even if these social actors might not have been aware of the consequences of their decisions. This kind of resistance, together with the rebellion against patrilocal arrangements mentioned in Chapter 5 (1-05, 2-05, 2-08) adds significant numbers of cases to this family type.

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[98] See Chapter 7.

[99] Between 1945-1949, many low-ranking officers and soldiers left their families (parents and very often, wives) in China and came to Taiwan alone with the KMT army, taking up jobs at administration jobs in the government or in the army. They were called Mainlanders (外省人). Ban-shan (半山, "Half-maintains") refers to those who were born in Taiwan, went to China during the colonial time and came back to Taiwan after 1945.

[100] Ban-shan usually had parents living in Taiwan. Women who married Ban-shan often swung back and forth between conjugal and complex families because of husband's work.

A combination of reasons, including the traditional dynamics of patriarchal families and social change in wider society, contributed to the unusually high number of conjugal families among the upper classes and averagely wealthy families. These conjugal family forms meant that many 'modern women' skipped the stage of being daughters-in-law, becoming wives and mothers without having been subjected to generational hierarchy within their husband's family. While their peers were suffering in complex families, these women enjoyed great freedom within conjugal families, as demonstrated in the following discussion of the structure and internal dynamics of conjugal families.

Economic Arrangements

How were family resources managed in conjugal families? In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that upper class complex families kept a common coffer. The patriarch usually acted as the distributor and assigned one family member to be the financial manager. Chapter 5 showed that in moderately wealthy and non-merchant households, where the capability and powers of the patriarch were not central to family survival, the mother-in-law was very likely to control the family coffer. How were the roles of patriarch and financial manager assigned in conjugal families? The following section identifies five patterns of money management within conjugal families and investigates the interplay of class and patriarchal kinship relations. In the end, I compare these with the situation in complex families.

Pattern 1. Benevolent Patriarchs

In the first model, the patriarch assigned the role of financial manager to the wife, who, as his delegate, was given stable sources of income (such as land rent) and a certain degree of autonomy to run the household. Gue Yao-hia (2-23) married into a complex household and quit her job after the birth of her first child. Her husband was in business with his brother and owned several factories. After their widowed mother died, the

family divided. Gue's husband became the patriarch of a conjugal family, with full control over the money. He allowed Gue to act as a landlady and collect the rents from a house he owned. Gue used this money to buy consumer goods for the family and to pay the maintenance costs of the household. Although Gue had plenty of money, her autonomy was achieved by recognising the legitimacy of the patriarchal authority. Despite the conjugal family structure, this arrangement was identical with that of merchant complex families.

Pattern 2. Dominant Patriarchs

In the second pattern, the husband took on the roles of both patriarch and financial manager, while the wife was not given any access to family funds. For example, Lin's husband (1-12) was a doctor with his own clinic and Lin worked as a pharmacist in a public hospital. Lin described how they managed their money:

> 'My husband was in charge of our family expenses and had the full responsibility. His income belonged to him, while I saved my own salary for my own use' (1-12: 202).

One should not confuse this pattern of income management with an egalitarian type. While the patriarch held complete control over household finances, his wife *was allowed* to own her private money, i.e. her independent income. Had Lin not worked and earned her own salary, she might have become a powerless dependent wife because she was not given any direct access to family resources. I suspect this might be the underlying reason behind Lin's decision to go out to work rather than stay at home, helping in her husband's clinic, as was typical. Lin explained that she wanted to work outside the home because she did not want to waste her professional training and wanted to earn some money for *her mother* (1-10:197), a wish that was unlikely to meet approval within her husband's family. Her decision to work could thus be interpreted as a form of rebellion against patriarchal authority. This kind of case was also found in a bourgeois family, even when the wife was employed outside the home in a new middle class job.

Conceptually, this category might also include a situation where the patriarch acted as the financial manager *and* demanded full control over the wife's earnings, but there were no such cases among my informants.

Pattern 3. Powerful Wives v.s. Soft Husbands

In the third model, the husband did not take up the role of patriarch and the wife acted as financial manager. This produces an image of a 'powerful wife' and 'soft husband.' The latter contributed substantially or partially to the family economy but he had no objections to his wife being in charge of money and did not exercise his legitimised authority as patriarch. In some cases (1-11, 2-07) the wife enjoyed the power attained by managing the family's money and held onto full control. In others, the wife managed the money initially, but later found herself too busy (1-02) or the task too burdensome (2-20) and returned the rights to the husband. It seems that in this pattern, women gained the maximum autonomy or power to negotiate because the husband did not claim authority over their finances.[101] This pattern was largely reliant on the character of the husband and was not related to the wife's employment status at all. Nevertheless, these cases were mostly, but not solely, new middle class families.

Pattern 4. Irresponsible Husbands vs. Capable Wives

In this pattern, the husband contributed little or nothing to the conjugal family while the wife held the sole responsibility for the survival of the family. This was the most prevalent type of money management among my informants; about 42% (9 out of 21) fall into this category. Even worse, most of the husbands claimed their authority as the patriarch although they earned nothing. This pattern was very characteristic of low-income families, whether the couple worked in petty bourgeois or new middle class jobs. The following story is just one example.

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[101] However, if the wife managed money while the husband did not contribute to family economy, it is categorised as pattern 4.

Qiu's husband (2-18) was a civil servant when she first met him, but he went bankrupt immediately after their marriage. He was totally incapable of earning any stable income, yet he established himself successfully as a left-wing politician and became mayor in Tai-dong. This did not improve their economic predicament, for he spent all his salary on drink and supporting his friends. For forty years, Qiu was the breadwinner of this conjugal family with five children. She sold calligraphy on the streets, opened a restaurant and raised funds for his political activities. From outside it seemed that they lived a comfortable life as a successful family, but Qiu knew that they lived on the margins of poverty. She was constantly worrying about finding money for their next meal.

Pattern 5. The 'Egalitarian' Type

In my data, there was no example of an egalitarian type of money management in the *contemporary* sense: where both earned and each controlled their own income. However, there were different ways of being 'egalitarian', specific to that historical moment. The following cases illustrate these possibilities. Note that both cases also include marriage resistance as discussed earlier.

The first case resulted from a quasi-uxorilocal marriage. Genealogically, Xu (1-17) belonged to her husband's lineage and their children followed her husband's surname. However, the family's residence was uxorilocal. The couple lived in a house next door to her father, which he gave them. After marriage, Xu continued to work for her father and earned money from her shares in his business. Her husband remained a civil servant at the railway station. Both of them kept their own independent incomes. In this situation, Xu claimed no authority over her husband's money. However, her husband could also claim no authority over her income, probably because this was a quasi-uxorilocal arrangement. It seems such marriage arrangements did empower the

wife in this respect.[102]

The second case was found in a new middle class family resulting from a free-choice marriage. Yen-hia (2-12) married a Mainlander against her parents' wishes. She gave up her job before giving birth to their first child. Her husband was the breadwinner and left money in a drawer. Both of them had complete access to these resources. I suspect this arrangement might result from his background as a Mainlander because it was also found among later generations who had been educated under the KMT and learned to negotiate more egalitarian gender relations. Nevertheless, as is clear from the discussion of financial arrangements in post-war Taiwan in Chapter 8, this pattern could be seen as an example of 'patriarchal benevolence,' even if the wife appeared to benefit.

In both the above cases, the husband *consciously* restricted his authority over family resources. The wife either controlled her money or had unlimited access to the family coffer. Neither appeared to be normative practices for that time.

Class and Patriarchal Authority in Conjugal Families

By differentiating patriarchal authority from financial management, my investigation provides a more sophisticated view than conventional gender analysis, which assumes that a wife in charge of money is powerful. The simple fact of the wife controlling a certain amount of money did not necessarily mean the absence of a patriarch (Pattern 1 and 2). Moreover, whether it was the wife or the husband managing the money, if the

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[102] Upper class women who married uxorilocally did appear to have stronger power in household arrangements. However, there were problems. The husband who lived uxorilocally usually experienced low-self esteem (cases of Yang Kui's brother, grandmother of 2-05, husband of 1-15, the second husband of 2-22, and various other cases from oral histories). It left the wife for two choices: to keep the husband, she must lower down her status to boost her husband's masculine identity, or he could run away or divorce her. This might be interpreted as the feminine version of patriarchal kinship exploitation, mirroring experiences of daughters-in-law in patrilocal marriage. However, while husbands in patrilocal marriage could maintain their patriarchal authority and abused their wives, wives in uxorilocal marriage usually needed to perform gender subordination (to demarcate gender hierarchy) to keep their husbands. Xiu-lian's grandmother who experienced uxorilocal marriage was against Xiu-lian marrying uxorilocally, for 'I experienced it already. I would not like her to suffer [as I did]' (2-05:79).

husband did not exercise the authority granted by patriarchal genealogy, the wife appeared to be powerful (Pattern 3 and 5). In other words, it was the claim to patriarchal authority that upset wives even if they had financial control. Women were more likely to be empowered because of the absence of patriarchal authority rather than the simple act of managing money.

The data demonstrated a close link between class and financial arrangements between couples. In bourgeois families, the patriarch was very likely to claim his authority, even if he exercised it benevolently. Wives in new middle class and petty bourgeois families seemed to have the highest level of autonomy in controlling the family coffer. Apart from class, alternative forms of marriage might also contribute to more egalitarian financial management. However, a wife in charge often faced great challenges from simple lack of money. This was unfortunately the most prevalent pattern to be found in my data. Worse, in the face of poverty, the husband might still impose his patriarchal authority over her.

How did the diverse financial arrangements of conjugal families differ from those of complex families? The findings here complement those in the previous chapter, thanks to the range of conjugal families of different economic standings. Findings in both complex and conjugal families consistently indicate that patriarchs of bourgeois families were very likely to claim their authority, while husbands in new middle class families were more likely to relinquish it. Wives were more likely to manage family finances in non-bourgeois families than in bourgeois ones. Relations of production, rather than family structures, seem to hold the key to understanding the diverse patterns of management.

Nevertheless, family structures still mattered. The position of wives was more advantageous in conjugal families than in complex ones. The chances of them taking the role of financial manager were comparatively high, probably because of the absence of other adult family members. Moreover, of the three hierarchies of patriarchal

genealogy (i.e. generation, age and gender), gender was the only hierarchy that could be played out in conjugal families. If the husband did not exercise his authority as the patriarch, a wife could be free from any hierarchy of patriarchy and enjoyed significant independence.

To conclude, my investigation has shown the intersection of class and patriarchal authority in determining different types of financial management in conjugal families. Evidence suggests that the relations of production were closely connected to the way money was managed and that wives often had greater autonomy in conjugal families. Does the organisation of reproductive work show a similar pattern?

Work, Motherhood, and Domesticity

In comparison with daughters-in-law living in complex families, wives living in conjugal families engaged much more actively in work of all kinds. How were decisions about work made? What identities were embedded in these choices? If wives worked, how was reproduction carried out? How were motherhood and wifedom defined and negotiated in relation to employment decisions and domestic arrangements? How did these arrangements differ from those of complex families? The following section looks at employment decisions, ideas of motherhood and domestic arrangements, to explore how reproductive work was carried out in conjugal families of different economic standing. Finally I consider how patriarchal kinship relations intersected with economic relations in conjugal families and how they might differ from those of complex families.

Upper class wives in bourgeois or grand bourgeois families showed a strong commitment to employment, both in lucrative professional positions and unpaid voluntary work. Shi-man (1-11) and A-xin (1-01) were both devoted doctors. Shi-xia (1-05) not only worked as a teacher but also helped her husband manage his business. Cai-su (1-02), who needed one further year of training to work as a teacher, was not engaged in paid work but performed the role of a 'doctor wife' after marriage, helping

out in the clinic, smiling at patients and sometimes doing injections. Moreover, all of these women participated in community activities as expected of upper-class women (according to the Japanese 'cult of productivity'): training midwives (1-01), teaching weaving (1-02) or attending meetings of Patriotic Women's Association (1-11, 1-02). These activities were not only encouraged by Japanese policies. These elite women themselves felt a strong duty to contribute their knowledge to the society (1-01) and improve the living conditions of the poor (1-02).

Even though actively engaged in work of all kinds, elite wives did not neglect their responsibility as mothers. For Cai-su, being a good mother was more important than serving the nation. When she was invited to run in a local election in 1947, she refused, saying,

> 'I may have fulfilled my responsibility as a wife, but not as a mother. I could only dedicate myself to the nation after my children entered university' (1-02: 137).

Her words prioritising motherhood over civil responsibility echoed many other upper class women's ideas, even when their practices might suggest otherwise. In the 'cult of productivity,' breast-feeding seemed to carry the symbolic meaning of being a good mother, although it departed radically from the upper class custom of employing wet nurses. Without being prompted by the researcher, some informants stressed that they breast-fed their children (1-02, 2-12). This belief seems so deeply inscribed that if a woman did not do breast-feed, she found it necessary to defend herself. When asked how she brought up her children, Shi-man replied,

> 'I did not breast-feed my children because I had to attend to patients, which was my job. But, I always kept an eye on them because the clinic was also my home' (1-11:251).

Family values were strongly promoted in the 'cult of productivity,' affecting even those who resisted marriage. Mao-zhi (1-10) worked and delayed marriage until she was thirty-three. She eventually gave in and married for her mother. Once the marriage was arranged, she quit her job. The reason was,

'I thought, "If I love working so much, I should not marry. If I marry, I shall take care of the family." Housewives should not travel here and there, without taking the family into consideration. I have always thought so. This was why that I chose singledom' (1-10:73).

It seems that many upper class women also perceived the purchase of food and cooking as part of their marital duties. Shi-man kept the habit of buying vegetables everyday. Even when she started to work outside the home, she would buy vegetables every morning and send someone to take them home for the maid to cook. She only cooked when guests were around because they knew that she cooked well and requested her to do so.

It appears that even though being a good mother and good wife was highly valued, upper class women tended to define these roles in their own terms. To be a good mother did not seem to mean spending time with children intensively. They might be very busy working and still considered themselves as good mothers. Some quit jobs for marriage and gave the family first priority while continuing a certain amount of charity work. The diversity in women's working patterns and domestic arrangements seems to suggest the possibility of many different ways of performing motherhood and wifedom among upper class families. Nevertheless, adopted daughters and paid servants who carried out domestic work created the space for upper class women to have choices.

How was domestic labour organised in upper class conjugal families? Grand bourgeois families used 'adopted daughters' as handmaids to run the errands and to keep the children company, maintaining a lifestyle resembling that of complex households.[103] In such conjugal families, four to five 'adopted daughters' were quite usual, in addition to paid servants and the divisions in domestic work did not seem to differ from those in complex households (1-05, natal family of 2-20). In bourgeois families, where the workplace was also the home, formal employees as well as maids were used to carry out domestic chores. Chen Shi-men and her husband both worked as doctors in their own clinic. They employed one maid for cooking, a wet nurse for the

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[103] When the first generation women grew up and married in the 1920s, the handmaid systems were discouraged and 'adopted daughters' were named instead. See chapter 4.

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infants and two workers for the clinic. The clinic workers were often used to assist in household tasks (1-11:248).[104]

The different practices between grand bourgeois and bourgeois families were perhaps based on economics. Adopting daughters as handmaids cost much more than just providing board and modest living expenses for live-in maids. Moreover, the latter involved no paternal responsibility such as education or marriage, which some grand bourgeois families were able to offer. By doing so, they also acted as the patriarch who *owned* handmaids rather than *employed* them (Chapter 4).

If the freedom of first generation upper class women to define motherhood and wifedom was established on the basis of class privilege, second generation women who married Mainlanders negotiated their domestic responsibilities based on romantic love relationships with their husband. In interviews, these women claimed with pride that 'I can't cook' or 'I don't know how to cook.' In that case, who did cook? These women usually mentioned proudly that their husband prepared food. Lim's (2-20) husband was a soldier and learned to cook in the army. On leave, he would bring his friends to eat and cook together at home. She was then free from cooking essential meals. The husband of Lai (2-15) was a *ban-shan*, working as a judge. He joked about her inability to cook and cooked *for her* every weekend.

Nevertheless the claim that their husband cooked may only have revealed part of the reality. An examination of these women's life stories exposes discrepancies. When they first married and worked, live-in maids or paid servants cooked. Both Lai and Lin denied that they employed maids after they became 'housewives' in 1952 and 1958. Perhaps it was only then that their husband cooked over the weekend. Even so, there is a question about who cooked on weekdays. I suspect that they meant that they could only prepare food in a very simple way, which was not understood in Taiwanese culture as 'cooking.' Moreover, not all Mainlander husbands accepted this division of labour

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[104] It was also found in the clinics of Cai-su's husband. Moreover, when the mother visited her son at clinics, she would bring her adopted daughter to help housework of his family (1-12:203).

unconditionally. Lai's husband told her, 'It's OK that you can't cook well. But, the house must be kept tidy all the time.' The implication was that the wife should be responsible for both cooking and cleaning. In his words, the presumption that the wife should provide domestic services for the husband was not challenged, even if the definition of being a good wife was negotiable. These new middle class women who remained 'unable to cook' continued to face patriarchal expectations of them performing the role of good wives. Perhaps this assertion was made possible on the basis of the romantic love between the couple.

Narratives of women in lower-income conjugal families show a completely different picture. They worked for out of economic necessity (2-03, 2-04, 2-08, 2-19, 2-15, 2-20) and said little about what it meant to be a mother and a wife. However, their experiences suggest that these roles most often meant juggling productive and reproductive work, coping with the absence of maids and working hard to keep the household afloat. In one family, the husband helped with domestic work (2-08). However, what happened when the husband did not help and the maids did not stay long? The case of Xie Cui-hia (2-11) illustrates the process of a working wife transformed from an office worker to a petty bourgeoisie.

Xie worked as a typist at the railway station until she chose to 'retire' in 1958, after working there for eleven years and having her fifth child. Cui-hia's husband was a blue-collar low-ranking civil servant and a habitual gambler. He not only lost money but also their house. He sometimes beat Xie up and his bad temper usually scared maids off. Facing these difficulties, Cui-hia coped with full-time work, six births and childcare arrangements without help from her husband. If she could, she preferred to employ live-in maids, but they never stayed long. In between, she relied on relatives, neighbours and kindergartens to take care of her two children so that she would have time to care for her investments, a credit rotation association and a small business on the top of her full-time job as a typist. Eventually, after the third child was born in the early 1950s, she managed to employ a middle-aged nanny to take care of the baby.

However, Xie soon had to sack her for stealing the money for buying milk and feeding the baby cheap rice bran. While Xie was looking for a new nanny, she again asked her relatives to take care of her children. Her first daughter lived at her sister's between the ages of six and ten. In the following years, she continued to send children to relatives, work at several jobs and employ a live-in maid to take care of housework and the young baby. After the birth of her fifth child, she eventually gave up the idea of 'asking people to help.' She left her job and opened up a grocery store so that she could take care all of the children herself.

After becoming a petty bourgeois household, the division of domestic labour changed.[105] Boys and girls in this low-earning conjugal family were trained and organised to carry out domestic labour. Xie was pleased with her six docile children, who washed dishes and clothes from the age of fourteen. Yet their involvement was gendered. Boys were to carry out 'hard labour,' while girls were to deal with 'light work.' They lived in a temporary shelter with no running water. 'Hard labour' meant that the boys were responsible for washing clothes (or to be more precise, to take the clothes of the whole household for washing).[106] The second daughter, aged around 10, stayed at home to help Xie with the grocery shop and housework. While their father contributed nothing but debts to the family, the children became vital to the survival of the household. They 'saved' their mother from carrying out all labour consuming domestic work while she ran the business. Moreover, to increase the family income, the son was also engaged in paid work, selling tickets at the bus station, while the eldest

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[105] There is no intention to generalize the ways in which domestic labour was carried out in petty bourgeoisie households. In these families, domestic arrangements varied according to wealth and scale of the business. In less well-off households, children were very likely to involve in housework. Nevertheless, if circumstances permitted (e.g. small-scale business), it was also very likely that the mother did all the work alone (2-05, 2-24). If the family was wealth enough, they employed maids and employees (2-21). Children were kept free. Children's, especially boys' involvement would be avoided especially when the mothers expected son's upper-ward mobility (2-21, 2-05).

[106] I had no clue whether he carried out the washing task by himself or other women at the reservoir did for him. Cui-hia said that he was too tired and found no time to sleep. He went there, and slept at the reservoir. She also said that her children started to wash their own clothes at the age of fourteen. This issue needs to be explored further.

daughter started to work as a live-in maid at fourteen.

The changes in Xie's class status illustrate the contribution of live-in maids to the stability of new middle class women's employment outside the home. When maids were not available, wives attempted to cope by combining home and work, i.e. leaving formal employment to engage in the informal economy. 'Coincidentally,' many other working wives left full-time employment in the 1950s. It was hard to evaluate what kinds of gender identities were in play when they took these decisions. In their narratives, the reasons for doing so appeared to be personal: tired of seeking help from others (2-11), the need to attend to the children's education (2-20) and to care for an aging adopted mother (2-15). All of these explanations stress their roles as devoted mothers and filial adopted daughters. However, considering the fact that all of them had worked for ten or eleven years after marriage, such claims do not make much sense. Moreover, none of them became 'leisured wives.' They took up needlework or piecework at home, or opened grocery shops. I suspect these 'coincidences' might imply a general decline in the availability of young live-in maids in the 1950s. The time corresponds to the historical events of land reform, rising attendance in primary education and industrialisation (Chapter 7).[107] Without more evidence, this must remain a hypothesis here.

To sum up, my analysis has demonstrated that wives in conjugal families of different economic standing performed the roles of mother and wife differently, even if all of them employed maids. In upper class families, wives usually showed strong commitment to work and defined motherhood and wifedom in their own terms. The 'cult of productivity' appeared to be very effective among this group of women. In contrast, wives of low-income families usually worked out of economic necessity. For them, motherhood probably meant balancing the demands of home and work, sustaining the livelihood of all family members.

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[107] In England, the decline of maids was related to industrialisation (Glucksmann, 1990).

Conclusion

My analysis has shown that in the case of financial management, wives were best off when patriarchal authority was absent, adding the concept of patriarchy to the conventional view that women became powerful when they controlled money. Different patterns of financial management were also linked to relations of production and alternative marriage arrangements. Compared with daughters-in-law in complex families, wives in conjugal families had some advantages, for there was more chance of them managing money and meeting a husband who did not assume the role of the patriarch. Wives in conjugal families were also very likely to engage in work outside the family, to practice the 'cult of productivity' and to transfer their domestic responsibility to maids. However, these practices were probably supported by their class privileges, rather than representing a radical departure from patriarchal expectations of wives' responsibility for domestic work. Patriarchal expectations of wives in conjugal families seemed easily transferred to maids through economic exchange relations. After the 1950s, the autonomy of wives established on class privileges seemed to decrease with the declining numbers of maids. Many working wives resumed domestic responsibility. Some renegotiated their roles with their husband, while others coped by involving children.

Conclusion to Part One

'Patriarchal Power Structures' in Colonial Taiwan

In previous chapters, I demonstrated the diverse experiences of 'modern women' in colonial Taiwan from the perspective of lifecycle as well as family structure. There are limitations to this approach, [108] but my aim is not to provide an exhaustive representation of social reality but to make use of these materials to develop theoretical understanding of patriarchy. In the following section, I combine arguments generated from previous chapters to put forward a concept of 'patriarchal power structures,' which is further articulated in relation to class and state ideology in colonial Taiwan.

Patriarchy in the Han Family Institution

What was patriarchy? What was its relation to the Han family? Patriarchy refers to the patriarchal genealogy that recruited members to the household. Patriarchy produced kinsmen and kinswomen. Under patriarchy, a man became a son, a husband and a father. A woman was defined as a daughter, a daughter-in-law, a mother, a wife and a mother-in-law. In the following section, I elaborate on the principles of patriarchy in terms of hierarchies and family structures, resource distribution, and domestic labour.

Hierarchies were an inextricable part of patriarchy but were played out differently in different family structures. Patriarchy ranked family members according to the three principles of generation, age and gender. The younger generation was to obey the elder

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[108] Social realities were much more dynamic and diverse than I can represent here. Not all upper class daughters grew up in complex families, nor did all my informants come from upper class families. Similarly, the roles of wives and mothers were not restricted to conjugal families. They might be applied to wives of the elder generation in complex families, who were free from generational hierarchy. Moreover, throughout her life, a woman might move back and forth between different family structures either by default or by choice. These chapters freeze these movements and choose the most significant patterns to form the main arguments.

generation. The younger sibling was to defer to the elder ones. Women were to subordinate themselves to men. However, in practice, these hierarchies relied a great deal on the structure of the family. In the extended family, where the parents lived with several married sons and their *fang*, these three hierarchies were utilized to the maximum. In the stem family, where the parents lived with only one married son and his *fang*, only the hierarchies of generation and gender were played out. In the conjugal family, patriarchal genealogy was reduced to the simplest form and gender hierarchy was the only governing principle. Since different types of families were structured differently, each family type had its own core area of conflict. In extended families, disputes among sisters-in-law challenged the age hierarchy between brothers. They often led to family division, resulting in stem or conjugal families. In stem families, the hierarchy of generation that suppressed intimacy between genders often led to disputes between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, which might lead to the dissolution of either generational hierarchy or conjugal ties. The former produced a conjugal family, and the latter, divorce. In conjugal families, the hierarchy of gender could be the major issue of dispute. However, class privileges or romantic love relations between couples might empower the wife and the hierarchy between genders might become less visible.

In the Han family, patriarchy also structured production and resource distribution; the three hierarchies of generation, age and gender defined different members' access to family resources. The patriarch of upper class merchant families stood at the vantage point of the three hierarchies controlling the labour of his family members, the means of production of the family and common family coffer. He could determine the ways in which family resources were redistributed, according to patriarchal genealogy, sometimes complemented with personal preferences.

A woman's access to family resources differed according to her position in stratified patriarchal kinship structures. As a daughter, she was perceived as a temporary member of her father's genealogy and thus had various possible relations to family resources, depending a great deal on the attitude of the patriarch. She might be

given away from a very young age as an adopted daughter-in-law or she might be given the chance to complete higher education or professional qualifications

A daughter-in-law was positioned at the bottom of generational and gender hierarchy and, as an outsider to the patriarchal family at the beginning of their marriage, she literally had no access to the family economy. Her status relied a great deal on her private money. In complex families, a daughter-in-law had to *wait* to gain access to family finances. She might initiate family division (to weaken the age hierarchy) or empower herself by becoming the financial manager in the upper class family. However, ethnographers have suggested that the long process of waiting might also lead to a strong psychological bond between the daughter-in-law and her sons, which contributed to the formation of the 'uterine family' (Wolf, 1972) and 'patriarchal bargains' (Kandiyoti, 1988). The desire of the mother to control her sons rather than her husband under patriarchy could lead to further structural conflicts between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law of next generation.

A widowed daughter-in-law without access to family resources might become desperate for family money to protect her and her children. Behaving normatively or initiating family division could be the most realistic plan for her to gain access to resources for her 'uterine family.' A wealthy daughter-in-law with resources outside her husband's family would rather *not* wait but often left the complex family early on. My empirical data has shown that wealthy daughters-in-law often resisted patriarchy. Nevertheless, their rebellions were unlikely to succeed without support from their natal families or husband.

Wives in conjugal families apparently had more power to negotiate access to family resources, being free from generational hierarchy. Yet, any autonomy gained was again determined by the affluence of the family and the husband's claim to authority. However, if the wife did fail to gain economic support from the husband, she

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might draw on her children's labour to fulfill her husband's economic obligations.[109]

Patriarchy placed kinswomen into different positions; each entailed different levels of power and assigned specifically defined domestic responsibility. The mother-in-law, standing at the vantage point of generational hierarchy, enjoyed culturally consented authority over the labour of the daughter-in-law. The daughter-in-law, without privilege in the hierarchy of generation and gender, often endured the darkest phase of her life, unless she had sisters-in-law to share domestic work. The daughter, who was perceived as a temporary member of her father's genealogy, was rarely expected to take on any serious burden of domestic labour. Nevertheless, in upper class complex families and in conjugal families of different economic standing, the intersection of class and patriarchy was also important. Daughters of destitute families were bought or adopted to become concubines, handmaids or adopted daughters-in-law to serve the daughters of upper class families. Married women in poor families were employed to breast-feed infants, to care for children and to perform labourious housework for upper class households. Wives in conjugal families employed maids or adopted little daughters-in-law to carry out domestic work. Daughters and wives of destitute families were subjected to the most extreme form of patriarchal exploitation.

Towards the 'Patriarchal Power Structures' in Colonial Taiwan

The term 'patriarchal power structures' is used to capture the specific form of forces that operated along lines of patriarchal genealogy based on hierarchies of generation, age and gender. The following section illustrates its internal logics and dynamics as observed in Taiwanese families and explains its interplay with economic relations and the state in colonial Taiwan.

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[109] I suspect that this mechanism might also lead to the formation of a 'uterine family,' as a consequence of economic deprivation and an irresponsible husband. The generational hierarchy of patriarchy is less relevant here.

In patriarchal power structures, family member's obligations and responsibilities to the family were defined according to patriarchal genealogy. The patriarch would wish to maintain the matrix of hierarchies. The mother-in-law would attempt to secure her status in the family by producing a 'uterine family'. The daughter-in-law would struggle against the patriarchal order. This is not to deny that in practice the patriarch could depart from patriarchal norms or the mother-in-law could be kind to daughters-in-law. There were always variations in daily practices, but choice and conduct at the personal level should be analytically independent from the structural level of analysis. This allows the dialectical relations between the structural and the individual to be further examined empirically. For example, a mother-in-law could be kind to her daughter-in-law but this did not undermine the power relations between them. When the patriarch declared that men and women should eat together, he was exercising his culturally consented power within generational, age and gender hierarchy to counter an aspect of gender hierarchy that he believed to be inappropriate. This inevitably brought challenges to the patriarchal power structures where he stood. In other words, personal identities could be shaped by discourses other than patriarchy, but might in turn interact with patriarchal power structures and eventually lead to changes to such structures.

Resistance to patriarchal power structures can be understood as internal or external. Internal resistance drew on the same logic of patriarchy. This might include what Kanidyoti called the 'passive resistance' of young daughters-in-law waiting to become mothers-in-law. In early twentieth-century Taiwan, adult women practiced adoption and minor marriages, which followed most of the patriarchal principles, to maximize their interests. Even if it brought about changes to patriarchal power structures, women often re-imposed the same hierarchies onto the most powerless family members, who were disadvantaged by their age, gender or class. External resistance challenged the hierarchies of patriarchy. Under Japanese colonialism, romantic love relations and work outside the home provided opportunities for the

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young to resist patriarchal power structures.[110] Romantic love and strengthening conjugal ties challenged the stress on obedience of the younger generation and the suppression of romantic relations between genders. Life stories suggest that some sons and daughters of upper class questioned patriarchy because they had adopted westernised ideas of romantic love through Japanese education and contacts with the May Fourth movement in China (see Chapter 7). During the period of 1945 to 1949, another wave of resistance took place among young 'modern women,' who fell in love and married Mainlanders against their parents' wishes. Both forms of resistance usually resulted in conjugal families.

Work outside the home posed another challenge to patriarchal power structures. Conceptually, work was a site where the colonial state and patriarchal power structures came into conflict. A young woman living in a complex family was usually subject to the power structures of patriarchy and thus unable to work outside the home. In contrast, a young woman in conjugal family, free from generational hierarchy, was more likely to practice the 'cult of productivity' promoted by the state. This suggests that patriarchy was more influential in complex families, while state ideology was more visible in conjugal families.

Relations of production and the wealth of the individual family further complicated the contestation between the colonial state and patriarchal power structures. The colonial policies of the 'cult of productivity' appeared more influential in new middle class families than in grand bourgeois and bourgeois families, where the

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[110] Perhaps the most significant rebellion took place in the 1930s among the sons of peasants or artisans, who refused to marry adopted daughters-in-law. This trend was revealed form investigations of statistics of that time (A. Wolf and Huang, 1980). It was also recorded in ethnography conduced two decades later (M. Wolf, 1972). M. Wolf suggested that employment in factories and economic independence provided the explanation.

power of patriarch appeared to be particularly strong.[111] Nevertheless, the formation of a new middle class during colonialism had *limited* effects on Taiwanese elite families. The racialised and gendered labour market often made employment outside the family an unpleasant choice for the sons and daughters of upper class families. These sons frequently returned home to take charge of the family business, perpetuating patriarchal power structures. Their daughters often married into other upper class families, subordinating themselves to the patriarchal power structures of the husband's family. Only a small number of daughters of elite families, perhaps anticipating their unpromising future, chose to work full-time outside the home for the colonial government and to resist marriage. In contrast, the sons and daughters of poor families often stayed in new middle class jobs out of economic necessity. Therefore, the colonial state seemed more likely to replace the authority of the patriarch in low-earning than upper class families.

It must be stressed that the continuation of patriarchal power structures in upper class families should not be interpreted as the absence or failure of colonial state intervention. Colonial state policy had firmly established a gendered and racialised labour market, although it also challenged patriarchal power structures in various instances. The 'cult of productivity' was evident in the practices of conjugal families, in new middle class families and among upper class elite women. The colonial state also interfered with the Han practices of selling handmaids and promoted the rights to divorce for concubines. However, it was not the colonial state's intention to intervene in patriarchal power structures of upper class families, probably because it relied on the support of the patriarch of these families to mediate its authority.

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[111] The new middle class patriarch, employed as a professional worker, was unlikely to require his family members to engage in domestic economic activity. In contrast, patriarchs of traditional grand bourgeois and bourgeois families that relied on family businesses for a living were more likely to require the labour of their family members. The bourgeoisie who owned their clinics were situated in between the two. They might or might not require the labour of their wife but not usually that of his children. In other words, the patriarch had greater power in the family when he controlled the means of the production than when sold his labour to the colonial government. Therefore, wives whose husband did new middle class jobs might find it easier to engage in work outside the home than wives whose husband was grand bourgeois or bourgeois.

In Part One, I have utilised empirical findings to articulate the interplay of patriarchal power structures, economic exchanges and the state in colonial Taiwan. In Part Two, I further explore how patriarchal power structures were transformed after industrialisation under KMT rule.

Part Two

Changing Family Practices in the KMT Era

What were modern women's experiences in the family in the 1970s and the 1990s? How did their identities and practices differ from those of colonial families? How did the organisation of the Han family institution change after industrialisation under KMT rule? How did patriarchal power structures interact with a modern nation-state in the market economy? In Part Two, I draw on the experiences of my third and fourth generation informants in their family of procreation to illustrate the organisation of Han families in terms of production, reproduction, resource distribution and patrilocal practices. These materials are used to explore the changing patriarchal power structures in KMT-led industrial Taiwan. The frameworks of class, patriarchy and state policy remain the axes for analysis. Although the historical periodisation of Part Two started from the 1945 when KMT took over Taiwan from Japan, it must be noted that my empirical data foregrounds the early 1970s and late 1990s when my third and fourth generation informants formed their family of procreation. I refer to these two generations as 'post-war generations,' who received KMT education, were exposed to the KMT state ideology and experienced their marital lives *after* the rapid industrialisation that took place since the 1960s.

Chapter 7 explores the changing political, economical and educational structures under KMT rule, and investigates how such drastic changes contributed to reorganise the class structures of post-war Taiwan society. The general trends of women's participation in the labour market and Taiwan's social and economic transformation are also examined. Furthermore, I scrutinize the ideal of womanhood promoted in KMT state policy and investigate how it was promoted through the state apparatus. This chapter describes the historical contexts of post-war Taiwan helping situate the

following sections.

Chapter 8 looks at production and resource distribution in the family of procreation of my third and fourth generation informants. This informs our understanding of their formal employment and ways of organising the family economy among post-war generations. Moreover, it also explores the ongoing debate about whether women's long-term employment in the labour market contributed to enhance their status in the family. The economic organisation of industrial families provides a detailed context for Chapters 9 and 10, where reproductive work in conjugal and complex families is explored for industrial and post-industrial Taiwan.

Chapter 9 discusses the reproduction of conjugal families, especially housework and childcare. After investigating the ways in which reproductive work was carried out and the changing identities of post-war wives, the final part of this chapter explores the impact of industrialisation and examines the meanings of such change. I argue that access to the market economy is the key to explain those changes observed in post-war conjugal families.

Chapter 10 investigates the reproductive and patrilocal practices of complex families, foregrounding the diverse divisions of domestic labour and power relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. I argue that the increasingly varied power relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law were shaped by the difference in economic standing between generations. Moreover, I look into the coping strategies of the elder generation and the resistance of daughters-in-law in the face of social change. These materials are used to consider whether patriarchal power structures disappeared from industrial and post-industrial complex families.

Chapter 11 looks at the identity formation of fourth generation daughters-in-law with regard to patrilocal practices and kinship maintenance. How did daughters-in-law interpret their experiences in patrilocal families? How did their interpretations impinge on their decisions with regard to patriarchal kinship relations? My analysis interrogates

the interconnections between state ideology, gender identity and patriarchal kinship relations. I argue that the hegemony of tradition promoted by 'the cult of domesticity' was still effective in the 1990s. To contest it, I suggest that localised and differentiated feminist interpretations of patriarchal kinship relations may be useful.

All these chapters suggest that significant transformations have been taking place in the Han family institution since industrialisation and that what we understood as patriarchy in colonial families faced serious challenges. Are patriarchal power structures still a useful concept to explain family relations after industrialisation? In the conclusion of Part Two, I draw on arguments developed in these chapters to explain the changing patriarchal power structures in a capitalist economy and a modern nation-state.

Chapter 7 Industrialisation and the KMT 'Cult of Domesticity', 1945-1999

This chapter introduces the historical background to post-war Taiwan from 1945 to 1999. What changes had the KMT brought about to the political, economic and educational structures in Taiwan? After industrialisation, how were class structures reorganised and women's participation in the labour market transformed? What was the character of KMT state ideology on the subject of women and the family? This historical chapter not only complements the previous analysis of conjugal families before 1960 but also sets up the context for the following four chapters on transforming gender and generational relations in Taiwanese new middle class families after industrialisation.

Political Contexts

After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, Taiwan was taken over by the KMT of the Republic of China, who had fought with Japan for eight years after 1937. The 'Taiwanese islanders' of the Japanese colony then faced a hostile political regime and a new set of social and economic discourses that had developed over half a century in Mainland China. The Chen Yi government took over all Japanese state monopolies and Japanese owned private companies and filled up posts as technical and administrative personnel in the government, intentionally excluding Taiwanese [112] from the bureaucracy. In other words, they simply replaced the Japanese colonisers.

Under the Constitution of the ROC, those Taiwanese local elites, who had

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[112] In post-war Taiwan, the Han residents evolved into two antagonistic groups: the Taiwanese (including Hokkien and Hakka who experienced Japanese colonialism) and the Mainlanders.

campaigned for years under Japanese colonialism for political rights, came to participate with great enthusiasm in local politics (Kuo, 1991:26). However, beyond this, conflicts over political and economical interests between the corrupt Chen Yi government and Taiwanese elites inevitably caused resentment. Many other differences between the 'colonised' Taiwanese, who appeared to be healthy and wealthy, and the 'new ruler' who appeared to be poor and lacking discipline caused continuous conflict.. In 1947, these tensions finally exploded into the 228 Incident that initiated an island-wide massacre of Taiwanese elites by the KMT and a lasting white horror in the 1950s. When the KMT retreated to Taiwan in 1949, with one million personnel and soldiers, the 'ethnic' divisions were intensified. However, after the experience of the horrifying massacre conducted by the new government, the Taiwanese learned to behave obediently, accepting the inequalities between Taiwanese and Mainlanders.

The impact on Taiwanese elite families was astonishing. Many elite men lost their lives in the massacre and their wives became political widows. Those who did not die but were labelled as ideologically problematic, were barred from any jobs in public sector, often harassed by the police, and closely monitored by the KMT government. Therefore, most Taiwan elite families hated KMT intensely. They would rather go abroad to become a second-class citizen in a foreign country than stay in Taiwan. The most traumatic case was that of the social activist Lin, Xian-tang (林獻堂), who spent most of his life agitating against Japanese colonialism but ended up leaving Taiwan and died in Japan (Z.Y. Zhu, 1994). The first Taiwanese woman doctor Cai, A-xin was forced to emigrate to Canada after the 228 Incident. Many upper class elite women whom I met at The Third Girls' High Schools and midwife associations had spent most of their lives abroad after 1949 and only returned to Taiwan in the 1990s. This 'diaspora' caused severe disruption to the careers of these outstanding women who had grown up in under Japanese colonialism.

The post-war political history of Taiwan must be also set in the context of the cold war, when the United States of America aided KMT government agitated against the Chinese Communist Party of the People's Republic of China. To support its huge

military and ideological campaigns against China, the KMT reduced the power of Taiwanese local elites through Land Reform (1948-1953) and developed Taiwan economically with American aid. After the late 1960s, the USA gradually withdrew its support from the KMT. However, the authoritarian and repressive political measures of the KMT extended into the 1980s. With the continuous challenges of Taiwanese political uprising and the thaw in international relations, the KMT finally took gradual steps towards reform. The Martial Law that banned all forms of political gathering and protests for thirty-eight years was eventually lifted in 1987. A new era opened up. Diverse discourses and social movements, including feminist movements, mushroomed. Yet, thirty-eight years of authoritarian rule were not ended overnight and its political and ideological effects still haunted Taiwan in the 1990s. The KMT era ended in 2000, when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party came into power through democratic presidential elections.

Economical Development

The KMT initiated land reform and industrialisation in post-war Taiwan and transformed the Taiwanese economy from an agriculture-based colonial one, to an industrial and then a post-industrial system by the end of the twentieth century.

Between 1948 and 1953, the state carried out land reform and acted as the capitalist. Landlords lost the majority of their land to the state in exchange for bonds and shares in government-owned industries. Peasants gained their own land by paying instalments plus 4% interest to the state. Within years, the pattern of land ownership transformed dramatically. The production of those cultivators who owned their land increased from 36% of the total in 1940 to 65% in 1961 (Thornton and Lin, 1994: 62-3). The land reform laid the foundation for state-led industrial development, with aid from the USA, until 1967.

Economists and KMT propaganda writers (up to 1987) usually distinguished four phases of economic development in Taiwan; firstly, economic expansion (1949-1960); secondly, a labour-intensive period (1961-1973); thirdly, a period of industrial

upgrading (1973-1988), and finally, economic outflow (1988-2000) (Thornton and Lin, 1994; K.Y. Wong, 1994; W.H. Tsai, 2001). Yan (1996) argued that within five decades, the Taiwanese economy shifted from agriculture (in the 1950s), to industry (1960 to 1980) to become a post-industrial society (1981 onwards). Different scholars have used slightly different time spans to refer to these phases. The disagreement between Yan and the rest was perhaps the timing when Taiwan entered post-industrial society. In this aspect, I agree with the former, perceiving the Taiwanese economy has become post-industrial after the economic outflows dramatized in 1988. This periodisation corresponds to the structures of production shown in figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Structures of Production under the KMT State, Percentage of GDP by Sector, 1952-1999

Sources: Table 1-1b, *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2000*. Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, R.O.C.

Here, I give more detailed description of the economic developments under KMT rule. In addition to land reform (1947-1953), the KMT strengthened agricultural production and adopted a strategy of import substitution in the 1950s.These measures brought the per capita income that had been rising about 8% per year back to the pre-war level. In the 1960s, Export Processing Zones were set up and the index of industrial production increased at average of 16% per year. Taiwan turned itself from an agricultural based economy to an export-oriented industrial one. Rapid urbanisation

and migration accompanied industrialisation. The proportion of the population living in cities of fifty thousand or more rose from 41% in 1961 to 59% in 1973 (Thornton and Lin, 1994:75). In the 1970s, oil crises and the world economic recession pushed some of the urban population back to the land. This contributed to rural industrialisation (R. Gallin, 1984; T. L. Hu, 1991) and a small increase in agricultural productivity, but did not bring agriculture back to life.

Two decades of drastic economic development slowed down in the 1980s. The Taiwanese economy entered another stage. The agriculture sector shrank continuously, due a great deal to the USA, who forcefully opened Taiwan's agricultural market. Both manufacturing and agricultural declined, and production relied heavily on the service sector after the late 1980s (K.Y. Wong, 1994). Capital flew to other South Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, while the high wages in Taiwan led to a gradual influx of labour from other Asian countries. In the 1990s, trade between Taiwan and China increased dramatically. According to Hong Kong Customs Statistics, the value of Taiwan's trade with China via Hong Kong totalled US$ 4043.6 million in 1990 and $ 9803 million in 1999 (W.H. Tsai, 2001:11).[113] In Taiwan, as figure 7.1 indicates, the service sector continued to grow from 1987 to 1999 (to about 65 % of the GDP).

Educational Expansion

During KMT rule, education expanded dramatically. Since the days of the KMT in China, western critics had rightly pointed out that KMT was a party supported by the urban elite, believing in educational campaigns rather than revolution (Siu, 1982:160; Stacey, 1983). The KMT had no problems in investing in education in Taiwan although

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[113] This intensive cross-strait trade raised another urgent issue of bigamy and extra-marital affairs that shaped many family problems among my interviewees across generations (from the second to the fourth generation). Unfortunately, constrained by the scale of the thesis, I will not address the issue of marriage and sexuality here.

this was also political.[114] However, unlike the Japanese who intended to keep the education of Taiwan islanders at basic and practical levels, KMT made primary education compulsory for boys and girls, and in 1968, extended compulsory education for girls and boys to nine years. Senior high schools, college and universities were also set up and continued to grow over the years. Figure 7.2 shows the general trends of this educational expansion. Gender differences were always obvious in the early stages. Nevertheless, after two decades of economic development, from the 1980s girls' attendance began to catch up with boys' and they appeared to have higher attendance at all levels in 2000 (excluding post-graduate training, not shown here).

Figure 7.2 School Attendance Rates by Level of Education and Sex, 1952-2000

Note: School attendance rates are defined as the percentages of students in the same age groups. However, the statistics on the years 1952-1967, 1970-1988 and 1988-2000 may not be fully comparable since the three series came from different sources, which may have adopted slightly different definitions. Sources: School attendance rates between 1952-1988: computed from various government statistics by Thornton and Lin (1994: 68). Rates between 1988 and 2000: *Essential Educational Statistics*, 2002, Minister of Education.

[114] In 1943, the Japanese were desperate to turn Han people in Taiwan into Japanese to avoid the risk of them supporting the Chinese during Sino-Japanese war. After 1945, the KMT was desperate to turn the Japanese educated Han people in Taiwan into Chinese, for the hatred of the Chinese towards Japan had accumulated in the eighty-year Sino-Japanese War. Mandarin came to be the official language taught and promoted at schools of all levels and the Japanese language was soon seen as inappropriate, having to be eliminated completely (Kho, 1996).

Under KMT rule, the standard length of education increased significantly and education was no longer restricted to the basic levels. Unlike Japanese education, where different curriculums had been set up for boys and girls of different nationalities, the KMT did not differentiate these groups at institutional levels. Girls and boys, if they did manage to attend schools, be they Mainlanders or Taiwanese, read the same textbooks and had the same study hours and lessons. Gender inequality might be reified through the gendered roles taught in schools and quota allocations at some colleges or departments of the university. Yet girls were allowed to do better than boys and studied most subjects, including medicine and law, through the system.[115] The inequalities between Mainlanders and Taiwanese were conveyed through education allowances[116] and language,[117] and only dissolved gradually in the 1960s. 'Ethnic' inequality between Mainlanders and Taiwanese was significant in early KMT rule. Nevertheless, it was not implemented through defined ethnic differences. If a Taiwanese man or woman could conform to the rules of the game set up by the KMT in schools and social institutions, s/he could still achieve certain positions. Most of my third generation informants had done so and worked as government employees or teachers with good salaries and benefits. However in the process of doing so, they had often uncritically accepted the gendered and racialised ideology that the KMT had tried to convey. The education that was part of the KMT state apparatus became an important site for disseminating an ideal of womanhood to educated women. This issue is addressed in the section of this chapter devoted to state ideology.

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[115] This point is important to understand my finding in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter 11.

[116] Soldiers, government employees and teachers, most of whom were Mainlanders, were eligible for generous education allowances for their children.

[117] The KMT promoted 'orthodox' Chinese identity. It legitimised Mandarin as the official language and banned Japanese and local Taiwanese dialects from schools and broadcasting. Standard Mandarin bore greater social and cultural capital under KMT rule. These measures disadvantaged Taiwanese students who spoke dialects at home. Under this atmosphere, many of my third generation informants had learned to speak fluent Mandarin. One even mentioned that she faked her birthplace in her writing, so that her teacher also mistook her for a Mainlander.

Changing Class Structures in Post-war Taiwan

Rapid political, economical and educational development brought about huge changes to the class structures of Taiwan society under KMT rule. These are important here because class restructuring has had a huge impact on the numbers and composition of new middle class people in post-war Taiwan and thus on the inter-generational interactions in Taiwanese families, which are addressed in the following chapters.

During the colonial period, the Japanese did not directly challenge the class structures of Taiwan society. However, after KMT land reform of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the interdependent 'landlord-peasant' relation that was characteristic of a 'traditional' Han society was demolished. This had two significant consequences. Firstly, the gentry-landlord class declined, especially local landlord families where the rent from land was the only source of income.[118] Nevertheless, those who had invested in finance, commerce or industrial opportunities may well have continued to do so and have maintained their status as grand bourgeoisie. Secondly, land reform produced a significant number of owner-farmers. Most peasants now owned their means of production. This change contributed to their investment in children's education (particularly for boys) in the 1960s and bred a significant number of new middle class

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[118] For the landlord family whose family incomes solely depended on land and land rents, land reform had changed their class status drastically. Many of them suddenly became jobless after the land reform (H.Z. Wang, 1999:18). One family story of the third generation interviewee's was very revealing of such changes and the effects on married women. Zheng Guan-fen's mother was a second-generation upper class daughter who worked as a music teacher and was served by handmaids before marriage. The Zheng family that she married into was also a landlord extended family. Guan-fen's father was a civil servant, who was lucky enough to keep his post in the government after 1949. However, after land reform, they lost most of their lands and could no longer rely on rents for a living. They started to employ farm labourers to cultivate their land. Zheng's father continued his paid job as a civil servant and worked away from home. The most significant change occurred to Guan-fen's mother. After the birth of her first child, she was pushed by her mother-in-law to quit her job. Once she quit, she became a house worker. She took shifts with another daughter-in-law. One cooked for one month for the whole family and employed labourers. The other would supervise farm workers for that month. Together with her marriage status, land reform caused her social status to decline from a new middle class teacher to an agricultural and household labourer. Zheng's father apparently lost status with the decline of his family to the level of farmers. However his new middle class status, the result of his civil service job, continued and became more important. The decline of the Zheng family illustrates the impacts of land reform on a local landlord family and its gendered effects. However, since Mr. Zheng still held a job as civil servant, his family was better off than another group of landlords who had no incomes other than land rents. Moreover, the gentry legacy did not diminish immediately. Zheng's family fully supported daughters' education while other owner-farmer families were very unlikely to do so.

sons in the next generation.[119]

Class structure in post-war Taiwan had several distinctive characteristics. Capitalists, comprising the KMT state and several Taiwanese industrialists, were few in number, no more than 5% of the population (Gates, 1979). The majority of employment opportunities were found in middle and small-scale factories and enterprises, understood as 'old middle class' (or petty bourgeoisie), owning the means of production, working long hours and usually fusing home and work (Burris, 1999:441).[120] This suggests that in Taiwan, the 'old middle class' was not a 'traditional' phenomenon that died out with industrialisation. Declining agricultural production released a great amount of labour from the land. These workers might then become petty bourgeoisie when the opportunities arose during the 1960s. In other words, in Taiwan, the petty bourgeoisies grew with industrialisation.

The existence of new middle class also became significant under the KMT regime. The huge size of the 'new middle class' owed a great deal to this regime's immense bureaucratic system that included state monopolised business, central, provincial and local level government, army and industry (C.G. Hsu, 1990:44; Gates, 1979:393). Sociologist Sheu (1990) computed that in 1988 about one-third of the new middle class were government employees. They composed about 10 to 12 % of the employed population. Among them, women usually occupied low ranking jobs and the percentages of managers and supervisors were extremely low (64). Sheu's definition of new middle class excluded the lower-ranking white-collar workers that I also

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[119] Owner-farmer families had quite different experiences after the land reform. During the 1950s, owner farmers suffered from short-term economic pressures for purchasing lands, the costs of building houses, growing numbers of children (the average fertility rate was 6.5 in 1956), as well as the need to support children in education (M.C. Yang, 1970). Nevertheless, as they now owned their own means of production, productivity increased and many of them managed to send their children to school. However, the preference for sons over daughters seemed much stronger in farmer families than families in the city. Therefore, only two of the third generation interviewees who came from owner-farmer families made their way (self-supported by a combination of work and study) to high school or college, while all their brothers received more education than they did. In comparison, previous landlord families, although they had become owner-farmers, appeared to have more liberal attitudes to daughters' education, as long as there were enough hands to work on the farm (usually the elder daughters).

[120] In 1974, 86% of all non-farm private enterprises in Taiwan had no more than six employees (Gates, 1979: 275). In 1988, 20 % of households were categorised as urban petty bourgeoisie (Burris, 1999:437).

considered 'new middle class' in this research. This means that the population of new middle class might here be larger than he suggested.

Symbolically, the new middle class outranked the old middle class and carried positive cultural associations relating to modernity. The new middle class received significantly higher levels of education than the old middle class (Sheu, 1990:65). Moreover, the new middle class was widely represented in films, popular fiction and TV shows. It was seen as having a modern, politically correct and rewarding lifestyle that others would aspire to imitate (Gates, 1979:393). The division of new and old middle class also reflected ethnic politics in post-1945 Taiwan: more Mainlanders were government employees than Taiwanese. More Taiwanese were petty bourgeoisie than Mainlanders (Gates, 1979). That is to say, the new middle class were predominantly Mainlanders while the old middle class included clusters of Taiwanese.

Economic development also contributed to the restructuring of ethnic divisions. Based on her fieldwork experience, anthropologist Gates argued that before 1960 the class division of Mainlanders and Taiwanese was congruent. Even a low-ranking mainlander soldier would enjoy much more privilege than a well-educated member of the Taiwanese elite. In the 1960s, the situation started to change. There were still visible divisions between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. However, Gates found that ethnic division gradually became a stratagem that groups may have used to further their competitive ends. In reality, more and more Mainlanders experienced downward mobility, while a flourishing of Taiwanese petty bourgeoisie meant that the many Taiwanese people's desire for upward mobility could be met (Gates, 1979). This phenomenon of Taiwanese owner- farmers and petty bourgeoisie breeding new middle class sons could also be observed in the family backgrounds of my informants' husbands.

Women in the Labour Market

Figure 7.3 Rate of Labour Force Participation by Sex, 1952-2000

Note: Rate of labour participation is defined as those aged 15 or older employed or seeking civilian employment divided by the sex-specific population. Sources: Social and Economic Index, Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan. Http://61.60.106.83/

Figure 7.3 shows rates of labour participation in post-war Taiwan. Compared with the labour market of 1930, when only 26% of the female population was employed, the rate of women's participation in the labour market was high in 1951. Unfortunately, there were no statistics on women's participation between 1930 and 1950. The sudden rise in women's employment in the 1950s might imply that Taiwan had entered a wage economy even before significant industrialisation took place in the 1960s. Nevertheless, compared to the contemporary situation, the overall participation rate was still low and it actually declined with industrialisation.[121] Women's participation in the labour market only increased gradually from the 1980s until 2000 and it never went beyond 50%. However, there has been no satisfactory explanation for the fluctuations. (Yan, 1996). As men's participation in the labour market was declining over the years, the gender gap closed and dual-career families became the norm. In 2000, 69% of men and 46% of women were involved in paid work.

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[121] This trend corresponded to my finding in Chapter 6 that many second generation women quit their jobs in the 1950s 'accidentally'.

What were women's occupations in post-war Taiwan? Figure 7.4 shows the structure of women's formal employment. From 1951 to 1973, the majority of employed women were in agricultural work although this continued to decline. From 1973 to 1988, the majority of employed women were in industrial work. After 1988, more and more women started to work as white-collar workers (1988-1994). This trend generally corresponded to the shifting modes of production in post-war Taiwan and the pattern showed that women formed a reserve army of the labour market (Yan, 1996).

Figure 7.4
Structures of Female Employment by Occupations, 1951-1994

Sources: Table 6, 7, and 8 in Yan, (1996:168-70). Original data: *Year Book of Taiwan Human Resources Survey and Statistics*, 1993 and 1995. Taipei: Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan.

A comparison of pre-war and post-war structures of women's employment shows that under KMT rule women had many more opportunities to be employed as white-collar workers and service workers. In the 1930 labour market, 80% of the working-women were employed in agricultural, 11% industrial and 9% service work. In 1951, the female employment in agriculture was not as high (60%). There was an increase in none agricultural-work of service (14%) and white-collar work (13%), while blue-collar work remained the same (11%). The proportion of new middle class women, according to my definition, cannot be learned from these percentages. However, a rough estimation could be made to include the all of the white-collar workers, comprising teachers, professionals, managers, technicians, civil servants and office workers, and a small part of the service workers, who worked as sales rather than

clerks, waitresses and hairdressers. Therefore, in 1951, perhaps about 18% of the female working population can be categorised as new middle class. As stated earlier, in the post-war era the visible presence of a new middle class owed a great deal to the huge bureaucratic system of the KMT state apparatus. This might explain the sudden increase in the white-collar workers in post-war Taiwan even before mass education and industrialization took place. Yet, this collective data includes Mainlanders and there is no information about the percentage of Taiwanese workers included.

KMT State Ideology: the 'Cult of Domesticity'

The above section has shown that in post-war Taiwan, social, economic and political conditions differed a great deal from the colonial period. What was the ideal of womanhood in KMT state ideology? Did the KMT promote a different kind of femininity from the Japanese 'cult of productivity' that stressed women's virtues as well as women's productive contributions to the nation? I will begin my analysis from early twenty-century China, for KMT state ideology in post-war Taiwan was closely linked with its history in China.

About the time when Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895, China went through dramatic transformations that the majority of people in Taiwan did not experience. Critiques of the Confucian patriarchal family system were developed among westernised Confucian elite reformers. Together with these reform discourses, radical feminism, which attacked feudal family practices and fostered women's participation in saving the 'semi-colonised' Chinese nation, also contributed to overthrow the Qing Dynasty of Chinese Empire and establish Republic of China in 1911. During the May Fourth Movement (1915-1928), critiques of Confucianism, traditionalism and the 'feudal family system' also entered the main domain of discussion. Intellectuals and feminists adopted and appropriated foreign thought of all kinds to construct images of modern women that associated them with the strength and prosperity of the Chinese nation (Barlow, 1991; Judge, 2000). By claiming that national salvation depended upon

the strength of mothers, feminists strived to emancipate women from traditional marriage and the family and to bring women into public spaces: attending schools, entering the labour market and campaigning militantly for political rights (Stacey, 1983:73).

Since the 1920s these radical feminist challenges to tradition gradually came to be expressed with the policies put forward by the KMT and the CCP. Compared to the radical stance of the CCP, KMT discourses on women tended to depoliticise all forms of women's movements and to redefine feminism as moral human beings who retained traditional virtues (Siu, 1982:160-5). In KMT propaganda, early feminist challenges to tradition were replaced by a call for professional training that did not conflict with Confucian virtues. Anthropologist Croll found that a new female role model in 1930s urban China combined traditional virtuous roles as wives and mothers with a westernised idea of professional training (1978:158). Radical feminist claims to emancipate women from the oppressions of traditional marriage and family systems were thought to be realised through the 1930 Civil Code, in which free-choice marriage was legitimated, monogamy was the principle and women had slightly more rights than before in matters of divorce, inheritance and property, however, fundamental patriarchal principles were sustained. In most instances, patriarchal authority was the final determining principle. Stacey criticised these as attempts to 'legislate a family system that was a compromise between modern Western values and Confucian patriarchal principles' (Stacey, 1983:78).

In post-war Taiwan, the 1930 Civil Code was enforced. Yet, from the Taiwanese viewpoint, this Civil Code still appeared to be more 'advanced' than that of colonial Taiwan. As stated in Chapter 3, the Japanese colonial state had intentionally left most Taiwanese customary practices of the family and marriage unchallenged. Thus, in post-war Taiwan, the 1930 Civil Code seemed to challenge the Han patriarchal kinship system by virtue of its monogamous principle and a guarantee of women's rights in divorce and inheritance. However, this Civil Code, which still contained patriarchal principles, was neither revised nor contested until 1987.

Under martial law, the KMT monopolised all forms of social discourse and no

debates about gender equality could take place. Most newspaper articles agreed that

men and women were equal under the leadership of the KMT and that women's rights

had been completely achieved through the Constitution. The classic discourses read

like this,

> 'Compared with many other countries in the world, our contemporary
> women are really lucky. They need not 'fight' (爭) to enjoy equal rights with
> men in education, employment and political participation. Even more, there
> are many women who enjoy career achievement that is more successful than
> a successful man' (the editorial, Central Daily News, 1976, quoted in Yu,
> 2000:493).

Similar opinions were repeated every year in this official newspaper from 1965 to

the 1980s.

The KMT ideal of womanhood was always associated with anti-communist

ideology. When martial law was proclaimed in 1949, non-governmental organisations

were restricted. The KMT set up two women's groups: the Taiwan Provincial Women's

Association[122] and the anti-Communist Women's League (ACWL).[123] Both aimed at

mobilising women to become moral and virtuous and to devote themselves to the

anti-communist campaign. Within the KMT, the Women's Department was set up in

1953. Rather than mobilising women for party politics, the aim of the department was

to reinforce the traditional sexual division of labour for the purpose of 'serving the

needs of our countrymen' (1976, Women's Department of KMT, quoted in E. Yao,

1983:206). Song Mei-ling, who continued mobilising women in anti-communist

campaigns in post-1949 Taiwan, again associated female virtues with national survival

and the anti-communism project,

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[122] Their goals were to help rural women to become educated, to offer skills for house keeping, to provide services and counselling in employment and family crises, and to contribute to the country by serving the military in several ways, such as sewing uniforms, entertaining soldiers and visiting the wounded (Yi-shu Pi, 1973:129-30, cited in E. Yao, 1983:205).

[123] This group was established in 1950 to unite all women in Taiwan toward the ultimate goal of recovering Mainland China. Women were encouraged to engage in basic homemaking and childcare, to assistant in caring for the poor and the wounded, to extend social education for proper moral conduct and to be anti-Communist by understanding and developing interpersonal diplomatic relations with citizens in other anti-Communist countries (Yi-shu Pi, 1973:116-25, cited in E. Yao, 1983:205).

'[Women] shall cultivate their morals, expand their knowledge, cooperate with each other, correct the weaknesses of the past, expand the strong points of modern life, take diligence and service as their vocation, and be frugal and practical to support the front line of the battle. They shall also support the battle in the backyard by providing money, spiritual stability, and physical strengthen to foster the success of the anti-Communist and anti-Russian project. They shall grasp chances and work effectively to establish the foundation for the revitalisation and establishment of our nation' (1954, Women's Department, cited in Yu, 2000:494).

Historian Chien-min Yu commented that from 1950 through to the 1970s, social discourses emphasised women's family roles and family responsibilities more than their social responsibilities (2000). KMT ideal womanhood was developed in conscious opposition to the CCP that attacked tradition and the family in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. Since the CCP criticised 'traditional Confucian values' and promoted 'model female cadres' who were productive workers, KMT endorsed 'traditional Chinese culture' and associated women with 'traditional' familial responsibility and family values. Therefore, in KMT ideology, even when women were encouraged to expand their scope of contribution to the society by engaging in work, family was again highlighted as the primary responsibility of women (Yu, 2000:494-6). Again, this invoked a very Confucian idea, that self-cultivation was the foundation to achieve the moral family, and that the moral family was the basis of the well-governed nation. A woman's main responsibility was to educate a new moral generation and this was how she should contribute to the nation.

These modern western values, patriarchal principles and anti-communist ideologies were assembled together in KMT school textbooks. As these texts appear to have had a huge impact on the thinking of my informants, I give some details here. Jeffrey Meyer investigated the textbooks of elementary schools (for pupils aged 6-12) and middle schools (aged 13-15) in 1980s Taiwan and found that moral education penetrated every subject of study: from language, literature and social studies to human geography (1988). The contents of the morality taught in the schools, according to teachers surveyed by Meyer, was traditional Confucianism modified in a few areas according to the exigencies of the modern situation (270). Moral education associated

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moral personal conduct with the survival of the nation. Confucian values of respecting the hierarchy of age and generation were invoked and articulated together with patriotism.[124]

Moreover, western values were incorporated to 'modernise' the Confucian scheme. Firstly, individual freedom was praised, but it was never mentioned without cautionary statements about the limits of freedom. Secondly, both the extended family and nuclear family system were included to evaluate their advantages and disadvantages, but the clear preference remained the 'three generations under one roof' type of the family. Thirdly, the textbooks overtly rejected sexual inequality, stressing that men and women were equal. However this reflection was followed by the remark that women by nature seemed to suit managing housework, watching over the health of their family, educating children etc. Meyer was amazed by the frequent stories of 'mother inspires son to greatness' in these textbooks, which held up as examples widowed mothers across Chinese dynasties motivating their sons to achieve greatness for the nation (276-7).[125]

To sum up, a combination of western values, traditional Confucianism, and anti-communist ideology was the tone of ideal womanhood in KMT state ideology. The following section will elaborate on the character of such ideology by contrasting it with the Japanese 'cult of productivity'.

If the term 'cult of productivity' (Nolte and Hastings, 1991) is used to describe the gender politics of the Japanese colony, then it would be appropriate to deploy the term 'cult of domesticity' to refer to the gender ideology in KMT policies. The 'cult of domesticity' confined women to the domestic space and discouraged them from

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[124] In school textbooks for early primary school pupils, exemplary stories were used to urge children to study diligently, to be brave and to be docile for parents and teachers. The ultimate goal was to serve others and not to be selfish. Virtues of filial piety came in when children were told to honour, respect and obey their parents, to be harmonious within the family and to defer to older siblings. Then, the horizon was broadened to include the neighbourhood and town or villages, and then the nation. Realisation of the self was the realisation of the nation (Meyer, 1988: 271-6).

[125] In Chapter 4, I have shown that under patriarchy, resourceful widows usually produced great sons and daughters. The KMT decontextualised these stories from the context of the family and articulated them in relation to the nation

working. To contribute to the nation, a woman was supposed to take good care of the next generation of citizens *only*. To be virtuous, under the 'cult of productivity' was to be strong, to endure, and to be productive for the nation *and* the family. In contrast, under the 'cult of domesticity', to be virtuous meant to cultivate personal morality, to take good care of the family and to be 'unproductive'. Moreover, this 'cult of domesticity' is understood here as a modern appropriation of Confucian philosophy, for it valued personal moral cultivation highly. It also appeared to be very 'Chinese' in that it deployed the 'differential modes of association' (差序格局), defined by Fei (1991 [1947]) as the basic structure of Chinese interpersonal relations, where the concentric circles were centred on the self, extending towards the family and then to the nation. Priority was given to the moral cultivation of the self and the family. In contrast, the Japanese 'cult of productivity' prioritised the needs of the nation over the needs of the family.

Another significant contrast is seen in the different female subjects promoted in these ideologies. In the 'cult of productivity' a woman should be strong and enduring, with the ultimate strength to support the family and the nation, especially at times of crisis. In the 'cult of domesticity', an ideal woman was weak and fragile as a result of her biological difference from Man. The formation of such subject positions can be traced back to Chinese feminist writings of the May Fourth Movement (1915-1928). By analysing May Fourth literature, Barlow suggested that a westernised female subject, *nuxing* (female sex, 女性), emerged out of feminist and nationalist discourses when feminists appropriated Victorian ideology from nineteenth-century Europe (1996). She argued that the most shocking development of Chinese feminism was that these feminists grounded sexual identity in sexual physiology and substituted sexual desire for the Confucian women's reproductive service to the Chinese family as the foundation of human identity (1996:58-9).[126] The unintended consequence was that,

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[126] Unfortunately, Barlow did not expand on the point of 'sexual desire'. It appears to me that this relates to the discourses of 'romantic love' that posed a great threat to the generation hierarchy of patriarchal kinship system. Chinese feminism during the 1920s produced significant narratives on romantic love and some of these discourses spread to Taiwan through students who studied in China (see C. Yang, 1993).

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'When Chinese translators invoked the sex binary of a Darwin or an Ellis, they valorised notions of female passivity, biological inferiority, intellectual inability, sexuality, and social absence through reference to the location of the "truths" in European social scientism and social theory. Thus, Chinese women became women/*nuxing* only when they become the other of Man in the Victorian binary' (Barlow, 1996:59).

The term *nuxing* was contested by the CCP, which regarded it as an urban bourgeois concept and replaced it with the concept of *funu*, which associated women with class struggle. However, *nuxing* was still embraced by the KMT camp and it continued to 'enter cultural and economic circulation on its own accord' (1996:60). When *nuxing* was deployed and articulated in the 'cult of domesticity' in post-war Taiwan, it inevitably produced a modern female subject that simultaneously believed in equality between genders as well as in women's weakness rooted in their biological differences in relation to men. The female subject was encouraged to prioritise the family and respect the generational and gender hierarchy of the patriarchal family system. Women who received education and obtained professional work were already understood as 'progressive' modern women, unprecedented in Chinese, rather than Taiwanese, history.

Thirdly, in a different historical moment, the KMT 'cult of domesticity' was more widespread and influential than the 'cult of productivity'. This might be attributed to the institutionalisation of the 'cult of domesticity' through the powerful state apparatus of the KMT. Figure 7.2 has shown that education at all levels expanded drastically in this period. Moreover, all students relied on memorising textbooks to pass through central examination system to enter higher levels of education. The rapid expansion of education and the central examination system produced a significant number of literate Taiwanese women and contributed to both the dissemination and the absorption of the 'cult of domesticity'. Moreover, the effectiveness and wide acceptance of the 'cult of domesticity' were accelerated by two other factors, firstly, the successful mobilisation of diverse institutions to rewrite 'traditional culture' and secondly, the repressive measures the KMT adopted to censor the moral practices and ideological thinking of every individual in Taiwanese society, particularly under martial law (1949-1987).

Allen Chun's article 'An Oriental Orientalism' (1995) provided detailed analysis of how KMT utilised 'tradition' as disciplinary practices in institutions at all levels. Various ethical and moral conducts were defined by the KMT party as 'traditional culture' and constituted the framework in which the hegemony of tradition was created (44). This all-encompassing framework, from regulating personal moral conduct to requiring patriotic thinking and behaviour, allowed the KMT to influence its citizens' inner thoughts.[127] A person's mobility in the bureaucratic system as well as social strata relied upon her/his moral performance, which meant conformity to the moral codes defined by the KMT. With a postcolonial perspective, Chun persuasively argued that what appeared as 'tradition' in contemporary Taiwan was articulated by the state apparatus with a political aim (44-5).

Contextualised in the cold war period, Chun's article clearly pointed out that the systematic writing of tradition could not have been achieved without the successful mobilisation of multiple agents in diverse institutions to rewrite 'traditional cultures' in a way that incorporated state hegemony into the personal conduct of moral cultivation. However, Chun's article lacked a gender dimension. He failed to point out that the articulation of traditionalism not only constructed a national identity but also individual gender identity. Nevertheless, his analysis of state monitoring of individual conduct has the potential to explain the implementation of the gendered 'cult of domesticity' at a personal level. It might explain my sense that my third generation informants offered accounts of family life in which emotions had been repressed (Chapter 1). Moreover, it might also clarify the reasons why the discourses of traditionalism functioned in such subtle and naturalised ways as discussed in three articles by the feminist anthropologist Diamond(1973a, 1973b, 1975) which sought to uncover the role of KMT ideology in

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[127] Through "confessional rites" such as writing weekly diaries or "speaking-out" activities carried out at schools of all levels, in military training and the workplace, the KMT could monitor every individual's thought and conduct in terms of morality and loyalty to the state as well as to traditional cultures (Chun, 1995:45).

shaping the gender relations of 1970s urban Taiwanese families.[128] Even in 1999, these discourses still appeared very influential. I address this issue further in Chapter 11, when I investigate the identity construction of fourth generation daughters-in-law.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the drastic changes in Taiwan after 1945. Within five decades, it was transformed from an agricultural to industrial and then post-industrial society. Social, economic and educational developments transformed class structures in post-war Taiwan. Political white-horror and land reform eliminated the powers of local elites, and destroyed peasant-landlord relations. Due to the huge bureaucratic system of the KMT, the scale of new middle class increased even before significant industrialisation. In the 1960s, rapid economic development contributed to the formation of petty bourgeois and new middle class families, while the agricultural sector continued to decline. Economic development gradually slowed down in late 1980s, when Taiwan turned into a post-industrial society as capital flew to China and other Asian countries and there was an increase of GDP from the service sector. In the 1990s, women's participation in the labour market, especially in the service sector, had become the norm.

Politically, the KMT was unlike Japanese, whose powers over Taiwan were established on the hierarchies of gender and generation of Han patriarchal families. The KMT replaced these with 'modern' practices that combined western values and patriarchal principles. The KMT brought the Constitution and Civil Code to Taiwan. These contained some feminist elements drawn from radical feminism currents from

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[128] Her first two articles (1973a, 1973b) delineated the depressing gender relations in urban middle class Taiwanese families without addressing the role of the state. Throughout her description, Diamond seemed very frustrated by the 'oppressed' Taiwanese women who lacked self-consciousness and annoyed by such 'modern Chinese culture'. Although Diamond applied the term 'ideology' to describe these gender relations, she used it as if it occurred *naturally* without state manipulation. Only in her third article, 'Women under Kuomingtang Rule: Variations on the Feminine Mystique' (1975) did Diamond connect state ideology with her ethnographal findings and reject the 'traditionalism' claimed by both the women she interviewed and KMT discourses.

early twentieth-century China. Yet, with the political intention of contesting CCP ideology, KMT stressed traditionalism and family values and suppressed any debates about gender equality during the martial law period. It promoted a 'cult of domesticity' that emphasised female virtues and weakness, moral cultivation and family responsibility. The 'cult of domesticity' dominated political and social discourses. It was disseminated through the expanding educational system and was used to monitor the individual's conduct and thinking through the operations of state apparatus in schools and the workplace. In post martial law Taiwan, the institutional support of the 'cult of domesticity' weakened, but hegemony continued to be reproduced and gained a life of its own. The following four chapters address transforming Han family practices under KMT rule.

Chapter 8 Economic Organisation In Industrial Families, 1970-1999

Chapter 7 demonstrated that the structures of the labour market had changed significantly under KMT rule while the state ideology 'cult of domesticity' also encouraged married women to stay at home. What were my informants' working histories? Did wives give up work and stay in the 'inner sphere'? Or did they take up the jobs available to them in an industrial society? How would women's employment outside the home change the economic organisation of the Han family institution?

In this chapter, I explore economic organisation in families under industrialisation by looking at the employment patterns of third and fourth generation respondents and the ways in which family economy was managed. Moreover, I investigate whether women's long-term employment outside the home contributed to enhance their status in the family. The chapter aims to present a profile of production and resource distribution in *both* conjugal and complex families after industrialisation, for family structure no longer has such significance in determining patterns of resource distribution. The economic aspects of industrial families lay the foundation for the next two chapters, which look at the organisation of reproductive work in conjugal and complex families respectively.

Patterns of Employment

How were families in industrial times resourced? I begin with an examination of the employment patterns of my third and fourth generation informants and then address their relations to the family economy.

In colonial times, few upper class married women had lasting employment outside the home, except those who resisted marriage or were driven to it by poverty. Upper class young men usually shifted from new middle class employment to become self-employed in bourgeois jobs or capitalist positions. The employment structures in post-war Taiwan differed significantly from those of colonial times. Among the post-war generations, there appears to be ongoing employment of both men and women in new middle class jobs. This trend is shown in Chapter 7 and can also be also identified by comparing the employment history of pre-war and post-war generations. Nevertheless, it must be noted that women with a history of long-term formal employment were most easily to be found in the public sector. Only a small number of such women were in the private sector and a minority worked as self-employed bourgeoisie. The occupations of the third and fourth generations are listed in table 8.1 and table 8.2.[129]

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[129] These tables also contain information about the class positions of the husband's parents, which will be explained later in this and the following two chapters.

Table 8.1 Employment and Class Positions of Wife, Husband and Husband's Parents, Third and Fourth Generations Living in Conjugal Families

Generation and Name	Family Structures	Wife's Employment	Husband's Employment	Class Positions of the Young Couple	Class Positions of Husband's Parents	Information about the Husband's Original Family
3-03. Wong, Mei-fen	Neo	College professor	Employed Doctor	New middle class	Owner-farmer	Nantou, farmer.
3-04. Xia, Juan-fen	Neo	Civil servant (computer programmer)	Civil servant	New middle class	Owner farmer	Farmer
3-05. Jiang, Yu-fen	Neo	Primary school teacher	Technician-Factory Owner	NMC +Bourgeoisie	?	Taichung.
3-06. Liao, Hui-fen	Neo	Animation painter/*/chief secretary of a media company	Employed Film producer (died early)	New middle class	?	(Mainlanders from Shang-hai)
3-07. Ke, Shu-fen	Neo	Newspaper Editor/*/ S-E publisher	Newspaper Editor-S-E publisher	NMC/ Bourgeoisie	New Middle Class	Taipei. Civil servant (F)
3-08. Wen, Li-fen	Neo	Primary school teacher	Primary school teacher	New middle class	?	?
3-09. Shen, Rong-fen	Neo	Nurse/Primary school nurse	Primary school teacher	New middle class	?	Mother living with youngest son in Tainan.
3-10. Shao, Siao-fen	Neo	Office worker/*/ self-employed business	University professor	Bourgeoisie+ NMC	Owner-farmer	Tai-chung, owner- farmer
3-11.Yan, Ru-fen	Neo (matri)	Civil servant/ insurance saleswoman	Business, self-employed	Bourgeoisie+ NMC	?	?
3-12.Zhuang, Cai-fen	Neo	S-E Pharmacist/S-E Health food saleswoman	Pharmacist	Bourgeoisie	New Middle Class	Chancellor of a high school. Educated.
3-13.Zheng, Qiu-fen	Neo	Accountant/*/helped at husband's company	Business, self-employed	Bourgeoisie	?	Tainan, mother was bullied by MIL & tensed relation with husband
3-16.Ou, Yue-fen	Neo	Accountant/Insurance saleswoman	An overseer at building site	NMC+ WC	New Middle Class	Tainan. Mainlanders. Civil servant (F).
3-18 Liang, Xian-fen	Neo	Lab. researcher/manager (employed by husband)	Architect-business/Businessman	New middle class /bourgeoisie	Owner-farmer	?/Owner farmer

Generation and Name	Family Structures	Wife's Employment	Husband's Employment	Class Positions of the Young Couple	Class Positions of the Husband's Parents	Information about the Husband's Original Family
3-19. Cai, Zhu-fen	Neo(matri)/Neo	Civil servant (retired)/writer	Teacher-manager of private company	New middle class	Farmer	Jia-yi, farmer (FIL died early)
4-01 Tan, Yi-ping	Neo (matri)	Associate professor	Business.	New Middle Class + Bourgeoisie	?	Xin-zhu (his parents died early)
4-02 Huang, Rong-ping	Neo (work)	Lawyer	Judge	New Middle Class	Farmer	Jia-yi. A 'traditional farm family'
4-03 Wong, Ru-ping	Neo	News editor	News editor	New Middle Class	New Middle Class	Kaohsiung, F: civil servant, Mainlander.
4-06 Sun, Yen-ping	Neo, house given by hus's parents	Civil servant	Civil servant	New Middle Class	Petty bourgeoisie.	Hua-lien. Food proccssing.
4-08 Dai, Wen-ping	Neo (matri)	Insurance saleswoman	Self-employed driver	New Middle Class +self-employed	New Middle Class	Kaohsiung, F: Mainlander, bank manager. M: teacher at kindergarten
4-11 Qi, Yu-ping	Neo (matri)	Accountant	Technician	New Middle Class	?	Miao-li
4-15 Hong, Suei-ping	Neo (matri)	Primary teacher	Policeman	New Middle Class	?	Miao-li (go home once or twice every month).
4-16 Luo, Hui-ping	Neo (matri)	Civil servant	Insurance salesman	New Middle Class	Petty Bourgeoisie	Taidong, street vendors.
4-17 Guan, Xing-ping	Neo	Bank employee	Technician	New Middle Class	?	Hua-lien
4-19 Gu, Fong-ping	Neo	Self-employed businesswoman	Computer technician	Bourgeoisie + NMC	Bourgeoisie	Yi-lan. F:Chinese medicine doctor own herbal shop. M: housewife.

Neo= Neolocal. Matri=living next to or near the wife's mother's house. NMC: New Middle Class. WC: Working Class. S-E: Self-employed. Hus.: husband.

F: Father. M: Mother

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Table 8.2 Employment and Class Positions of Wife and Husband and His Parents, Third and Fourth Generations Living in Complex Families

Generation and Name	Family structure	Wife's Employment	Husband's Employment	Class Positions of the Young Couple	Class Positions of the Husband's Parents	Employment of Husband's Father	Employment of Husband's Mother
3-01.Hu, Jia-fen	Neo-stem-neo (lifecycle)	Primary school teacher	Teacher/Judge	New middle class	Peasant	Hua-lien. Owner Farmer (did not reside with son)	Housewife of retired owner farmer.
3-02.Fu, Ling-fen	Stem-neo (husband's decision)	Elementary school teacher	Factory owner, self-employed	NMC + Bourgeoisie	New middle class	Zhan-hua, civil servant in sugar plantation. Retired.	An adopted daughter, wife of retired civil servant.
3-14.Wang, Min-fen	Stem-neo (lifecycle)	Accountant	Soldier	New middle class	?	Mainlanders from Shanghai but did not own any property	?
3-15.Su, Long-fen	Stem (divorce)	X/business, self-employed	Architect	Bourgeoisie + NMC	Declining landlords	Tai-chun. Previous landlord family.	?
3-17. Ding, Fan-fen	Extend-family division-neo	High school teacher + NGO	Family Business	NMC + Bourgeoisie	Grand Bourgeoisie	Taipei, merchant, local elite, catholic.	Wife of merchant family. Never worked
3-20 Li, Yao-fen	Neo-stem (divorce)	College Lecturer	Office worker	New middle class	?	?	Housewife (implied)
4-18 Hao, Xiu-ping	Stem	Bank employee	Insurance salesman	New Middle Class	Petty bourgeoisie	Taipei, factory owner + house rents	Work with husband at factory
4-12 Kang, Yuan-ping	Extended-neo (her decision, work as excuse)	Senior saleswoman	Technician	New Middle Class	Proletarian	Tao-yuan, factory section leader.	Never worked
4-09 Lan, Wei-ping	Stem	Civil servant	Electronic engineer	New Middle Class	Petty Bourgeoisie	Taipei County. Selling foods in night market	Selling food in night market
4-10 Lu, Yao-ping	Stem (3 gen.)- neo (husband's decision)	Lawyer (self employed)	Lawyer (self-employed)	New Middle Class	Grand bourgeoisie	Taipei, merchant	Never worked
4-20 Li, Ren-ping	Stem	Bank employee	Music company manager	New Middle Class	New middle class	Taipei, Mainlander. Retired civil servant.	?
4-14 Peng, Na-ping	Stem (divorce)	Graphic designer, self-employed	Architect, self-employed	Bourgeoisie	(mother) relied on rents and son.	Taipei. High ranking civil servants (deceased)	House rents, (concubine, never worked)
4-05 Jin, Yi-ping	Stem- neo (her decision)	NGO employee	Engineer	New Middle Class	Proletarian	Taipei, non-working	Cook assistant
4-07 Ma, Kang-ping	Stem	University lecturer	University lecture	New Middle Class	New middle class	Taipei. Head teacher.	Low-ranking government office worker
4-04 Zhao, Mei-ping	Extend-neo (matri) (her decision)	Journalist/Computer programmer (p/t)	Civil servant	New Middle Class	Grand bourgeoisie	Taipei. Successful businessman	Wife of merchant (never worked)
4-13 Wei, Mong-ping	Neo-extended-neo (work)	NGO. Social activist	NGO. Social activist	New Middle Class	Retired petty bourgeoisie	Taipei. Non-working	Retired street vendor

Neo= Neolocal. Matri=living next to or near the wife's mother's house. NMC: New Middle Class. WC: Working Class. S-E: Self-employed. Hus.: husband. F: Father. M: Mother

The majority of third generation informants continued to work in the public sector, mainly as teachers or civil servants after studying commerce, nursing or teaching after high school or college. Employment in the public sector was a popular option after the 1970s, because it offered all kinds of benefits, such as subsidies for children's education, daily consumption and even electricity bills. Public sector employees also get generous pensions when they retire. Moreover, if they wish, they can upgrade their skills in work related training courses, sponsored by the government. The first benefits improve women's chances of combining family care with economic activity, while the opportunity for training was often utilised by daughters of the 1970s who were eager for education but were not sponsored by their parents. These factors attracted most of my informants to transfer to the public sector after working as nurses, teachers and accountants for private companies. Juan-fen was one of the 'luckiest' women, who passed the difficult examinations and stayed in the same working unit for thirty-eight years in 1999.

> Q: 'Have you thought of quitting jobs?'
>
> Juan-fen: 'Never. I worked here after passing the examination and getting the civil servant qualification. The examination was even more difficult than the university entrance examination. You also gained every possible benefit in this job. Most of my colleagues did not quit their jobs to take care of children. At most, they employed maids to help. Because it was difficult for us to return here once you quit.'

Once women had gained permanent employment in the public sector, those benefits usually carried them through the child-rearing stages without problems (3-01, 3-02, 3-04, 3-05, 3-08, 3-09, 3-11, 3-17, 3-19). In contrast, women who worked in the private sector often found it more difficult to cope with home and work. Only two working as accountants in private companies (3-14, 3-16) had an unbroken working history. In both cases, economic necessity motivated their long-term employment. The rest of the informants had taken career breaks (3-03, 3-07), left formal employment (3-06, 3-13) or became self-employed (3-03, 3-13) to take care of their children. Nevertheless, in women who had worked in both private and public sectors, there

appeared to be a very strong gender ideology that 'Man took charge outside, women inside' (3-02, 3-09, 3-03, 3-06, 3-13). I will address this in detail in Chapters 9 and 10.

With the decline of manufacturing and agriculture in the 1980s, the service sector grew: more and more women worked as white collar or service workers, especially in finance, commerce and insurance. As Salaff identified, in the 1990s working had almost become the norm. Women increasingly earned a living out of economic necessity. A process of proletarianisation has been taking place (1994). Book-keeping, telephone operating, typing and accounting, which were fashionable jobs for modern women in the 1930s, had become low-level white-collar jobs in the 1990s. More educational credentials were needed before entering the labour market and a lot of effort was made, as in the 1970s, to work in the public sector as civil servants or teachers (4-06, 4-09, 4-15). Moreover, there were a significant number of professional women working as lawyers, doctors, editors and certified accountants after a university education (4-02, 4-03, 4-11, 4-17, 4-18, 4-04). Sales positions in the insurance industry were another high-income occupation that attracted women (4-08), including some third generation informants who switched career in the 1990s (3-11, 3-16).

In the 1970s, women who finished high school or university education were the privileged few[130] and there were plenty of working opportunities available when they graduated from high school or college. In contrast, in the 1990s, receiving higher education was *not* unusual for fourth generation informants, but employment after graduation was not always guaranteed. Unless women worked as professionals, job security was low, especially for women who worked in the private sector. When I carried out my research in 1999 there was pessimism about job security and great doubts as to any promotion opportunities in both public and private sectors. In the

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[130] In late 1960s and early 1970s, the majority of peasant daughters were taken away from the village by factory coaches and lived in cramped factory dormitories (Kung, 1994). My third generation informants, who were born between 1945 and 1950 and finished their high school or university education around 1970, were rare among their generation (around 22% female attended high school and 18% university in 1970, see figure 7.2). They were mainly daughters of gentry or civil servants.

government and in schools, few women were promoted to managerial levels. Moreover, after working for six to ten years in the same company, they complained of a lack of challenge (4-03, 4-12, 4-20, 4-04). Wong worked for two years in a magazine after graduation from university. Thereafter, she worked as an editor for one of the top newspaper companies in Taiwan. She said,

> 'I've worked here for ten years. I'm very experienced in this job. Nevertheless, I am worthless here. It is like this in the newspaper office. They only want young people and see them as having potential. We seniors are burdens for them. We do not have a trade union. Therefore, you are either transferred to another office or dismissed. There is no future.'

Sometimes, when the labour market frustrated women, marriage and the family offered an alternative (4-05, 4-06, 4-14). Mei-ping's working history provides a good example of this situation.

> 'Recently, I quit my job in the press and work part-time for a web company on women related issues. This is because my six-year-old daughter had skin problems and thus had very bad temper. My mother did not want to look after my daughter for me. My nineteen-month-old son was also constantly ill. After last winter, the three of us often caught colds. My mother then suggested that I quit my job. My husband also thought so. Some women, after giving birth to children, transferred to working for the evening press, which required less working hours. But I am a workaholic. I know that even if I work for the evening press, I will devote as much energy as I did in my previous position. At this time, I also felt frustrated at work. I have been working for ten years as a journalist. There is nothing new. However, I always look for challenges and want to learn new things.'

However, it must be recognized that not all women could afford to work part-time. Mei-ping's decision to work part-time was supported by her husband's stable and more generous salary as a manager in a government owned industry. Many of my informants thought of changing jobs, but opportunities did not often come easily and they usually had to wait. Wong, quoted above, had thought of changing jobs for two years but found no alternatives. Job security became even worse after the recession hit in 2000 but this was beyond the time span of this research.[131]

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[131] In 2001, I learned that one informant had been laid off and another petty bourgeois interviewee who worked with her husband had got divorced. She thereby lost her source of income and was living on the margins of poverty.

Despite these constraints in the labour market, many women, especially those who romantically expected marriage provided alternative chances to work, were motivated to go back to the labour market after marriage (4-08, 4-10, 4-20). Lu Yao-ping married at twenty-two, immediately after graduation from law school. Her husband wanted her to be full-time housewife so she got married without gaining a lawyer's qualification or taking up any formal employment. However, as the daughter-in-law of a wealthy stem family, her mother-in-law expected her to do all the housework.[132] To escape from such torments, she started to work, at first as a contracted office worker in the public sector. Then, she took the examination and became a lawyer.

Li Ren-ping was another example. She got married early, at twenty-four, because she was tightly controlled by her natal family and wanted to escape. After marriage, she quit her job at her husband's request and enjoyed her leisure. Nevertheless, she was working when she was interviewed.

Q: 'Why did you go back to work?'

Ren-ping: 'Because I did not want to be home looking after the baby. I was depressed after giving birth. I regretted a lot. I suddenly realised that I could not go wherever I pleased and the child kept me at home so I started to work again.'

The above cases show that the fourth generation of women made working decisions as they negotiated the structural constraints of both the labour market and patriarchal kinship relations. On the one hand, the sexist and exploitative nature of labour market has pushed women to expect to combine part-time work with motherhood as an alternative to a frustrated career. On the other hand, work has become a legitimate excuse for married women to defy patriarchy.

Although this research looks at new middle class women, it also included a small number of self-employed bourgeois families. It seems that the chances of women running their own business increased over time. In previous generations there had been

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[132] This case will be analysed in detail in Chapter 11.

female entrepreneurs, but all of them started their business after marriage or after their children grew up (2-02, 2-09, 2-10, 2-11, 2-21, 3-07, 3-10, 3-12, 3-15). In the fourth generation, a female entrepreneur started a business with her boyfriend, later her husband, before marriage (4-19). This suggests an increasing autonomy for young women, who no longer needed marriage to gain access to capital to start their own business. Moreover, it must be noted that the nature of family business in post-war families differed significantly from that of colonial families. Among the colonial upper class, the family formed a unit of production, reproduction and consumption. The patriarch, as the owner of the family business, did not usually pay salaries to family members but distributed the profits of his business as he pleased. The family business was part of family property. Nevertheless, it seems that concepts of corporation were gradually developed in post-war Taiwan. In the 1970s, the profits of the family business were not usually directly distributed to family members; family members who worked for the family enterprise would expect to earn a salary. In other words, there was already a separation of home and work.[133] However, such a division could still be blurred when the business was run by a couple alone and employed no workers.

To sum up, the majority of the third generation women in my research had lasting employment in the public sector. Apart from those in economic need, women working in the private sector often took career breaks or became self-employed to cope with the demands of the separation of home and work in the 1970s. Women in the fourth generation had higher educational qualifications, but insecurities in the labour market were greater in the 1990s than the 1970s. Women often swung back and forth between the exploitative labour market and patriarchal kinship relations. The majority of my third and fourth generation informants lived mainly in dual-career new middle class

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[133] Following such division, there is an interesting shift in conceptualising manhood. In post-war Taiwan, if the husband ran the business, he did not act as the androgynous patriarch taking charges of both the 'inner' and the 'outer' spheres (Chapter 2). Instead, he worked 'outside the home', while his wife was in commend in the 'inner' sphere. It appears that an essentially divided masculinity and femininity was developed through the division of home and work, corresponding to an essentialising articulation of gender as determined by biological sex (Chapter 7).

families while a small number of women turned to bourgeois employment on their own or with their husband. In both new middle class and bourgeois families, there was a separation of production and reproduction, work and family, in industrial times.

How should the couple's employment patterns be used to account for the production aspect of these new middle class families in different family structures? In industrial conjugal families, the husband's and wife's incomes from work resourced their families. What about the couple who lived with the husband's parents in complex families? How were these complex families resourced? Should I take the husband's parents' occupations into consideration, as was the case during colonial times? Answers to these questions rely on the ways in which family resources were pooled and distributed. My empirical data indicated that the common coffer of urban complex families was now extremely rare. Each couple managed their own money and the flow of money between generations had been reversed. Where the patriarch had distributed money to family members, now the young couple paid 'feedback funds' to his or her parents.[134] Therefore, in complex families, I choose to differentiate the class positions of the elder generation from that of the younger generation. Table 8.1 and 8.2 are drawn with this in mind and inform the following two chapters.[135] The evidence also suggests that among the post-war generations, family economic organisation no longer varied according to family structure. The conjugal unit between husband and wife formed the basic unit of production and consumption, and patterns of distributing money were negotiated between couples. Therefore, in the following analysis I am able to look at the economic arrangements of all third and fourth generation couples, paying no special regard to differences in family structure.

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[134] Among the third generation, it was normal for married sons giving money to his parents. However, wives who wished to give money to her parents were usually frowned upon by their husbands. The gender-biased practices only became more balanced when fourth generation new middle class daughters in my research took control of their money and paid some to her parents. Earlier research in mid 1980s also demonstrated this trend (Tsui, 1987). This issue is addressed in the following section.

Economic Arrangements

How have resources been managed between couples of the third and fourth generations? Were existing patterns repeated? Would wives' active engagement in paid work outside the family give them more autonomy in dealing with family money? Building on my analysis in chapter 6, I again examine how the role of patriarch and financial manager was assigned between couples in the later period. This approach allows comparisons with previous generations. In the process I also explore emerging issues among the post-war generations in relation to wives' long-term employment. Finally, I investigate whether the wife's employment contributes to enhance her status in the family.

The Third Generation

The 'benevolent patriarch' model that I described in Chapter 6 was when the husband acted as the patriarch and assigned the role of financial manager to the wife. He supplied household expenses for his wife to control. In post-war generations, this pattern was practiced in a slightly different style because both husband and wife were earning. Husband and wife kept their own incomes but the husband would give a certain amount from his income to the wife for household running costs. As a result, the wife often kept her own independent income on the top of the household expenses (3-2, 3-3).[136]

The 'dominant patriarch' pattern where the husband acted as patriarch and financial manager, and the wife might or might not keep her own income as private money, occurred in both colonial and industrial generations (3-2, 3-7, 3-8, 3-10). Although in colonial times this pattern suggested male domination, in post-war

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[135] Comparing these two tables, it is apparent that women in conjugal families rarely mentioned their parents-in-law in their life stories. In contrast, women who resided patrilocally often provided details of the occupation of their parents-in-law. The lack of narratives on parents-in-law thus corresponds to both geographical and psychological distance between women in conjugal families and their parents-in-law.

[136] The same case number could be quoted in different patterns because couples changed their methods of management at some stages.

generations, it had diverse meanings. For example, Ke was very happy with such arrangements. Her husband took charge of essential family consumption, such as buying a house or a car. Ke kept her own income but also had access to her husband's money when she needed it. Ke found this pattern satisfactory because she had no worries about money. In another case, this arrangement was a result of negotiation because the wife did not want to be bothered by the triviality of money management (3-8). To complicate the picture, the wife in this couple appeared to be the dominant one. Cases like these suggest that most wives had a say in family consumption decisions even if their husband controlled and managed the money. Since all these wives worked and retained their own income, the issue shifted from access to family resources to the power of disposing of *their* money. Shao was the only informant who was unhappy with this arrangement (3-10) not because she had no money but because her husband did not pay attention to her opinion over important purchases.

As in colonial times, the pattern of 'powerful wife versus soft or irresponsible husband' was most common. The wife often acted as the financial manager of the household and took over her the husband's income, which might be stable or unstable, ample or meagre. In post-war generations, working wives usually added their incomes to the shared family coffer and thus had no private money. The husband might or might not claim his authority over family resources, depending on his personality. The experiences of women under this model were divided by the economic standing of the couple. A wife might find herself in the most difficult situation when her husband did not earn enough money and yet claimed his authority over it (3-9, 3-11, 3-16). On the other hand a wife might enjoy complete control over the family resources without her husband challenging her decisions (3-12, 3-13, 3-17, 3-19).

Among the third generation, the egalitarian type of management was practiced slightly differently than among the second generation, where the husband and wife shared a common coffer and both had direct access to it. Young couples of the third generation often had independent bank accounts and shared the household expenditures

spontaneously as well has having autonomy dealing with their own money. However, only three cases were found in this type (3-3, 3-4, 3-14). Moreover, in the 1970s, financial autonomy was still 'culturally' conditioned. There was still a norm that the wife should not support her natal family financially, although the husband took supporting his parents for granted (3-3).

Different models of financial management entailed varied access to power and can be interpreted in different ways. In post-war generations, most wives had direct access to family resources, had money to spare and made decisions about household expenditure even when husbands might have the final say. However, these patterns did not depart radically from the economic arrangements of colonial conjugal families, except that fewer husbands were low-earning, that more wives kept their own earnings to themselves and that there was a bit more equality. Most often third generation informants had access to money and the major question was whether they could have a say in important decisions about family consumption. This was especially an issue for women who had a dominant husband.

Changes in the Fourth Generation

In the 1990s, there were several interesting developments. Firstly, the egalitarian type of money management was as common as the 'wife-manager' pattern, which had previously been dominant. The numbers of cases do not allow true statistical analysis, but it is clear that there was a significant increase in the egalitarian type of money management by the fourth generation. This corresponds to other aspects of fourth generation conjugal relations that suggest more gender equality in terms of housework and childcare arrangements (see Chapters 9 and 10).

Moreover, it was not only that the egalitarian pattern was more common. The content of spending was also changing from patrilineal choices towards egalitarian ones. By the 1990s, both third and fourth generation wives with independent incomes gave money to their natal family without the need to consult their husbands. In the

fourth generation this was almost a norm, so that most husbands took no offense.

Examples of the husband acting as both patriarch and financial manager became rare. Only two cases were found. However, their existence suggests that male authority and domination had not completely disappeared. The following case demonstrates some resurgence of patriarchal responsibility, emerging out of the wife's insecurity about her employment.

> 'When I was earning, he spent his money and I spent my money. When we went out together, he bought things for children and I also did that when I was alone with children. I wouldn't care who spent more or what. But, when I got married, I had already made arrangements with my husband that he should give me NT 10,000 dollars each month.[137] One of my previous classmates told me to do so. She told me to ask for a 'family fund' from my husband, just in case I lost my job one day. If you only start to ask money from him then, it will become a burden for him. So, I did. It was reasonable. He knew that I spent money for the family.'

This case shows the re-emergence of 'patriarchal arrangements' from an egalitarian type. At a superficial level, the couple spent money spontaneously and did not care about whom spent more on the family. However, underlying this arrangement was the wife's sense of insecurity, which led her to ask the husband to contribute to the household expenditure. This intriguing case might serve to illustrate the increasing insecurity of fourth generation women in the labour market and their attempts to consolidate their economic position. It also suggests that the more confident a woman felt about her own income, the less she would attempt to control her husband's money and vice versa.

Did Women's Employment Enhance Her Status in the Family?

Did women's employment enhance her status in the family? This was the question most frequently asked by researchers (Chuang, 1986; Tsui, 1987; Yi, et al 2000). Most gave a positive answer but my comparisons between colonial and post-war generations suggest a complicated picture reflecting different relations between couples and family

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[137] NT 10,000 roughly equals to 200 pounds sterling.

structures. The most positive change was the increase in the egalitarian type of management, which not only related to the wife's employment but also the increasing number of couples married after romantic courtship. The intensified emotional content of conjugal relations certainly promoted a co-management pattern between couples corresponding to their dual-earning working patterns. However, beyond this, the contribution of women's employment to her family status in a conjugal family was limited.

In colonial times, women in conjugal family did not need to engage in full time employment to gain access to family resources. This pattern persisted in the post-war generations. Women's employment contributed only in that they had additional independent incomes to spare (even if secretively). It did not guarantee that the husband would not attempt to exercise his final authority as the patriarch, as also found by Yi et al. (2000). Only when the family was affluent and the husband did not intervene (which could happen in colonial and industrial families) did the wife benefit from taking charge of the money.

However, women's employment benefited daughters-in-law in complex families a great deal. In previous generations, daughters-in-law had no direct access to family economy and relied on private money. Moreover, their working opportunities were constrained by domestic responsibilities. Third generation daughters-in-law were much more likely to have direct access to family money when they earned. In other words, they were no longer subordinate to generational hierarchy and might even enjoy a more privileged position than a non-working mother-in-law.[138]

Did women's employment outside the home enhance their status in the family? This question cannot be answered in simple terms. Through employment, women gained direct access to market economy. However, even control of the money did not guarantee full autonomy. The importance of financial arrangements in supporting

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[138] See Chapter 10 for a more detailed discussion.

women's position in the family still depended a great deal on negotiation between couples, the authority of the husband, the economic standing of the family and finally, the groups in the past with which comparisons are being drawn

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated production and resource distribution in families of the third and fourth generations. After the 1970s, a significant number of women engaged in new middle class employment and did not quit jobs on marriage. Increasingly, the distribution of resources in conjugal and complex households shows no significant difference. Over time, a more egalitarian type of money management seemed to be increasing in parallel to the strengthening of conjugal ties. It seems that issues of resource distribution were less critical for post-war women in all family structures because if they worked, they usually had access to money. There was more variation in the ability of wives to make or influence important family decisions. Their economic power still depended a great deal on the economic standing of the family as a whole and on the relationship between the couple. Compared to women in complex families of colonial times, employed daughters-in-law enjoyed higher status. However, the status of the women in conjugal families, except those with egalitarian types of money management, did not differ radically from previous generations. Having addressed issues about production and resource distribution between couples of the post-war generations, the next two chapters investigate the reproduction arrangements in conjugal (Chapter 9) and complex (Chapter 10) families respectively.

Chapter 9 Changing Family Relations in Conjugal Families, 1970-1999

In Chapter 6, I have demonstrated that *before* industrialisation, wives negotiated their domestic responsibilities by employing live-in maids or bargained with their husbands on the basis of romantic love relations. How was the reproductive work of conjugal families organised *after* industrialization? How did dual-career conjugal families in industrial times cope with the separation of home and work? What kind of gender identities and ideologies were embedded in these arrangements? Would class privileges or gender hierarchy be maintained in conjugal families? Were there significant generational differences between women of the 1970s and the 1990s?

This chapter focuses on the organisation of reproductive work in conjugal families in the 1970s and the 1990s and explores the transformation of patriarchal kinship relations after industrialisation. The first two parts of this chapter look at housework and childcare arrangements of third and fourth generation conjugal families. The third section identifies transformations in reproductive work in conjugal families since the 1970s and investigates the underlying mechanisms shaping them. My analysis suggests the interplay of patriarchy, state ideology and economic exchange relations might account for the changing gender and generational relations observed from conjugal families after industrialisation.

Dutiful Wives of 1970s Nuclear Families

The conjugal family in the 1970s differed from that of previous generations. Owing to the migration and urbanisation that occurred drastically in the 1960s, the majority of

third generation informants lived in conjugal families in Taipei, keeping a good distance from their husband's natal family in the countryside.[139] The size of conjugal family also declined significantly, because of migration and the declining birth rate.[140] Furthermore, industrialisation has produced a significant number of *dual-career* nuclear families in Taiwan.[141] Meanwhile, thanks to the major impact of newly available modern conveniences, in the 1970s most urban households had running water, gas hobs and washing machines, which had become a common part of dowries for middle class families.

How was domestic work carried out in this new form of conjugal families in the 1970s? The majority of the wives claimed that they did all the housework, looked after their children, while working full-time. Did these claims reflect social realities? What gender identities were embedded in them? What did their life stories say about these arrangements? In this section, I look at housework first and then ways of arranging childcare.

As for the second generation informants, the majority of third generation interviewees had no experience of cooking and doing housework as daughters. Only two daughters of farmers had helped their mothers occasionally during childhood. However, unlike the many second generation working women in conjugal families, who negotiated cooking roles with their husband and identified themselves as 'unable to cook' in 1999, it seems that the majority of third generation informants believed in a clear-cut gender division of labour that 'men took charge outside, women inside (the home)' (男主外女主內). Interestingly, behind such a conservative gender division of

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[139] Fourteen out of twenty cases lived in conjugal families after a marriage ceremony held in the countryside.

[140] Sponsored by United States, the KMT government started to implement a family planning programme in the 1960s. The fertility rate dropped dramatically from 1965 to 1969 (Sun and Soong 1979). Since third generation women married in 1970s, we can see the number of children in each conjugal family dropped drastically. Third generation women usually had two, no more than three children, while in previous generations it was often the case for a woman to have 6-8 children. This decreased the stress of women arranging childcare and increased the possibility of women staying in full-time employment.

[141] See the previous Chapter.

labour, most of these women had learned cooking from their husbands.

There is a stereotype in Taiwan that Mainlander men do housework while Taiwanese men do not. My empirical data did not support this saying. Except one Mainlander, all of the husbands were Taiwanese and cooked or taught their wife cooking (3-02, 3-03, 3-06, 3-09, 3-16). These Taiwanese husbands had learned to cook while they studied or worked away from home. After they taught their wives, they remained free from cooking responsibilities. Along with the majority of the third generation husbands, they cooked only out of necessity and regarded cooking as a woman's work. It seems that learning to cook in itself had not lead to a transformation in ideas.

Of the two cases where the wife claimed her husband cooked, the husbands only did so at the beginning of the marriage. Ethnic division did not seem to account for the husband's engagement in cooking, for one was a Mainlander and the other Taiwanese. Instead, these two cases shared one common feature: the couple married through romantic courtship. I am not saying that all romantic courtships resulted in a husband's involvement in housework, but it seems that some husbands perceived cooking for their wives as a way to demonstrate their love. The following case serves to illustrate this point.

Mei-fen and her husband met at university. Following a romantic courtship, they got married after graduation and lived as a conjugal household in Taipei. He enjoyed doing housework and had cooked while he studied away from home. As if he was trying to spoil her with overflowing love, at first he did all the housework, preparing good food and washing dishes and clothes. He enjoyed this if Mei-fen was around. When Mei-fen was breast-feeding their first baby, he had been envious of her and wanted to do that himself. Mei-fen was moved by his engagement and pondered, 'How come he did so many things? What did I do as a wife?' She decided to take over all these responsibilities and performed the role of a 'good' wife and mother. Mei-fen

learned her ideal gender roles from novels.[142] She said,

> 'I read too many novels. I tried to be a good mother. I took my children in pushchairs to the park. I scrubbed the floor everyday. I prepared hot soups for my husband whenever he came back home. We shared all our money, so we left it in a common place at home. It wasn't until a thief stole it that I realized that it was not safe to leave money at home. Then, we saved it in the bank, with individual accounts'.[143]

As Mei-fen had taken this ideal nuclear family as her priority, she negotiated for a part-time job. She did not think of giving up her performance as an ideal mother and housewife until her work later required her full-time engagement. Her husband protested against this change, as he had become accustomed to her service.

Even though the majority of third generation wives regarded cooking and maintaining the household as a *woman's* responsibilities, in the life stories there were still some respondents who reported that their husbands helped in cleaning, washing and sometimes cooking (3-03, 3-05, 3-14, 3-16). In some cases, when the wife took a night shift or worked extra-time, the husband took care of children (3-09, 3-04). I attribute these husbands' participation to the needs of the conjugal family structure that lacked of other (female) human resources to help during the wife's absence. In other words, rather than sharing household tasks, the husband only 'helped' as requested or in the wife's absence. The husband's participation did not challenge the underlying gendered presumptions that divided husbands and wives responsibilities. Even a husband who believed that taking care of children was the wife's responsibility might still lend a hand when the household needed him *and* when he had spare time.

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[142] The 1960s literature was usually understood as a phase of 'modernist' and 'westernisation', when American culture entered the imagination of educated young people. Most work in this period stressed the internal psychology of the individual, written in a timeless and inward-looking style, presenting a lifestyle without any references to political problems or local contexts. Nevertheless, Qiu criticised such generalisations and provided a more subtle interpretation which saw modernist writing as a local appropriation of western concepts (G.F. Qiu, 2001:27-30). I agree with Qiu's criticism but cannot deny that modernisation and westernisation were still the dominant discourses in the 1960s. Similarly, the domesticity and gender division of labour described here shall also be regarded as the agent's appropriation of these western 'modernist' values.

[143] There is no facility for a joint bank account in Taiwan.

Several women trained their children, especially daughters, to do housework. However, this training was gender biased and usually not very effective (3-03, 3-09). One daughter protected against such discrimination. 'Mum, why didn't you ask my brother to do it?' (3-03) It must be reminded that in the past, unwed daughters were expected to learn to make clothes but *not* to do housework in preparation for marriage and these third generation women themselves were rarely expected to do housework during childhood. Nevertheless, in the 1970s these wives seemed to believe in an universal womanhood, promoted by the KMT 'cult of domesticity,' that women were women because of their biological sex. The genealogical idea that daughters did no housework was changing, as was the meaning of being a woman. Instead of acting according to the expectations of patriarchal genealogy, in these new middle class conjugal families without maids, many wives had started to involve daughters in housework.

Even so, the majority of the wives still carried all the domestic work alone without any help from the husband or daughters. Although housework has been simplified to a great extent and washing machines have become available, a wife who tried to combine full-time work, childcare and housework would still find herself working 'double shifts.' Many women with this experience claimed that they had been dealing with housework in a very scientific and efficient way so that they could guarantee the quality of food and save time for other tasks, such as preparing for work (3-05, 3-07) or caring for a sick mother (3-01). Some women, such as Shen Rong-fen, who was a nurse and worked for night shifts, tended to lower their expectations of 'tidiness' because it was hard for them to keep up with all the housework requirements. Nevertheless, it was not easy to keep 'untidy' either. For example, Rong-fen talked to me about her house,

> 'My daughter is lazy and so am I. My house is really messy, like a rubbish dump. My husband wouldn't ask me to tidy it up. He was OK with it, but I was not. I would ask him to tidy up or just cleaned his things away. Then, he became very annoyed. But, if he messed up the house, I would feel very angry. We had rowed many times. In the end, I just gave up. I lowered my criteria or turned a blind eye to it. As long as we have a place to cook and to eat, that's OK.'... 'When his friends come, I always feel very embarrassed

about it. Probably they are thinking that this housewife is really untidy so that the house is this messy' (3-09).

It seems to me that the definition of 'tidiness' and the desire to keep the house tidy involved subtle power relations between husband and wife, imbued with a moral discourse. Even though she wanted to, Shen failed to fulfil the social expectation of her as a good wife, who would keep the house tidy. Yet within moral discourses that associated tidiness with the wife's personality, the wife, not the husband, was censured for the untidiness of the household. Shen was caught between her husband's power and social sanctions. Unable to challenge her husband or the social sanction, Shen was subjugated to the moral discourse and reproduced the power relation in her interpretation. 'My daughter is lazy, and so am I'. Social discourses had been successfully implemented in Shen's mind. As a result, she expressed her anxiety in gendered terms to blame both herself and her daughter.

Given such tough situations for wives who were both working and responsible for domestic work, surprisingly, only two informants employed maids. In Chapter 6, I mentioned the difficulties of hiring maids in the 1950s, however, in the 1970s, it became very rare for even a conjugal family to employ maids. Probably due to industrialisation and mass education, young female workers were extremely scare in the 1970s.[144] The question here is, at a time of scarcity, who would choose to employ maids and why? At first, I suspected that employing maids might relate to a previous gentry lifestyle and that women from wealthy backgrounds would continue to employ maids. However, no evidence supports this speculation. Instead, wives who employed maids put high value on their quality of life and did not mind using money to secure it. Hu, a high school teacher, explained,

> 'I told my husband, "We shall share it [the housework] if you regard this as our home. But, if you don't want to do anything, I won't tire myself out

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[144] The expansion of mass education was listed as one important mechanism that absorbed young female labour and replaced maids, according an experienced housework service broker (see C.J. Lin, 2000). However, referring to England experiences (Glucksmann, 1990), I wonder industrialisation could have been another possible factor that caused the decline of live-in maids.

either.' It shouldn't be my sole responsibility. I always have the idea that if you can pay for it and have a better quality of life, why not? I do not go shopping, so I do not spend much money on myself. I just spare some of my money to hire someone to do things.'

Hu was the *only* third generation informant to hold an egalitarian view towards the gender division of labour in the family and expected her husband to take care of their family. When the husband failed to do so, she chose to 'buy' equality: employing a maid. The maid ensured her equal opportunity with her husband to enjoy leisure activities such as reading and dancing after working full-time as a schoolteacher. To employ maids in the 1970s, a family might need to earn above the average income. I did not know how much Hu paid to employ a maid in the 1970s. However, in the mid-1990s, she spent half her salary on the maid, who went to clean her house daily. Hu's husband worked as a judge and his salary could cover other family expenses easily. The other wife who employed maids earned a lot, owning her own pharmacy.

To sum up, most of the third generation women were the main bearers of housework, even if they worked full-time outside the home. They coped with the stresses of combining home and work by seeking assistance from husband and children, simplifying housework, reducing expectations of tidiness, or employing maids with a good portion of their salaries. Under such difficult circumstances, how did they attend to their young children?

Surprisingly, half of the third generation informants claimed that they themselves were the primary carer. Alternatively, the husband's kin (six mothers-in-law and four sisters-in-law), paid nanny (seven), the informant's own mother (four) and a live-in maid (one) attended babies.[145] What does this information mean? The high frequency of 'self-care' resulted from the three mothers who quit full-time jobs to take care of children, one mother taking a career break, one part-time worker and several women

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[145] Since many informants combined several methods, sometimes for different children, the total frequency was more than 20.

looking after children after work in combination with other methods.[146] When considering the fact that working mothers of colonial times unapologetically employed live-in maids to look after their babies, I suspect that the 'cult of domesticity' might have contributed to so many claims of 'self-care,' suggesting the symbolic importance of the mother attending to children by herself, even if she was working full-time.

Secondly, male kinship played a significant role in childcare arrangements. The high involvement of husband's kin (both husband's mother and husband's sister) across geographical space implies that patrilineal principle underlay childcare arrangements in the 1970s. In general, the husband's relatives, even living at a distance, appeared to be more trustworthy to the young couple than unknown nannies nearby. For example, upon hearing that her husband's sister wanted to take care of the baby, even at a distance in Tai-nan, Wen Li-fen was quite happy: 'That's the best situation, if the relative wanted to take care of him.' In another case, Wong Mei-fen and her husband married and formed a conjugal family in Taipei. When they had the first baby, the husband objected to farming the baby out to a nanny and mobilised his mother in Nan-to to take care of the child. However, Mei-fen did not want to be far away from the baby so a solution was found: the baby would spend two weeks in Nan-to with Mei-fen's mother-in-law. After two weeks, the young couple went down to Nan-to to pick up the baby as well as the mother-in-law to stay in Taipei for two weeks. Then the cycle was repeated, so that all of them travelled every two weeks. The mother-in-law's participation in childcare showed the dramatic decline in the generation hierarchy that will be addressed later in this chapter. The disadvantage of relying on husband's kin was the distance. As many of these patrilineal kin (3-08, 3-09, 3-16) lived far away, after years of being apart the mother could feel that it was difficult for her to accept the way the child had become and the child might also find it difficult to adjust to his birth family.

Compared with relying on husband's kin, paying for a nanny brought the

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[146] For example, when Jiang farmed her baby out to a nanny in the daytime and took it back in the evening, she reported that both the nanny and she herself attended the baby.

advantage that the baby could still be close to its mother. This arrangement suited those mothers who wished to care for the baby in person but was unable to do so due to paid employment. Life stories revealed that there were good nannies who loved the children as their own and kept the working mother worry free (3-07, 3-19), but an unqualified nanny and unstable situation could bring great trouble both for the baby and the mother (3-09, 3-14). Due to poor care from the nanny, Wang Min-fen's baby suffered from pneumonia almost two months after its birth. To take care of her, Wang had to ask for leave from work to attend hospitals and yet she was blamed by both her friends and the daughter (after she grew up), for being unable to provide a safe and steady environment for the child. The worries of finding a good nanny and distrust of 'outsiders'[147] had kept some informants at home as full-time housewives (3-13).

Mobilising the wife's kin was the least usual solution to childcare in the 1970s. Patrilineal discourse was influential here. Daughters are defined as outsiders by patrilineage. Since children of daughters do not bear their surnames but the father's, it was more acceptable to bring up a son's children than a daughter's. Therefore, asking the wife's mother to help out with childcare did not feel so appropriate for many of the informants' husbands, mothers and mothers-in-law, and even the informants themselves. For example, Yan Ru-fen's husband was often away from home for business and was not close to his family. In contrast, Ru-fen was in charge of all the family affairs of her natal family and her conjugal family. Although Ru-fen's mother had cared for her first two children, the third had a nanny. She explained why,

> 'When it came to the third baby, my mother's health was not very good. Also, my younger brother got married so that I felt uncomfortable to trouble her again' (3-11).

It seems that in the 1970s, the discourse of patrilineal family was still dominant. Using natal kin only became possible when others failed i.e. when the husband was

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[147] See Hill Gates' (1981) analysis of the distrust of 'outsiders' in a repressive political climate under the KMT.

absent from family affairs or when the husband's kin was not available. Even so, the married daughter still felt the need to take patrilineage into consideration and restricted herself from asking her mother for childcare when her mother was supposed to be preoccupied by her own patrilineage.

To conclude, although each childcare arrangement was the result of a variety of complex considerations in the 1970s, it was primarily performed by the working-mother with a combination of other methods. Among them, patrilineal kinship relations, even at a distance, were welcomed and often used. Paid nannies and matrilineal kin were also used, but with some suspicion and limitations. Together with the housework, the majority of third generation working wives of conjugal families had also been responsible for most of the reproductive work in the 1970s.

Towards Gender Equality? Resourceful Wives of the 1990s

In the 1990s, the conjugal family was shaped by migration together with an equally important factor of daughters-in-law struggling to live away from patrilocal families and to reside independently as a conjugal family. How was the reproductive work carried out in these families? This section looks at housework first and then arrangements for childcare among the fourth generation informants.

Compared with previous generations, there were three significant changes in the arrangement of housework. Firstly, the practical content of housework was even more simplified than it had been in the 1970s and dining out provided a solution. Most of my informants who not yet had children answered my question about domestic arrangements in one sentence.

'He cleans the floor and I wash the clothes. We usually dine out.'(4-16)

'I never clean the house. We just dine out.' (4-02)

For the fourth generation young couple, there was less emphasis on the family cult of 'eating at home' than for previous generations. Dining out was speedy and affordable

solution for a couple with no children and it seems that married couples simply continued the most common lifestyle of unwed urban dwellers.

Secondly, in the dual-career conjugal household, the wife no longer perceived their husband's neglect of domestic chores as something 'natural'. Five out of fifteen couples claimed to share simplified housework equally. *More and more* wives believed that the husband and wife should share housework and were 'training' their husbands to do it (six cases), even if many of them had married with the idea that a wife should do all domestic labour (seven cases). 'Perhaps', one of my informants explained, 'I came from a traditional family. My mum did all the housework.' Nevertheless, things started to change after the wife found out that she worked as much as her husband did and yet still had to do a 'double shift' to manage housework. If the rationale for the third generation was 'housework is a woman's responsibility', the fourth generation would probably think, 'He works, so do I. Why do I have to do more housework than he does?'

In a focus group, Li Ren-ping complained about her husband being unwilling to contribute to the family as much as she did.

> 'The man only plays with the baby. It is still me who washes the baby's clothes and bottles. Sometimes when I clean the house, I would rather not see him there. It makes me angry for he is just sitting there and reading newspapers.'

Guan Xin-ping couldn't agree more,

> 'It felt so unfair. After I coaxed the baby to sleep, even if it was late, around eleven in the evening, I would still try to cook porridge and clean the house. If it was him who did this job, he would just go to sleep with the baby. Once I rang him up and found out that both of them were sleeping.'

Thirdly, men in the fourth generation seem *less* constrained by ideologies of 'cooking' as a woman's job and the wife's kin was very likely to be mobilised to help. Hong Suei-ping's husband had left home when he was sixteen. He studied, worked and got married in Taipei. Talking about their domestic arrangements, Suei-Ping laughed,

> 'It is usually my husband who does the housework. When I go out to study at the weekend, he is usually at home. Then, he mops the floor and cleans the table. Clothes are washed separately. We each wash our own after bathing.

> Only large items go in the washing machine. Since our marriage [two years ago], I have not cooked once because I have attended night classes. Most of the time, he cooks and we eat at home. At other times, we eat at my mum's house.'

Hong's husband was the *only* man (out of the twenty) who did more housework than his wife. In fact, this arrangement resulted from Suei-ping's strategic choice of partner.

> 'He could take care of himself. But, some boys are not able to… That was one of the reasons why I liked him at the first place.'

Nevertheless, it is somehow problematic to say that fourth generation couples have achieved 'egalitarian' relationships on the basis of the simplified housework mentioned above. Usually, after the birth of the child, the wife's kin was heavily drawn upon to cope with the shortage of human resources in dual-career conjugal families. Let's turn to the ways of living in conjugal families with children.

Dai Wen-ping married her husband and lived independently at northern Taipei. After she got pregnant, her mother, who lived in southern Taipei, wanted to help her out and asked her to move to near to her. During the pregnancy, Dai stayed in her mother's house most of the time. After the birth of the child, Dai's mother, who never took up any formal employment, looked after the baby. Since then, Dai started to work. After work, they couple usually ate dinner at her mother's house and then went back to their home, opposite to her mother's.

Guan Xin-ping and her sister both lived in Taipei while their parents were in Taichun. They helped each other out with their babies. Xin-ping worked in the bank and got off work usually around 7 pm or 8pm. Her sister was a civil servant and regularly got off work at 5pm. Thus, her sister would pick up Xin-ping's child from the nanny for her and cook dinner for the two households. After dinner, Xin-ping washed the dishes and went home with her husband and child.

These were *not* unusual cases among conjugal families in the 1990s. In eight out of sixteen childcare arrangements, the wife's mother or sister was involved. Although these cases often happened when the husband's parents were not in Taipei, there were

many young women striving to reach such practical arrangements.

Zhao Mei-ping married into a grand bourgeois stem family. She cooked two meals for her parents-in-law daily, although she worked as a journalist. Zhao had planned to move out to form a conjugal family but could not find an opportunity. Her pregnancy gave a good excuse. As her mother-in-law was too old to care for Mei-ping during her pregnancy, Mei-ping stayed at her mother's house until the birth. After the birth, she continued to work full time as a journalist and her own mother took care of the baby for a year. During this time, Mei-ping persuaded her husband to buy a house near her mother so that her child would get proper care from her mother. After Mei-ping eventually grasped the chance to move out, she did not cook anymore. In 1999, they ate at her mother's and returned home with two children, one of whom was put in the care of a nanny and the other attended daytime kindergarten.

It seems that in the 1990s having the children looked after by the mother-in-law became an unpopular solution. Yan-ping was the only informant who had her baby boy cared for by her mother-in-law, at the request of the mother-in-law herself. Nevertheless, it must be realised that patrilocality and patrilineage was still an influential discourse. Many daughters-in-law resided with their parents-in-law in stem families and thus had children cared for by the mother-in-law (Chapter 10). Moreover, both married daughters and their mothers still negotiated childcare arrangements in the context of patriarchal principles. For example, Hong's mother was very enthusiastic about her daughter's baby. Right after the marriage, when Hong was reluctant to have a baby so soon, she pushed Hong to be pregnant as soon as possible so that she could look after it *before* Hong's brothers got married. Hong duly did so. Her mother took care of the baby while she worked.

Paid nannies were most likely employed by couples without kin in Taipei or utilised as a complementary method to the wife's kin support. However, women of the fourth generation were more at ease with farming babies out than the third generation had been. Moreover, there were increased numbers of child minding services that took

care of the baby on weekdays and the parents only took it back at the weekend. Although there were still certain social pressures scrutinising mothers (rather than fathers) to keep watch over the baby's well-being,[148] these mothers also believed that they need not to be with the baby all the time. They would argue, for the sake of the baby, it was better for them to have proper care than to be with the mother constantly. Gu Fong-ping, who worked from home for her business, farmed her baby out for weekdays and took it back over the weekend, explained her thinking,

> 'We both feel that it is better for the baby to stay with the nanny. Her life there is much more stable and safe than staying with us. I might stay out all day for business. Sometimes, I work late until two or three in the morning. I don't have time to keep her company. She is only an infant now. When she grows older, I can take her with me around and about. That will be fine for both of us. But now she needs sleep and rest.'

The emphasis on performing the role of a good mother, which had been stressed so much by the KMT 'cult of domesticity', seemed to be declining in the 1990s. Most fourth generation young mothers were less likely to act like the third generation mothers. They were likely to give greater importance to their career and to leave babies with nannies for longer periods. The changing perceptions of the motherhood perhaps reflected some loosening of the 'cult of domesticity' in the 1990s.

Employing maids remained rare. There was only one informant employing a live-in foreign maid in 1998 to take care of children and housework. Probably, this option became possible due to the high incomes enjoyed by the dual-career lawyer family. However, constrained by strict legal regulations, this employment only lasted for one and a half years. In another case, the wife of a dual-career civil servant family thought about the possibility but met objections from her husband, who thought it strange to have an 'outsider' living in their house.

To sum up, in the 1990s, gender equality in domestic labour was most likely to be achieved among conjugal couples with no children, especially when they dined out

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[148] At a group interview, young women reminded each other to keep an eye on their baby's health, such as 'I worried about your baby. Have you paid enough attention to this and that?'

regularly. Maybe the socialisation of catering has contributed to the realisation of the gender equality between couples. Although the majority of women still married with conservative ideas about gender division of labour, their active engagement at work gradually made them feel that it was unfair for the wife to bear domestic responsibilities alone. Fourth generation wives exercised their powers in conjugal relations to redefine gendered roles between husband and wife.

There were an increasing number of women who utilised matrilineal kin to help with childcare; patrilineal kin became unfavourite choices. Sisters with different workloads disregarded the patrilocal principle and helped each other to solve the problems of cooking and childcare that faced all dual-career conjugal families. When the wife's kin was incorporated into domestic arrangements, the husband was again free from any major responsibility within the conjugal family. On the other hand, by leaning on their own kin and distancing themselves from husband's kin, young wives of the fourth generation challenged the patriarchal discourse that perceived married daughters as spilled water. The willingness of the mothers to invest in daughters' children in the 1990s seems to suggest that the value of daughters had increased significantly, a rather unexpected development under patriarchy.

Transformations of Patriarchal Kinship Relations

The changing organisation of reproductive work from the 1970s to the 1990s suggests that three trends were taking place after industrialization. Firstly, the class privilege of employing live-in maids gradually weakened with the disappearance of cheap young maids. The reproductive work that was mainly carried out *in* the family before industrialisation was increasingly socialised, performed by people *outside* the family. Secondly, ideologically, the gender division of labour in housework shifted from a divided 'men took charge outside, women inside (the home)' towards egalitarian types of arrangements within three decades. More mothers felt comfortable to leave children for longer periods with a nanny. Thirdly, for many families, children were still looked

after by kin. In the 1970s, mothers-in-law who had formerly been privileged in generational hierarchy got involved in childcare. In the 1990s, mothers of married daughters took over the role. The engagement of matrilineal kin replaced patrilineal kin.

What mechanisms can explain these developments? Perhaps industrialisation, state ideology and the development of capitalism can elucidate the first two trends. However, the third movement of patrilineal towards matrilineal kin in child minding appears unexpected in the context of patriarchal kinship relations. What happened? What can account for the dramatic shift from mothers-in-law to mothers taking care of their grandchildren? How did industrialisation undermine the generational hierarchy of patriarchy? To answer this question, let's start from existing interpretations of rural families.

By studying changing family relations in 1970 rural Taiwan, Rita Gallin identified a new division between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. The daughter-in-law usually worked in the factory, while the mother-in-law stayed on the farm and took care of her grand children. Three changes might have contributed to diminish the prerogatives of the traditional mother-in-law. Firstly, since the young daughter-in-law went out to work in the factory, the mother-in-law could no longer rely on the daughter-in-law to reduce her workload. Secondly, the daughter-in-law who was engaged in paid work had more economic resources than the mother-in-law. Thirdly, the daughter-in-law who married through mediated arranged marriage might be in a romantic love relationship with her husband. Gallin argued that rural daughters-in-law capitalised on these disparities to negotiate a new relationship with their mother-in-law (1984). This suggests that sexual attraction between young couples and the opportunities for work outside the home and earning independent incomes might have empowered the rural daughter-in-law of the 1970s to challenge the generational hierarchy of patriarchy. Nevertheless, Gallin illustrated that co-residence still gave mothers-in-law more privileges than living apart from the daughters-in-law. No matter

how powerful the daughter-in-law became, when they lived together, she could not escape from the responsibility of taking care of the mother-in-law in old age, even if she did not subordinate herself to the mother-in-law's authority in 'traditional' sense (1984).

In comparison, my third generation informants, who were new middle class, educated and lived in conjugal families, were even more privileged than their rural counterparts. Urban wives were more likely to be in romantic relationship with their husband than rural daughters-in-law. They worked and enjoyed higher socio- economic status than their mothers-in-law, most of whom were peasant wives. Moreover, they lived in a conjugal household in the city. It was unlikely that these educated new middle class couples would return home to look after *his* mother in her old age. Constrained by geographical distance and a lack of economic power over the young, the mother-in-law had absolutely no way of exercising her privileges. Nursing the grandchildren for the young couple seemed to become the only solution of the powerless mother-in-law to maintain the ties between her 'modernised and educated' sons and daughters-in-law in the city. Here, I am suggesting that mothers-in-law who enjoyed a certain degree of power would probably stay with their land to be served by the younger generation. Only those who felt insecure about their old age would try very hard to affiliate to married young couples in the city. Such mother might have to make the move to visit them or to look after their children to prove her usefulness. The willingness to go through such upheavals suggests serious anxiety about her future.[149]

Probably because daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law were positioned differently in patriarchal kinship structures, the anxiety of the rural mother-in-law was not at all addressed in the words of my informants when talking about childcare arrangements. Moreover, they rarely mentioned the desperation of the mother-in-law seeking for economic security when taking up responsibility for childcare. The

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[149] For more detailed descriptions of the feelings of rural elderly women in the 1990s, please refer to the group interviews conducted by Hu and Chou (1997).

following statement might be unusual in middle class families for its honesty, but it reveals an often unspoken reality.

Q: Who took care of your child?

Wen Li-fen: My husband's sister offered to bring up our child for a year. Then, my mother-in-law came by, saying that she wanted to look after the child. We let her do that...[she recalled more details] we had no money. We had no house, so we needed save money to buy a house. We also needed to pay for childcare. After paying the nanny, we had no money left. Then, my mother-in-law came to ask money from us. I said to her, "We had no money. Also, you did not look after the child. We had no extra money for you"...Then, she wanted to take care of the child. We let her do that.

This case is very revealing. It was not only that those daughters-in-law who earned and lived away from their husband's family could prioritise their 'uterine' family over the survival of the mother-in-law, but also that economic insecurity might underlie many elder women's involvement in childcare. Although from the narratives of my respondents it appeared 'natural' for mothers-in-law to engage in childcare, I must stress that not all older women were eager to take care of their grand children. A contrast must be made with older women who had direct access to the economy through market exchange. None of my second generation informants who worked in the formal economy engaged in time consuming childcare. Even if they 'helped out', they at most kept an eye on the grandchildren after they grew up. They did not engage physically with the infants or full-time child minding, which was just not their business. Why? Let's look at the following case study.

Yu-fen and her husband lived with *her* mother, a middle class widow, with two daughters and no sons, who was working in Taipei in 1999. Yu-fen had insisted on keeping a distance from her husband's kin to maintain her autonomy from the very beginning of her marriage. Jiang had farmed her baby out to a nanny, for she had to work. However, she said she herself loved babies and interpreted this as a form of compensation for not being brought up by her mother. Despite her mother's presence in her family, I was surprised to learn that at a period of transition at work, Jiang decided to have her child cared for by her mother-in-law, rather than her mother for a year. Why?

'I think my mother was not a suitable person to bring up the child,' Jiang said.

At first, I also took Jiang's words for at their face value. Nevertheless, after my analysis, her words became questionable. Perhaps it was her working-mother's autonomy and access to the market economy that made her an 'unsuitable' person to take care of Jiang's child. In contrast, her mother-in-law, whom Jiang had kept at a distance from the beginning of the marriage, was more 'appropriate' because she had never worked outside the home. Across all the life stories, there seems to be a close connection between the act of elder women taking care of grandchildren and their lack of access to the market economy. Moreover, my research on elderly domestics of 1990s Taipei also confirms this argument. Instead of going to their children's family, taking care of their grandchildren for limited or no payment, these elderly women chose to work as domestics for cash even if they had to subjugate to the class hierarchy at workplace (C.J. Lin, 2000). That is to say, in the 1990s, if the elderly women could choose, they would probably prefer to work for themselves in the market than work for nothing in the family.[150] Child minding work of the non-working mother-in-law for the younger generation should therefore be interpreted as an economic exchange relation, disguised in the name of kinship 'helping out'.

By contrasting elder women who worked and who did not work in the labour market and their different levels of responsibility for child minding, I am proposing that women can develop two sets of economic exchange relations. One is through market exchange and the other through kinship exchange. The economic gain of the former is pretty straightforward, however, the latter has not yet been fully explored in existing literature. Economic exchanges in kinship relations work differently from market exchanges. In market exchanges, one gains payment for one's labour soon after the work is done. Patriarchal kinship exchange works differently. The *patrilineal* intergenerational exchange relations operated as follows: the sons appreciated the

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[150] I am not suggesting that all elderly women would like to work as domestics outside the home. My argument here is specifically about these elderly domestics who had long working history. They found it more attractive to earn wages through market exchange than kinship exchange.

efforts of the parents to bring them up and when they became mature, they cared for the parents' old age in return. Nevertheless, the logic might be complicated in the industrial era by the fact that sons and their wives were spending more and more money on their conjugal families. The young couple usually had a tight budget at the childrearing stage while they were expected to pay a small amount of 'feedback funds' to his parents. This payment could be expected to increase over time as the young couple might earn more at work and spend less on rearing children. Therefore, by 'doing favours' to the young ones, the elder woman would thereafter expect to be well-treated by the younger generation, securing an old age with dignity. However, it also meant that in patrilineal exchanges, it might well take two decades before the elder woman eventually enjoyed the 'feedback' from her sons. That is to say, to secure her old age, an elder woman who had no direct access to the market economy might offer services for a decade or two to be supported properly in economic terms by the younger generation, assuming that they continued to practice 'filial piety'. Under patrilineal kinship exchange, the elder woman looked for long-term feedback than short-term incomes.[151]

The economic exchange made by non-working elder women leads to the argument that after industrialisation declining generation hierarchy has contributed to shape new exchange relations between younger working women and non-working mothers-in-law. At a superficial level, non-working mothers-in-law taking care of their grandchildren appeared 'reciprocal', for it saved the childcare expenses of the young couple and secured the old age of the mothers-in-law. However, for whom it was 'reciprocal'? Who was forced into such 'reciprocal' exchange relations? It was clear that such arrangement benefited the young couples. In contrast, the mother-in-law who had no

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[151] By looking into the economic flows between generations, Greenhalgh (1985) also made similar points on differentiated intergenerational economic exchanges between sons and daughters and their parents. Greenhalgh and my arguments challenge home economist Becker's family altruism theory. Becker (1993) argued that people are selfish in the labour market but altruism in the family because altruism is an effective way to accumulate family resources. He fails to take into consideration the dynamics of patriarchal families, and thus creates a tautology between the market and inequality in the family. Who would sacrifice for whom? Why? Were these mothers-in-law really so altruism? My following analysis shows that the answer is no.

access to the market economy was forced to enter such exchange relations. Why should she, take care of her grandchildren having spent all her life working in the family in order to enter a comfortable old age? Just as the handmaids of the colonial period should be understood as suffering from exploitation by upper class households in the name of patriarchal benevolence, in industrial times, elder women without access to the market economy came to be exploited by the wage-earning sons in the name of reciprocity between generations.

How should we interpret the mothers' involvement in child minding work for married daughters? Perhaps an economic incentive also underlay the matrilineal kin's engagement in childcare in the 1990s. However, the exchanges between mothers and daughters operated in a slightly different way. According to patrilineage, it was not possible for the daughter to be responsible for her parents' old age and the mother was not expected to care for her daughter's children, who had another surname. Nevertheless, in industrial middle class families, married daughters tended to lean on mothers to contest patrilocality. Since neither mothers nor daughters took the mother's offer of childcare for granted under patrilineage, a short-term economic exchange was formed between mothers and married daughters. Daughters felt obliged to pay their mothers for child minding, and mothers were more likely to benefit immediately rather than waiting two decades to receive 'feedback funds' for her labour. Moreover, since mothers were not legitimate carers of daughters' children and did not expect old age security from married daughters, they might find it easier to turn down requests if they found it hard to cope with child minding work. It thus appears to be even more 'reciprocal' than mother-son exchange relations. A new form of mother-daughter exchange relations under patriarchy was being shaped, particularly among new middle class families where married daughters earned and controlled their own incomes.[152]

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[152] Native feminist researchers have pointed out similar trends where middle class married daughters contributed more and more money to their natal families and took more responsibility for their parents' old age. Both of them took a positive stance to argue that married daughters were no longer spilled waters in contemporary Taiwan (Tsui, 1987; Y.H. Hu, 1995).

Although some feminist researchers were optimistic about this change (Tsui, 1987; Y.H. Hu, 1995), I think the economic exchange behind such arrangements should not be ignored. After all, if kin should be more reliable than outsiders, as most of the informants claimed, would young couples pay more than market price to ask their mothers to care for the baby? There was no evidence of this in any of my cases.

To sum up, after industrialisation, elderly women who had no direct access to economy were forced to take care of children for the younger generation, as a means to secure a comfortable old age. In contrast, older women who had sufficient funds for old age through the labour market faced no such worries. They had the lowest incentive to take care of their grandchildren. Women's unequal access to the labour market has shaped new forms of economic exchange relations between women of different generations. The difference between non-working mothers/mothers-in-law and working daughters/daughters-in-law has sometimes worked to turn previous generation hierarchy into 'class relations', understood as exchange relations (Glucksmann, 2000:167), which are materialised through childcare arrangements but practiced in the name of kinship 'reciprocity.'

Conclusion

The empirical data on reproductive work in conjugal families suggests that three trends can be identified after industrialization. Firstly, reproductive work was gradually socialised; housework and childcare were most likely to be carried out outside the household. Secondly, after maids disappeared from new middle class families, more and more husbands who had married through romantic love were drawn into housework. Even if the 'cult of domesticity' was influential among the third generation, the gender division of labour, as a set of ideas more than in practice, changed significantly within three decades. Thirdly, elderly kinswomen became heavily involved in child minding work and there was a trend from patrilineal towards matrilineal kin helping in this way.

These changes imply that when class privileges no longer held in the 1970s, gender hierarchy was tightened in conjugal families. Over time, there has been a trend towards gender equality without utilising their class privileges as dual-earning families. Moreover, after the 1970s, a new form of inequality has been created between women of different generations, relating to their unequal access to market exchange. This suggests that after industrialisation, the autonomy of the wives in conjugal families might not be achieved through class privileges but via negotiations with their husbands and, most importantly, declining generational hierarchies.

Chapter 10 Changing Family Relations in Complex Families, 1970-1999

The implication of Chapter 8 and 9 is that the generational hierarchy of patriarchy was in decline after industrialisation and that power relations between working daughters/daughters-in-law and non-working mothers/mothers-in-law were reversed. Is this also the case in complex families? How was reproductive work organised? What were the experiences of the third and fourth generation daughters-in-law in complex families? What can account for changing divisions of labour in complex families after industrialiastion?

This chapter explores the dynamics of complex families through the organisation of reproductive work in the 1970s and the 1990s and asks whether patriarchal genealogy was still the principle determining division of domestic work in these families. By examining the experiences of daughters-in-law and exploring their relations with their parents-in-law, this chapter also considers whether daughters-in-law resisted hierarchies of patriarchy and contested patrilocal practices. The aim of this chapter is to further elaborate on the interplay of patriarchal kinship relations, capitalist economic relations and state ideology in the context of complex families in industrial Taiwan.

Contesting In-law Relations in 1970s Complex Families

Compared with other generations, a very limited number of complex families were

found in the third generation.[153] Among them, only half of the daughters-in-law *entered* their husband's family, the rest had seen their mothers-in-law *follow* their son to live with the young couple.[154] Industrialisation and migration might explain the reduced the numbers of complex families in my research data. In terms of the organisation of reproductive work, there was great diversity in these families. In the following section, I first introduce three stories as the basis of discussion. They are compared and contrasted to the evidence on families under colonialism. Thereafter, I investigate the underlying mechanisms shaping these diverse experiences.

'Good' Daughters-in-law in the 1970s

> Ding Fan-fen married into a joint family in 1975. Before marriage, owing to her prospective father-in-law's fondness for her, he found her a job teaching at a high school near to his family. She continued to work there after her marriage, but now only taught evening classes. She served and helped her mother-in-law and her husband's eldest sister (*da-gu*) who has been a working woman to all her life and has never married. The *da-gu* ran the household and cooked breakfast and dinner for thirteen family members. Ding only helped her out. The family divided soon after the death of Ding's father-in-law. Each *fang* occupied a floor and ate independently, but they all still lived in the same building. In the evening, Ding went to work and her *da-gu* looked after her baby. Ding felt that she had very tense relations with her *da-gu*, whom, in Ding's mother's opinion, assumed the role of mother-in-law in the joint family. When the mother-in-law suffered from a stroke, Ding and her three sisters-in-law (the husband's two unwed sisters and the wife of her husband's brother) helped care for their mother-in-law for four years until she died. Ding never quit her job.

> Fu Ling-fen was a schoolteacher in southern Taiwan. After marriage, both Fu and her mother-in-law migrated to live with Fu's husband in Taipei. They formed a three-person stem family. Fu also had tense relations with her mother-in-law. The mother-in-law insisted on going out with the young couple; especially when they purchased important goods. At the beginning of the marriage, she even went out with the young couple to buy clothes for Fu because she had opinions on Fu's dress. When Fu went out to work, her mother-in-law looked after her first child. When Fu was at home, she still

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[153] Among the third generation, only six out of twenty informants lived in complex households (five stem and one joint family).

[154] I owe this insight from Hu's research on the powerless rural mothers-in-law who migrated to the city to live with their sons in the 1990s (Y.H. Hu, 1995). This change underlay the diverse reproduction arrangements and continuous power contest between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law in the 1970s that I addressed in Chapter 9.

cooked under her mother-in-law's supervision. If Fu Ling-fen did not arrive home at the expected time, her mother-in-law questioned her about her whereabouts. After twenty years of living with her mother-in-law, Fu was on the edge of a nervous breakdown. But Fu did not want to move out, because she felt that it was not filial to do so and was afraid of losing her husband's support.

Hu Jia-fen was a junior high school teacher and took full charge of the household right after marriage in a conjugal household. She employed relatives to do the housework. When her first child was born, her mother-in-law came to live with them. The mother-in-law wanted to take charge of their household money, but Hu refused. The mother-in-law wanted to take care of her baby, but Hu felt that it was against principles of filial piety. She used her salary to employ a live-in maid to do washing, cleaning and take care of her two children along with her mother-in-law. The mother-in-law then insisted on cooking and began to get up at six to cook breakfast. Hu, who tried to be a 'filial' daughter-in-law, intentionally woke up at five-thirty to prepare breakfast only to find that the next day her mother-in-law would get up at five to cook. In the end, Hu gave up. Thus, the mother-in-law decided what dishes she wanted to cook (which according to Hu was monotonous and not nutritious) and insisted in feeding the child in her own way (which Hu felt was unhygienic). When her mother-in-law thought that there was not enough money for food, she would stay in bed all day. Hu did not pay any attention to this until the paid servant explained the signal to her: the mother-in-law needed money.

The above stories show three different domestic arrangements in 1970s urban complex families. In terms of housework, there appeared no consistent pattern of the division of labour between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law: Ding was only a helper; Fu had full family responsibility right after she returned home from work; Hu employed a live-in maid while the mother-in-law insisted on taking charge of food shopping and cooking.

In terms of childcare, the most common pattern was that the daughters-in-law went to work and their mother-in-law took care of their babies. This pattern was not unknown in colonial families when the daughter-in-law went out to work. Nevertheless, if a daughter-in-law wanted to work, she needed the consent of the elder generation. However, these cases suggest that in industrial families, even if the elder generation could still have a say on their children's employment, they no longer had an absolute power to impose their opinions. In other words, a colonial mother-in-law of an averagely wealthy family might *choose to* look after grandchildren and do domestic work for a working daughter-in-law, but an industrial mother-in-law might be *forced to*

do it. Yet the mother-in-law in the 1970s still had a certain power over the daughter-in-law, even if the elder generation was not earning enough. For example, the Mainlander parents-in-law of Wang Min-fen came from a good family in Shanghai but faced declining status in Taiwan. They wanted her to quit work and look after her baby. Wang insisted on working because her husband, a low-ranking soldier with a meagre salary, wanted her to earn more money for their conjugal family. Therefore, for the welfare of her 'uterine family', she continued to work full-time and had her baby attended by a paid nanny, since her mother-in-law refused to look after her child.

It should also be mentioned that the three daughters-in-law quoted above had all intended to be 'good,' respecting patrilocal traditions and serving the mother-in-law without pushing to leave the complex family. However, their efforts to perform what they thought of as 'filial behaviour' did not always bring about the same response. Apart from Ding, who seemed to develop the 'harmonious yet hierarchical and respectable' relationship that was expected of the in-law relations in the 1940s, both Fu and Hu found their mother-in-law unpredictable and hard to please. Their relationships did not improve with the passage of time, as had happened in the earlier period, remaining strained throughout the years they lived together.

The information above suggests that in the 1970s, patriarchal genealogy was no longer the dominant principal regulating the ways in which reproduction work was carried out in complex families. Domestic arrangements seemed to be contingent upon individual relationships between the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law. But why were some daughters-in-law more dominant than the mother-in-law? Why did some daughters-in-law still suffer? Was there any mechanism behind these diversities?

Class and Generational Hierarchy of Patriarchy

I find that the economic standing of the elder generation in relation to the younger generation is the key to deciphering the diverse power relations between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law. The class positions of both generations in

complex families can be found in Table 8.2. Let's use this class dimension to re-consider the three cases given above. The father-in-law of Ding was a merchant and member of the local elite, running several businesses. He sent Ding's husband to Japan to learn commercial skills, before leaving him his business on his death. When the father-in-law died, this extended family followed a formal family division process in 1975. Family members still resided in the same building after the division. Ding needed not to assist her unwed sister-in-law anymore but she was still responsible for looking after her aging mother-in-law. This pattern resembles the colonial upper class families that we saw in Part One.

Fu's mother-in-law was an adopted daughter-in-law who married her foster brother, a new middle class civil servant. It was the non-working mother-in-law who controlled her husband's money. Fu was a primary school teacher and her husband a technician-turned-factory-owner. In Fu's family, both generations could be seen as middle class. The struggles between them appear to have been the most explicit and strenuous. Yet compared with Ding, who was very obedient in the complex family, Fu protested and talked back to her mother-in-law, despite her strong belief in gendered virtues (an example will be given in the next section). In the struggles between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, the mother-in-law could still impose her authority over Fu, who was left very much on edge at home.

Hu's mother-in-law was the wife of an owner-farmer. Hu was a junior high school teacher and her husband was a judge. The young middle class couple apparently had far more social and economic resources than the elder generation. Apart from some meagre money from her husband on the farm in eastern Taiwan, the mother-in-law had no source of income. In this complex family, it was Hu who controlled the money and made the decision to employ maids to serve her mother-in-law. Hu regarded the employment of a live-in maid as filial behaviour. However, it meant quite different things for the mother-in-law. Control over the family economy and her daughter-in-law were the two things that a mother-in-law might wish for - signifying her strength in the

patriarchal power structures in which she claimed her privileges. Failing to control either the family money or subordinate the daughter-in-law to perform domestic labour, Hu's mother-in-law had to secure her power in the field of domesticity: cooking and food shopping. She did not let Hu intervene in her domains. This gave Hu difficulties, for she could not practise her more 'advanced' ideas about food and nutrition. She felt powerless. On the other hand, the powerless mother-in-law also protested against her lack of money by lying in bed. Why did she not just ask for money? Probably it was very humiliating for the mother-in-law to 'beg' for money from her son and daughter-in-law who, according to patriarchal norm, should serve their parents and let the elder generation distribute money to them. Control over money was the most significant change that occurred in the complex family after industrialisation and I return to this issue in the next section.

To conclude, gaps between the economic standing of both generations appear to be key in understanding competing power relations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. The higher the class status advantage held by the elder generation over the younger generation, the more control the elder had over the young. The higher the class status of the younger generation, the more likely they were to defy the wishes of the elder generation. In the 1970s, the elder generation claimed authority on the basis of a generational hierarchy of patriarchy, but the younger generation tended to defy them thanks to their greater social and economic status. In these intergenerational power contests, it seems that the key issue was control over the economy in complex households. However, in colonial complex families, the family coffer had been centrally organised. What happened? How and when did these changes take place?

The 'Cult of Domesticity' and Silent Resistance of Daughters-in-law

Let's read the narrative of Fu, who revealed to me with an air of secrecy in the end of our interview:

> 'My older colleagues warned me, "Never give your mother-in-law your salary. The first time will be very hard, but you must insist. If you don't, you

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will be controlled by her in the future. If you want 200 dollars for a friend's wedding, it is very likely that she will only give you 100 dollars." I took their advice and insisted not giving her my salary. (What about your husband?) He wanted to give her his earnings but to be on the same side as me he did not. I told her that she could tell us how much money she wanted and then we would give it to her.'

This narrative indicates an important historical change to structures of Han complex families after industrialisation. In colonial complex families, the family coffer was centrally organised and distributed, no matter whether the young ones were earning or not. By the 1970s, complex families no longer held a common coffer, mainly because the younger generation refused to do so. It must be said that Fu was a very conservative woman who was a good example of the KMT 'cult of domesticity'. She believed in the 'traditional' virtues of a woman: to serve her husband and parents-in-law, to educate the next generation and to be content with her work without attempting to climb up the career ladder. With this gender identity, surprisingly, she dared to resist her mother-in-law's demands over her salary! The act of refusal was not only practiced by Fu's colleagues, but also found in the narratives of Hu and Wang, another informant who attributed her mother-in-law's demand for her salary as a 'strange Mainlander custom, different from Taiwanese.'[155] Their common behaviour seems to suggest that most daughters-in-law resisted handing over money to their husband's family, regardless of gender or ethnic identity. This was a *collective* resistance against the generational hierarchy of patriarchy by asserting a right over their salaries and even the family economy if the elderly were not earning. This resistance took place not only in urban but also rural Taiwan in the 1970s.

B. Gallin and R. Gallin (1982) and T. L. Hu (1991) all found that in the 1970s there were important changes in the family organisation of rural Taiwan. The 1973 oil crisis made urban unemployed youth return home and initiated rural industrialization. In 1979 in the village of Hsin-hsing, the number of joint families increased and young

[155] In 1999, Wang was politically opposed Mainlanders and supported Taiwanese independence. Her description reveals two points. First, she did not know of such a custom before. Second, she attributed such an 'unusual requirement' as a practice of Mainlanders. In other words, she attributed this to ethnic difference.

couples kept their earnings to themselves rather than sharing a common coffer as described in Cohen's research (1976) on Yen-liao, in Southern Taiwan in 1964. T. L. Hu also observed in 1977, that with the increasing number of young couples returning to the countryside, two trends occurred simultaneously. On the one hand, more and more young couples lived independently from the husband's family before dividing family property. On the other hand, those who lived together did not share a common family coffer, nor did they cook together. Hu interpreted this as a result of urbanisation in the 1960s that had given young couples a flavour of independence in the city. When they returned in the 1970s, the younger generation *did not want to* give all their earnings to the father and daughters-in-law also *wanted* to keep their incomes to themselves. This was interpreted as the younger generation's resistance to the older generation brought about by industrialization (T. L. Hu, 1991:216-8).

If we accept that industrialization made this resistance possible, it must also be placed in the context of an historical moment when the KMT 'cult of domesticity' dominated public discourses. This might explain why the majority of the third generation daughters-in-law resisted silently on the one hand and yet struggled for years to live with tense in-law relations, feeling obliged to practice filial piety.[156] In contrast, daughters-in-law in colonial times simply rebelled and left complex households when they grasped (or more precisely, created) chances to do so without addressing the ideology of filial piety. For the majority of third generation informants, their silent resistance was disguised in the name of traditional virtues and had its limitations: stick to the marriage and do not lose support from your husband. Hu's words seem very representative of the thinking of her generation.

'People in our generation still hold the belief that a woman should follow her

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[156] Although among the third generation there were also two incidences of divorce, they were unusual cases. Su divorced because she was rebelling against the arranged marriage into which she was pushed at the age of eighteen. She was determined to divorce from the day of her engagement ceremony. According to her, both *forced* arranged marriage and divorce was rare for her generation. Li got divorced because of conflicts with her in-laws that led to her husband's extra-marital affairs. Nevertheless Lee was a pioneering feminist activist in early 1980s. Her identity and consciousness was rare among her generation.

husband no matter what his lot is (嫁雞隨雞). It was not possible to talk about divorce just because you are not happy with the situation. You just stay in the marriage and put up with it.'

It seems that the 'cult of domesticity,' promoting Confucianism as tradition and stressing the importance of cultivating personal morality in a modern society, might well have contributed to these women's decisions to stay and struggle with the parents-in-law rather than to divorce or to leave with the husband. Those resistance strategies that were very likely to be adopted by daughters-in-law in colonial times now became unthinkable. It appears to me that the limit of their resistance was more ideological than economical.

Parents-in-law Coping with Industrialisation

How did parents-in-law cope with the resistance of the younger generation and their declining status? In the 1970s, industrialisation affected parents-in-law of diverse economic standing differently. In families headed by grand bourgeois parents (such as the family of Ding), patriarchal power structures remained unchallenged. The father-in-law still held sway over the young and the mother-in-law was still respected and served by her daughters-in-law until the day she died. When the elder generation held far more economic resources than the younger generation and were still able to co-opt the son into the family business, their authority did not seem to decline immediately with industrialisation.

However, for the elder generation whose socio-economic status was in decline or was lower than the younger generation, industrialisation damaged their ability to maintain the generational hierarchy. This process was gendered. Let's look at the declining status of the father-in-law first. For Su Fong-fen, it was her father-in-law rather than her mother-in-law who made her life difficult. When Su wanted to connect modern conveniences to the house, such as running water or an extra-telephone line, her father-in-law used his harsh experience in the past to stop her doing so. Previously, it was the mother-in-law who carefully censored any sign of intimacy between the

young couple. In the 1970s, the father-in-law joined in. The father-in-law of Wang Min-fen intentionally created obstacles to prevent his son from visiting his wife when she was in childbirth. Wang gave birth to a baby girl alone in the hospital, without any acquaintances around. In the 1970s, the father-in-law's complaints about the younger generation became as trivial and irrational as words from mothers-in-law. He also attempted to assert his power by making trouble, rather than showing generosity as the patriarch. Both fathers-in-law belonged to the moderately wealthy landlord class before industrialisation. After they lost their means of production and property and thus their privileges over the younger generation, they attempted to exercise their powers as the patriarch to seek their obedience, especially the daughters-in-law.

When the mother-in-law did not work and her husband's economic status was lower than the young couple, industrialisation made the parents' status decline significantly. Mothers-in-law in patriarchy used to control the daughter-in-law's labour and the family economy (except in upper class merchant families). After industrialisation they were very likely to lose both. The degree of power lost depended a great deal on the particular family structure. I have mentioned in Chapter 9 that in the 1970s mothers-in-law who lived alone were eager to offer childcare services and make themselves useful in exchange for cash or old age security. Cases mentioned at the beginning of this chapter show that for the mother-in-law in complex families, the situation was slightly different. They still expected to exercise their culturally consented power over their daughters-in-law. However, when the daughter-in-law resisted handing over money to her mother-in-law in the 1970s, the mother-in-law not only faced a challenge to her authority, she also came to be controlled by the daughter-in-law economically. She might feel that her status and security were in danger. To rescue them, she adopted whatever means necessary to gain the compliance of the younger generation, especially the daughters-in-law. The mothers-in-law of Hu and Fu offer good examples. They both wished to subordinate their daughter-in-law and to restore their own privileges in the patriarchal power structures. Their desire to secure their old age shaped endless power contests between generations which no longer lost

their sting over their lifecycles. Mothers-in-law struggled to claim authority in every interaction, from dressing and food preparation, to shopping and the loyalty of the sons.

Nevertheless, a working mother-in-law from the new middle class would respond very differently to a rebellion from her daughter-in-law. Pan Hen-hong (1-14) had worked as a public health midwife to bring up her eight children and to hold marriage ceremonies for them[157] (roughly between 1960-1980) without her husband's financial contribution. She recalled her changing perceptions of being a mother-in-law,

> 'When I arranged marriages for my sons, it had become more "contemporary". [Our] thinking in the past was different. [Comparing the times] when I gave birth and when I 'married in' (娶)[158] my daughter-in-law, my thinking had changed completely. Completely different!! In the past, I thought, (speaking in a slowed tone, immersed in the past) "Now, I bring up my son in hardship. In the future, my daughter-in-law will act like me. She will treat me as I treat my mother-in-law, and bring up her children as I bring up my children. I treat my mother-in-law well now and she will treat me well in the future. My hardship today will be rewarded by her..." Anyway, I thought like this. In the end, when I 'married in' my daughters-in-law, it was different. I thought, how come we had that tough time then, and now? ...Some daughters-in-law murmured in this room and that room, "Those old guys, why did they not die? Could we not deal with them?" Lots of other things...[they] murmured like this...this room and that room. I thought, "I am old, yes, but I don't need to hear this. Go if you want to!"

In 1999, Pan Hen-hong had been living alone for twenty years, since the day her husband died. All her children lived independently in conjugal households. For most of her life she had supported her 'uterine' family alone and she continued to support herself through to her old age. 'Go if you want to!' Perhaps this is the most apt phrase to describe the feelings of new middle class parents in the industrial era: they found they could no longer claim privileges over younger generation. They did not own enough resources to maintain the generational hierarchy as it was in the grand bourgeois family, but they could at least support themselves without relying on their sons. Such reluctant

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[157] To hold a marriage ceremony and pay for it is regarded as the parental responsibility. This does not mean that she chose marriage partners for her children.

[158] 'Married in' is used to mean arranging a marriage patrilocally. Interestingly, the way Pan Hen-hong used it suggested that this verb does not have to go with a male subject as it is used in contemporary Mandarin. A mother-in-law could 'marry in' a daughter-in-law. The parents could 'marry in' someone for their sons. This suggests the patriarchal authority that could arrange marriages for their children.

self-reliance rested on their new middle class status, which guaranteed their economic security in old age and sustained their independence without recourse to the younger generation and consequent humiliation. This was the most prevalent mentality of *new middle class working* mothers-in-law among my first, second and third generation informants, whether they were in their fifties, seventies or eighties in 1999.

The discussion above has led to the conclusion that when facing declining generational hierarchy in rapid industrialisation, elderly men and women might react differently according to their class status and access to the market economy. Parents-in-law in grand bourgeois families might continue to enjoy generational authority. New middle class mothers-in-law who had access to the market economy and earned average incomes tended to accept social change and leave younger generations to do as they pleased. Fathers-in-law and mothers-in-law who faced declining economic standing in relation to the younger generation suffered the most. They often resisted change and hoped to control the younger generation through constant demonstration of power, if they resided in complex families, or by making themselves useful for younger generation, if they lived in conjugal families. Did these situations continue in the 1990s? Let's look at family relations of the 1990s stem family.

Structures and Power Relations Of Stem families in the 1990s[159]

Compared with the third generation, the numbers and sizes of stem families increased among the fourth generation. *All* of my informants whose husbands' family was in Taipei lived with their parents-in-law upon marriage. [160] Patrilocality was still commonly practiced in the 1990s. Moreover, the size of the family increased. The 1990s stem family easily reached six family members and more, but in the 1970s, due to migration, family groups were sometimes simply three or four, usually without

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[159] Here, I am addressing stem families rather than complex families because the joint family does not appear in my data.

[160] As a result, ten fourth generation informants formed complex families in the 1990s, while only five out of twenty did so in the 1970s.

unwed siblings. Furthermore, while in the 1970s many parents-in-law *followed* the son and migrated to Taipei city, all of the daughters-in-law in the 1990s *entered* the husband's family alone as observed in the 1940s. Would the return to patrilocal practices reproduce the harsh experiences of daughters-in-law in the 1940s? Did fourth generation daughters-in-law resist patrilocality? The following section investigates the experiences of fourth generation daughters-in-law and the organisation of reproductive work in 1990s stem families.

Housework arrangements in 1999 showed even greater diversity than in previous generations.[161] They ranged from the old style expectation of the daughter-in-law to do all housework to the full participation of family members of both sexes of different generations. The patterns of domestic work as well as the results of resistance were often linked to the relative economic standing of both generations. In stem families headed by grand bourgeois parents, the parents-in-law still intended to keep a hold on the younger generation and controlled their daughters-in-law in terms of employment, domestic labour and co-residence (4-10, 4-04). Mothers-in-law who were not working were very likely to put the daughter-in-law under pressure to do all domestic chores even if they were working.

For example, Zhao Mei-ping married into the stem family, living with her husband, the brother of her husband and her parents-in-law. The couple kept their own money apart from the joint family and did not give the elder generation any money. This was because 'they are much wealthier than us and my husband usually receives extra cash and bonuses from them.' Her parents-in-law expected her to be a full-time daughter-in-law but Zhao declined. Nevertheless, she did as much housework as she could, while working as a newspaper photographer. She made use of the flexible working hours to return home to cook lunch (as much as she could) and dinner

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[161] I do not address childcare arrangements in this chapter mainly because half of the stem families (i.e. five) dissolved before the baby was born. In the other four cases (because one couple had no children), two mothers-in-law and two nannies were responsible for childcare. The meaning of such arrangements could be read from the previous chapter.

(everyday) for three years. She only washed clothes once per week not because she wanted to save time but because her mother-in-law prohibited her from doing it more frequently. When her husband's brother returned home to live with his parents and thus diverted the attention of the mother-in-law, Zhao grasped the chance to leave the stem family and resided with her mother using her pregnancy as an excuse.

In this type of family composition, the new middle class younger generation usually deferred to the parents-in-law when they first married but then contested this to leave the grand bourgeois family. In the case of Lu Yao-ping, it was her husband, who loved her very much, who decisively took her away from the stem family to live independently on their own (4-10).[162] In both cases, their successful rebellion could not be achieved without the above average earning power of the younger generation.

In contrast to grand bourgeois parents-in-law, dual-career new middle class parents-in-law were very likely to form the most egalitarian type of domestic arrangements with the new middle class younger generation (4-07, 4-20). Ma Ken-ping and her husband married in the USA where they had been studying. After returning home, they became university lecturers. They lived with his parents, the father a director at primary school and the mother the lowest-ranking civil servant. The young couple had full control over their income. They calculated all family spending, including money to his and her parents and shared the costs equally. Before she got a full-time job, she spent lots of time home and cooked. After she worked as an associate professor in the university and became very busy, she rarely cooked at home. Her parents-in-law never complained. All family members were doing housework: the father-in-law washed his and his wife's clothes together. Ma and her husband were responsible for their own clothes. Ma felt that she was really lucky to have parents-in-law like this and had a strong incentive to continue living with them in the future.

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[162] This case will be quoted in detail in next chapter.

In this type of the family, there were the least tensions between generations. This could probably be attributed to the new middle class mothers-in-law's access to the market economy, which secured their old age without the need for recourse to the next generation. Moreover, the new middle class father-in-law or son were also doing housework, thus maximising the available hands. Please note that participation by the father-in-law in this type of family was *not* unusual, no matter how light the work he did. This was an interesting development because the third generation new middle class husband of the 1970s thought that housework was wife's responsibility, but in the 1990s they did not appear to mind doing routine housework. This was evident in the narratives of both third and fourth generation informants. Neither daughter-in-law in this family composition felt the need to leave patrilocal families.

In stem families headed by proletarian and petty bourgeoisie parents-in-law, who earned less than the younger generation, the mother-in-law did most of the housework and the daughter-in-law did no housework or only assisted (4-05, 4-12). Even so, new middle class daughters-in-law usually found it difficult to adjust to the different 'family customs' of the husband's family. They felt themselves 'unfit' and tried to leave the patrilocal family. In the next chapter, I quote Jin Yi-ping's case in detail to illustrate this process. The daughter-in-law's resistance still met struggles from the mother-in-law who might have felt aggrieved that she had made concessions, did the housework and sidestepped tense issues with her daughter-in-law to make them feel comfortable in her family, yet the daughter-in-law was leaving and taking away her son. In this situation, the mother-in-law was absolutely powerless. She complained and protested against such a decision and attempted to manipulate the sons' emotions. Yet both daughters-in-law successfully left the family within a year of the marriage.

Perhaps the most intriguing negotiations were found between high-earning petty bourgeois parents-in-law and their new middle class children. This probably reflects the paradoxical class status between old and new middle classes. The petty bourgeois parents usually had low levels of education, owned the means of production and

worked with their hands on labour-consuming tasks, but earned much more than the younger new middle class couple who had educational credentials and were employed on average, steady incomes. In sum, the younger generation earned less than the parents-in-law but claimed higher social status in Taiwanese society. The following case can be analysed in the context of such paradoxical inter-generational class relations.

Hao Zong-ping worked in a bank and married into a stem family composed of her parents-in-law, her husband and her two unwed sisters-in-law. A six-person household meant that the domestic work could be very demanding even though housework had been so much simplified in the 1990s. Hao's parents-in-law owned a factory and the mother-in-law had trained her daughters to do the housework since they were young. Before Hao married in, it was usually the youngest daughter who could not put up with the mess and washed the clothes and cleaned the house. When Hao Zong-ping got pregnant and then married into the stem family, the un-wed sister-in-law continued doing the housework but expected Hao to take over these tasks once Hao gave birth. Afterwards, they shared the tasks but Hao was not happy with the whole arrangement:

> 'I knew that she was sympathetic to my pregnancy so she did all the housework. But, the other *xiao-gu* (小姑, unwed younger sister-in-law) never did any housework. I knew the youngest *xiao-gu* did a lot. Of course she felt it was unfair: "Why am I still doing so much housework after having a *da-xiao* (大嫂, wife of the eldest brother)?" But later I started to get angry. I also worked.... but she [the other unwed sister-in-law who did no housework] could sleep until noon everyday.... When coming back home, I still needed to take care of children and do housework. I felt very angry...I always grumbled when I was folding the clothes.'

This complaint resulted from structural conflicts between a daughter, who was usually granted no responsibility under patriarchal genealogy and only did housework out of necessity, and a daughter-in-law, who was assumed to be responsible for all housework no matter whether she worked or not. It shows that even in this complex family of the 1990s, patriarchy was still the underlying principle shaping the expectations of all family members in terms of domestic arrangements. Hao was

grateful to the youngest *xiao-gu* who carried out housework, but she still felt powerless to confront the unequal division of domestic labour between her and the other *xiao-gu*.

After the youngest sister-in-law got married, Hao found no one to share domestic labour. If Hao had not worked, those tasks would have become her sole responsibility. Since she did work (and very often overtime) she negotiated on this basis for better arrangements. The stem family then spontaneously formed their own arrangements:

> 'Washing clothes: my father-in-law did it. He washes, hangs them out and brings them into the house. Cooking: because I usually go home late, my mother-in-law cooks. After returning home, I need to clean the table, wash up the dishes as well as clean the kitchen. Then, I fold all of the clothes. After that, I bath the kid, and sweep the floor. I ask my husband to mop it. "This is your task", I told him. "The floor needs to be clean. The kid walks here and there, so the floor becomes dirty easily."'

Housework eventually was shared out, however unequally, between men and women of different generations. It came as some surprise that many husbands in complex families also did housework. In previous generations a husband who helped the wife with housework would be condemned as 'born by the wife': i.e. that the son had betrayed his mother and leaned to the wife, a saying that reveals the complicated relationships between mother-in-law, son and daughter-in-law under patriarchy. Even in the 1970s, constrained by this moral accusation, many third generation sons dared not help their wives even if they married through romantic courtship. The changing concepts in the division of labour between husband and wife in new middle class *conjugal* families were also found in *complex* families, except in those headed by grand bourgeois parents. Yet when comparing the workload between the young wife and the young husband, the workload of the husband was almost negligible. Just as the participation of the husband in domestic chores became very limited after incorporating the kin of the wife into childcare, the participation of the husband in complex households was also disturbed by the presence of other female members. Hao attributed this unequal gender division of labour to the residential arrangements. The following is an extract from a group interview with women residing in different family structures.

Hao: 'I would tell my husband sometimes, "Hey, look - you work and so do I. When you come home tired, so am I. Why do I have to do all these chores? Bathing children, cleaning dishes...and all you have to do is sit there on the sofa...."'

Guan (who lived in conjugal family) commented: 'Her [Hao's] husband seems very moderate. If she lives with her husband [alone], I think they would have an equal division of labour. But the problem is that she lives with her parents-in-law.'

Jen (an unwed friend of them): 'Do you need to perform work for the parents-in-law?'

Hao: 'No, it is only because we are living with them that my husband dares to defy my orders. Look at Guan, she only lives with her husband. If he does not do the housework, she would complain.'

Thus, this daughter-in-law of petty bourgeois parents-in-law, no matter how much she had negotiated with other family members, still found herself the main bearer of the housework for the whole stem family. If she lived in a conjugal family, she would have had more autonomy and might have been able to negotiate better terms. In other words, in the area of domestic labour, the stem family structure still posed constraints for daughters-in-law who did not have higher economic standing than their parents-in-law.

In families headed by high-income petty bourgeoisie families, it was not easy for the young ones to make the final decision to leave the patrilocal family. Some reasons were economical, while others might be attributed to the effects of patriarchy.

Chen Nuan-ping stayed in the stem family, enduring trivial in-law conflicts and problems of personal adjustment, but did not want to move out of the stem family for the time being. This decision was the result of several considerations. Firstly, when Chen worked, her mother-in-law cooked and took care of her two babies. When Nuan-ping came home, the dinner would be ready for her. Secondly, the mother-in-law of Nuan-ping paid half of the money for her son to buy a house, but the young couple had to pay the mortgage to own the house. Currently, they rented that house out to pay the mortgage and stayed with her parents-in-law. The biggest wish of Nuan-ping was to save enough money, have a house of their own and live independently as a conjugal family. Economic considerations underlay this temporary co-residence arrangement.

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However, the economic standing between generations alone was not enough to explain the struggles faced by daughters-in-law. The effects of patriarchy could not be ignored, even in the 1990s. The non-working mothers-in-law with no economic resources to market economy were not all losers in this power competition.

Na-ping's mother-in-law was a concubine of a high-ranking government official. Although well-educated, she never worked. She was given a house to generate income and lived independently from her husband. She bore four daughters and one son. Since she was very young, she had seen her son as her own property and source of old age security. Na-ping fell in love with her husband at eighteen and they got married when she was twenty-eight. Before the marriage, Na-ping had severe quarrels with her mother-in-law when she resided with him and his mother. Na-ping gave an ultimatum to her boyfriend because of the tension. Her boyfriend did not find it a problem at all and could not understand what she was asking for. On the other hand, Na-ping also found the decision to leave him unbearable since she had been in love with this man for ten years. In the end, she married him and decided to try her best to deal with her mother-in-law, but it did not work out. Na-ping escaped to live alone and eventually divorced her husband.

Even if one may say that this case was rare - it might be difficult to find a concubine nowadays - there were always women who earned a living *mainly* through kinship exchange relations. [163] As mentioned above, the experiences of daughters-in-law leaving patrilocal families revealed that mothers-in-law in grand bourgeois, petty bourgeois and proletarian families had all protested vigorously. The following is one more case to illustrate the needs of mothers-in-law to control their sons.

Hao's parents-in-law owned a factory and were richer than the young couple. In

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[163] In post-war Taiwan, there was no pension system except for government employees, including teachers, civil servants and solders. Pensions for the elderly only became a political issue when raised by the opposition party in the 1990s.

this stem family, the father-in-law covered family expenses and the mother-in-law was given a certain amount of money every month from her husband to buy food for the family. The mother-in-law, even though working with her husband as petty bourgeoisie, did not have economic autonomy. Once they quarreled and the father-in-law refused to give her money for food. Since Hao's husband was young, his mother had taught him very clearly that she had been working so hard to bring him up so that he must take care of her old age. When Hao wished to move out with her husband, he disagreed.

> 'Why? Don't they treat you well? Why do you have to see yourself as an outsider? If you have to go, you go on your own. I must stay with my parents...If they do anything wrong, I can correct them. But never ever ask me to leave them.'

In this case, there appears a strong correlation between the mother-in-law's lack of access to money and her need to secure the son's loyalty, which insured her old age. This long-term psychological manipulation by the mother of her son was not easily challenged by the daughter-in-law, whom he married through romantic courtship. At the time of interviewing, when asked by her friends, 'If you and your mother-in-law were both drowning, whom would he rescue first?' Hao answered without thinking, 'His mother'. This was the reality that Hao had learned to accept after three years of marriage but she did not want to upset herself by thinking about it. Hao continued to live patrilocally but she bought a motorcycle so that she could go to her natal family every day before she went back to the stem family. As long as she could chat with her mother, even if only for ten minute, she released her stress and sense of isolation in the stem family.

To conclude, the configurations of stem families in the 1990s showed great diversity. Patterns of interaction were strongly determined by relative economic resources between generations. Families headed by new middle class parents tended to move towards egalitarian arrangements. In other families, patriarchy genealogy still underpinned the ideal of reproductive arrangements. However, the eventual agreements on domestic work and living depended a great deal on negotiations between family

members on the basis of their privileges either terms of economic standing or patriarchy.

Conclusion

This chapter investigated the organisation of reproductive work and diverse familial relations in industrial complex families from the 1970s to 1999. At structural levels, the trends of declining generation and gender hierarchies were observed, even though the 'cult of domesticity' appeared to be influential in the 1970s. The mother-in-law's authority appeared to be fading with industrialisation and the young husband's engagement in housework gradually became possible. The interplay of patriarchy and class explained the reasons why very varied domestic arrangements existed in complex families in the industrial period. The higher the comparative economic status of the parents-in-law, the more likely they were to impose the generational hierarchy of patriarchy onto the younger generation. The higher the status of the younger generation, the easier they found it to contest patriarchal power structures. Apart from new middle class parents, the patriarchal power structures leading the mother-in-law to wish to keep her son tightly connected to her and the daughter-in-law to seek to live independently as a conjugal family still underlay all of these negotiations.

In this chapter, I have shown that patriarchal power structures did not collapse immediately with industrialisation. The economy and patriarchal genealogy both played a role in forming domestic arrangements in complex families. State ideology also upheld patriarchy during rapid industrialisation. The following chapter will go on investigating how the 'cult of domesticity' continued to maintain patriarchal power structures in the 1990s, by scrutinising the identities of fourth generation daughters-in-law.

Chapter 11 Virtuous Daughters-in-law in the 1990s

In Chapter 10, I explored the ways in which reproductive work was organised in complex families from the 1970s to 1999. Frameworks of patriarchy and class help explain these diverse arrangements. I also addressed the role of state ideology in shaping the identities of third generation informants but not of the fourth generation. How did fourth generation young women understand their experiences of being daughters-in-law? How do such interpretations impinge on their decision to resist or to comply with the hierarchies of patriarchy? What strategies did they adopt to deal with kinship relations? Would a belief in a woman's independence or a feminist interest in gender equality contribute to possible challenges of the power structures of patriarchy?

This chapter foregrounds the identity construction of fourth generation young women and explores the interconnections between the state ideology, gender identity and patriarchal kinship relations. Stories of six daughters-in-law form the focus of analysis, for their narratives showed that they had carefully considered kinship relationships and were very conscious of their own practices. At the time of interview, all these women were working and had the resources to live independently as a conjugal family, although they *might not* be richer than their parents-in-law. Five of them lived near their mothers, who cared for their children after kindergarten. A close examination of their dealings with their husband's family shows that this situation did not come easily and they constantly revealed dilemmas in making decisions relating to their husband's kin. By re-interpreting their dilemmas in a feminist framework, the following analysis aims to propose localised feminist strategies available to contemporary daughters-in-law still living in the web of patriarchal kinship.

Moral Discourses: The Logic of Practices

I begin my analysis with two daughters-in-law who made a conscious decision to be virtuous wives and to avoid violating hierarchies of patriarchy in the 1990s. Although there are differences in their thinking about gender equality, they were united by a dominant moral discourse promoted by the KMT state which shaped their interpretation of patriarchal kinship relations.

Lu Yao-ping was a woman who strongly believed in hierarchies of gender and generation and insisted on cultivating her own morality through patriarchal kinship relations.

> 'For marriage, I seek perfection. It cannot be evaluated from a mundane perspective... I think the family must be harmonious. I not only hope to have good relations with my husband but also [with other family members in the household]... If I have problems with my in-laws, I feel like ...somehow a bit deficient... So, I would cater for other people's needs as far as I could.'

Lu's efforts to follow this ideal were clear from her behaviour. She met her first boyfriend at law school. He had a job as a lawyer and did not want to wait long before marriage. After she graduated, they got married immediately. Both of them felt that her main responsibilities after marriage were to stay at home, be a housewife and teach her children. She paid no attention to her father's expectation that she would take the national examination to qualify as a lawyer before she got married. She might have succeeded in her goals of being a virtuous mother and a good wife had she not lived with her parents-in-law. Lu's parents-in-law were grand bourgeoisie and looked down upon her. According to Lu, they felt that she had married their son to acquire a wealthy lifestyle. This distrust and dislike initiated a series of negative interactions between Yao-ping and her in-laws from the first day of the marriage. As the daughter-in-law, Yao-ping was responsible for all the housework in this three-generation stem family, where her husband was the eldest grandson, and there were three unwed sisters-in-law. She cooked five meals a day, two breakfasts (one for the grandparents, early in the morning), lunch, dinner and night snack. Later, she started to assist her husband in his

law firm, but still performed all the domestic chores at the same time. Her parents-in-law did not like her. They reproved her for being too intimate with her husband and her early pregnancy was not welcomed. Lu said that she was regarded as the bad woman who had seduced their son.

As Lu wanted to be virtuous, i.e. to accept the hierarchical and non-reciprocal relations in the family, she never complained about her sole responsibility for domestic chores, nor did she reply to her parents-in-law's criticisms. When her parents-in-law unreasonably accused her, she would perform even more virtuously in response. All she wanted, she said, was to demonstrate to her parents-in-law that she was not the evil and lazy woman they thought. During that period, in 1996, Yao-ping often dreamed about visiting her primary school teachers and getting a copy of her moral education transcript. It seems that although Yao-ping was preoccupied with the desire to maintain harmonious relations with every family member, she also wanted proper recognition of her virtue.

Eventually, the struggle to be moral became unsustainable. Yao-ping fainted at work due to stress, pregnancy and double shifts at home and work. On the same day, without rest, she went home to cook dinner, but was criticised by her mother-in-law for looking reluctant. For the first time in half a year, she lost her temper. She defended herself against her mother-in-law and then left the house. However, she did not go to her natal family to seek support, for she was afraid that if they supported her it would bring trouble for her mother-in-law. 'I did not want revenge', Yao-ping explained. Even at this point, she put the hope of harmony before her feelings. Apart from this incidence, Yao-ping has never attempted to rebel against the generational hierarchy of the patriarchal family. Yao-ping's suffering as the daughters-in-law only ended when her husband, who loved her, decided to buy a house of his own and they moved out.

In the case of Lu, there is a logical connection between her own gendered identity and her subordination to patriarchal hierarchy. This is not the case for Lan, who was

ambitious and believed in a woman's independence. From a young age, Lan wanted to practice Buddhist or Taoist rules in a secular context to help those in need. She knew that family would take up her time and for many years so she chose not to have a boyfriend. In the daytime, she worked as a civil servant and in the evening worked voluntarily in the hospital. Her desire to remain single and practice Buddhism was threatened when she suffered from chemical poisoning at work and became physically vulnerable. A man whom she had always avoided seeing continued to chase her. Under pressure from him and his family they eventually got married, although she felt that they did not suit each other very well.

Lan's moral involvement with Buddhist ideas did not alter with marriage, but the field of practice changed: from people outside the family to her husband's kin. Her gender identity and her commitment to respecting the elderly did not change, but marriage brought her into systematically organised patriarchal kinship structures where her beliefs were put to the test. If she had remained single, her energy could have been devoted directly to those in need *in society*. After marriage, based on her firm moral principles, she asked herself to submit to a hierarchy in relation to her parents-in-law and negotiated with her husband *in the family*. In this decision, the Confucian 'differentiated mode of association' (Fei, 1991 [1947]),[164] which was also promoted by the 'cult of domesticity,' was invoked. It seems that her Buddhist thinking was subsumed to the state promoted Confucianism that supported hierarchies of patriarchy.

The fact that she was going to become the eldest daughter-in-law in the stem family did not scare Lan. She was confident in her ability to interact with others that her parents had taught her. She said,

> 'I was taught by my parents to be sensible, be skilful in interpersonal interactions, to be filial, to be humble, to be modest and to know the hierarchies.'

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[164] For a more detailed description of this concept, see Chapters 2 and 7.

Perhaps these moral principles would also apply to men in Han culture who were trained to respect the elderly and behave properly. However, for a woman, to practice propriety is simultaneously to submit to gender and generational hierarchy. On the basis of the traditional moral teaching, Lan considered the interests of her parents-in-law in everything she did. She decided to live patrilocally after marriage because,

> 'I feel that to live in the stem family only makes a difference to my individual freedom. I chose to stay with them for it is not very filial to move out. They were getting older and needed to be cared for. If I bought a house outside, I reduced their chances of playing with their grandchildren. If I did so, I would feel myself very selfish.'

Even though she suffered from debility from time to time, she still put her parents-in-law's needs before her own. She accompanied them when they needed to go out late in the evening or early in the morning. Lan was different from Yao-ping, for the latter believed in gender hierarchy and would never ask her husband to do any housework. Lan wanted her husband to share some part of housework or childcare when she was busy. However, she met resistance to any such requests. He refused to offer any kind of cooperation in the home. They also had very different attitudes to educating children. He beat the children on many occasions. The couple had many serious confrontations on these issues. Lan was not a weak woman. She held firm to her ideas and quarreled with her husband. However, she could not ultimately change his ideas and behaviour. She suffered a great deal from these confrontations. She felt herself to be very pathetic and her only strategy was to pray.

> 'I used to be a very happy person. I did not know what sadness was before marriage. I do not believe in any particular religion... I prayed. I only prayed and asked for wisdom to deal with this relationship. I wanted to be happy and not to be angry at anything... Maybe this is a test of my wisdom and endurance. When you need to endure, there must be something unreasonable there, so that you have to endure. Gradually, I am no longer getting mad and angry with him... I believe that one day, I will learn wisdom and not to be upset by any of his behaviour.'

Probably due to her belief in a woman's independence, Lan suffered a lot from her decision to stay in the patrilocal family. In contemporary Taiwan society, Lan was not

without choices. Her father, who was also very religious, urged her to seek divorce. However, Lan did not want to divorce, due to her insistence on cultivating morality within the family. As a result, Lan sought refuge in Buddhist and Taoist ideas to support her attempts to be virtuous.[165] She asked for wisdom from religion and hoped to transcend her anger by learning to accept things as there were. The morality promoted by the state was given higher value than her belief in women's independence. Giving priority to being virtuous, any obstacles were perceived as tests. In fact, she transferred her 'sacrifice' onto a higher level, that of wider society. She was sure that if she learned to overcome the difficulties in her own marriage, she could offer a model for women who had similar problems. Moral discourses blinded her to the alternatives and suppressed her desire to be independent.

Both Lu and Lan were deeply influenced by gendered moral discourse. To be moral, in their interpretation, was to perpetuate the gender and generational hierarchies of the patriarchal family. Both women also believed that their moral behaviour in the family could provide models for society as a whole. In this sense, they practiced Confucian dictates promoted in the 'cult of domesticity.' Nevertheless, they also adopted westernised perceptions of conjugal relationships. Lu believed in romantic love relations and Lan wanted a partnership to share the burden of housework. Rather than interpreting their beliefs as essentially 'Chinese', they should be understood as the effects of the state 'cult of domesticity,' in which ideal womanhood was characterised by a combination of modern western values and Confucian patriarchal principles (Chapter 7).

Ideology could have extremely powerful effects once accepted and internalised by the individual. In seeking to be moral, a woman might deny herself independence and actually defend patriarchal values, seeking to suppress and overcome her personal

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[165] Sangren's research on the thriving religious life of Taiwan elaborates very well how religion has served as one mechanism for Taiwanese women to act as agents in reproducing patriarchal ideology (2000).

conflicts with family members. Thus a moral discipline, imbued with Confucianism as well as state ideology, served to perpetuate the power structures of patriarchy.

The KMT construction of a timeless 'traditional' morality has been so seamlessly integrated with patriarchal familial values that those informants who did not identify with it found it difficult to contest. Let us look at Dai Wen-ping's explanation of patrilineal kinship relations. Dai Wen-ping had lived in a conjugal family with her husband since the beginning of her marriage. Nevertheless, she offered help to her husband's brothers and parents in Kaohsiung on various occasions even though they were not at all close. This caused various difficulties for her. At the time of the interview, she and her husband had been considering divorce for almost two years. Wen-ping interpreted the struggles she faced as follows:

> (After she had described several occasions when her husband's parents had annoyed her, she explained), 'Anyway... there are many other reasons that made me feel negative about them. When I gave birth, I didn't feel that they were happy about this child. I kept some distance from them. Then, we have no sense of closeness at all. But, actually, I don't know whether traditional in-law relations are like this. I don't know whether I am perceived as traditional or not. You know what I mean? I am talking about the identity problem. Should people like us in this arena identify our traditional ideas of 'male superior, female inferior'- under this logic, a woman marries a man and leads a life to serve her husband and educate her children (相夫教子)? I always wonder whether I should choose to live such an inferior life, to make great concessions for the purpose of accomplishing [other people's] full interests (委屈求全), or should I follow the western way of cutting off connections with relatives after marriage. It's like a cross-roads for me and I don't know which way to go. My mother often tells me that I should go to my husband's family for Chinese New Year. My father also says so. But, I feel that my relation with my husband is not good at all and the kinship relation might be eliminated soon. Why should I pretend to behave well? If this were not what I want, I wouldn't hesitate. If I don't like a friend, I could just not phone him. But my parents would tell me that you should behave as a good daughter-in-law. You know what I mean? It's a decision to be yourself or to behave in a way that people expect you to. If I decide to behave myself, I will feel that once you become an adult, you would have a family with your spouse. The natal family is not very important. I can respect them, keep a good relationship, but not very close. But, I feel it's a bit of anti-tradition.'

> Q: 'Then, you don't have to obey the tradition if you don't want to.'

> Dai: 'But my husband doesn't feel this is right.'

In this narrative, Dai Wen-ping reveals her dilemma. Should she follow her personal wishes or submit to the gender and generational hierarchy of patriarchy? Probably it was at the moment when she considered alternative lifestyles that she realised how far her ideas had departed from the normative expectations called 'tradition.' However, to realize this discrepancy only arouses further confusion. In Dai's interpretation, 'our tradition' was in conflict with 'Western ways.' 'Our tradition' refers to the gender and generational hierarchy to which a woman must subordinate herself, while the 'Western way' is 'to cut off the kinship relations completely' after marriage. In this context, the dichotomy of 'tradition' versus 'Western' runs parallel to the dichotomy of 'moral' versus 'immoral.' Just as morality is politically defined, 'traditional' and 'Western' are also political terms. To counter the hegemony of 'tradition,' where social order was hierarchically arranged, the 'West' becomes an opposing concept that represents whatever is not 'traditional.' The 'West' here is a local appropriation to account for what is not available to her in 'tradition,' defined by the 'cult of domesticity'. In between these oppositions, Dai did not know what to do.

Kang Yuan-ping also experienced painful struggles whenever she made decisions that might violate hierarchies of gender and generation. Kang had been unhappy to live patrilocally although her proletarian mother-in-law did not actually ask her to behave in any particular way. After deciding to move out, it took her a whole year to find 'legitimate excuses' (正大光明的理由) to justify her behaviour so that her mother-in-law would not be ashamed by neighbours' gossip. In her conjugal family, Kang has faced a similar dilemma. When there was a chance of her working abroad for eleven weeks, Kang faced tremendous struggles to finalise her decisions. She had wanted to go abroad but she also felt that if she did so, their colleagues might look down her husband, who worked in the same company with her but did not have the chance to go away. She needed to find 'legitimate excuses' for her husband to prevent him from losing face before she could accept the offer.

Why was Kang so desperate to find 'legitimate excuses'? It seems that Kang faced

great anxiety about acting in her own interests. Although she never explicitly said so, it appears that to violate the generational and gender hierarchies meant 'selfish' and 'immoral.' To prove that she was not selfish, she thoughtfully considered the interests of her mother-in-law and her husband by finding legitimised excuses for them to step down before she made any final decisions. By doing so, she proved that she was altruistic and responsible, and she was only forced by external circumstances to act in her interests.

The four cases of Lan, Lu, Dai and Kang suggest that the hegemony of tradition had very different effects upon those women who affiliated themselves to it and those who wished to contest it. Those women who *wanted* to be virtuous, as defined within the 'cult of domesticity,' aligned themselves with the hegemony of tradition to prevent their moral identities from being questioned or challenged by alternative discourses. For example, Lu's father expected her at least to obtain lawyer qualifications before she married. Lan's parents also advised her to divorce for the sake of her happiness. Nevertheless, both stuck to their chosen positions and deployed moral or religious discourses to give meaning to their suffering. These discourses were so powerfully supported by the state apparatus that none of the advice from their important others were able to challenge them.

In contrast, those who *wanted* to contest the discourse of tradition and to violate the hierarchies of gender and generation seem to face crises of identity. Kang and Dai, who struggled to distance themselves from socially defined kinswomen, found it difficult to deploy any cultural resources to defend their behaviour. Kang had to find 'legitimised excuses' to justify her decisions. Dai thought that appealing to a 'Western way' of doing things might potentially offer some justification but hesitated to do this. She was afraid of being stigmatised as 'anti-traditional,' a term loaded with negative meanings under KMT rule. Thus, the dichotomy she employed between traditional and Western in this context was a product of guilt and uncertainty rooted in her departure from the hegemonic moral discourses. The dichotomy signifies Dai's predicament as

being unable to legitimate her behaviour by appropriating existing social discourses. In contrast, those who benefited from the 'cult of domesticity,' in this instance, Dai's husband, could use 'anti-tradition' as an accusation against her.

The hegemony of tradition promoted in the 'cult of domesticity' has impeded changes at ideological levels to reduce the power of patriarchy. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapters, migration and modernisation brought about major changes in Taiwan society. Moreover, the organisation of Han family institution went through dramatic transformations after industrialisation. Nevertheless, owing to the effective implementation of 'cult of domesticity,' social ideas did not seem change as fast as material conditions. Among my respondents, the hegemony of tradition secured Lu's and Lan's self-identity. Otherwise, advice from important others or their continuous sufferings in the family might have led them to question the hierarchies of patriarchy, as daughters-in-law in the 1940s had done. The discourse of tradition was also available as a method of censorship against individual women's departures from the patriarchal order. Dai and Kang struggled to negotiate new meanings for their behaviour. However, they did not seem successful in producing discourses that could effectively challenge hegemony. Could the feminist movement provide some answers?

Feminist Attempts to Contest 'Tradition'

The Taiwanese feminist movement in the 1980s began with women's consciousness raising, mainly based on participants' own experiences of being married women. However, their discussions stressed problems and issues in conjugal families, possibly constrained by available discourses, which were mainly produced in American contexts. In the 1990s, similar arguments against 'familial patriarchy' (家庭父權) did not deepen, but the focus shifted. New debates challenged 'familial patriarchy' by criticising its normative quality and promoted various alternative lifestyles, such as singledom,

divorce, friendships and non-heterosexual relationships.[166] This approach might be perceived as a strategy to engage marginal voices in challenging the legitimacy of patriarchy. However, by avoiding producing counter-discourses *on* the most dominant form of the family, the approach seems to me a sign of disengagement from dialogue with the majority of married women. In other words, up until now, patriarchal kinship relations have been under-theorised in feminist thinking, in contrast to their ubiquity in contemporary Taiwanese society. This lack of detailed debates seems likely to result in confrontation *only*, rather than providing useful strategies for married women living within the webs of patriarchal kinship. The following story illustrates this point.

Mei-ping worked in a 'progressive' office where her colleagues were young and tended to accept liberal ideas from Western academic and social movements. Mei-ping often felt that her ties with her parents-in-law were belittled by people at work. Once, when her colleagues overheard Mei-ping saying that she was going to accompany her father-in-law to the hospital, they commented on her decision, 'I did not know that you were so traditional.' Mei-ping explained her response at that moment,

> 'I was taken aback for a while. 'How come they thought of me as 'traditional'? What is the definition of being 'traditional?' Later, I thought, it doesn't matter. I feel that's something I shall do. The most important thing is that if I don't do things in this way, I feel guilty about it. It doesn't matter whether it is traditional or not, I just do things that I want to do.'

In this instance, by labelling Mei-ping as traditional, Mei-ping's colleagues seemed to challenge normative expectations of being a daughter-in-law. Mei-ping was shocked by this confrontation, for she also faced the uncomfortable dichotomy that Dai narrated in the previous section. In this dichotomy, tradition was associated with hierarchical and patriarchal kinship relations. In contrast, to be non-traditional meant a distance from patriarchal kinship relations, implying a possibility of independence and egalitarianism. Depending on the context, their predicaments were interpreted

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[166] This history could be traced in the feminist magazine *Awakening* and then *Stir*, both published by Awakening Foundation, the leading feminist organization in contemporary Taiwan. *Stir* 3 (1996) provided useful articles on this issue.

differently by the people surrounding them. Dai's husband accused her of being 'anti-traditional,' for her attempts to seek independence. The 'progressive' colleagues of Mei-ping condemned her as 'traditional,' for her connections with patriarchal kinship relations. By failing to see their needs to live *both* as kinswomen *and* independently, this binary opposition of traditional and non-traditional provides no solutions to their predicament. To associate kinship relations with tradition hardly helped feminist thinking on this issue. Is it possible to create alternative non-hierarchical kinship relations? Has there been any feminist attempt to re-interpret, appropriate and subvert the hegemony of tradition through creative strategies and resistance in daily practices? To me, Jin Yi-ping's story seems to provide some answers.

Subverting the Hegemony of Tradition in Daily Practices

Jin Yi-ping's strategies in dealing with in-law relations were not constrained by theoretical debates at abstract levels but were grounded in her daily practices. Yi-ping worked at a local women's centre and only started contacts with feminist groups after she gave birth to her second child. She saw her trajectories as very different from other feminists engaged in social movements who were usually unwed or well-educated graduates. She had been interviewed several times on the topic of in-law relations. Nevertheless, she was told once that her interview was not included for analysis because her case was too 'atypical,' implying that the 'most oppressive Taiwanese culture' did not affect her. 'Ha, ha, ha,' she laughed loudly.

'Atypical?' From my perspective, the answer is both yes and no. She has always been an autonomous person. She chose to marry her husband after she had strategically dated several boyfriends, looking for a man that suited her. Moreover, feminist thinking helped her to reinterpret her past decisions and current struggles. However, in terms of life cycle trajectories and living arrangements, Yi-ping is not very different from other interviewees. She got married at twenty-five. She and her husband resided with her husband's natal family for eight months until she could no longer bear the arrangement.

She decided to move out, and her husband, though reluctant, accepted her decision. A combination of feminist practices in daily struggles and not-so-localised feminist thinking at theoretical levels was characteristic in her interpretations of marriage and patriarchal kinship relations. For example, at interview, she said, 'After we had dated for couple of years, our parents all thought we should marry. So we did.' She claimed further that she believed her decision to marry was made under the hegemony of heterosexuality. However, when I asked how the decision was made to live with her husband's family, it took her a while to think,

> 'Well... the decision was... my husband and I... I... kind of took it for granted. We did not buy a house and both of our families were in Taipei... Of course, then, it was me move to his house.'

Probably feminist anti-marriage discourses had led Yi-ping to be very aware of the effects of heterosexuality, but the issue of patrilocality was still a naturalised and an under-theorised social practice. Nevertheless, what differentiates Yi-ping from other interviewees is that she fiercely rejected patriarchal kinship structures with a reflexive feminist perspective, which served to destabilise the hegemonic discourses of patriarchy once she became aware of it. Consider the event of her moving out of patrilocal household and her relations with her parents-in-law as an example.

> 'After being married for eight months, I moved out of my husband's family. I felt that I could not fit into that family atmosphere at all. Everyone was working and busy with his/her own business... There were few interactions between family members... I did not get used to it at all. After eight months, I had adjusted to the marriage but I disliked this lifestyle. So, I discussed it with my husband and then we moved out. We did not have children and I was not pregnant. But, when I moved out, I seemed to be criticised. I, as the daughter-in-law, was blamed but I did not hear it. (Why?) They were talking... but I was working. My mother-in-law cried, feeling very sad. I felt "It's only fair, when I married into your family, my parents were crying, too." Now, we only moved out and we were still in Taipei... I think that the meaning of *jia-qu* (嫁娶, women **marry out** to husband's family, and men **marry in** a woman) is really abominable... Marriage is marriage. You just get married. You don't need these terms, *jia-qu*. When you marry out (*jia*), your natal parents feel that they give you up. It feels that you are going to be responsible for your own life, good or bad. Actually you are still their daughter and you'll be their daughter forever. That women have a 'complex' about their husband's family is also due to this concept of *jia-qu*... I think

these ideas should be changed... Anyway, when my husband and I moved out, I felt that people in my husband's family deliberately ignored us. Later, my mother-in-law sat there crying, feeling sad. I am not a person without sympathy... but, I felt...'OK, you felt sad about it, that was nothing.' I had felt that as well [when I got married]. My husband was feeling emotional as well because he saw his mother crying. Then, he felt unhappy with me. "It was you wanting to move out." But, I am very certain. I knew this thing happened there, but I did not deal with it. I just did it.'

Along with the majority of fourth generation informants, Yi-ping believed that marriage should be something between the young couple, rather than two families. In taking this decision to leave the patriarchal family, Yi-ping faced as much difficulty as other interviewees did. Her proletarian mother-in-law felt threatened and upset by the son's leaving home and manipulated his emotions to prevent this from happening. On the one hand, Yi-ping worked, so she paid little attention to those criticisms of her. On the other hand, she knew clearly why she wanted to move out. While the majority of other informants were still unable to challenge the hegemony of tradition, Yi-ping refused to subordinate her life to it. Rather than conforming to the moral dictate that one shall not violate parents' and parents-in-law's expectations, and feeling guilty about it, Yi-ping questioned the biased patriarchal assumptions in marriage practices. She argued from a feminist perspective that it was unfair for parents of sons and daughters to give two different meanings to the simple act of children leaving their natal families. As a result, Yi-ping was able to transcend her mother-in-law's sadness and moral accusation.

It is not easy to put aside social pressures to be a good kinswoman in the family. That was the predicament facing Dai and Kang, but it did not seem to bother Yi-ping unduly. Why was this? Instead of being trapped in the 'traditional' or 'non-traditional' dichotomy and unable to decide what to do, she subverted the meaning of being moral or good according to her own criteria, based on her feminist interpretations of patriarchal familial relations. Yi-ping chose to treat her parents-in-law simply as 'people' and did not position herself as a secondary member of the household. Yi-ping did not try to please her mother-in-law deliberately as Lan and Lu had attempted to do.

Instead, by treating her as a person, Yi-ping put aside patriarchal expectations of her as the daughter-in-law. As a feminist, she was very sympathetic to her mother-in-law's secondary status in the household and defended her when all other family members failed to see that her mother-in-law was suffering. As a result, they developed a very good relationship after some time. Her mother-in-law would talk to her about her feelings when she found it difficult to talk to other family members. It appears to me that Yi-ping redefined filial piety with a feminist perspective and thus developed different in-law relations from those prescribed under Confucian family ideology and the KMT 'cult of domesticity.' By doing so, she subverted the hegemony of tradition and gave new meanings to what had been hierarchically arranged patriarchal kinship relations. In attending to her mother-in-law's needs as a woman who was exploited by patriarchy, Yi-ping refused to reproduce patriarchal values and dislodged the complex between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.

By presenting Yi-ping's strategies at some length, I do not intend to claim that this is the only feminist strategy that can contest patriarchy. My main point here is to suggest that the hegemony of tradition that dominated post-war Taiwanese society repressed alternative thinking on ways to contest patriarchal values. By taking the meanings that daughters-in-law ascribed to their acts seriously, it is possible for Taiwanese feminists to develop grounded strategies with a feminist perspective to subvert patriarchal power structures from within.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the identities and consciousness of fourth generation young daughters-in-law. Their narratives show that the hegemony of tradition promoted in the 'cult of domesticity' was deeply inscribed in many women's decisions to comply with hierarchies of patriarchy in the early stages of their marital lives. This hegemony defined morality, invoking Confucianism to sustain the patriarchal hierarchies of gender and generation. Nevertheless, it did not work in totalistic ways to produce

homogenous responses. Under the same hegemony, women developed their own interpretations, which influenced their ways of dealing with patriarchal kinship relations. Their narratives show that a consciousness of gender equality alone did not necessarily contribute to contest hierarchies of patriarchy. A false dichotomy of 'Western-egalitarian' versus 'traditional-hierarchical' may not help to contest patriarchal power structures. Instead, I suggest avoiding these interpretations and propose a more grounded feminist interpretation of patriarchal familial relations. It might serve to subvert the hegemony of tradition and empower women collectively even when they used to be positioned differently under patriarchy.

Conclusion to Part Two

'Patriarchal Power Structures' in Industrial Taiwan

In Part Two, I presented a complex picture of urban Taiwanese families in transformation by looking into production, reproduction, resource distribution and patrilocal practices from the narratives of my third and fourth generation informants. How did changes in these areas illustrate the intersections of patriarchy, state and capitalism in Taiwan? The conclusion to Part Two is divided into three sections. I begin by summarising the changes that were observed in these Taiwanese families. Then the role of the state in shaping these changes is investigated. Finally, I suggest how the market economy serves to perpetuate or undermine the patriarchal power structures depending on the women's economic standing and position in patriarchy. All these discussions articulate the historical development of 'patriarchal power structures' in industrial Taiwan under the KMT 'cult of domesticity.'

Transforming Taiwanese Families after Industrialisation

My arguments in Part Two suggest that under KMT rule and after industrialisation, Han family organisation underwent significant transformations. In terms of family economy, the 'domestic mode of production' (where the family formed a unit of production and reproduction) became rare in the narratives of new middle class informants about the 1970s. Long-term employment became possible and families came to be resourced by paid employment outside the home. Thanks to resistance from the younger generations, the common family budget of complex families was replaced by inter-generational money transactions. After industrialisation, each couple formed a unit of production and consumption, even if they resided together with his parents. Although egalitarian types of money management increased, financial agreements between couple did not

differ radically from those in earlier conjugal families.

In conjugal families of the 1970s, the state ideology 'cult of domesticity' appeared to be influential in shaping conservative gender ideologies. Most of my informants claimed that they held themselves responsible for housework and childcare. However, in practice, husbands, maids, children and patrilineal kin were mobilised to help with reproductive work. The childcare arrangements between working daughters-in-law and non-working mothers-in-law created a new form of inequality between kinswomen who had different access to the market economy. In contrast, women in complex families had a relatively tougher time. Daughters-in-law often experienced ongoing power struggles with their mother-in-law. The domestic division of labour in these families appeared to be contingent upon negotiations between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. However, it tended to reflect the relative economic standing of each generation. However, it was very rare for daughters-in-law to attempt to leave the patrilocal family for it was regarded as against filial piety and gendered virtues, concepts promoted by the KMT 'cult of domesticity.'

In the 1990s, the economic difference between generations continued to shape various patterns of division of domestic labour. The patrilocal arrangement was still the norm and the elder generation utilised a wide range of strategies to secure it. Wealthy parents-in-law might try to 'buy' younger generation's loyalty. Mothers-in-law without wealth or direct access to market exchanges might offer free or low-cost childcare or manipulate the sons' emotions to secure their old age. However, the numbers of conjugal families continued to grow in the 1990s. Migration and resistance from daughters-in-law accounted for this trend. Moreover, the husband was more integrated into domestic work than previous generations. Such arrangement did not seem to solve the predicament faced by many older women: lack of direct access to the market economy and hence old age security.

After industrialisation was initiated by the KMT state, the Han family was profoundly transformed. Patriarchal genealogy no longer regulated production,

reproduction and resource distribution within urban Han families. In complex families, the authority of the elderly began to be weakened and the status of the mother-in-law declined. In both conjugal and complex families, working wives' contribution to the family economy was significant and husband's participation in housework was increasing. All these changes suggest a decline in the power of the hierarchies of generation and gender. These trends may easily lead to the common theory that capitalism is incompatible with patriarchy and that industrialisation has contributed to the destruction of patriarchal power structures. How far is this the case? What can my findings in Part Two suggest about continuation and change in patriarchy in a market economy and modern state?

The KMT State Apparatus and Taiwanese Patriarchal Families

After 1945, the KMT propagated 'modern' and 'western' ideas and practices in Taiwan. In this period, there were significant changes in many aspects of social life. A new Constitution and Civil Code that combined 'western values and patriarchal principles' and which had been developed in 1920s urban China was introduced to post-war Taiwan. These laws could not immediately be enforced, for it took time to eliminate 'Taiwanese customary practices' such as adoption. However, they were gradually realised after the KMT challenged the relations of production through land reform and industrialisation. These measures contributed to the elimination of the material basis of patriarchal family structure in colonial Taiwan and the domestic mode of production gradually disappeared. In addition, the development of modern education, the establishment of a state apparatus and capitalist economy helped to challenge the patriarchal Han family institution.

Accompanying these 'modernisation' processes, official discourses promoted an ideology which contained rather conflicting values. On the one hand, they encouraged the autonomy of the youth and the right to free-choice marriage. On the other hand, the opinions of the elderly and parents were still to be respected. Gender equality was

promoted and education for women was encouraged. However, women were not encouraged to participate in the labour market and their place was said to be in the home. Images of modern women were deployed which called on them to devote themselves to the nation and the anti-communist campaign by being good mothers and virtuous wives. Women were perceived as fragile and weak due to their biological inferiority. Female virtues and domesticity were even more valued than gender equality.

These principles were propagated through educational and government institutions and permeated wider social discourses during the marshal law period without the emergence of any contesting voices. The state apparatus closely monitored the thought and moral conduct of government employees. Challenges to the dominant discourse were only gradually heard when martial law was lifted. However, the state ideology had entered cultural and economic circulation and was appropriated and reinterpreted by my third and fourth generation informants in different family circumstances. In conjugal families, romantic love and free-choice marriage were probably the most obvious effects of 'state intervention'. However, in complex families, the veneration of the elderly became a major concern for many educated new middle class women. Once the social agent decided firmly to become virtuous, it was difficult to challenge such hegemony. Gender identities that were not sensitive to the context of patriarchal families could not contribute to shake up the moral discourses promoted by the KMT 'cult of domesticity'. Feminists had not yet systematically formulated ideas that effectively challenged the hegemony of tradition.

The impact of the KMT state on patriarchal families was complicated. On the one hand, the KMT destroyed feudal land relations and initiated industrialization, eliminating class structures and the 'domestic mode of production' that had supported the patriarchal power structures of colonial upper class Taiwanese families. On the other hand, it promoted a 'cult of domesticity' that combined patriarchal principles with western values in social institutions at many levels for thirty-eight years without challenge. All of these discourses entered cultural circulation and met diverse responses.

The implicit modern female subject *nuxing* might contribute to the popularity of romantic love and free-choice marriage among the young and challenge patriarchal power structures. However, the state 'cult of domesticity' could also produce discourses of filial piety and strengthen the hegemony of tradition that served to reinforce patriarchal power structures. My analysis of accounts from post-war generations has showed the intricate relationships between women's consciousness and state ideology. It appears to me that the 'cult of domesticity' operated in a subtle and complex way, in interaction with changes brought about by industrialisation and appeared to have become an integral part of my informants' personal identities.

Patriarchy under the Capitalist Mode of Production

In this section, I explain the effects of the capitalist mode of production on patriarchy.

In the conclusion to Part One, I proposed a concept of 'patriarchal power structures,' under which domestic responsibilities and family resources were allocated according to hierarchies of generation, age and gender. The mother-in-law stood at the vantage point of generational hierarchy, controlled the labour of daughters-in-law and expected to be served by them. Daughters-in-law were held responsible for domestic work and had to support their mothers-in-law in old age. Daughters-in-law, situated at the bottom of the generational and gender hierarchy, had no interest in conforming to such power structures but were likely to attempt to rebel and form a conjugal family of their own, if financial or emotional support was available from their natal family or husband.

The tensions between mothers-in-law daughters-in-law were exaggerated in a capitalist economy where some daughters-in-law gained direct access to market economy, while most mothers-in-law did not. Daughters-in-law now challenged generational hierarchy on the basis of their earning power but mothers-in-law resisted by recourse to the culturally accepted power of patriarchy. In patriarchal power

structures, working daughters-in-law whose interests were served by leaving the patrilocal family gradually transformed the rules of patrilocality and threatened patrilineage: forming conjugal families and residing near to their natal families. This interpretation contributes to debates about family structure in contemporary Taiwan. Rather than attributing the increasing numbers of nuclear families to vaguely conceptualised processes of 'westernisation' or 'modernisation,' I argue that they partly resulted from the dynamic interactions between patriarchy and capitalism. Apart from migration,[167] the growing preference for nuclear families could be interpreted as the daughters-in-law's resistance to patriarchal power structures in the market economy.

In the contest between women, the mother-in-law was very likely to be the disadvantaged one, for she could hardly compete with the daughter-in-law in economic terms. Strategies available included making herself useful to the younger generation, tightening emotional ties with her sons or manipulating the daughter-in-law psychologically. These did not guarantee any economic gain. However, if successful, they could bring very real material consequences: a sense of security in her old age. In contrast, those new middle class mothers-in-law who did have access to the market economy did not usually utilise such strategies. Instead, they developed changing perceptions about the need to 'let go' of the younger generation and the desire to lead an independent old age, which suggest alternative mechanisms for dislodging patriarchal power structures in a market economy.

By contrasting mothers-in-law with or without access to market economy, I suggest that in a capitalist economy, a woman could obtain resources through two forms of exchange: through kinship relations or through market relations. When a woman could earn enough to sustain her independence and to support her old age through market relations, she was less likely to rely on kinship relations. This could contribute to counter the patriarchal power structures between generations. In contrast, a lack of

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[167] My empirical data suggest that migration was another main factor contributing to the increasing number of nuclear families.

access to the market exchange or insufficient earnings usually led her to rely on kinship exchange and thereby to reinforce patriarchal power structures.

This approach to the intersection of patriarchy and capitalism is also applicable to different dyadic relations within patriarchal power structures. When the wife gained access to the market economy, they were also less likely to rely on the husband's contribution to the family economy. This led to egalitarian types of relations among dual-career couples. However, at times of economic recession, facing the uncertainties of the market economy, there were already signs of a resurgence of the expected husband's responsibility for family expenses. Constrained by data, my interpretation of patriarchy in the market economy mainly concentrated on the roles of mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, husband and wife. Other dyadic relations in patriarchal power structures were mentioned but not fully explored. For example, even in a capitalist mode of production, the grand bourgeoisie father could still be expected to try to maintain his privilege within the generational hierarchy and seek to control the son and daughters-in-law's loyalty and labour. He was very likely to offer economic inducements or even jobs to the sons and daughters-in-law. He could thus maintain structures that might resemble the powerful patriarch in the domestic mode of production.

When the market economy penetrated the patriarchal kinship structures, kinsmen and kinswomen who were positioned differently could use economic powers gained through the market to contest or to reinforce the structures of patriarchy. For those who did not have access to market economy, in my current analysis the non-working mothers-in-law, it was possible to continue to appeal to kinship relations. In other words, the diverse family relations and domestic arrangements observed in contemporary Taiwanese families should be interpreted as the results of complex contestations between social actors positioned differently in relation to patriarchy and the market. From a structural perspective, this stance refuses to accept a dichotomous incompatibility between capitalism and patriarchy. Instead, I suggest that patriarchal

kinship structures do not diminish with the development of capitalism. Capitalism and patriarchy intersect in a dynamic way and the market economy contributes to the transformation of patriarchy by empowering those who were once powerless. This has led to the general trends of declining generational hierarchy and patrilocality after industrialisation. However the once powerful elder generation did not completely lose out. They might still claim privileges in patriarchal power structures by recourse to the market economy or moral tradition. Diverse family practices after industrialisation resulted from negotiations of different family members under patriarchy, capitalism and state ideology.

Chapter 12 Four Generations of Women in Twentieth-century Patriarchal Families

This thesis has examined the experiences and identities of four generations of 'modern women' in changing Taiwanese families. This conclusion draws together the findings presented in previous chapters and states the contributions of this research at empirical and theoretical levels.

Transforming Patriarchal Kinship Relations

This research conceptualises patriarchy as kinship structures and locate family practices in particular political and economical contexts to articulate the interplay of patriarchal kinship relations, the state and class in twentieth-century Taiwanese families.

It begins by describing the social organisation of Han agricultural society before Japanese colonialism where women owned no means of production except entering marriage, Confucianism was the dominant moral discourse and the family was organised according to genealogical principles. After the Japanese came, the colonial state developed the capitalist economy and set up a gendered and racially stratified labour market. I argued that in early twentieth-century Taiwan, the Japanese chose upper class patriarchs as delegate of the colonial power and intentionally gave them space to exercise their authority in their communities and families. It thus helped to perpetuate the domestic mode of production among Taiwanese upper class families.

In the colonial family, each woman was positioned differently under patriarchal genealogy and assigned specific obligations and responsibilities accordingly. Three hierarchical principles of generation, age and gender supported the structures of

patriarchy but they had different degrees of influence in different family forms. Women's experiences varied according to the lifecycle of themselves and the family as well as family structures. Moreover, social change Japanese brought about, such as employment outside the home and romantic courtship, had contributed to challenge patriarchal hierarchies of generation and gender. The state ideology 'cult of productivity' affected women differently because its realisation depended on the will of the patriarch. 'Patriarchal power structures' is a concept built upon these empirical findings. I use the concept to articulate the dynamics of patriarchy and its interplay with the economy and the state during colonial Taiwan.

In Part Two, I explored changes to patriarchal power structures under KMT rule. After land reform, the KMT destroyed the domestic mode of production and initiated industrialisation. Family structures that had affected the experiences of married women before gradually lost their significance. Right after industrialisation, conservative gender relations and reversed inter-generational power relations were observed, whereas in the post-industrial era of the 1990s, every arrangement in reproductive work and the family economy seemed to be contingent upon negotiation. However, I argue that patriarchy did not diminish with the development of the modern state and the market economy in post-war Taiwan. In the capitalist mode of production, the centralised family coffer in complex families became rare and the market economy penetrated the family. Different family members might access resources from the market to pursue for their interests in the family. Those who had no direct access to the market economy faced great anxiety. They might make themselves useful for other family members through labour without immediate or significant payments or to seek to tighten the emotional bonds with sons and daughters, gaining security for the present and the future. In the capitalist mode of production, patriarchal power structures seem to fluctuate with the wax and wane of the market, for women might rely on kinship exchanges when their access to market exchanges became limited. Moreover, family practices were complicated by the perpetuation of KMT ideology and contesting feminist thought.

Theoretical Implications

Throughout the thesis, state ideology, class and patriarchy are the three analytical frameworks that I use to elucidate the diversities of my empirical data. In this section, I address how my research has contributed to refine and sharpen these three analytical frameworks, which have important implications for future research.

State Ideology and Modern Women

My historical approach to the ideologies of women and the family shows shifts in state discourses on ideal of womanhood in twentieth-century Taiwan.

Before Japanese colonialism, traditional Confucian thought understood women as achieving womanhood through key stages of their lives as daughters, daughters-in-law, mothers and mothers-in-law in patriarchal kinship exchanges. A woman was taught to be virtuous and obedient in the patriarchal family. Under the Japanese 'cult of productivity', modern women were to be simultaneously good mothers, productive workers and loyal Japanese citizens who were strong and enduring, ready to be conscripted for their family and nation. Under the KMT 'cult of domesticity', modern female subjects were rather fragile and weak, desiring romantic love and seeking to be virtuous mothers who cultivated their personal morality, took good care of the family and produced new moral generations for the nation.

The discourses of the 'cult of productivity' and 'cult of domesticity' had different degrees of penetration within and between the two political regimes. During colonial times, the realisation of the ideal of womanhood depended a great deal on the decision of individual family head because the patriarch was the delegate of the colonial power. The scope and effects of the 'cult of productivity' were not as wide-ranging as that of the 'cult of domesticity'. Under KMT rule, the 'cult of domesticity' was disseminated through expanding education systems and backed up by the state apparatus in social institutions at all levels. It produced the hegemony of tradition, which was particularly effective among the well-educated new middle class women. However they utilised

these discourses in a dynamic way to perpetuate or challenge patriarchal power structures in different family structures.

My historical investigation of changing female subjects in two political regimes paves the way for further research on the relations between state ideology and women's identities in twentieth-century Taiwan.

Class as Economic Exchange Relations

This research defines class as economic exchange relations in the market, the household, and in the family and overcomes several conceptual constrains of class in previous research.

This thesis adopts a historical approach to delineate a brief history of class structures in traditional, colonial and industrial Taiwan and investigates the emergence of new middle class women. Through grounded empirical data, I argue that women could develop two sets of exchange relations: one through kinship, the other through the market economy. Analytically, a woman might utilise both to maximise her security (for now and the future) or she might rely on one more than the other, depending on her positioning in the patriarchal family and in the market. In the domestic mode of production, kinship exchange was likely to be the most important economic relation for women. As the market economy gradually developed and a significant number of women gained access to it, the importance of kinship exchange seems to decrease. This is *not* to suggest that a linear development towards market economy leads necessarily to a decline in the power of patriarchal kinship relations. In the market economy, kinship relations might become a means of production for those who had no access to the market. For them, kin relations needed to be maintained and invested in, for they bore very real material consequences. It is possible that kinship exchange coexists with market exchange in the capitalist economy.

The family is perceived as the basic unit of production and consumption in both domestic and capitalist modes of production. However, the boundary of this unit was

changing and hence the patterns of distribution. In the domestic mode of production, the co-residential family formed a unit of exchange in the market. Kinship relations subsumed market exchanges. A woman's access to the family economy differed according to her positioning in patriarchal kinship structures and the type of family. In the market economy, the conjugal pair of husband and wife formed the basic economic unit with no regard to residential arrangements. Distribution of family resources was negotiated between couples and became a major issue of concern in the conjugal unit.

By looking into the ways in which resources were pooled and distributed in the Han family, my interpretation of economic exchange relations not only explains the interplay of patriarchy and the economy in different modes of production at institutional levels, it also provides a gender-sensitive analysis of class that can account for individual woman's exchange relations within the family and in the market.

Patriarchy, Women and Social Change

This research used a refashioned concept of patriarchy as an analytic framework. It contributes to the studies of patrilineage, the family and patriarchy in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology and feminism.

In previous anthropological studies of Han families in Taiwan, patriarchy was invisible. Terms like 'juridical principles' or the 'uterine family' were developed from empirical investigation without addressing patriarchal genealogy and its exploitative nature against women. In this thesis, I restored the concept of patriarchal genealogy and argued that kinship members did not just reside and interact as they pleased. They acted according to patriarchal principles. The family in this research is defined as a site where patriarchal genealogy and household overlap. This enables an analysis of family lives at the levels of both household and kinship. A focus on household production, reproduction, consumption and resource distribution puts women's diverse experiences into context. A concept of patriarchal genealogy enables the examination of kinship relations beyond households. It serves to illuminate the shifting power relations

between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law after industrialisation even if they did not reside together. This definition makes it possible to interrogate the links between the practices of Han families and the underlying principles of patriarchy before and after industrialisation. It challenges conventional definitions of the Chinese family, which assumes that Han families differ fundamentally from contemporary Western ones. Such definitions fail to locate Taiwanese families in historical context to examine how particular structural changes over time may have shaped this difference.

By situating the family practices of four generations of modern women in an historical context, my research provides sociological interpretations to add to a previous anthropological concept of patrilineage. My analysis shows that patriarchal genealogy was the key principle that shaped interaction between family members in both colonial and industrial Taiwan. Moreover, I also demonstrate that patriarchal power structures interacted dynamically with the state and the economy. Patriarchy was constituted by and constitutive of the social formation of twentieth-century Taiwan. This historical research has worked to overcome the constraints of quantitative sociological research that often fails to provide meaningful interpretations of local social phenomenon. It has gone beyond the idea of 'recording' and 'measuring' social realities in order to prove or to deny western theories in a Taiwanese situation. Instead, it shows the possibility to develop social theories from 'below', by acknowledging the specificity of the structures, practices and meanings produced in local and historical contexts.

The thesis has also contributed to feminist theorisations of patriarchy. Western feminists in the 1970s articulated the relationship between domestic labour and gendered exploitation. Nevertheless, by attributing these exploitations to 'patriarchy' (i.e. male domination over female) without defining it as patriarchal genealogy or patriarchal kinship relations, they failed to turn 'patriarchy' into an analytically useful framework. This research demonstrates the possibility of using patriarchal genealogy as a concept to analyse empirical data and elucidate social change. My research

suggests that patriarchal power structures were supported by the hierarchies of gender, generation and age. Although gender was an inextricable part of patriarchal kinship relations, patriarchy could not be reduced to gender, despite the arguments of many British feminist empirical researchers (Rowbotham, 1981; Scott, 1988; Riley, 1988; Acker, 1989; Pollert, 1996).

Moreover, this research explains the relationships between gender identities, patriarchal kinship structure and social change through grounded empirical investigation. My evidence suggests that patriarchy did not necessarily generate gender consciousness, as Kandiyoti (1988) and Sangren (2000) had assumed. The hierarchies of patriarchy are imposed upon women as 'roles', naturalized concepts in the Han family organisation. Rebellions did occur. However, kinswomen negotiated for their interests in the family not because of their gender but their different positioning under patriarchy. Moreover, these three naturalized and intersectional hierarchies of gender, generation and age might have somewhat blocked the development of gender consciousness in Taiwanese women under patriarchy.

Can modernity emancipate women from the family or patriarchal kinship structures? This question must be re-examined before it can be answered. Firstly, this question assumes patriarchal kinship relations are essentially exploitative and thus imagines that modernity can emancipate them *from* such exploitation *to* live in a utopia where there will be no exploitative patriarchal kinship. It suggests a spatial or temporal distance, if not complete incompatibility, between the two concepts of patriarchy and modernity. Secondly, this question implies a profoundly individualist account that assumes one person's emancipation can be achieved through his/her change. It fails to consider that modernity produces heterogeneous effects on different social groups and that not everyone in the society benefits from modernisation. Moreover, through kinship exchanges, modern women living in the web of patriarchal kinship relations, come to develop social relations with a variety of new family members, who may benefit or suffer from the changes brought about by modernity. Individual

'emancipation' of modern women does not lead to a utopian world, where there is no kinship relation.

The question thus should be revised. How did patriarchy and modernity impinge on the family lives of modern women? How could social change become possible? My analysis suggests that the structural forces of patriarchy, class and the state create different positions for women and a proliferation of identities. Women positioned differently by these structures were granted various degrees of power and access to social, economical and cultural resources and hence developed diverse identities. However, diversity did not mean a lack of patterns. The identities of those mothers-in-law who had been positioned as kinswomen all their lives were most likely to be shaped by patriarchal power structures. Well-educated daughters-in-law were more likely to identify with state discourses on the subject of modern women than their un-educated mothers-in-law.

It is through these diverse identities shaped by various structural forces that modernity had an impact on the social agents and thus on the organisation of the patriarchal family institution. Working daughters-in-law could make use of their class advantages to defy patriarchal orders. Mothers-in-law who worked in new middle class jobs also contributed to dislodge the patriarchal power structures by withdrawing the expectation that their sons would provide for their old age. Sometimes, women's multiple identities might produce paradoxical practices. There were modern women who chose to embrace the state ideology, supporting the hierarchically structured patriarchal values while at the same time resisting generational hierarchy. This eventually led to the transformation of patriarchal power structures. There were also feminists who believed in solidarities between women, attempting to transcend the divided interests of mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law. Thanks to these multiple interpretations and crisscrossing identities, social change was not linear but contingent upon negotiation between diverse social actors in specific time, space and social positions.

By drawing on the lived experiences of four generations of modern women, my analysis has shown that it is possible to establish the dialectical relations between social identities on the one hand and the structural forces of patriarchy, state ideology and class relations on the other. A focus on social practices has also demonstrated that even as structures were shaping social realities, the identities and decisions of individual social actors hold the key to understanding social change.

Implications for Future Research

My three analytical frameworks and conceptualisation of structures and identities contribute to the disciplines of sociology, anthropology and feminism in general terms. In addition, this research has its own particular implications. Twentieth-century Taiwanese society provides a valuable chance to study social change and the family, for it went through traditional forms, colonialism, modernity, and post-modernity in one hundred years and thus allows a sociological investigation of change in kinship relations that might have taken place over hundreds of years in early industrialised societies. This compressed development is characteristic of many other developing countries in the world. This research design and analytical frameworks could thus be applied in the study of other developing countries for possible comparisons. Furthermore, because the Han kinship structure is part of that 'classic patriarchy' that Kandiyoti (1988) identified as practiced in the Middle East (including Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran) and South and East Asia (especially India and China), my analysis of transforming patriarchal kinship relations in different modes of production also has the potential to illuminate changing kinship relations in those countries.

Glossaries

[T]=Taiwanese
[C]= Cantonese
Unless otherwise stated, the terms here are pronounced in Mandarin

Bao-zheng 保正
ban-shan 半山
Ban Zhao 班昭
Cai Pei-huo 蔡培火
Cai You-ting 蔡幼庭
cha-bo-kan 查某嫻 [T]*Handmaids*
chaxu geju 差序格局
chia 家 the family
chia-chang 家長 family head
chia-tsu 家族
Classics of Female Filial Piety 女孝經
Da-dau-cheng 大稻程
da-ge 家姑 [T] mothers-in-law
da-gu 大姑 husband's eldest sister
da-guan 家官 [T] *Fathers-in-law*
da-xiao 大嫂 wife of the eldest brother
Dan-sai 妯娌 sisters-in-law
fang 房 the basic unit under patrilineage
Female Analects 女論語
Female Instructions 女訓
fu 婦 wife
jen 仁
jia ji sui ji 嫁雞隨雞
Jia ting fu quan 家庭父權 familial patriarchy
jia-qu 嫁娶 married out and married in
li 禮
Li Chun-sheng 李春生
huanshen 宦紳 gentry-official
Huang Wan-cheng 黃旺成
Liu Xiang 劉向
mooi-jai 妹仔 [C]
mu 母 mother
nan 男 male
nan zhu wai nu zhu ne 男主外女主內 men took charge outside, women inside (the home)
ne 內 Inner
nedi hua 內地化 Mainlandised
nu 女 daughter or female
pei-qian-huo 賠錢貨

Pin-pu 平埔
qianjin Xiaojia 千金小姐
Ruhan hua 儒漢化 Han-Confucianisation
qu 娶 married in
ren 人 persons
sanzi nuer jin 三字女兒經
sim-pu-a 媳婦仔 adopted daughters-in-law
Taiwan Minbao 台灣民報
tang-chia 當家
Xiao 孝 filial piety
Xiaojing 孝經
xiaogu 小姑 unwed younger sister-in-law
xianshen 鄉紳 hometown-gentlemen
xianfu jiaozi 相夫教子 to serve her husband and educate her children
Xie Xue-hong 謝雪紅
Wai 外 outer
Wei qu qiu quan 委屈求全 make great concessions for the purpose of accomplishing [other people's] full interests
wulun 五倫
Zheng da guang ming de li you 正大光明的理由 legitimate excuses
Zhiye furen 職業婦人 career woman
Zhuang Wu-xian 莊無嫌

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Appendixes

Appendix A. Definitions of Class Positions in this Research

This appendix defines six class positions used in this research. The definitions mainly draw on Gates (1979), but I revise her suggestions in the light of current debates and my empirical analysis of colonial and post-war Taiwan.

The proletariat refers to blue-collar workers, who sell skills that need not be attested by educational credentials. These include factory hands, construction workers, sales clerks hired artisans, and landless agricultural workers (Sheu, 1987; Gates, 1979).

Peasants (Farmers): Before land reform, the majority of peasants were tenant farmers owning no means of production. After land reform, the majority of peasants became owner-farmers. Gates (1979) classified owner-farmers as petty bourgeoisie, but Sheu (1987) disagreed. At this point, I follow Sheu to categorise them as peasants. However, those farmers who relied on capital resources were understood as petty bourgeoisie.

The Grand Bourgeoisie (or **Capitalists**) refers to the owners of large amounts of private, industrial and financial capital and the highest ranks of government officials who control and essentially own the still very large state economic sector (Gates, 1979) in post-war Taiwan. This includes non-agricultural employers (Sheu, 1990). In colonial Taiwan, upper class merchant and landlord families belonged to this group.

The Petty Bourgeoisie (or **Old Middle Class**) owns the means of production, need no education qualifications and use his or her physical labour for production. This included a large group of small business people and artisans, who employed no more than six workers. Gates estimated these people made up 15% of the Taiwanese population in 1974. I exclude agricultural owner-operators, who Gates included in the petty bourgeoisie category (about 38% of the whole population in 1974). Gates (1979) and Burris (1994) found the petty bourgeoisie critical to an understanding of Taiwan's social and economic structure. However, this understanding lacked a historical perspective. I have argued in Chapter 7 that the presence of petty bourgeoisie probably only became significant after land reform and industrialisation.

The **New Middle Class** refers to those with education credentials, who sell their skills as non-manual white-collar workers and earn average incomes without manipulating capitals. In the 1970s, this group was made up of 'non-manual workers employed by the government as civil servants, educators, and career military personnel, or by large private firms as administrators, technicians and clerks' (Gates, 1979:391). Nevertheless, both Sheu (1990) and Gates (1979) excluded lower-level sales and service workers from middle class and treated them as workers or proletarian. My analysis of *changing*

class structures includes lower-level sales and service workers in the new middle class, but considers them further as lower middle class. There have been some disputes about whether government employees who held secure jobs and received fringe benefits but worked as lower-ranking manual laborers or office workers should be categorised as 'new middle class' (C.G. Hsu, 1990; Ke, 1990:53; Sheu, 1990; Gates, 1979). My solution to this dispute is to return to the three criteria of the new middle class. If the sales and service workers had averagely educational levels and earned average incomes, they should be treated as new middle class rather than proletarian. For low-ranking office workers employed by government with a permanent job contract, as long as they fit three of the criteria, they should be categorized as new middle class. Government employees with a permanent contract, and fulfilled at least two of the criteria should be categorised as lower new middle class. Government employees *without* a permanent contract, and failed to fulfill even two of the criteria are regarded as proletarian.

The Bourgeoisie (or Self-employed Professionals) has educational credentials, work as self-employed professionals and may employ up to six workers. They include self-employed doctors, lawyers, accountants and architects. They are differentiated from Capitalists or Grand bourgeoisie by the scale of their business. They are not petty bourgeoisie, for their work relies on their professional credentials rather than physical labour. This class position only becomes prominent after analysis of the empirical data and has not been defined as an independent category in previous research. These 'independent professionals' are often generally categorised as new middle class (Sheu, 1990, C.G. Hsu, 1990). Positioning them as petty bourgeoisie obscures the importance of their professional training and hence their social status. Understanding them as new middle class It also misses the fact that they own their mean of production, especially in colonial Taiwan. The term 'bourgeoisie' is not used here in a Marxist usage. Instead, I use the name to locate them in relation to existing class positions of grand bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, defined by previous researchers.

The above definitions developed out of my revision of previous literature and the need to produce meaningful accounts of class structures in twentieth century Taiwan. They can be understood as the result of a combination of a Marxist analysis of relations of production and a sensitivity to the importance of educational credentials in Han society.

Appendix B. Defining 'Modern Women' Across Generations

In this research, the term 'modern women' refers to women who received modern education and engaged in formal employment. At the beginning of the research, I identified 'modern women' as women who worked as 'the new middle class', who held education credentials, *worked or have worked* in non-manual white-collar jobs and earned average or above incomes. By this definition, both white-collar employees and self-employed 'independent professionals' were included in my sample.

Only after my analysis did I realize that relations of production play a role in shaping women's family relations. I therefore differentiate 'the bourgeoisie' from 'the new middle class'. I then follow Gates (1979) to redefine the new middle class as those who held education credentials, *sell-skills* in non-manual white-collar jobs and earned average or above incomes. I reject C.G. Hsu (1990) and Kao (1990) to identify 'independent professions' as new middle class. Since they owned means of production, they were redefined as 'the bourgeoisie'.

Personal incomes are sensitive questions, so in practice I often worked on the basis that white-collar jobs in Taiwan that require educational credentials are known to usually offer average or above incomes. When seeking out interviewees, I decided to identify new middle class women by their educational level and employment in white-collar work without asking for details of their incomes. Only after systematic analysis did I realise that even among women in the same category of 'new middle class,' my informants' families could still be grouped into different class positions. To check out their family incomes served less to identify them as new middle class than to allow more specific analysis of the class positions of their entire family.

As educational provision expanded over the past one hundred years, the average education levels of each generation were determined from data about each specific historical period. For women who worked under Japanese colonialism, they should have received at least primary school education to be categorised as new middle class. In the post-war era, third generation women should have received high school education or above. The fourth generation should hold college or university credentials and above.

In terms of employment, I tried to cover a wide range of experiences in the research, interviewing 'modern women' who worked in both public services and private companies. However, women's working history was usually not static and the majority had worked at 'new middle class' jobs at some stage of their lives. It must be stressed that my informants were qualified as belonging to the new middle class or the bourgeoisie because of their work, rather than their husband's.

Appendix C. Sources

Name and Index Number	Generation	Year of birth	Sources
1-01 Cai, A-xin	1	1896	C. Yang, 1993:499-506; Shi & Cai, 1999:22-54.
1-02 Lin, Cai-su	1	1902	Yu, 1994:121-174.
1-03 Lin, Yu-zhu	1	1902	L.Y. Wang, in Jiang, 1998:116-132.
1-04 Qiu, Yuan-yang	1	1902	Yu, 1994:73-100.
1-05 Chen Wong, Shi-xia	1	1905	Chen Wong, in Jiang, 1995a:2-35.
1-06 Ye, Tao	1	1905	C. Yang, in Jiang, 1995a:36-49; C.Yang, 1993:355-356
1-07 Mother of Du Pan	1	1906	Jiang, 1995b:2-37.
1-08 Chen, Jin	1	1907	Jiang, 2001; Shi & Cai, 1999:116-158.
1-09 Guo, Yi-qin	1	1907	Shen, 1997:32-43.
1-10 Yang, Mao-zhi	1	1909	Shen, 1997:58-79.
1-11 Chen, Shi-man	1	1909	Yu, 1994: 217-252.
1-12 Lin, Cai-wan	1	1910	Yu, 1994:175-216.
1-13 Yin, Xi-mei	1	1913	Yu, 1994:9-72
1-14 Pan, Hen-Hong	1	1914	Interview, 5/8/99
1-15 Chen, Ai-zhu	1	1914	Yu, 1994:253-283.
1-16 Qing-hua	1	1916	P.J. Cai, in Jiang, 1995a:113-125.
1-17 Xu, Jiang-chun	1	1916	Shen, 1997:137-151.
1-18 Xie, Xue-hong	1	1901	Autobiography, Xie, 1997.
2-01 Ruan, Mu-bi	2	1920	Jiang, 2001: 182-189.
2-02 Lin zhuan, Ji-chun	2	1920	Yu, 1994: 101-120
2-03 Yang, Qien-he	2	1921	Autobiography, Yang, 1995.
2-04 Jiang, Fen-hia	2	1922	Interview, 17/6/99
2-05 Shi Chen, Xiu-lian	2	1923	Biography, Zhang, 1996.
2-06 You, Xiao-hia	2	1923	Interview, 5/5/99
2-07 Lao, Jen-hia	2	1923	Interview, 5/8/99
2-08 Wang, Dun-hia	2	1923	Interview, 28/7/99
2-09 Zhong, Xue-hia.	2	1924	Interview, 21/7/99
2-10 Zeng, hui-hia	2	1924?	Interview, 28/7/99.
2-11 Xie, Cui-hia	2	1924	Interview, 9/3/99
2-12 Zhang, Zhong-hia	2	1925	Interview, 21/6/99
2-13 Xin, Ben-hia.	2	1924?	Interview, 28/7/99
2-14 Madam Wang	2	1925	Chen, 1999: 134-138
2-15 Lai, Qing-hia	2	1925	Interview, 18/8/99
2-16 Du Pan, fan-ge	2	1927	Jiang, 1995b:2-37.
2-17 Li, Yu-hia	2	1928	Interview, 4/7/99
2-18 Qiu, Ruei-sui	2	1928	Autobiography, R.S. Qiu, 1994.
2-19 Gue, Yen-hia	2	1928	Interview, 13/4/99
2-20 Lim, Ting-hia	2	1929	Interview, 25/6/99
2-21 Fan, Li-qing	2	1929	Autobiography, Fan, 1993.
2-22 Zhang, Yu-zhan	2	1929	Shen, 1997:152-171.
2-23 Gue, yao-hia	2	1930	Interview in person, 21/7/99; telephone interview, 10/8/99.
2-24 Lun, zhun-hia	2	1932	Interview, 22/7/99
2-25 Zhong, Zheng-hua	2	1933	Jiang, 1995b:40-78.
3-01.Hu, Jia-fen	3	1947	Interview, 12/2/99
3-02.Fu, Ling-fen	3	1947	Interview, 5/3/99
3-03.Wong, Mei-fen	3	1949	Interview, 23/3/99
3-04.Xia, Juan-fen	3	1946	Interview, 29/3/99
3-05.Jiang, Yu-fen	3	1943	Interview, 8/4/99
3-06.Liao, Hui-fen	3	1946	Interview, 8/4/99
3-07.Ke, Shu-fen	3	1950	Interview, 12/4/99

Name and Index Number	Generation	Year of birth	Sources
3-08.Wen, Li-fen	3	1949	Interview, 21/4/99
3-09.Shen, Rong-fen	3	1948	Interview, 21/4/99
3-10.Shao, Siao-fen	3	1948	Interview, 25/6/99
3-11.Yan, Ru-fen	3	1947	Interview, 29/6/99
3-12.Zhuang, Cai-fen	3	1947	Interview, 1/7/99
3-13.Zheng, Qiu-fen	3	1952	Interview, 7/7/99
3-14.Wang, Min-fen	3	1950	Interview, 14/7/99
3-15.Su, Long-fen	3	1946	Interview, 5/5/99
3-16.Ou, Yue-fen	3	1947	Interview, 5/4/99
3-17. Ding, Fan-fen	3	1950	Interview, 2/4/99
3-18 Liang, Xian-fen	3	1948	Interview, 16/4/99
3-19. Cai, Zhu-fen	3	1951	Interview, 20/9/99
3-20 Lee, yao-fen	3	1946	Interview, 20/9/99
4-01 Tan, Yi-ping	4	1961	Interview, 12/8/99
4-02 Huang, Rong-ping	4	1961	Interview, 20/8/99
4-03 Wong, Ru-ping	4	1963	Interview, 12/8/99
4-04 Zhao, Mei-ping	4	1964	Interview, 7/4/99
4-05 Jin, Yi-ping	4	1964	Interview, 1/4/99, 14/5/99
4-06 Sun, Yen-ping	4	1965	Interview, 3/8/99
4-07 Ma, Kang-ping	4	1965	Interview, 12/8/99
4-08 Dai, Wen-ping	4	1965	Interview, 9/2/99
4-09 Lan, Wei-ping	4	1966	Interview, 5/3/99
4-10 Lu, Yao-ping	4	1966	Interview, 9/4/99
4-11Qi, Yu-ping	4	1966	Interview, 22/1/99
4-12 Kang, Yuan-ping	4	1967	Interview, 11/2/99
4-13 Wei, Mong-ping	4	1967	Interview, 30/3/99
4-14 Peng, Na-ping	4	1969	Interview, 6/8/99
4-15 Hong, Suei-ping	4	1969	Interview, 11/3/99
4-16 Luo, Hui-ping	4	1969	Interview, 5/3/99
4-17 Guan, Xing-ping	4	1969	Interview, 28/1/99
4-18 Hao, Xiu-ping	4	1970	Interview, 18/1/99, 3/4/99
4-19 Gu, Fong-ping	4	1970	Interview, 11/2/99
4-20 Li, Ren-ping	4	1971	Interview, 9/2/99

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Appendix D. Documenting Written Life Stories

In Taiwan, the 1990s were an important historical moment to recall and rewrite 'women's history'. It was a few years after the late 1980s when the KMT authoritarian regime eventually responded to its people's wish for democracy and lifted martial law, a variety of voices that had been repressed since 1949 had begun to blossom. It was also in the 1990s that feminism and women's issues became the focus of both academic work and mass media interest. There were immense efforts to write women's oral histories in academic as well as popular literature. Historians shifted their focus from the history of men in Mainland China, to men and women in Taiwan. Outside the academy, literate women wrote histories to document their mothers' or grandmothers' lives, to gain strength from intimate dialogue with women of the previous generations, whose stories had been ignored for so long. Meanwhile, some young men also engaged in writing stories of their mothers or other female heroine's stories, for history of women's oppression symbolically represented Taiwanese suffering under the KMT regime. Perhaps for the first time in Taiwan history, women of all classes attracted so much attention that these women realised their importance in history. In this appendix, rather than presenting all these oral history anthologies, I include only a selection of these books, which are referred to in my thesis, and evaluate their usefulness for my analysis. Most books contained the life stories of upper and middle class women that are the main focus of my research.

Academic work

In the academy, historians shifted their interests from Mainland Chinese histories to histories of Taiwan. However, men were still the focus.[168] Women's history was rare but not unseen. In 1994 Yu Chieng-ming published the book *Taiwanese Career Women through Political Change*, continuing interest developed from her pioneering work *Women's Education under Japanese Colonialism* published in 1987. *Taiwanese Career Women* is an oral history anthology, including the life histories of seven women from interviews conducted by Yu between 1991 and 1992. There were no clear explanations as to how and why these particular women were chosen. They were mainly successful career women, born in Taiwan between 1902 and 1914. They had worked as nurse, teacher, pharmacist, doctors and politicians. In other words, they fulfilled the same criteria that I looked for in my interviewees but came from the generation before. I categorized these women as 'first generation' working women and included them in my analysis.

Yu's anthology focuses on her informants' natal family background, marriage, working experience, career development, perceptions about work, combining work and family, children's achievements and their lives after retirement. Although it covers the main themes common to a life history, it focuses on women's work much more than their family lives. The interview material is presented according to different themes, rather than in the form of transcriptions. On the one hand, this includes the main issues and meanings that interviewees raised; on the other hand, it avoids the unnecessary repetition and temporal confusions of transcriptions. As a result, these stories read like semi-structured interviews, however, I had no information as to how these interviews were edited and what information was excluded for the sake of publication, nor whether some interviewees had known that their words would be published and held back information about family relations. Although this anthology appears extremely useful for understanding first generation women's lives, I felt that there was insufficient information for me to get an in-depth understanding of family relationships.

Writing Taiwanese Women's History as a Political Act

In a post-martial law arena, writing 'Taiwanese women's history' is also a political act. When more and more male historians began excavating the 'historical truth' for the victims of the 228 Incidents of the 1947 uprising, the wives of the victims were interviewed to reveal the hidden history of their husband. However, the lives of women themselves were still ignored. How did the widowed women survive the Incident and continuous white horror that followed. The leap from writing men's history to the history of 'political widows' was eventually made by Shen Xiu-hua. Shen employed an oral history method to conduct interviews with wives of twelve of the 228 victims in 1992 and 1995. These stories were edited, rewritten and presented in the form of life stories in the book *Women's 228*, published in 1997. Topics include work and the family before marriage, marriage formation, family life while the husband was alive, the 228 Incident, and life after the husband's death. All of these cases illustrate the fluctuations in women's status across the important life events of marriage, childbirth and widowhood. Although these interviews were edited, they were skillfully written so that the interviewer's questions and the atmosphere of the interview were interwoven in the texts. Moreover, different formats were used, depending on the responses of the interviewees. These detailed life stories provide important material for my analysis of the intersections between women's class and patriarchal structures. Several upper class women's life histories in this book were included in my analysis. However, for the sake of comparison with my other material, I *mainly* drew on information about their natal

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[168] For example, historians in Academia Sinica recorded the life history of 'Taiwanese "Half-mountains"' and 'Taiwanese soldiers' among others, mainly looking at men.

family background and their lives before the death of their husband.

Writing Women's History as Popular Culture

The efforts to record women's history in the 1990s Taiwan were not restricted to academics and the margins of politics. The oral history of the Amah (Grandmother in Hokkien) also attracted public attention through popular culture. The Japanese soap opera 'A-xin', an epitome of the suffering Japanese ordinary woman, A-xin, in the Muji period, achieved great success and touched millions of hearts both in Japan and in Taiwan. Based on a similar enquiry 'What are the stories of the Taiwanese Amah?' The Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights solicited articles and invited authors to write about their grandmothers. *Amah's Stories* was published after such efforts (Jiang, 1995a). The Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights have since published two further books, *The disappearing Taiwan A-mah* (1995) and *A-mu's stories* (1998). All three books are edited by Jiang Wen-yu, a professor in linguistics in Taiwan National University and the director of the Taipei Association for the Promotion of Women's Rights.

The Disappearing Taiwan A-mah is an anthology of life history interviews, conducted by Zeng, qiu-mei. This book is organized according to the main family relationships, such as father-daughter, mother-daughter etc. In other words, the life stories of women of different class backgrounds were told around the family institution. This book provided two useful lengthy case studies for my research.

Both *A-mah's Stories* and *A-mu's Stories* were anthologies of various authors' writings about their grandmothers or mothers. Apart from one article by Chen Wong Shi-shia (born in 1905) about her own life, all the rest involved two subjects: the author and the woman whom s/he was portraying. Some of these writings incorporated oral history interviews as one element. However, most were writing from an authors' perspective and were therefore very different from other oral history interviews because the interviewer was usually hidden in the texts. In these articles the author was an obvious presence, defining the written subjects and methods of representation. Also, the authors did not usually set out to present a 'full' picture of their subjects. Thus, the information could be fragmented and the literary and fictional nature of these stories became prominent. Due to my emphasis on middle class working women, I only use limited cases from these two books. Nevertheless, the style of these two anthologies raises questions about the data that I had been citing. To what extent should these written oral histories be regarded as a fair representation of women's lives rather than the authors' and my interpretations? I found no direct answer to this question. Perhaps one way to face this difficulty is to admit that all academic writing is only product of the history. No writing, including both oral history and academic work, can be independent

from the historical contexts that shape them. A researcher should acknowledge the impossibility of fully capturing the lives they had lived and to acknowledge the presence of authorship in citing all these life stories. In addition, the researchers make own judgments as to what available materials can be used to illustrate the sociological investigation of their own concerns.

Young Academic Feminists Writing Taiwanese Women

This 'social movement' promoting the value of ordinary women's life history has attracted several female postgraduate students to join in the project of writing women's history. Zeng Qiu-mei, who was responsible for conducting interviews for *The Disappearing Taiwan Amah,* further pursued the issue of *sim-pu-a* (adopted daughter-in-law) as the focus of her MA dissertation, which was turned in to a book *The Lives of Sim-pua,* published in 1998.

Yang, Ya-hui is another enthusiastic researcher who developed her interests in oral history after writing her MA dissertation on *Taiwan Women in the [Japanese] War System* (1937-1945) in 1994. Later, she conducted ten oral history interviews with women who were almost forgotten after social changes: open-air opera actresses, midwives, mining workers and artists etc. They were interviewed about their childhood experiences, family lives, working lives and marriage (Yang, 1996:3).

Yang's and Zeng's works pay comparatively more attention to working class women than upper class women. Although valuable, they are not directly quoted or referred to in my thesis. In contrast, Chen Hui-wen's book, revised also from an MA dissertation, was an important source for my research on family structure. As a postgraduate student who engaged in a community revitalization project of *da-dau-cheng* in Taipei, Chen Hui-wen wrote a remarkable women's spatial history of this community. With a prosperous economy built on trade, *da-dau-cheng* was an affluent area, where the majority of my second generation interviewees' natal families had lived. In her book, *The Women's map of da-dau-cheng,* Chen Hui-wen drew on interview data and historical documents to reconstruct the daily lives of *da-dau-cheng* women under Japanese colonialism. She explored several distinctive roles performed by women in this community: working women, geisha, adopted daughters-in-law, wives and daughters-in-law in the family business. Chen's interviewees tended to be upper class women (H.W.Chen, 1999:9), aged between forty and ninety in 1996. The experiences of women born in the 1920s as presented in this book were very similar to and consistent with the narratives of my second generation interviewees. The most valuable part of this book for my analysis is Chapter Six, which reconstructs the family relations of the successful merchant family in *da-dau-cheng*. As the focus of my interviews was my informants' subjective interpretations of their lives, I paid

comparatively less attention to the complex structures and relationships within the extended family at the time of interviewing. This chapter, constructed from the experience of the older informants of *da-dau-cheng*, provides a precious picture of family structure in a very specific temporal and spatial context Chen's book was also distinctive from other sources because it is not presented in the form of plain oral history but offers a combination of interview data and analysis.

Experimental Life Stories: Biographical Literature and Documentary

Century women, Taiwan first (Shi and Cai, 1999) is the written version of a series of documentary films on pioneering Taiwanese women. What differentiates this book from others is its 'documentary' character: short, diverse and precise. It draws on some published autobiographies and interviews with their relatives and friends. Compared with other published in-depth interviews, this book appears livelier but it sacrifices depth in each life story. Nevertheless the book shows the diverse ways of using oral history interviews. It also provides multiple angles to explore life stories. I draw on two stories from this book, which also overlap with my other sources.

Daughters of San-di-men —Chen Jin and her Female Students is written by Jiang wen-yu (2001), the editor of *A-mah's Stories* and *A-mu's Stories*. The main subjects are the pioneering female painter Chen Jin (born in 1907) and her female students at Ping-dong high school. Jiang categorized her book as 'biographical literature' that aims to present biography in literary forms. The opening scenario is Chen Jin's regular gathering with her former students in 1996, Taipei. The storylines evolved around the overlapping, yet distinctive life stories of these elite women, who were born in the first half twentieth century. These biographies were gathered by Jiang, who conducted in-depth interviews with Chen Jin and 27 women and men who had been in sustained contact with her. All of the characters presented in this book are upper class elite women. Some of them had been interviewed for other published life histories. The scenarios that Jiang described were often identical to those from my own interviews with upper class women and other published material.

Conclusion

The field of writing women's life stories became very fertile in the past ten years. It was really amazing to read all these fascinating life stories, presented in diverse forms. However, I also have to admit the more the material had been subject to editing and subjective interpretation by each individual author, the less clear a picture I could draw on. The author's subjective selections might not be (and usually were not) consistent with my research questions. Thus, most of these life stories provided me with essential knowledge to revisit the history, but did not necessarily offer useful empirical data. The

main constraint on my use of these written oral histories lay in the fact that I could not question the subjects directly. I could only become a passive reader, waiting for those authors to ask questions that I wanted to ask the interviewee. Thus the written life stories I mentioned here are only occasionally quoted in my thesis.